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ABSTRACT 
This work explores how the PDS, as legal successor to the SED and thus to a party 
emanating from a Marxist tradition, has sought discursively to deal with the task of 
adapting to the demands of the all-German polity and of establishing a place for itself 
on the far left of the German political spectrum. Leaning heavily on the work of the 
critical linguists whose central interest was in exploring the relationship between 
language and ideology, this study starts from the premise that language and ideology 
inform one another dialectically: language is constitutive of ideology. As establishing 
and maintaining dominant ideologies and/or honing or adapting these in accordance 
with external exigencies is central to politics, the relationship between language and 
politics (and language and history) is likewise a dialectical one. A particular focus is 
upon the attempts of PDS party leaders and ideologues to establish a mediating, 
'super-discourse' capable of smoothing over the high-level of intra-party 
factionalisation and of legitimising the PDS as broadly as possible in the political 
establishment. Opposition is a thematic leitmotiv: the PDS's historiographic portrayal 
of the SED's and its own relationship to opposition movements in the GDR and the 
Wendezeit is examined, as is the high-level of intra-party opposition and the 
linguistic staging of the inner-party polemic on whether the PDS's self-styled, extra-
system, oppositional role will allow its inclusion in conventional governmental 
alliances. In addition, aspects of the language of the vociferous political opposition 
engendered and encountered by the PDS are also considered. 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE PDS - A N INCIPIENT OPPOSITION 
Broadly, the present work aims to take an inter-disciplinary look - of the type 
described by Grunert1 - at the theme of opposition as it relates to the discourse of the 
Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus in German politics. In early February 1990 
the party executive of the SED-PDS - the name which the erstwhile SED had borne 
since its aujierordentlicher Parteitag in December 1990 - issued a resolution 
renaming it Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS).2 The PDS thus emerged 
not as a newly founded party, but as the SED's legal successor. (We wil l have more 
to say on this issue below.) As a party emanating directly from a Marxist tradition, 
the PDS has, in the attempt to establish itself on the far left of the pan-German 
political spectrum, faced the inordinately complex task of adapting the discursive 
legacy of the monist, official East German state teachings enshrined in the 
'dialectical materialism' of Marxismus-Leninismus to the fundamentally different 
demands of a 'pluralist' Federal Republic. As we will attempt to show below, the 
necessity of forging something of a discursive 'hybrid' 3 has necessarily yielded a 
particularly fascinating and graphic exemplary catalogue of how language is used in -
and is an integral part of - the attempt to deal with the awkward problem of 
smoothing over what Trew has called, and described in some detail as, "glaring 
(ideological - MD) anomalies"4. (We will return to Trew in chapter 4 below.) 
Our understanding here of the term discourse is a broad one; we use it to refer to 
spoken or written utterances enframed in text, this being a "piece of naturally 
occurring spoken, written or signed discourse identified for purposes of analysis or 
'"[D]as Adjektiv 'Interdisziplinar' ist zur Summe linguistischer - also pragmatischer, logischer und 
semantischer Kategorien - zur Summe auBerdem politologischer, soziologischer, psychologischer, 
okonomischer und asthetischer Kategorien zu erklaren - bzw. zu dem, was aus dieser Bandbreite 
heraus fur die vorliegende Problemstellung sinnig praktikabel erschien und erscheint. Eine 
pragmatisch-integrierte Sprachkritik macht nicht am Text, macht nicht an der Sprache halt." Gruner, 
Paul Hermann: "Inszenierte Polarisierung, organisiertes Trugbild - Sechs Thesen zur Sprache des 
Wahlkampfes." In: Opp de Hipt, Manfred/Erich Latniak (eds.): Sprache stall Polilik. Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag GmbH 1991, p. 24 
2 See Arnold, Otfrid/Frank Schumann et al. (eds.): Von den Anfangen. Eine illustrierte Chronik der 
PDS. 1989-1993. Berlin: Dietz Verlag 1993, pp. 12, 22 
3 Colin Good has drawn an interesting parallel here with the situation faced by the SPD at the time of 
its crucial Bad Godesberg conference in 1959. See: Good, Colin: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken': Der 
Versuch der PDS, eine neue Sprache des Sozialismus zu finden." In: Reiher, Ruth/Rudiger Lazer 
(eds.): Von Buschzulage und Ossinachweis. Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag 1996, p. 265 
4 See Trew, Tony: "Theory and Ideology at Work." In: Fowler, Roger/Bob Hodge/Gunther 
Kress/Tony Trew: Language and Control. London, Boston etc.: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979, 
p. 97ff. 
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description ... a language unit with a definable communicative function ..." 5 From a 
(linguistic) pragmatic point of view the utterance is seen as "what happens when a 
sentence, or even bits of a sentence, are transformed into real chunks of language in a 
real context of use ... Utterances are what make up actual spoken or written texts."6 
Under discourse are subsumed both the sub-categories of "face-to-face interaction" 
discourse and "staggered" discourse of the type described by Simpson.7 The first type 
relates to "interaction between speakers who share the same physical context"8. The 
second relates to "communication ... between participants who are separated in space 
and time"9, such as media language, advertising language - including electoral 
advertising - etc. This last discourse is aimed at an "invisible ideal consumer ..." 
(ibid.) with whom "actual viewers or listeners have to negotiate a relationship"10. 
In a party as complex and factionalised as the PDS it is self-evident that any 
understanding of an overall 'PDS-discourse' must take into account that it is a 
complex amalgam of competing sub-discourses, the aggregate of those discourses. 
For this reason our guiding (but not exclusive) perspective is that of the efforts of 
certain individuals - party leaders and key ideologues - to create what we call a 
mediating 'super-discourse' calculated to take in the differing aspirations of the 
party's many sub-groups and thus appeal to the greatest number of inner-party 
positions and make the PDS poliiikfahig. At the same time we will attempt to show 
how this discourse has a 'quasi cubist' dimension, where the attempt is to legitimise 
the party as broadly as possible within the new polity. (Party leaders are, after all, a 
party's most public figures, and thus particularly responsible for creating its public 
image.) Put another way, we focus - primarily - upon how the party (or, more 
specifically, what we might call its ideological 'think-tank') has attempted to 
surmount the task of having to appeal to fundamentally differing textual recipients in 
fundamentally different ways. This 'super-discourse' is of course a key manifestation 
of the "permanent contest for dominance between discourses which characterises 
much political debate"11. At the heart of political activity, we wil l argue below, is the 
attempt to establish dominant points of view. 
5 Crystal , David: An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Language and Languages. Oxford: Blackwell 1992 
6 S i mpson, Paul: Language, Ideology and Point of View. London: Routledge 1993, p. 120 
7ibid., p. 121 
8 ibid. 
9 ibid. 
, 0 Fairclough, cited in: Simpson, ibid. 
"Good, Colin: Language, Politics and Ideology. Unpublished Inaugural Lecture, University of 
Durham 1995 
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A fundamental criterion for choosing the material informing our discussions below 
has been, then, its relevance to our attempts to discover and describe the generation 
of this 'super-discourse.' Our selection of discursive material from the wealth of sub-
discourses which can come under the general notion of 'PDS-discourse' (which, we 
understand broadly as including the PDS-related discourse(s) of other parties and of 
political commentators/journalists in general) has further been motivated, alongside 
by a fundamental consideration of its general thematic relevance to our general 
leitmotiv of opposition (see below) by, in particular, the following ancillary 
considerations: 
*to give as broad a flavour as possible of the inner-party positions and their 
respective discourses • 
*to highlight the range of responses the party has generated from extra-PDS 
commentators 
In pursuing this endeavour, we draw upon a very wide range of texts: press 
commentaries across the spectrum (from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung to Neues 
Deutschland) magazine articles, electoral material, programmatic material, inter-
disciplinary academic writing (articles in journals etc.), biographic and 
autobiographic material, newspapers and television interviews and chat-shows etc., 
in the attempt to give a flavour of the party's many faces. 
One point must be emphasised at the outset: it is not, we will argue, that the 
linguistic devices underpinning the 'discursive somersaults' performed by the PDS in 
grappling with the complex task of holding together a party under whose auspices, as 
we wil l show, a plethora of ideological positions co-exist uncomfortably, is in any 
way unusual; we start from the premise that the features we describe are evident in 
the discourse of all parties. It is merely the case that as a party so beset with 
problematic heterogeneity and simultaneously taking on the arduous task of coming 
to terms with a highly problematic historico-political 'Altlast', the PDS offers a 
particularly revealing picture of how recourse is had in any ideology to means which 
provide a level of abstraction/generality upon which potential anomaly might be 
viewed from a perspective in which it is by-passed or backgrounded - always 
assuming, of course, that the target audiences concerned accept the abstraction 
involved! As we will see below, the attempts in 1995, for example, of PDS leaders 
and ideologues to 'sell' an abstract conceptual model of opposition, in which the 
term was drawn widely to enframe both a governmental role within the system and a 
fundamental 'extra-system' oppositionality at one and the same time, fell foul of 
many in the party, for whom at was symptomatic of what was seen as an increasing 
position of opportunistic pandering to the demands and dictates of the political 
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establishment. A dominant discourse, as Townson has said, has to be credible; the 
hearts and minds of the groups it targets have to be won. 1 2 Real circumstances and/or 
pre-existing classifications may aid or frustrate attempts to establish its dominance. 
(Telling workers, for example, that unpaid Mehrarbeit was a Normerhdhung did not 
prevent the 1953 uprising in the GDR.). Dominant discourses are ones which become 
'naturalised'. Their ontological stability is taken for granted: a constructed reality is 
taken to be what really is. 
The aim is to treat the theme of opposition broadly: our interest is in examining not 
only the PDS's self-styled - as we shall call it - 'oppositional' role (cf. its well-known 
slogans, "Wir sind Opposition", "Alle wollen regieren, wir nicht", which we will 
discuss below) and the concomitant inner-party polemics upon that nature of that 
opposition, but rather to consider, too, some of the features of the discourse of the 
uncommonly vociferous opposition which the PDS, as the legal successor to a state 
party with a tarnished and compromised past, has engendered and encountered in its 
emergence onto the post-Wenden pan-German political scene. Spearheading that 
opposition has been CDU-sponsored Patrick Moreau, a leading French commentator 
upon the PDS, the language of whose sharply right-wing perspective upon the party 
we wil l examine in some detail. We look closely at the intra-PDS opposition14: at the 
party's high level of factionalisation and ideological in-fighting and at the 
concomitant attempts by party ideologues to articulate positions broad enough to take 
in the (fundamentally!) conflicting world-views. 
GENERAL THEORETICAL APPROACH: CRITICAL LINGUISTICS 
While we draw upon and bring together an inter-disciplinary range of (East and 
West) German and non-German perspectives, i.e. the work of prominent historians 
(e.g. Weber, Fulbrook), politicians (von Weizsacker, Erhard Eppler, Jens Reich), 
politologists (Gorski and Markovits, Moreau, Pfahl-Traughber, Jiirgen Lang, Gerner, 
Sontheimer) sociologists (Neugebauer, Stoss, Koch) psychoanalysts (Moser), 
1 2 Townson, Michael: Mother-tongue and fatherland. Manchester, New York: Manchester University 
Press 1992; see p. 24ff. 
" W e use the term Wende to refer to the period in the G D R between autumn 1989 (when the drive for 
political change began to gather particular momentum) through to the 'free' elections to the 
Volkskammer in March of the following year. 
, 4Neugebauer and Stoss's broad model of the main forces at work in the PDS touches upon precisely 
this intra-party opposition: "Wahrend die Reformer und die kleine Gruppe der Fundamentalisten den 
Parteivorstand besetzen und dort auch mehr oder weniger gut miteinander auskommen, bilden die 
Traditionalisten die eigentliche innerparteiliche Opposition, eine Partei in der Partei. Der Vorstand 
bemiiht sich redlich im Interesse des Organisationserhalts, die Traditionalisten einzubinden, was 
diesen de facto die Macht einer Sperrminoritat zuweist ..." Neugebauer, Gero/Richard Stoss: Die 
PDS. Geschichte. Organisation. Wahler. Konkurrenten. Opladen: Leske & Budrich 1996, p. 302 (my 
italics) 
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journalists (Falkner, Huber) and linguists (Good, Reiher, Volmert, Townson, 
Schlosser, Burkhardt), our primary focus is a linguistic one; as such our attempt is to 
bolt an essentially linguistic perspective onto - and thus complement - the 
multiplicity of existing politological and sociological studies about the party. This 
aim was motivated in part by a general feeling that all too frequently (often highly 
emotive) politological, journalistic and historical commentaries appear to be lacking 
in the wherewithal to articulate their comments upon and/or objections to certain 
features of PDS discourse without recourse to emotive, reductive and simplistic 
categories. For example, PDS discourse is frequently accused of, and sweepingly 
dismissed as being, 'populist' or 'undemocratic' with little attempt to set the features 
upon which these accusations are based against any sort of comparative yardstick, i.e. 
to examine how the features of PDS discourse objected to are different from those 
witnessed in the discourse of other parties. A l l too often, too, an emotive truth/lie 
schema can be seen to creep into such studies which, we will presently seek to argue, 
offers something of a misplaced perspective in a world where 'objecitve truth' is an 
elusive and illusory goal and where notions of 'right' and 'wrong', 'true' and 'false' 
are frequently informed by little more than the bias of the individual commentator. 
Our focus, then, is on the use of language in the political domain, with particular 
exemplary reference to the discourse - or more correctly discourses - of the PDS, and 
to the PDS-related discourses of extra-PDS observers; more specifically still, we 
focus upon - as our leitmotiv - the particular theme of 'opposition' within these 
discourses. This focus is not predicated upon a perception of language as a mere 
descriptive tool for 'reflecting' and relating putatively 'extra-linguistic' political 
events, upon a perception, in other words, which sees language and politics as two 
essentially distinguishable domains. It is a focus which recognises language as a 
central constituent of politics itself, dialectically inter-related to it, creative of that 
politics. This perception of the relationship between language and politics (which we 
view as a microcosmic model of a greater relationship between language and social 
reality in general) is firmly rooted in the tradition of critical linguistics centred 
around the work of Fowler, Kress, Hodge and Trew et al. at the University of East 
Anglia in the 1970s. While we have generally chosen to 'localise' theoretical 
explanations in the main body of the ensuing text as the means best suited to 
effecting - to re-invoke a worn phrase - a unity of theory and practice, a few general 
remarks upon the basics of the theoretical approach adopted by the critical linguists 
will be germane at this juncture. 
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In pursuing their central endeavour - exploring the relationship between language and 
ideology ("the value systems and sets of beliefs which reside in texts"15), the latter 
reject what Grace has called the "mapping view" of language, doubtless the most 
commonly held, whereby language is: 
regarded as ultimately representing ... a real world - an objective reality the 
existence of which is independent of any observers . . . 1 6 
In this view: 
The real world is a closed system ... there is a single finite real world which 
is common to all mankind and, therefore, to the speakers of all languages.17 
Here, language (texts, sentences, lexical items) is seen as reconstituting a small piece 
of that 'reality' which, as it were, has been 'sliced o f f ; it is conceived of as: 
a way of classifying everything that belongs to the real world: it is therefore 
analogous to a map. That is, the relation that exists between that language and 
the real world is analogous to the relation between a map and the territory 
which it maps ... Analogously, a lexical item in a particular language (in this 
view -MD) corresponds to a certain territory within the real world. The 
territory to which it corresponds encompasses just the set of real-world 
phenomena to which it may properly refer.18 
This view of language Grace contrasts with what he calls the "reality construction" 
view, a central element in the credo of the critical linguists. Here, primacy is given to 
what Grace calls our "effective environment"19, our environment as we perceive it 
and respond to it. This effective environment is a socio-cultural construct, not a 
natural one. The medium for its construction is language. As such: 
language is shaped by its culture and a culture is given expression in its 
language, to such an extent that it is impossible to say where one ends and the 
other begins, i.e. what belongs to language and what to culture ... it is 
impossible to draw a clear line between thinking i.e. bringing a thought into 
being and encoding the thought, i.e. putting it into words ... it is misleading 
1 5 Simpson, op. cit., p. 5 
1 6 Grace , George William: The Linguistic Construction of Reality. Beckenam, New York: Croom 
Helm/Methuen 1987, p. 7 
1 7 ibid. , p. 26 
1 8 ib id. 
1 9 ibid. , p. 3 
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to talk without proper qualification of human beings as all living in a common 
objectively given world ... each language-culture system must to some extent 
have its own conceptual world that is the product of its own history - a world 
that has been created continuously by its speakers throughout history.20 
Ultimately this is a position which recognises the mediating role played by 
perception21 in the creation of reality, a reality which "has no meaningful structure 
except in connection with the standards we employ to ascribe qualities to i t " 2 2 . (This, 
as Shapiro observes, is not the same as the subjectivist position "that there is nothing 
in the world until we cognise it or speak of i t " 2 3 . ) 
As such then, if the 'reality construction' view is accepted - and thus the view that 
the "representations provided by our languages are regarded as nothing more than the 
models which serve as surrogates for the real world" 2 4 and that "language mediates 
our world in both production and interpretation"25: we "formulate thoughts in 
language, and by formulating them we also form them" 2 6 - then politically motivated 
language must be about attempting to generate acceptance of a given version of 
reality, of what 'really' is/what 'really' happened in a given situation, to win 
acceptance for a particular "angle of telling" 2 7. Language, as Good has observed, is 
politics 2 8. Politics, in turn, is language. I f we accept this premise, any model of 
reality can only lay claim to the status of 'truth' inasmuch as it might be the one most 
broadly accepted; its 'truth' value is not, however, an ontologically stable given. Such 
a model is open to subversion by a differing perspective, set of values or beliefs. For 
this reason our survey of PDS historiography in chapter 1, for example, is not based 
upon an approach which seeks to 'prove' or 'disprove' it as 'true' or 'false', but 
rather on one which seeks to exemplify - by setting it against different perspectives 
upon the 'same' reality described - by what means the PDS has sought to win 
2 0 ib id . , pp. 10, 11 
2 1 "[I ]n the reality construction view, our sensory data are regarded as falling seriously short of 
constituting an adequate picture of the real world. They are considered to be very incomplete and 
unsystematic, are seen as not Adding up to anything like a representative sample of what is out there. 
On the contrary, all we can do (according to this view) is invent explanations for the sensory data 
which are attempts to make sense of the whole of the sensory input. To put it differently, all we can 
do is theorise about reality, or to put it more precisely still, to construct models of it."(ibid., p. 6) 
2 2 M . Shapiro, cited in: Townson, op. cit., p. 20 
2 3 ib id . 
2 4 G r a c e , op. cit., p. 7 
2 5 Wilson , John: Politically Speaking. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1990, p. 14 
2 6 S . L . Rubinstein, in: Towson, op. cit., p. 20 
2 7 Simpson, op. cit., p. 2 
2 8 G o o d , Colin: Language, Politics and Ideology, op. cit. 
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acceptance for one particular way of looking at its role (and that of the SED) in the 
'friedliche Revolution' which culminated in the disappearance of the GDR as a geo-
political entity. As Fowler has put it, "comparison reveals the variety of 
representations"29. In examining PDS historiography, our interest is in the type of 
"confrontation of different views of 'the same' object"30 whose very nature is at the 
heart of the critical linguist's rejection of the mapping model of language. Our 
premise here is ultimately that to talk of an inherent 'correctness' on the part of any 
of these models is meaningless; what we can challenge is how 'reasonable' this 
version is perceived to be by the audiences it targets, how widely accepted it is/has 
been and - with particular reference to the political domain - how successful it has 
been in the central political endeavour of self-legitimisation and marshalling support. 
("[0]ne of the functions of politics is to generate acceptance in the public mind" 3 1.) 
Simpson sums it up well as follows: 
Exploring the distinction between truth and reality is another part of the 
critical linguistic creed. As particular linguistic codes embody particular 
realities, then nothing in language can be regarded as truly objective or 
neutral. Certainly while it is difficult to challenge [a] ... piece of language on 
the criterion of truth, the issue of which version of reality it functions to 
represent is entirely another matter.32 
The eschewal of a 'normative' or 'prescriptive' approach is well expressed by Wilson 
who remarks that: 
In classic terms we are interested (from the linguistic point of view -MD) in 
describing what happened, not in prescribing what should happen. In order to 
understand what politicians do with language it is important to understand 
what it is possible to do with language in general.33 (my italics) 
With particular reference to the political domain Schelenz rightly observes that: 
Die politische Sprachkritik stellt den Sprachgebrauch in Bereich der Politik 
zu Diskussion. Der Linguist sollte primar nicht nach den politischen Inhalten 
2 9 Roger Fowler, cited in: Good, Colin: Presse und Soziale Wirklichkeit. Diisseldorf: Schwann 1985, 
p. 9 
3 0 G r a c e , op. cit., p. 18 
3 , L i i b b e , cited in: Townson, op. cit., p. 199 
3 2 Simpson, op. cit., p. 108 
3 3 Wilson , op. cit., p. 15 
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fragen - Sprachkritik ist keine Sachkritik - sondern nach den 
Ausdrucksformen der Handlungsbeteiligten.34 
As such, then, our focus is upon the mechanisms by which "things are made to look 
in language"35. 
It must be emphasised at this juncture that the eschewal of a prescriptive approach is 
not to imply that the ensuing discursive analysis will or even could be 'value-free'. If 
we start from the premise that there is no extra-linguistic 'objective reality', then 
critical linguists, as products of their socialisation, cannot but approach a text with a 
given set of constructed assumptions and beliefs. Thus, as Townson has rightly 
observed, there can be no neutral 'meta-language'; personal positions will colour 
even the most ardent attempts at 'objectivity'; thus: 
it is well-nigh impossible to discuss politico-linguistic phenomena without 
'revealing' one's own political position ... Intellectual honesty and the need 
for more effective analysis both require that this should be clearly stated.36 
Recognising the eFusiveness of the goal, however, does not preclude striving towards 
it, and explicit analytical procedures at least reduce the interference from the position 
of the observer. 
In the view of the critical linguist, then, choosing and generating acceptance of a 
particular way of perceiving some aspect of the 'real' world and its attendant 
processes - selecting from the infinite permutations on offer in language for 
representing it - must therefore be at the heart of any attempt to win support for a 
given ideology and, thus, must be at the heart of political action. Critical linguists 
start from the premise that language reproduces ideology which in turn is 
inextricably linked with the socio-political context in which it functions: 
Language (in the view of the critical linguist - MD) is not used in a 
contextless vacuum; rather, it is used in a host of discourse contexts, contexts 
which are impregnated with the ideology of social systems and institutions.37 
... our perceptions and world view are conditioned by the language in which 
we are socialised.38 
3 4 Schelenz, Bernhard: Der politische Sprachgebrauch der Republikaner. Frankfurt am Main: Peter 
Lang 1992, p. 28 
3 5 ib id . , p. 4 
3 6 Townson, op. cit., p. 123 
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Explicit procedures for exploring how dominant ideologies are manifested in 
language, how language is integral to perception, thus allow a 'way in ' to exploring 
politically motivated language, language aiming to persuade people to perceive 
things/conceive of things in certain ways, to share or accept an ideology. Politics and 
ideology, it must be stressed, are not thus understood as synonymous: politics, as 
well as referring to an institutionalised, day-to-day administrative and procedural 
routine in which we are not interested here, is about persuasion, it is about generating 
acceptance of ideologies, achieving their dominance, or about adapting and honing 
existing ideologies in the light of external exigencies; whether or not those who 
attempt to marshal support for a given way of perceiving the world actually 
'genuinely' or 'really' share the ideology - the system of beliefs - they are 
constructing (and thus attempting to have others believe) is a very different and 
complex issue. We will dwell below upon this crucial and problematic disparity 
between (as we call it) 'tactics' and 'conviction'. 
The issue of selection is a key element in the critical linguists' aim of describing 
"how ideological positions are reflected through linguistic choice"39. It underpins the 
critical linguists' system of transitivity (to which we give particular attention in 
chapter 4 below) which sets out to "show how speakers encode in language their 
mental picture of reality"4 0, how the choice of linguistic structure can effectively 
encode a particular world-view. Kress, Hodge, Trew et al. see language as 
"consisting of a related set of categories and processes" of '"models' which describe 
the interrelation of objects and events. These models are basic schemata which derive 
in their turn from the visual perceptual processes of human beings".41 The choice of 
'model' is dialectically inter-related to the world-view it enframes. As a simple 
example, 'X died', is a very different way of expressing the 'reality' of X's death, 
than is the focally different choice 'Y killed X ' , neither of which depart from what 
Simpson calls a "notional parameter of 'truth'"4 2 - the 'truth' of X's death. The first 
model might be regarded as obfuscatory inasmuch as a syntactic structure has been 
chosen which selectively 'edits out' what many would perceive as a piece of 
information of fundamental causal relevance; this is a very different thing from 
saying, however, that it is 'untrue'. In other words, the critical linguist is interested in 
3 7 S i mpson, op. cit., p. 6 
38Townson, op. cit., p. 24 
3 9Wilson, op. cit., p. 12 
40Simpson, op. cit, p. 88 
4 1 Kress, Giinther/Robert Hodge: Language as Ideology. London, Boston etc.: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul 1979, p. 7 
42Simpson, op. cit., p. 106 
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how a particular perspective upon a real world process is reflected in the choice of 
syntactic structure, in the selective mediation of information, in lexical choice, the 
choice of categories we use to describe things. As Trew observes: 
linking particular events to a network of causal relations and to structures of 
objects or forces is part of all judgement and perception. This idea is 
commonplace in philosophical and methodological discussion.43 
A particularly graphic account of the role of categorisation in creating cognitive 
structures and thus shaping perception is provided by Edelmann44 who observes that: 
Perception involves categorisation. To place an object in one class of things 
rather than another establishes its central characteristics and creates 
assumptions about matters that are not seen ... categorisations give meaning 
both to what is observed and to what is assumed ... a term is the thought it 
evokes, not a tool for expressing a pre-existing thought ... Political and 
ideological debate consists of very largely of efforts to win acceptance of a 
particular categorisation of an issue in the face of competing efforts on behalf 
of a different one.45 
Edelmann shows how classification systems can neatly and conveniently gloss over 
complex causal relationships: 
Terms like 'mental illness', 'criminal' and 'drug abuse' focus attention on the 
alleged weakness and pathology of the individual, while diverting attention 
from their pathological, social and economic environments.46 
We wil l have much to say on the circumvention of complex causality below. 
Political actors select from the 'contradictory cognitions ... available for use'47 in the 
attempt to marshal support for their own particular world-view or cause. As we shall 
see below in chapter 3, the PDS will have gained much if it can secure wide public 
acceptance and thus cognition of its categorisation of the broad range of positions 
4 3 Trew, op. cit., p. 96 
4 4see Edelman, Murray: Political Language: Words that Succeed and Policies that Fail. New York, 
London: Academic Press 1977, esp. pp. 23-41 
4 5ibid., pp. 23, 24, 25 
4 6ibid., p. 27 
4 7ibid., p. 27 
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represented in the party as a healthy and positively-loaded Pluralismus48, i f it can 
secure preference of that cognition of 'reality' over another version of (or perspective 
upon) that reality, in which that selfsame breadth of positions might be enframed in 
more negatively-loaded terms such as 'disunity' or 'lack of direction'. Successful 
ideologies are ones which establish dominant perceptions: 
Wem es gelingt, sprachlich fixierte Perspektiven von der Wirklichkeit 
durchzusetzen, der hat den Kampf urn die Durchsetzung politischer 
Positionen zu seinem Gunsten entschieden.49 
Selective mediation is, of course, at the heart of contextualisation; the critical 
linguist, who rejects the mapping view's position that: 
content consists of the set of real-world situations to which [an] ... expression 
can truly refer, or of the conditions which a situation must meet in order to 
belong to that set50 
and thus rejects its proponents' conception of linguistic expressions "as if their 
relation to real world situations were an immediate one"51 must, perforce, reject the 
idea of 'autonomous text' which, as Grace puts it, "assumes that the expression so 
specifies its own meaning that it is completely understandable without reference to 
any contextual information ... " 5 2 ; "we cannot", Grace says, "understand the relation 
between a linguistic expression and a real-world situation to which it refers unless we 
recognise the mediating roles played by the speaker and by the context of the speech 
event".53 Ultimately, like Searle, critical linguists reject the 'zero context' notion of 
literal meaning proffered in traditional semantic theory, i.e. the idea that: 
the literal meaning of a sentence is entirely determined by the meanings of its 
parts and their syntactical combination in the sentence. This axiom has the 
consequence that the notion of the literal meaning of sentences is a context 
free notion and various authors have expressed the idea that the literal 
meaning of a sentence is the meaning it has in the 'null context' or the 'zero 
4 8"Vor dem Zusammenbruch des real existierenden Sozialismus gehorte Pluralismus zu den 
besonders geschatzten Grundwerten der westdeutschen Demokratie ... Pluralismus in Sachen 
Weltanschauung gehorte indessen nie zu den ostdeutschen Grundwerten." Teubert, Wolfgang: "Zum 
politisch-gesellschaftlichen Diskurs im Postsozialismus." In: Reiher/Lazer (eds.): Von Buschzulage 
und Ossinachweis. op. cit., p. 286 
49Schelenz, op. cit, p. 19 
5 0Grace, op. cit., p. 26 




context'; that is, the literal meaning is the meaning a sentence has apart from 
any context whatsoever.54 
We share Searle's view that: 
the meaning of a sentence only has application against a background of 
assumptions and practices that are not representable as part of the meaning.55 
In chapter 1, for example, we attempt to show how a basic proposition such as 'Hans 
Modrow is a reformer' acquires very different 'meanings' in different temporal and 
spatial frames of reference. The very superordinacy of keywords like reform(er) is 
what lends them the conflationary potential which make them so popular with and 
manipulable by the political actor. In other words, they can be readily transferred -
with potential ideological benefit - between quite distinct frames of reference, which 
can be (conveniently) confused if the recipients are unaware that any uniformity 
suggested may reside more on the level of sign than of denotation. Historian Mary 
Fulbrook touches upon precisely this point in observing that: 
Words such as "socialism" and "communism" are common currency in the 
cut-and thrust of contemporary politics - and are not always used with the 
precision of meaning necessary for scholarly debate.56 
and thus touches upon the crucial point that political debate and scholarly debate are 
two very different things. Fulbrook shows how it was precisely through a process of 
"political and analytical conflation"5 7 that many on the right in Germany were able to 
seize upon the demise of 'Marxist-Leninist' socialism as evidence of the triumph of 
capitalism over a generic socialism per se; in other words the whole range of vastly 
different conceptions of socialism were sweepingly distilled into one manifestation 
of the category and the failure or demise of this single manifestation then presented -
without any attempt to differentiate or relativise - as undermining or disqualifying the 
whole category. Fulbrook identifies how the CDU used its "Nie wieder Sozialismus" 
slogan to great effect in lumping together the SED {Sozialistische Einheitspartei 
Deulschlands) and the newly formed and "politically very different" 5 8 East German 
SPD {Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) on the conflationary level of the 
5 4Searle, John R.: "The Background of Meaning." In: Searle, John/F. Kiefer/M. Bierwisch (eds.): 
Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics. Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1980, p. 221 
5 5ibid., p. 223 
56Fulbrook, Mary: Studies in European History. The Two Germanies 1945-90. Problems of 




verbal form <sozialistisch>59 This conflationary potential in language will form a 
key element in our discussions below. 
Ultimately, our approach to language is based upon a recognition of its fundamental 
fluidity, upon a recognition that i f language represents mere models of reality, which 
in turn is that language, then nothing in language can be hard and fast. Like Saussure, 
we see the relationship between sign and denotation as essentially arbitrary one60; 
meaning is derived from context. Schelenz aptly observes that: 
Worter und Begriffe sind Symbole fur die Gegenstande der Welt. Die 
Zuordnung zwischen dem bezeichnenden Lautbild und dem Bezeichneten ist 
dabei beliebig. Zwar muB die Zuordnung von Ausdruck und Inhalt in der 
Kommunikation weitgehend normiert sein, es bleibt jedoch der sprachlichen 
Kreativitat (Performanz) des Menschen uberlassen, Gegenstande und 
Sachverhalte im konkreten Kommunikationszusammenhang mittels varianter 
Ausdrucke zu bezeichnen. Diese Grundtatsache der Sprache bleibt im Bereich 
der Politik nicht ohne praktische Folgen. Wer etwas mit einem 'passenden' 
Ausdruck belegt, kann Alltags- bzw. Politik-Realitaten versteckt bewerten, 
verfalschen, verhiillen oder gar erst konstituieren61 
and Mauthner observes that: 
Die Sprache ist aber kein Gegenstand des Gebrauchs und auch kein 
Werkzeug, sie ist uberhaupt kein Gegenstand; sie ist gar nichts anderes als ihr 
Gebrauch. Sprache ist Sprachgebrauch.62 
Kraus's aphoristic and percipient remark that 
Je naher man ein Wort ansieht, um so ferner blickt es zuruck6 3 
is true not only of the individual lexeme, but of language in general. The more 
broadly or deeply we contextualise, the more we shift perception(s) - and as meaning 
is perception, the more we challenge meaning. 
5 9See note I. at the end of this chapter. 
6 0 A n enlightening account of the "Willkiirlichkeit von Bennenungen" is provided by Burkhardt, 
Armin: "Palast versus SchloB oder: Wem gehoren die Symbole." In: Reiher/Lazer (eds.): Von 
Buschzulage und Ossinachweis. op. cit., p. 137 
6!Schelenz, op. cit., p. 17 
62Mauthner, Fritz: "Sprache und Sozialismus." In: Heringer, Hans-Jiirgen (ed.): Holzfeuer im 
Holzernen Ofen. Tubingen: Gunter Narr Verlag 1988, p. 37 
20 
If our premise is that language has no inherent, ontologically stable meaning, then 
this is a position which must, by extension, reject any position which categorises 
language in moralistic terms as inherently 'good' or inherently 'bad'. Klemperer's 
position that the Nazi party: 
durchtrankt ... Worte und Wortgruppen und Satzformen mit ihrem Gift, 
macht ... die Sprache ihrem furchterlichen System dienstbar ... Man sollte 
viele Worte des nazistischen Sprachgebrauchs fur lange Zeit, und einige fur 
immer, ins Massengrab legen64 
has been widely questioned for its failure to take into account the very specific and 
narrow socio-historical context in which that 'tarnished' language functioned. As 
Townson puts it: 
There can be no doubt that language can be used as a force for good or as a 
force for evil ... but it is a bold extension then to claim that language per se 
thus becomes good or evil, and it is even more debatable whether, within a 
given language, there is then a 'good' grammar and an 'evil ' grammar.65 
Townson touches here upon another important point: just as critical linguists eschew 
the pursuit of a prescriptive, normative 'true' version of an 'objective' reality, so they 
eschew a prescriptive, normative approach to questions of style as incompatible with 
a theoretical premise in which language seen is an integral part of creative 
perception. In this they would accord with Schelenz: 
Es kann jedoch nicht Ziel und Aufgabe des Sprachkritikers sein, als Moralist 
der Sprache aufzutreten, d. h. bestimmte Sprachnormen vorzuschreiben, nach 
denen man sich zu richten habe. Die Kritik muB sich an 
sprachwissenschaftlichen Kriterien (Wortmaterial, Wortgebrauch etc.) 
orientieren.66 
In summary, then, ours is a position which is neatly summed up by Schaffner and 
Porsch: 
6 3cited in: Volmert, Johannes: "Die 'Altparteien' auBer Fassung: Reaktionen und Kampagnen auf die 
Wahlerfolge der PDS - ein Pressespiegel." In: Brie, Michael/Martin Herzig/Thomas Koch (eds.): Die 
PDS - Empirische Befunde & Kontroverse Analysen. Koln: Papyrossa Verlag 1995, p. 162 
64Klemperer, Victor: LTI. Notizbuch eines Philologen. Leipzig: Reclam 1975, p. 22 
65Townson, op. cit., p. 151 
66Schelenz, op. cit., p. 24 
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What we are interested in is not language (or words) in its isolation as a mere 
object of research; what interests us is how social reality is created and shaped 
by language ... our assumption is that social reality is not only reflected in 
language and in communication, but that it is also consistently renewed by 
and in communication.67 
PERIODICISATION 
Our treatment of the theme of opposition in PDS and PDS-related discourse is 
embedded in a framework which can (very!) broadly be said to be chronological: 
In chapters 1 and 2 we take a close look at PDS historiography. The focus of our 
interest here is upon how the PDS (or, more specifically, its 'think-tank') has - as 
successor to the SED - generally presented the (problematic) 'reality' of its relation 
(and that of its political predecessor, the SED) to opposition movements in the GDR, 
in particular during the Wendezeil68. We look at 'competing' historiographies which 
offer very different perspectives of that same 'reality'. We argue that the PDS has 
relied heavily upon a discourse of what we call 'causal circumvention', in which 
complex causal problems are backgrounded and bypassed; in examining its linguistic 
features, we attempt to show how, inter alia, this discourse of 'causal circumvention' 
taps the conflationary potential of broad ideologemes such as Opposition, Reform 
and Sozialismus and suggests - at a high level of abstraction - a party past in which 
the ordinary members of the party rank and file - cast as the inner-SED opposition -
marched hand in hand with the - on the level of signifier identical - extra-SED 
opposition. In this picture, we argue, a telescoping of temporal and spatial frames of 
reference plays a crucial role. While Moreau et al. have strongly challenged PDS 
historiography as a Geschichtsfalschung (see below), we will argue that this is an 
unhelpful perspective from which to voice criticism; it is hard to show, we will 
argue, how the PDS's historiographic picture can be said to depart from any broad 
'notional parameter of truth'. What is at issue, we will argue, is the level of 
abstraction involved. In keeping with the theoretical premise outlined above, our 
general assumption here is that there is no ontologically 'correct' or 'stable' history 
which can lay claim to the status of 'absolute truth', to the status of enframing an 
'objective reality'; history is about competing interpretations - each vying for broad 
acceptance - of often complex processes and events whose 'reality' is dialectically 
67Schaffner, Christina/Peter Porsch: "Meeting the challenge on the path to democracy: discursive 
strategies in government declarations in Germany and the former GDR." In: Discourse and Society. 
vol. 4 (1). London/New Delhi: SAGE 1993, p. 35 
6 8see footnote 13 
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informed by the interpretation we give them. As such the way we fashion 'history' in 
language is an inextricable element in the creation of that history; it does not stand 
outside of language and independently of it. 
In chapter 2 we set the inner-PDS Vergangenheitsbewaltigung69 described in 
chapter 1 against the backdrop of a wider, earlier, pan-German 
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung, and examine the reliability of using - as has frequently 
been done - the features of 'causal circumvention' highlighted as an unproblematic 
basis for challenging the PDS's credentials as a democratic player. Our interest is 
not, we stress, in proving that the PDS is or is not undemocratic. Such a question is 
beyond the purview of a linguistic study. What we can address, however, is how the 
question is posited, against which background of assumptions, in what contextual 
situations. We look closely at just who it is who has frequently and vociferously 
challenged the PDS's democratic credentials and ask both whether this 'causal 
circumvention' can in any way be said to be exclusive to the PDS and whether it is 
not the case that, in the political domain at least, the highly superordinate term 
democracy - with its mythical, cult status - is not infrequently instrumentalised for 
the purposes of contravening the very values it is widely held to embody. 
Our particular interest in chapter 3 is in the 'intra-PDS opposition' (see footnote 14 
above), in the plethora of different and opposing forces which have made up the 
complex party tapestry in the period between 1989 and 1995. (At the same time we 
point to the evidence of an evolutionary background stretching well back into the 
GDR period.) We focus upon the ways in which leading ideologues have sought to 
generate a 'unifying' discourse - of which the overarching, vaguely drawn notion of 
demokratischer Sozialismus is emblematic - under whose banner the uncomfortable 
co-existence of the different party groupings with their fundamentally differing sub-
discourses might be made to look comfortable. The ideologeme Opposition -
straddling as it does the complex boundary between 'revolutionary' and 'revisionist' 
approaches (i.e. what kind of opposition to offer in a United Germany) - is itself, like 
Sozialismus, we argue, a central element in this 'unifying' discourse of 'lowest 
common denominators'. Ultimately, we argue, any uniformity of world-view 
suggested is located upon a very high leveJ of abstraction, where the denotative 
essence of any uniformly accepted demokratischer Sozialismus seems to be little 
more than a vaguely defined opposition to the here and now, a nebulous attitude of 
defiance towards the pan-German polity, coupled, in many instances, with an equally 
vague and variously manifested attitude of 'GDR nostalgia'. 
6 9 We will comment upon this term below. 
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In chapter 4 we focus upon the 'to govern or not to govern' debate in the PDS in the 
Superwahljahr 1994. In the wake of the PDS's surprising successes in the Sachsen-
Anhalt State election {Landeswahl), the party was forced to readdress the nature of its 
oppositionality against a background in which it was increasingly becoming a force 
to be reckoned with, yet had consistently styled itself an 'extra-system' (and thus 
non-governmental?) opposition. Drawing a parallel with the Realo/Fundi debate 
which bedevilled the Grtine in the eighties, we examine the language of the highly 
complex polemic between what we call (mindful of a convenient, polarised 
oversimplification!) the PDS's 'pro-' and 'anti-involvement' camps: between, on the 
one hand, those (such as the 'pragmatic' leadership) who appeared to favour the 
party's incorporation into strategic, (quasi-) governmental alliances with other parties 
and, on the other, those in the PDS for whom 'opposition' appeared to mean strict 
non-involvement in what was perceived as the corruptive machinery of conventional 
power structures. In particular, we look at the discursive means deployed by an 
evidently 'pro-involvement' leadership in its attempts to effect a complex 'Spagat': 
that of on the one hand now justifying (both within the party and without) the PDS's 
incorporation into establishment power positions while, on the other, simultaneously 
retaining the 'Bewegung'-style oppositional (and raw-governmental?) mantle. 
Central to this endeavour is again, we attempt to show, the tapping of the 
conflationary potential of highly superordinate terms such as Opposition and 
Verantwortung which allow a potential mixing of frames of reference and thus a 
potential (con-)fusion of what might easily be regarded as conflicting or 
contradictory perspectives. Exploring in some detail the critical linguists' system of 
transitivity in language, we seek to show in what ways the leadership's Spagat is 
manifested in the syntactic structure of key electoral promises. We look, too, at the 
linguistic staging of the 'Populismus-Debatte' surrounding the PDS, seeking not so 
much to offer an elusive, empirically stable, yes/no-style answer to the question of 
whether or not the party is populist, but rather, as with our study in chapter 2 upon 
the party's 'democratic' status, to examine the linguistic environment in which the 
question has generally (within the political domain) been posited: howl, by whom! 
and in what circumstances! Ultimately we ask whether it is not the case that the term 
Populismus, like anlidemokratisch, has been widely used in the political arena as a 
cudgel against the PDS by those whose unproblematic premise is the 
unchallengeable sanctity of their own position. It is hoped that drawing attention to 
some of the features of the 'linguistic climate' in which the debate has been 
conducted will help to prompt a more sane and rational debate upon this and other 
crucial PDS-related issues, a debate unhindered by emotional responses and emotive 
categories of the type we encounter so widely in current commentaries upon the 
party. 
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In chapter 5 we look at the integrative status of PDS 'oppositionality' by 1995, 
focusing in particular on the events surrounding the crucial 4 l h Parteitag in January 
of that year. We show how party leaders and ideologues attempted to proffer a 
widely drawn Opposition (in which the category was extended to include a 
governmental role), which constituted something of a 'composite model' taking in 
the inner-party positions on the nature of the party's oppositionality. 
In particular, we look at how party leaders used language in the attempt to mediate a 
Spagat between now actively challenging (or being seen, at least, to actively 
challenge) the problematic 'traditionalist' forces within the party ranks - so much a 
condition for the party's acceptance by the political establishment - and 
simultaneously playing down the challenge upon these forces on account of their 
vital symbolic significance for considerable sections of the party membership and 
- electorate. In the ensuing 'Stalinismus~DebaUe-,-asALwas-mdQ\y referred, to in_ the 
press, the element of conflation, we will seek to show, yet again played a crucial role. 
Notes: 
I . 
Where, in the attempt to illustrate the conflationary potential in language, our 
particular focus is upon lexemes as verbal forms, as signifiants, the terms concerned 
have been entered, i f this has been thought helpful, in the following markings < ... > 
(This we hasten to add, illustrates a primary focus and not any attempt to eschew a 
dialectic understanding of the relationship between sign and denotation; there is no 
suggestion that form can be considered entirely independently of content; we will 
comment below on the somewhat misleading Leerformel metaphor popular in 
linguistic analysis.). 
Thus, the following would represent an attempt to provide a more graphic illustration 
of the conflation, on the level of verbal form, identified by Fulbrook above: 
<502ifl/>istische Einheitspartei Deutschlands 
is equated with <sozi'a/>demokratische Partei Deutschlands 
I I . 
PID is used throughout as an abbreviation for the weekly newsletter issued by then 




T H E DISCOURSE OF CAUSAL CIRCUMVENTION (I): 
DEALING WITH HISTORY? -
T H E PDS AND OPPOSITION IN T H E WENDEZEIT 
(die) ... Auseinandersetzung mit der DDR-Vergangenheit ... ist fur die 
demokratietheoretische Einschatzung der ehemaligen Staatspartei von 
besonderer Bedeutung, zeigt sich hier doch besonders deutlich, inwieweit ein 
politischer LernprozeB tatsachlich erfolgte.1 
The above quotation typifies the stance adopted by numerous commentators in 
respect of PDS historiography: the PDS's 'democratic' credentials are to be measured 
in terms of its willingness to confront its past head on. In the present chapter we shall 
examine some of the typical features of PDS historiography and proceed - via a 
detailed examination of Heinrich Bortfeldt's crucial monograph of 1991 on the SED's 
transition to the PDS2 - to examine, in chapter 2, the appropriateness of using these 
as a basis for assessing the PDS's 'Demokratiefahigkeit'. One point must be 
emphasised at the outset. Given the well-documented wealth of inner-party positions 
(Strdmuiigen) and the concomitant range of competing discourses at work under the 
party auspices, our (necessarily reductive) picture of PDS historiography is 
predicated largely upon (and thus seen through the primary perspective of) the 
historiographic discourse of party leaders (Bisky, Gysi et al.) and leading party 
ideologues (Brie, Neubert, Wolf). It is these latter whom we enframe as the 'PDS' 
whilst mindful of the reduction involved. The latter's work in relation to the party's 
GDR history, we will seek to show, can very broadly be understood as an attempt to 
locate what might be called a broad 'historiographic terrain'; in other words theirs is 
an attempt to formulate a conceptual model of, and thus secure an understanding of, 
PDS history which serves to legitimise the party as widely as possible, both 
internally (i.e. within the party; amongst the complex of forces which make up the 
party membership) and externally (before the voting public; within the political 
arena). 
'Pfahl-Traughber, Armin: "Wandlung zur Demokratie? Die programmatische Entwicklung der PDS." 
In: Deutschland Archiv. 4/95, p. 361 
2Bortfeldt, Heinrich: Von der SED zur PDS - Aujbruch zu neuen Ufern? Berlin: Kommission 
Politische Bildung des Parteivorstandes der PDS 1990 
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THE PDS'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE SED 
Wir sind Mitglieder einer Partei, die aus den unterschiedlichsten Traditionen 
hervorging. Die Urspriinge unserer Partei liegen im Aufbruch des Herbstes 
1989 in der DDR, als wir aus der SED heraus dazu beitragen wollten, die 
Gesellschaft in der DDR umfassend zu reformieren.3 
Since its inception the PDS has faced a major problem: on the one hand it has had to 
seek discursively to divorce itself from, and establish an identity which clearly 
distinguishes it from, the SED, if it is to have any credibility as a player in the new 
system and find appeal - as has been its avowed intention - in the Western half of 
Germany; on the other, as something of a politische Heimat for large numbers of 
dispossessed and disorientated ex-SED members from whom it has generated much 
of its support, it must seek simultaneously to play down any condemnation of its 
political forerunner. 
The PDS has adopted a number of strategies in attempting to deal with the complex 
task of asserting an identity separate from that of the SED whil,e simultaneously 
taking on board its SED origins, a task made all the more complex by the PDS's 
decision to become the SED's Rechtsnachfolger. (These strategies form what we will 
discuss below as the discourse of 'causal circumvention'.) While many political 
commentators have suggested that the PDS's decision to become the SED's legal 
successor (initially as the SED-PDS) was motivated by a desire to secure its position 
as legitimate heir to SED funds4, PDS historiography has generally remained silent 
on the issue of financial considerations; instead the decision not to dissolve the SED 
has been consistently presented as a mark of the PDS's political integrity in wishing 
not to shirk its SED legacy, but rather to undergo the agonising and cathartic process 
of taking that legacy on board and confronting the 'Altlast' of the past. Typifying this 
sentiment is the following: 
Es ist ja wahrhaftig so, daG die PDS mit einem unerhort kiihnen Anspruch 
angetreten ist. Angesichts des gesamten Erbes der SED ... gait es, radikal 
aufzurdumen mit all dem, was in den letzten Jahrzehnten geradezu typisch fur 
die SED war.5 (my italics) 
3p 
rogramm der Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus. Berlin 1993, p. 3 
4see, for example, Krisch, Henry: "From SED to PDS: The Struggle to Revive a Left Party." In: 
Dalton, R.J. (ed.): The New Germany Votes: Unification and the Creation of the New German Party 
System. Providence/Oxford: Berg 1993, p. 173 




Couragierte Genossen nehmen den ErneuerungsprozeB selbst in die Hand. Sie 
erkampfen einen auBerordentlichen Parteitag. Eine entscheidende Frage ist: 
Erneuerung oder Selbstauflosung? Die Partei lost sich nicht auf. Es beginnt 
der schwere Weg von der stalinistischen Partei zur Partei des demokratischen 
Sozialismus . . . 6 
Where the link with an SED tradition is invoked, it is generally to suggest - in what a 
number of political commentators have come to regard as a Komplexitatsreduktion 
(propositional reduction)7 typical of the PDS - that i t ) ^ h a s remained as the SED's 
'honest core'. In relation to the extract from the PDS's programme cited above, 
Pfahl-Traughber percipiently observes that: 
Gleichzeitig suggeriert das Zitat, die PDS sei selbstandig aus der SED heraus 
- etwa als Minderheiten- und Reformflugel - entstanden.8 
It is precisely this element of PDS historiography which has allowed commentators 
to make observations of the type that: 
der Intellektuelle Gysi (succeeded by Lothar Bisky as Party Chairman in 
January 1993; now Chairman of the PDS parliamentary party - MD) ... die 
Sache eines gelauterten Sozialismus recht uberzeugend in der medialen 
Offentlichkeit der Bundesrepublik (vertritt).9 
The following arguments must be prefaced with the observation that simplified 
conceptual structures of this nature are not exclusive to the PDS; if the PDS 
simplifies 'reality' by pressing it into a linguistic mould which bypasses complex 
causal links between past and present, then Gysi is right to observe10 that the reverse 
of this coin is the equally sweeping formula - frequently invoked by certain members 
of (in particular) the right and the press, and widely used "mit denunziatorischem 
6Behrend, Manfred/Helmut Meier (eds.): Der Schwere Weg der Erneuerung. Berlin: Dietz 
Verlag 1991, back cover 
7 For a detailed linguistic analysis of the workings of propositional reductions, see: Schaffner/Porsch, 
op. cit., pp. 33-55; for a politological examination of this question in relation to the PDS, see 
Langguth, Gerd: "PDS - Partei mit Doppelgesicht." In: Die politische Meinung. no. 297. 8/94, pp. 19-
26 
8"Wandlung zur Demokratie?" op. cit., p. 368 
9Land, Rainer/Ralf Possekel: "Orthodoxie und Modernitat. Vom Sinn der Richtungskampfe in der 
PDS." In: DieNeue Gesellschaft. Frankfurter Hefte. 42. Jg. 1/95, p. 418 
, 0cf., for example, "... kein einziger Journalist vergiBt, bei der Bezeichnung PDS auch SED-
Nachfolgepartei hinzuzufiigen." Gysi, Gregor, cited from: Runge, Irene/Uwe Stellbrink 
(interviewers): Gregor Gysi: "Ich bin Opposition". Berlin: Dietz Verlag 1990, p. 14 
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Unterton"" - that the PDS is the SED-Nachfolgerparteii2, thereby suggesting that the 
PDS is a monolith and glossing over the fact that it is a highly complex and 
factionalised political entity: 
Die Stromungen in der PDS sind vielfaltig, widerspruchlich, kaum 
uberschaubar. Zwar waren etwa neun von zehn PDS-Mitgliedern auch schon 
in der SED, aber da gibt es Traditionalisten und Reformer, solche, die aus der 
Vergangenheit gelernt haben, und andere, die sie eher verklaren. Und es 
haben sich Gruppen und Griippchen unter dem Dach der PDS 
zusammengefunden, die in der alten SED undenkbar gewesen waren.13 
The concept of an 'honest core' is a recurring theme in PDS historiography: 
Die PDS bekennt sich zu jenem aktiven Teil der SED, der mit dem 
Stalinismus brach und gemeinsam mit anderen politischen Bewegungen des 
Herbstes 1989 die Gesellschaft der DDR umfassend reformieren wollte. 1 4 (my 
italics) 
Die Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus ist aus dem Reformwillen 
zehntausender SED-Mitglieder entstanden und wird im Wahlkampf 1994 ihre 
selbstkritische Auseinandersetzung mit der eigenen Geschichte fortsetzen.15 
Die PDS ist also gegeniiber der SED eine ganz andere, eine neue Partei und 
wird es von Etappe zu Etappe ihrer Entwicklung mehr. Was sie mit der SED 
gemein hat, sind viele Mitglieder, die ihre sozialistischen Ideale ernst 
nehmen.*6 (my italics) 
"Wolf, Herbert: Woher kommt... ? op. cit., p. 4 
,2Johannes Volmert ("Die 'Altparteien' op. cit., pp. 162-180), has shown graphically that the 
refusal of large sections of the political establishment (especially the right) to refer to the PDS by its 
chosen name has been an essential part of their "Strategic der Stigmatisierung" (p. 174) and 
marginalisation of the party. This, he argues, is "eine Taktik, die gegenuber der DDR fast vierzig 
Jahre lang von Union und (CDU-affiliated - MD) Springer-Presse mit wechselndem Erfolg 
angewendet wurde. Von 'SED-Nachfolgepartei' iiber 'Ex-SED', 'Altkommunisten', 'Neosozialisten', 
'Partei der SED-Kader', 'Partei der roten Bonzen1 u.a. finden sich die altbekannten Formen der 
Negativ-Etiketierung. Offenbar kalkuliert man hier mit einer bei schlichten Gemutern verbreiteten 
Form der Sprachmagie: Wie allein der Name (CDU) einer Partei die demokratischen Weihen verleiht, 
so diskreditiert auf der anderen Seite allein der Name (PDS) eine Partei - als 'sozialistisch' = 
'kommunistisch'= 'extremistisch'". (pp. 174-5) 
, 3Nawrocki, Joachim: "Genosse Rentner." In: Die Zeit. no. 49. 1 December 1995 
uNeues Programm der PDS: Eine sozialistische Partei in Deutschland. (Flyleaf advertising the PDS 
programme of 1993) Berlin 1993 
^Konkrete Oppostion: Opposition gegen Sozialabbau und Rechtsruck: Wahlprogramm der PDS. 
Berlin 1994, p. 4 
, 6 Wer ist das, die PDS? Berlin: Parteivorstand der PDS 1991, p. 8 
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Notice the indeterminate "viele", which creates the desired impression, while leaving 
room for defeasibility. We shall deal further with the use of linguistic indeterminates 
below. 
To this end, 'virtue' is made from the party's dwindling membership17: the party, 
argues Gysi in 1990, will be faced with 
... einer weiteren Dezimierung, denn nicht alle werden den Druck aushalten, 
der zu erwarten ist . . . , 8 
which contains an unmistakable contextual implication that the PDS will be a core 
-only for committed idealists whose convictions are strong enough for them to 
withstand the pressure from a hostile political environment without. (There is no 
suggestion here that the mass exodus form the party might have something to do with 
certain members' disillusionment with what they perceive as the PDS's unwillingness 
to effect a radical break with what commentators have often called "alte 
Denkmuster"; we will argue below that in its discourse the PDS has consistently 
performed a complex balancing act in which it has sought to adapt and 'graft on' 
some of the conceptual structures of dialectical materialism to the new political 
environment and in so doing has alienated a number of members - of whom Karin 
Dorre1 9 has been a particularly prominent example - for whom the PDS's 
transformation process has not been radical enough). Compare, too: 
Andere fruhere SED-Mitglieder dagegen, welche unter dem Eindruck der 
"Wende" fur die Idee des Sozialismus iiberhaupt keine Chancen mehr sahen, 
haben aus diesem Grund seinerzeit die PDS ebenfalls sehr bald verlassen.20 
(This last quotation raises the question - with which we wil l be confronted time and 
again and which we will examine in some detail in chapter 3 - of what is understood 
in PDS circles by "die Idee des Sozialismus"; as a highly superordinate term of the 
type whose ultimate semantic content "could hardly be specified"21, the ideological 
potential of Sozialismus lies in its vagueness;on the level of signifier it can be used to 
suggest a broad body of overlap with the socialism actively called for by what Gorski 
, 7 The PDS's membership fell from 2,300,000 in October 1989 to 131,000 in March 1994; for the 
relevant statistics see: Moreau, Patrick/Viola Neu: Die PDS zwischen Linksextremismus und 
Linkspopulismus. Sankt Augustin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 1994, p. 14 ff. 
, 8 Gysi , Gregor, cited from: Runge/Stellbrink, op. cit., p. 20 
, 9see footnote 70 
2 0Wolf, Herbert: Wolier kommt... ? op. cit., p. 5 
2,Schaffner/Porsch, op. cit., p. 38 
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and Markovits have called the East German "green" movement22, i.e. the 
Burgerbewegungen whose roots are to be found in the East German dissident 
movement which ultimately spearheaded events in the autumn of 1989 and with 
which the PDS, it will be argued, has sought to link itself precisely through the 
conflationary potential afforded by highly superordinate terms: it will be argued that 
SED/PDS conceptions of Sozialismus; Reform and Opposition - even among the so-
called 'reformers' - do not overlap as neatly and unproblematically with those of the 
Biirgerbewegungen as PDS historiography has generally, we will show, sought to 
suggest: we wil l return to this question below.) 
In bolstering up its image as the SED's 'honest core', the PDS makes frequent capital 
out of alluding to the notion of the Wendehals23, widely invoked from the Wendezeit 
onwards, in suggesting that those who have fled the party have betrayed their ideals, 
while those who remain are prepared to take on board (the difficult cathartic process 
of) 'suffering' in the name of these ideals (thus circumventing the highly problematic 
notion that [at least some of] the PDS's members might well be said to have remained 
with the party quite simply because they are 'die-hards' wishing to cling on to the old 
order which the PDS, in part, is seen as representing).24 When probed upon the 
problematic nostalgia and 'orthodoxy' of sections of his party's membership, Gysi 
parries the challenge with the following mental leap, in which virtue is made from 
what, ultimately, is necessity: 
2 2See Markovits, Andrei/Philip Gorski: The German Left. Red, Green and Beyond. 
Cambridge/Oxford: Polity Press/Blackwell Publishers 1993, pp. 237-263. The term is used broadly 
(and reductively) by Markovits and Gorski to refer to what they call the "independent GDR 
opposition" (p. 239) /"unofficial opposition" (p. 242) in the GDR, i.e. to the dissident movement/the 
citizens' action groups (Biirgerbewegungen) whose opposition to the SED and the 'official' 
opposition united in the Nationale Front challenged the very foundation of the system, (see p. 240 ff.; 
for more on the Nationale Front see footnote 21, chapter 2 below) 
2 3 cf. the following dictionary definitions of the term: 
1. Wendehals: >Vogelart, der Familie der Spechte zugehorig< ... schon 1575 in ubertr. Bed. 
"fur den wetterwendischen Menschen" ... aktualisiert Okt./Nov. 1989 in der DDR als Bez. 
fur SED-Genossen, die auf den revolutionaren Zug der Reformen wendig aufspringen 
(wollen); Demo-Spruch: kein Artenschutz fur Wendehalse ... (markings as in original - MD) 
2. Wendehals, der (ugs. abwertend) jmd., der aus Opportunisms [plotzlichj das politische 
Lager wechselt: der Ausdruck "Wendehals", mit dem unter anderem der friihere SED-Chef 
Egon Krenz auf den Arm genommen wurde (Welt 12. 12. 89, 26) (markings as in original -
MD) 
Cited from: Paul, Hermann: Deutsches Worterbuch. Tubingen: Niemeyer Verlag 1992 (no. 1.); 
Drosdowski, Giinther et al. (eds.): Das grojie Worterbuch der deutschen Sprache. Mannheim, 
Leipzig, etc.: Dudenverlag 1995 (no. 2.) 
2 4 Even the following on the whole open-minded commentator expresses his reservations in respect of 
the SED-Funktiondre who have found a poltische Heimat in the SED: "Diese Art Funktionare waren 
eine Pest, und ich bin mir nicht sicher, ob und in welchem Grade sie sich gewandelt haben." Christ, 
Richard: "Die Deutschen Ostler." In: Der Morgen. no. 96. 9/94 
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Mir sind Menschen mit Vergangenheit, die damit umgehen, lieber als solche, 
die ihre leugnen.25 
Something of the same idea is implied too in: 
Die Zahl derer, die sich-heute darauf berufen, Trager und Mitgestalter zu sein, 
wird immer groBer. Und an Politkern, die demokratische Umwalzung in 
geschickter Weise fur sich nutzen oder gar miBbrauchen, mangelt es nicht 2 6 
about which a cynical observer might well observe that the emotive, rhetorical 
device of condemning those who have sought to boost their credentials as co-
participants in the reformist movement comes within the context of a work which, in 
fact, seeks, to achieve exactly what it at one and the same time condemns. 
Observe how the following polarised structure simultaneously leaves the impression 
that the PDS is exactly equal to the inner-SED reform movement: 
Innerhalb der DDR-Zeit war viel friiher und viel tiefer, als man heute glauben 
mochte, innerhalb eines nennenswerten Teils (observe the 
unverifiability/unquantifiability here -MD) der SED-Mitglieder die Einsicht 
verbreitet, daB eine weittragende und prinzipielle Revision der damals 
offiziell vertretenen politischen und ideologischen Leitlinien ansteht ... Die 
Leute mit solchen Ansichten, in der Honecker-Zeit in der Minderheit, konnten 
1989 Oberwasser gewinnen, weil sowohl die Masse der Karrieristen wie auch 
die so oder so belasteten Trager des bisherigen Regimes dann sehr rasch aus 
der Partei ausschieden.27 (my italics) 
Witness too: 
Es ist heute nicht gerade karrierefordernd, Mitglied in Deiner Partei zu sein. 
Aber wir wissen ja: Nur tote Fische schwimmen mit dem Strom. Die 
Opportunisten fliehen in andere Bereiche.28 
Observe, in particular, the pathos in: 
2 5 Cited in: Volmert, Johannes: "Wahlkampf-Rhetorik: Ludger Volmer und Gregor Gysi im 
'Nachtduell des ZDF'." In: Reiher, Ruth/Riidiger Lazer: Von Buschzulage und Ossinachweis. op. cit., 
p. 250 
2 6 Modrow, Hans: Aufbruch und Ende. Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag 1991, p. 9 
2 7 W o l f , Herbert: Woher kommt... ? op. cit., p. 5 
2 8 Irene Runge, in: Gregor Gysi: "left bin Opposition", op. cit., p. 13. The quotation in question stems 
from an extended interview, conducted by a personal friend of Gysi's, which is clearly constructed to 
present the PDS in as positive a light as possible; the publisher is the PDS-affiliated Dietz-Verlag. 
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PDS - Ein DDR Traditionsverein? Vielleicht sind in der PDS die 
"Unverbesserlichen", die nicht bereit waren, sich mit ihrer Vergangenheit 
auseinanderzusetzen? Das Gegenteil ist der Fall. Wahrend nicht wenige, die 
im Herbst 1989 der SED flugs deh Riicken kehrten, heute so tun, als hatten 
sie nie in der DDR gelebt, macht es sich die PDS mit der Aufarbeitung der 
Vergangenheit, der Entartung, dem Scheitern des "Realsozialismus" und der 
Verantwortung jedes einzelnen dafur nicht leicht Die Genosslnnen halten es 
fur unmoralisch, sich aus der eigenen Geschichte wegstehlen zu wollen. Sie 
haben sich bewufit schwere Verantwortung aufgeburdet, weil sie anders 
keinen Weg in die Zukunfl sehen.29 (my italics; bold in original) 
And while it is true that many resignations were indeed predicated upon careerist 
considerations: 
Many party members had joined for career reasons: for them, the loss of the 
party's privileged status, especially in relation to filling state positions, was a 
reason to leave the party3 0 
this packaging of 'reality' must be set against the equally valid perspective that: 
Those who remained in the SED after October 1989 often did so only to 
pursue their goal of the total transformation or even dissolution of the old 
party. Such people left in waves of resignations throughout the period when 
the SED and the PDS did not change radically enough to suit them.31 (my 
italics) 
Land and Possekel's historiographic picture puts the same 'reality' - that of party 
members fleeing the party - in a very different context from that widely proffered by 
the PDS: 
Die Auseinandersetzung um die Zukunft der SED-PDS blieb bis Januar 1990 
unentschieden. Diejenigen (i.e. party members - MD), die die SED auflosen 
wollten, trafen sich zweimal in Bunsen-Saal der Humbolt-Universitat. Sie 
betonten, daB die SED als Zentrum eines zutiefst undemokratischen Regimes 
diskreditiert sei, daB ihr ungeheures Eigentum nur durch skrupellose 
Ausnutzung ihrer Stellung angehauft werden konnte, daB unter den 
Mitgliedern zu viele sind, die friiher leitende Positionen in Partei und Staat 
29Wer ist das, die PDS? op. cit., p. 5 
3 0 K r i s c h , op.cit., p. 170 
3 1 ibid., p. 164 
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innehatten und sich jetzt an die Partei klammern, weil sie nach einer 
Solidargemeinschaft suchen. Die Anhanger dieser Position vertraten die 
Forderung nach Auflosung der SED-PDS und nach der Neugrundung einer 
reformsozialistischen Partei, oder sie pladierten dafiir, daB die verschiedenen 
Stromungen die Chance nutzen, jeweils unabhangige Parteien zu grunden. 
Viele traten aus der PDS aus, aber nur wenige dieser im Herbsl 1989 
politisch sehr aktiven SED-Miglieder haben seitdem in anderen Parteien neue 
politische Wirkungsmoglichkeiten gefunden?1 (my italics) 
This interpretation of the motivation for the mass exodus from the party is noticeably 
lacking in PDS historiography. Indeed, we observe the internal contradiction: while 
on one level berating - what it widely packages as - the 'opportunists' for leaving the 
party when the immediate discursive aim is to suggest that a committed, idealistic 
core has remained, elsewhere the PDS has made capital from the positive general 
impression conveyed by a rebellious Basis fleeing the nest to boost its simplified, 
polarised discursive picture of a Fuhrung-vs.-reform-m'mded-Basis model, where the 
suggestion is that the PDS has emanated logically from a reformist tradition. The 
same 'reality' is pressed into quite different conceptual moulds to suit immediate 
discursive purposes. As StraBner has put it: 
Es geht (in political communication - MD) um Sichtweisen, die ... subjektiv 
interessengeleitet (werden). Es geht um einseitige, eindimensionale, 
ausschlieBende, ausgrenzende Sichtweisen der Wirklichkeit, um 
interessengebundene Normen ... 3 3 
Here the suggestion is that those who flee the party are opportunists, there the 
suggestion is that they are would-be reformers. No more starkly do we witness the 
ideological potential inherent in packaging the same 'reality' in different ways than 
in the presentation of the overlap between the SED and PDS membership. For a PDS 
wishing to suggest that it is different from the SED while at the same time taking on 
board that tradition (for reasons we wil l discuss below), it is important to suggest a 
minimal degree of overlap, a point which does not go unnoticed by a television-
viewer in 1994 who puts it to Gysi that: 
3 2 Land/Possekel, op. cit., pp. 416-7 
-1 3StraBner, Erich: "MaximenverstoB als Regel. Zum Grundprinzip politischer Kommunikation." In: 
Opp de Hipt, Manfred/Erich Latniak (eds.): Sprache statt Politik. op. cit., p. 137 
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[Zuschauerjfrage: Die PDS sagt, nur fiinf Prozent der SED-Mitglieder seien 
noch in der PDS, andere Parteien, die gegen sie antreten, sagen: 90% der 
PDS-Mitglieder waren in der SED. 3 4 
which Gysi deflects with the following anecdote: 
Ja, da ist beides richtig. Das ist wie in dem Witz tiber den Wettlauf von 
Chruschtschow und Kennedy. Im Westen stand in der Zeitung: Kennedy 
glanzender Sieger und Chruschtschow auf dem letzten Platz, und im ND 
stand: Chruschtschow belegte einen hervorragenden zweiten Platz, wahrend 
Kennedy nur Vorletzter wurde.3 5 
While Gysi's deflectionary anecdote might suggest that he perceives these 
representations as two sides of the same coin, it is hardly likely that he is unaware of 
the ideological advantage in suggesting a lower degree of overlap through the -
sophistic? - invocation of a lower figure through a transfer of perspective based upon 
the use of a larger reference group (the SED) for effecting a comparison. 
X 
a) PDS = 5% of SED 
b) PDS = 90% in SED 
In other words, while a) and b) might actually refer to the same reality, the 
impression they convey is totally different; the case presented here offers a prime 
example of the manipulability of statistics, as highlighted by Murray Edelman36. 
Notice how in the following, too, the fact that the PDS is largely made up of SED 
members is put at a discursive remove; the suggestion is that the overlap is minimal: 
Genauso wahr ist aber auch, daft die SED einmal 2,3 Millionen 
Mitglieder hatte. 2 Millionen davon gehdren der PDS heute nicht an, sind 
entweder parteilos oder Mitglieder anderer Parteien. Wenn man also 
schon alle ehemaligen SED-Mitglieder in gleicher Weise fur die Mifistande 
unter dem fruheren Regime verantwortlich machen wollte, muBte man 90% 
Prozent davon auBerhalb der PDS suchen.37 (bold in original). 
3 4 Cited from: Kohler, Jorg/Hanno Harnisch (eds.):Gregor Gysi: Freche Spriiche. Berlin: 
Schwarzkopf & Schwarzkopf 1995, p. 12 
3 5 ib id . 
3 6 see: Edelman, op. cit., pp. 31-32 
}1Wer isf das die PDS? op. cit., p. 4 
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While it is true that that this utterance is preceded by the observation that "Wahr ist: 
die PDS ist aus der SED hervorgegangen. AuGer den seit Januar 1990 neu 
eingetretenen etwa 5,000 neuen Mitgliedern der PDS waren alle fruher in der SED", 
the textual structuring means that it is the former impression which remains freshest 
in our mind. Notice, too, how this attempt to deflect 'blame' clashes with the PDS's 
pathetic statements of personal guilt and of assumption of responsibility elsewhere 
(see below). 
Moreau's observation that: 
95% Prozent der Mitglieder (der PDS - MD) sind fruhere SED-Mitglieder-
An diesen Zahlen hat sich in der Zwischenzeit kaum etwas geandert38 
is the representation of the 'reality' of the situation, the "angle of telling" 3 9 which is 
least flattering to the PDS and least favourable to a party eager to show that it has 
shed a politically tarnished past. By contrast, a graphic illustration of the impression 
with which the PDS wishes to leave with respect to its dwindling membership is 
offered by Heinrich, Graph von Einsiedel, a parteiloser Kandidat (see chapter 4 
below) for the PDS in the 1994 Federal elections, who has clearly been convinced of 
the validity of the 'honest core' picture: 
Ich weiB nicht, wieviele Miglieder die SED hatte - wieviele davon sind noch 
in der PDS? Nach den anderen Millionen ehemaligen SEDlern fragt keiner. 
Ich glaube, die in der PDS sind sicher die ehrlichen demokratischen 
Sozialisten. Sie haben sich vielleicht eingeredet, in dieser DDR konnte doch 
einmal Sozialismus entstehen . . . 4 0 
Compare also: 
Weder die formelle Kontinuitat (with the PDS - MD) als Organisation (auch 
wenn sie im Falle der PDS sicherlich ein Fehler war), noch die 
unvermeidliche personelle Kontinuitat (auch wenn es sich nur urn ein 
Zwanzigstel der SED-Mitgliedschaft handelt) bestimmt das Handeln einer 
Partei.41 (my italics) 
3 8 Moreau/Neu, op. cit., p. 15 
3 9 S i mpson, op. cit., p. 2 
4 0 Heinrich, Graf von Einsiedel, in: Schumann, Frank: Der rote Graf. Frankfurt/Oder: Frankfurter 
Oder Editionen 1994, p. 24 (interview) 
4 1 Brie, Michael: "PDS Ante Portas." In: Blatter fur die deutsche und Internationale Politik. 8/94, 
p. 936 
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This 'reality' looks quite different when cast as follows: 
Eine weitere heterogene, aber wichtige Gruppe bilden jene PDS-Mitglieder, 
die erst nach 1990 zur PDS gingen und deren politischen Bindungen zur PDS 
in der Umbruchskonstellation entstanden. Diese Gruppe bildet zwar nur einen 
kleinen Anteil der PDS-Mitglieder (95% stammen noch aus der alten 
SED) . . . 4 2 (my italics) 
The PDS has - as a legitimising tactic - consistently sought to boost its personal 
integrity through the invocation of the notion that this 'honest core' has been 
gradually reached, as we have said, through a cathartic process of suffering. This is 
frequently cast rhetorically in the form of pathetic quasi-religious imagery leaving 
the impression that PDS members are pilgrims or martyrs to their cause. Witness the 
title of a book published by the PDS-affiliated Dietz Verlag documenting the 
transition from SED to PDS - Der schwere Weg der Erneuerung (see footnote 6) -
which is clearly heavy with religious allusion. Witness, too, the pilgrimage metaphor 
informing the following account of why Graph von Einsiedel, Bismarck's great-
grandson, chose to join the PDS's ranks: 
Dieser Weg fiihrte ihn (Einsiedel - MD) ... in eine Sackgasse ... also kehrte 
von Einsiedel um. Seitdem versucht er eine andefe StraBe ... Bei dieser ist er 
auf andere demokratische Sozialistinnen und Sozialisten gestoBen, die sich im 
Herbst 1989 auf dem Weg gemacht haben. Und denen hat er sich nun 
angeschlossen.43 
The 'religious mode' reaches its apogee in the PDS's statements that it has actively 
taken on board its SED/GDR history, has actively chosen - Jesus-like - to become the 
bearer of the sins of the past: 
Im Unterschied zu anderen politischen Organisationen leugnet die PDS ihre 
Herkunft nicht. Sie steht zu ihrer Vergangenheit ... Sie bekennt sich zu ihrer 
Verantwortung, dort wo Sozialisten schuldig wurden.4 4 
In besonderem MaBe tragen wir die Verantwortung fiir die Geschichte der 
SED und der DDR, aus der wir hervorgegangen sind. 4 5 
4 2 Land/Possekel, op. cit., p. 418 
4 3 B i s k y , Lothar/A. Brie/C. Gohde/G. Gysi/A. Lcderer, "Borniertheit erneut als politische Kategorie?" 
In: Neues Deutschland. 29 March 1994 
44Neues Programm der PDS ... (Flyleaf advertising the PDS programme of 1993), op. cit. 
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Into this rhetorical schema fits the PDS's frequent invocation of its (pathetic) apology 
to the East German people: 
Wir haben uns bei den wirklichen Opfern von Unterdriickungsmechanismen 
in der DDR aufrichtig entschuldigt und bleiben dabei, daB diesjMindeste war, 
was wir tun konnten.46 ' 
Der Parteitag beschlieBt, die SED nicht aufzulosen, ihr aber einen, ihrer 
Zielstellung entsprechenden Namen zu geben, und entschuldigt sich in aller 
Form beim Volk der DDR fur die von der stalinistischen SED begangenen 
Fehlleistungen.47 
The latter citation from the party's own (1993) historiography offers a very graphic 
example of the interaction between selection (i.e. selective mediation of 'facts') and 
causality: a diachronic comparison with the form in which the 'apology' was 
originally cast when it was "protokolliert nach BeschluB" at the party's 
aujierordentlicher Parteitag of 8/9 December 1989 is highly revealing: 
9. Dezember: In einem von den Delegierten befaBten BeschluB entschuldigt 
sich die Partei beim Volk der DDR dafur, "daB die ehemalige Fiihrung der 
SED unser Land in diese existenzgefahrdende Krise gefiihrt hat".48 (my 
italics) (Observe here the reductive Fuhrung-vs.-Partei-&-Volk polarity) 
The selective removal by 1993, then, of a mere two words ("ehemalige Fuhrung") 
forming what may appear a minor relativisation has in fact effected a profound 
change in causality. The original apology (in essence given on the part of 'someone 
else') effects a discursive transfer of blame to the party Fuhrung. (We shall have 
more to say on this matter below.) By 1993 this relativisation has been removed. We 
can make sense of the 'transformation' of the message if we see PDS discourse as 
made up of a problematic - and often contradictory - set of different 'legitimacy 
strands' (see below) with which the party has sought to legitimise itself with different 
textual recipients. Unsurprisingly, delegates at a Parteitag, for many of whom the 
PDS is, it/seems reasonable to say, a vehicle - inter alia - for personal vindication, 
are offered something of an absolution through the formulation proffered in the 
4 5 B i s k y , Lothar/Gregor Gysi/Hans Modrow: "Sozialismus ist Weg, Methode, Wertorientierung & 
Ziel. Zu den fiinf wichtigsten Diskussionspunkten der gegenwartigen Debatte der PDS." In: DISPUT. 
no. 3-4. 1995, p. 28 (DISPUT is the name of the monthly party magazine.) 
4 6 ib id . 
4 7Arnold/Schumanrf et al. (eds.): Von den Anfdngen. Eine illustrierte Chronik der PDS. 1989-1993. 
o p . ^ h p. 11 
4 8 Zimmerling, Zeno: Neue Chronik DDR: Berichte, Photos, Dokumente. no. 3.24 November-
22 December 1989 2 n d edition. Berlin: Treptower Verlagshaus GmbH 1991, p. 71 
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immediate context; on the other hand, a PDS eager to boost its personal integrity in 
the eyes of the political establishment must be seen, in presenting a formal 
historiographic account of itself, to be seriously and 'objectively' confronting and 
expiating its problematic past: hence the deletion of the relativisation where the 
immediate discursive requirement so dictates. Observe here, too, how an expressis 
verbis statement of apology is difficult to challenge because of the impossibility of 
determining what in fact a 'satisfactory' apology is, i.e. where it starts and ends; its 
ideological potential lies in its unquantifiability and unverifiability: there is no way 
of pinning down who has apologised to whom for what and indeed of pinning down 
who should apologise to whom for what! There is some contradiction between a PDS 
making rhetorical capital from a pathetic and sweeping general assumption of blame 
on the one hand whilst, on the other, simultaneously playing down any blame by 
presenting itself as the mere butt of a campaign of victimisation4 9, as a scapegoat. 
Witness the rhetorical attempt to attenuate blame in: 
So unterschiedlich die politische Couleur der Gegner der Partei des 
Demokratischen Sozialismus, so einig sind sich alle in der Behauptung, die 
PDS musse bekampft werden, weil sie die "Nachfolgerpartei" der SED sei 
und damit verantwortlich fur alles Schlechte, was in der ehemaligen DDR 
geschehen ist. 5 0 
The hostile political environment to which the PDS has been exposed has helped to 
reinforce the pathos of PDS utterances of 'suffering'. There is much evidence to 
suggest that the PDS has been thriving on the hostility heaped upon it by the political 
establishment, by capitalising upon the perlocutionary effect (i.e. the generation of 
sympathy for the PDS) of utterances in which (with not inconsiderable justification!) 
it pathetically bemoans its treatment at the hands of the political establishment. 
Michail Nelken, elected as the PDS representative for Prenzlauer Berg to the Berliner 
Abgeordnetenhaus in 1995, has revealed that: 
... daB es die PDS uberhaupt so gibt ... ist nicht ihr eigener Verdienst ... 
sondern da ist sie einfach hingestellt worden, die (the established parties -
MD) haben sie einfach nicht mitspielen lassen, sie ist ausgegrenzt worden. 
1990/91, waren die Herrschenden einigermaBen klug ... gewesen, ... hatten 
4 9 T h i s is not to deny that the PDS has indeed been widely and consistently subjected by large sections 
of the political establishment to a visceral and often irrational campaign of defamation underpinned 
by cold-war thought patterns. This issue is given particular treatment in chapter 4. 
50Wer isl das, die PDS? op. cit., p. 4 
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sie die Arme aufgemacht ... Also die hatten sie integriert ... Damit wSre sie 
weg gewesen . . . 5 I 
a view upheld by Lothar Bisky: 
Bisher hat uns die Wahlpropaganda mit dem kommunistischen 
Schreckensgespenst nicht geschadet, vielleicht verschafft uns Herr Hintze 
noch mehr Wahler.52 
This hints at the fact that the PDS, while publicly berating the political parties for 
ostracising it, was 'secretly' quite glad for a generally hostile political establishment 
to provide it with fuel for its "Kopf hoch nicht die Hande" campaign. One 
commentator percipiently remarked that the latter party slogan incorporated "fiinf 
Worte, in denen sich Millionen Ostdeutsche erkannten; genial".5 3 In other words, it 
encapsulated the suggestion that the PDS's own personal fate at the hands of an 
overweening political establishment was emblematic of the fate of East Germans 
across the board in being exposed to what has been called the "West German 
(unification - MD) juggernaut".54 We encounter a problem here which we will 
encounter time and again in our examination of PDS discourse: a complex interplay -
often disparity - between conviction (what PDS politicians really believe or feel) and 
political tactics, where reference must be made to a wider context in order to get 
beyond the surface semantics. (We will discuss in detail the question of political 
'honesty' in our examination below of the PDS's pre-election pragmatism.) One 
observer has rightly remarked that the establishment's general hostility towards, and 
marginalisation of, the PDS has afforded it a 'unifying' level on which to avoid 
addressing the (as we shall see below) impossibly complex issue of its own 
factionalisation; these factions can hold together under the lowest common 
denominator of victim: 
Deren unterschiedliche Mitgliedschaft aus machtgewohnten Altkadern, 
Fundamental-Oppositionellen und heimlichen Sozialdemokraten wie 
Parteichef Lothar Bisky wird bislang vor allem durch das Stigma der 
Entrechteten zusammengehalten.55 (my italics) 
5 , M i c h a i l Nelken, in: interview with the author; conducted in November 1995. 
5 2 Cited in: Wochenpost. 7 December 1995 
5 3 Weidemann, Charlotte: "Vordenker im Hintergrund." In: Die Woche. 26 January 1996 
5 4Markovits/Gorski, op. cit., p. 262 
5 5 Reuter, Christoph: "Angst vor der eigenen Courage." In: Stern. 30 November 1995 
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The problem, we will argue below, for a PDS leadership increasingly eschewing its 
outcast role and seeking to embrace the political establishment through the increasing 
articulation of a desire to enter into strategic alliances already perceived as 'normal' 
by (in particular) leading East German SPD politicians such as Hoppner, Ringstorff 
and Stolpe56 is that this lays bare the party's deep ideological rifts; "... genau vor 
solcher Normalisierung regt sich die Angst in der PDS".57 
Modality is a crucial rhetorical element in this 'discourse of suffering'. Observe, for 
example, the deontic58 choice in: 
Sie (viele SED-Mitglieder - MD) mufiten zusehen, wie die neuergrundeten 
Bewegungen und Parteien ... die Probleme des Landes angriffen, die auch 
ihre Probleme waren5 9 (my italics) 
in which what is essentially a passive role is cast to suggest that the (SED) party 
members in question are nothing but victims, martyrs, forced into that passivity by an 
(overweening?) outside force (a nebulous Fuhrungl). The basic proposition in its raw 
form "Sie sahen zu, als ..." assumes a very different motivational aspect. 
It is only consistent, then, that we see Gysi as becoming something of a Jesus figure, 
the saviour of the party: 
Und dann kommt plotzlich einer von auBen, von dem sie immerhin so viel 
mitgekriegt haben, der hatte es nicht notig gehabt, der hatte auf seiner Strecke 
als Anwalt weitergehen konnen, der war durch den Apparat nicht 
diskreditiert ... [er] laBt sich (observe again the deontic modality! - MD) an 
die Spitze ihrer Partei stellen und wird sogar in der Zeit tiefsten Hasses 
5 6 see Reuter, ibid, 
" ib id . 
5 8 A very readable study of modality in language is offered by SimJpon (op. cit., pp. 46-85) who 
observes that "modality refers broadly to a speaker's attitude, or~opinion about, the truth of a 
proposition expressed by a sentence", (p. 47) He proffers a model of four basic, and not neatly 
separable, modal systems: 
1) deontic: concerns the level of duty/obligation/commitment ("may", must" etc.) 
2) boulomaic: concerns a speakers wishes and desires ("hope", "regret" etc.) 
3) epistemic: concerns "the speaker's confidence or lack of confidence in the truth of a proposition 
expressed" (p. 48) (e.g. "you may be right'V'you must be right") 
4) perception: is closely linked with the epistemic system and "is distinguished by the fact that the 
degree of commitment to the truth of a proposition is predicated upon some reference to human 
perception, usually visual ..." (p. 50) (e.g. "it is evident that you're right") 
5 9Bortfeldt, op. cit., p. 9 
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gefeiert, als Demokrat und Erneuerer ... Bei den Alten und bei denen, die an 
der Partei hangen, wirst Du dann nicht nur zum Retter der Partei, sondern es 
baut sich diese emotionale Beziehung auf . . . 6 0 (my italics) 
Compare, too, the religious overtones in Irene Runge's: 
Oder Ubernimmst Du ihre teilweise unreflektierte Schuld und lost damit diese 
Dankbarkeit aus.61 (my italics) 
Consistent with the idea of a 'purified SED' is the PDS's recurrent attempts using a 
simplified and polarised Fuhrung versus others construct to portray an 'innocent' 
SED-Basis, duped and at the mercy of, a vaguely defined Fuhrung onto whom all 
blame is transferred. 
Und Gysi selbst teilte ... zur Stasi-Problematik ... eine Art Blanko-
AblaBschein aus. Die "politische Verantwortung fur die Tatigkeit des MfS lag 
ausschlieBlich bei der Fuhrung der SED," schrieb er . . . 6 2 
Der Widerspruch zwischen VerheiBung und Realitat wurde immer groBer, 
viele Mitglieder der SED wurden insbesondere durch die Fuhrung um ihr 
Ideal betrogen.63 (my italics) 
Observe the clear polarity - the 'reformers' and the (entire) SED-Basis on the one 
hand, the Fuhrung on the other in: 
Besonders der Abschnitt 5 ist unter den neu entstandenen Voraussetzungen 
nur noch eingeschrankt giiltig. Er geht davon aus, daB der ReformprozeB 
durch die SED insgesamt eingeleitet wurde. Inzwischen ist er auch durch 
Massenaklionen der Burger und durch den Druck der Parteibasis gegen den 
anfanglichen Widerstand der Parteifuhrung erzwungen worden.64 (my italics) 
Hinweise und Signale aus Bezirken und Kreisen, aus der eigenen Partei 
wurden von der Fuhrung ignorierl.65 (my italics) 
^ G y s i , in: Gregor Gysi. Ich bin Opposition, op. cit., p. 10 
6 1 ib id . , p. 11 
6 2 Falkner , Thomas/Dietmar Huber: Aufschwung PDS. Rote Socken - Zuriick zur Macht. Miinchen: 
Knaur 1994, p. 178 
6 3 G y s i , Gregor: "Was will die PDS in Deutschland." In: Gysi, Gregor (ed.): Wir brauchen einen 
dritten Weg. Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag 1990, p. 11 
6 4 B r i e , Michael/ Rainer Land/ Hannelore Petsch/ Dieter Segert/ Roscmarie Will: Studie zur 
Gesellschaftstheorie. Berlin: Dietz Verlag 1989, p. 5 
6 5 Modrow, Aufbruch undEnde. op. cit., p. 10 
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The polarity emerges with striking clarity in: 
Die SED hat damals die Entwicklung nicht gefordert, sondern gebremst. 
Indem aber die Parteibasis der Fuhrung nicht mehr folgte, half sie diese 
isolieren. Sie trug so indirekt dazu bei, daB die Oktoberereignisse 1989 
friedlich verliefen.6 6 
Observe, again, how the determinate "die Parteibasis" conveys the (unproblematic 
and unverifiable) impression that the entirety of the PDS-Basis uniformly withdrew 
its support for the leadership; crucial questions as to the nature and extent of criticism 
within that Basis are glossed over. 
This Fw/inwg-vs.-ofhers model has two important functions: firstly, it is expanded to 
suggest that the PDS's membership is drawn from precisely this nebulous - but 
absolved - and well-meaning Basis:, in other words, the party's 'moral majority'. 
Compare: 
Die 350 000 Mitglieder der PDS waren uberwiegend friiher Mitglieder der 
SED. Sie bekennen sich mithin zur eigenen Geschichte, wenngleich es vielen 
noch schwerfallt, die eigene subjeklive Ehrlichkeit im Verhaltnis zum 
objektiven geschichtlichen Versagen der eigenen Partei zu setzen.67 (my 
italics) 
Compare, too, the (agentless!) pathos of 
Sozialisten und Sozialistinnen ... sehen sich doch in ihren ehrlichen 
Bemuhungen um eine gesellschaftliche Alternative betrogen68 (by whom?, we 
might well ask - MD) 
and: 
Subjektiv haben viele (note the indeterminate again! -MD) SED-Mitglieder 
zweifelhaft Gutes gewollt und tatsachlich geleistet, objektiv haben sie damit 
aber das System gestarkt, das sie so nicht gewollt haben.69 (my italics) 
a line of argument to which Karrin Dorre 7 0, upon leaving the party in early 1995, 
responds as follows: 
6 6Meier/Behrend: Der Schwere Weg der Erneuerung. op. cit., p. 8 
6 7 G y s i , Gregor:"Was will die PDS in Deutschland?" op. cit., p. 10 
6 8 B i s k y et al.: "Borniertheit erneut als politische Kategorie?" 
6 9Bortfeldt op. cit., p. 24 
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Sich immer wieder mit den subjektiv gewollten schonen Zielen zu trosten. 
Das ist die alte Krankheit der Linken, zu glauben, Gutes zu wollen und dafiir 
jeden Dreck zu schlucken. Wie lang wollts ihr die Offentlichkeit und Euch 
selbst noch tauschen?71 
In the following, the SED and its membership are presented as neatly separable 
poles: 
Wie konnte es geschehen, dafi - entgegen dem Willen der Mitgliedschaft - die 
SED-Politik letztlich zu reaktionarer Willkurherrschaft gerann . . . 7 2 (my 
italics) 
Secondly, therefore, and crucially, the polarised Fiihrung-vs.-Basis construct offers a 
sweeping personal absolution and circumvents the highly complex issue of personal 
involvement: we wil l deal with this aspect more fully below. We re-iterate the 
internal contradiction in the line of argumentation presented here: for one discursive 
purpose the SED-Basis is given blanket absolution. Elsewhere, where the 'honest 
core' is set off against the Wendehalse, the integrity of the many who left the party is 
clearly questioned; the latter are berated for their political opportunism. 
It is only consistent, then, that we see PDS historiography at pains to link and 
identify its absolved Basis (that very Basis, so the construct goes, from which it has 
generated its membership) to the reform movement which culminated in the 
friedliche Revolution. The following is typical: 
Andererseits schlossen sich spatestens ab November 1989 die mit den 
bisherigen Verhaltnissen unzufriedenen bzw. um aie Zukunft besorgten 
Parteimitglieder entweder mit der neuen Burgerbewegung zusammen oder sie 
traten ihrerseits (erstmalig) offen als aktive innerparteiliche Opposition auf ... 
... Die kritischen und auf Reformen drangenden Krafte in der SED haben es 
zwar nicht vermocht, die verkrusteten Strukturen der Honecker-Ara selber 
aufzubrechen. Sie wurden auf dem Hintergrund und zusammen mit der 
7 0 K a r i n Dorre was a prominent member of the party Vorstand, editor of the party magazine, DISPUT, 
and a member of the Berliner A bgeordetenhaus. 
7 1 Dorre, Karin: "Ich will mich nicht langer verbiegen. Erklarung zum Austria aus der PDS." In: Die 
Trageszeitung. 23 January 1995 
7 2 Adler , Helga: "Abschied von der Partei neuen Typus. Die PDS auf dem Wege zu einer 
demokratischen sozialistischen Partei." In: Wir brauchen einen Dritten Weg. op. cit., p. 51 
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=^>» oppostionellen Biirgerbewegung wirksam. Das diente zur Gewahrleistung des 
unblutigen Verlaufes der Umwalzung.73 (my italics) 
This issue is a highly complex one for a number of reasons: there is no way of 
empirically determining the extent and nature of commitment to 'reform' within the 
SED; the problem with key-words like reform or opposition is that they are highly 
superordinate terms whose semantic content, we remember, is very difficult to 
specify.7 4 In other words, the problem for the linguistician and politologist is that 
such words encapsulate a diverse range of differing visions which are never easily 
manageable; trreir usefulness to the political actor is that they can function as a 
unifier, can conflate, on the level of signifier, fundamentally different visions and 
thus gloss over a complex causal background of differences which emerge starkly 
from a wider contextualisation. Put yet another way, the conflationary possibilities of 
highly superordinate terms allows - as Colin Good has aptly put it - the 'conceptual 
obfuscation'7 5 necessary to present a version of 'reality' which blurs and distorts 
political boundaries. Townson discusses in some detail the ideological potential of 
the extreme vagueness of many central political terms and shows how an overlap in 
the signs instrumentalised by different political groups - i.e. their use of identical 
verbal forms - is not always mirrored by a uniformity of denotation. Put simply, there 
is ideolgical advantage to be gleaned from the fact that 'same' terms can be - and are 
- used differently. 7 6 The terms we shall concentrate on below are in particular 
Reform, Erneuerung, Opposition and Sozialismus. 
Trying to entangle the web of different conceptions of reform where they existed in 
the SED brings us up against a complex psycholinguistic, problem of the type 
described upon by Colin Good 7 7: what we cannot do is read the minds of all SED 
members and in any way quantify or verify how they subjectively understood the 
concept of reform, or the extent to which they were committed to the need for it. 
What we can do, however, is identify features which relativise the conceptual 
7 ; , WoIf , Herbert: Woher kommt... Pop. cit., p. 6 
7 4Schaffner/Porsch, see footnote 21 
7 5 Good , Colin: Language, Politics and Ideology, op. cit. Good traces, inter alia, the shift in reference 
in the seventies of the term Chaot; in the student domain the term had come to signal a preference for 
demos and sit-ins as opposed to "participation in institutionalised dialogue as part of the 
democratisation of the university sector" and had been further politicised as term of reference for 
students with 'Marxist' proclivities; in the seventies it came to occupy a particularly prominent place 
in the public-political debate where it became an instrument in the right-left debate over the 
problematic relationship between the radical left and the terrorist movement. The outcome, Good 
observes, was a "more or less deliberate blurring of the distinction between legitimate political protest 
on the one hand, and violent criminal behaviour on the other". 
7 6 F o r an excellent discussion of the issues raised here, see: Townson, op. cit., esp. chapter 5. 
7 7 G o o d , Colin: Die deutsche Sprache und die kommunistische Ideologic Bern and Frankfurt: H. and 
P. Lang 1975, p. 28 ff. 
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construct which the PDS has sought to create: a model suggesting that 1) there is a 
perfect overlap between, on the one hand, a body of SED members committed to 
reform and the PDS on the other (i.e. suggesting that the latter has been generated 
entirely from the former) and 2) that in its 'reformist' mode the PDS is a priori 
identifiable with the extra-SED reformist movement (described in detail by 
Markovits and Gorski as the "underground" or "unofficial opposition"78) of the 
Wendezeit. 
We must preface our arguments here with the vital observation that SED was indeed 
not a monolith, was: 
bei weitem nicht eine Gemeinschaft Gleichgesinnter ... Das Bild bleibt 
unvollstandig, wenn nicht berucksichtigt wird, daB in der SED - insbesondere 
bei dem der Intelligenz zuzurechnenden Teil - nicht weniger iiber notwendige 
gesellschaftliche Veranderungen und Reformen nachgedacht (oder besser: 
rasoniert) wurde als in der Bevolkerung insgesamt.79 
There can be no doubt that there were voices in the SED which were critical of the 
regime80 and that certain SED members indeed took part in the demonstrations that 
culminated in the friedliche Revolution'. 
Die uberhebliche und geradezu provokative Haltung der Parteispitze 
verbreiterte die oppositionelle Bewegung bis in die Reihen der SED hineinP 
(my italics) 
An der SED-Basis gab es seit 1986 erhebliche Unruhen. Die Berichte der 
Staatssicherheit belegen dies in aller Deutlichkeit und demonstrieren, wie sich 
die Genossen zunehmend von der offiziellen Parteilinie abwandten. Sie sahen 
mehrheitlich in Gorbatschow ihren neuen Hoffnungstrager und wollten ganz 
eindeutig einen dementsprechenden Kurswechsel. Die Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands war spatestens seit Glasnost und Perestroika 
7 8 op . cit., p. 241ff. 
7 9 Wittich, Dietmar: "Mitglieder und Wahler der PDS." In: Brie et al (eds.): Die PDS - Empirische 
Befunde ... op. cit., pp. 59-60 
8 0 F o r a discussion of inner SED-unrest in the Wende and pre-Wende period see: Krisch, op. cit.; the 
genesis of an inner-SED movement calling for a modernised socialism is discussed in chapter 3 
below. 
8 , Weber , Hermann: DDR - Grundrifi der Geschichte 1945-1990. Hannover: Fackeltrager 1991, 
p. 213 
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keine einheitliche Organisation mehr ... Der innerparteiliche Erosionsprozefi 
trug mafigeblich zum Untergang der alten Verhdltnisse bei.912 (my italics) 
This is not the same as saying, however, that there was a well co-ordinated, 
homogenous inner-SED reform movement, that the aspirations of certain members of 
an inner-SED reform movement were identical or, more importantly, that these 
coincided with those of the oppositional groups (in themselves, of course, highly 
diverse) which spearheaded the events that led to the fall of the wall. The PDS 
construct - which presents us with an 'absolved' Basis clamouring for reform in the 
face of an egregious and uncompromising leadership - simply circumvents and leaves 
unaddressed the crucial and complex question of Mitlaufertum, of why the 
democratisation of a Stalinist83 system was not possible, of whether the state of 
affairs which obtained in the GDR can be said to be symptomatic of any state 
predicated on a uniform ideology seeking to channel society along the lines of a 
rational schema. These issues the PDS leaves largely unaddressed. Weber shows how 
the poles of the FM/inmg-vs.-well-meaning 'others' construct are indeed not as neatly 
separable as the PDS's historiographic picture suggests; the system obtaining in the 
GDR, he observes, was predicated upon the complicity of: 
auch jener Typ des Funktionars, der jederzeit die von oben angeordnete (oft 
wechselnde) politische Linie befolgte, sich freiwillig unterordnete und 
Parteidisziplin iibte, als diene er einem strengen Orden ... Die Allmacht der 
Fuhrung beruhte eben nicht nur auf den Sicherheitsorganen, sondern auch 
auf der stalinistischen Funktiondrs-Hierarchie, wie aber auch auf der 
8 2 Gerner , Manfred: Partei ohne Zukunft? - Von der SED zur PDS. Miinchen: Verlag Thomas 
Tilsner 1994, p. 20 
8 3 T h i s term has been used widely and indiscriminately with reference to the system that obtained in 
the G D R : we will discuss its instrumentalisation by the PDS below. We use the term here as defined 
by Weber in DDR-Grundrifi der Geschichte (see pp. 13-15) who observes that "In der D D R blieb 
dieser Begriff {Stalinismus - M D ) bis 1989 ein Tabu, seither wird er dort fast infltionar verwendet und 
verdeckt oft mehr, als er aufdeckt." (p. 13). Weber distinuishes between a broader Stalinismus ("als 
gesellschaftpolitisches System", p. 13) and a "Stalinismus im engeren oder speziellen Sinne - dies 
ware Willkiirherrschaft und Personenkult" (p. 13). This wider Stalinism is thus much more than the 
mere external features of mass murder, a fanatical personality cult and arbitrary rule which 
characterised Stalin's rule: "Der Stalinismus im allgemeinen wie im speziellen Sinne wurde nach 1945 
auf die osteuropaischen Lander und somit auch auf die S B Z bzw. D D R - die ja zunachst abhangiges 
Besatzungsgebiet war - iibertragen. Erst nach Stalins Tod und insbesondere seit dem X X . Parteitag 
der KPdSU 1956 versuchten die kommunistischen Parteien schrittweise und mehr oder weniger 
intensiv, durch einen 'Entstalinisierung' sowohl den Personenkult als auch die Willkiirherrschaft, also 
den speziellen Stalinismus zu uberwinden. Weitgehend unberuhrt blieb indes... die 
Machtkonzentration bei der Hegemonialpartei. Die entscheidenden Merkmale des Stalinismus als 
gesellschaftspolitisches System (das nicht einfach als 'Kommunismus' bezeichnet werden kann, weil 
diese Formen unter Stalin entwickelt wurden) bestanden weiter: 1. Der ideologische Anspruch, die 
Partei habe 'immer recht'. 2. Das Organisationsprinzip mit dem hierarchischen demokratischen 
Zentralismus. 3. Das System der 'Nomenklatur' in der Kaderpolitik. 4. Das Erziehungs- Informations-
und Organisationsmonopol von Partei und Staat. Trotz erkennbarer Ansatze von Modernisierung 
vieler Bereiche blieb so das gesellschaftspolitische System des Stalinismus (oder des Neo-
Stalinismus) auch in der D D R unangetastet." (p. 15; my italics) 
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Untertanenmentalitat breiter Kreise der Bevolkerung, die in Unmiindigkeit 
gehalten wurden . . . 8 4 (my italics) 
For the purposes of identifying itself with the reform movement the PDS presents 
itself as a product of the Wende itself, thereby circumventing - for this discursive 
purpose - its problematic relationship with the SED which preceded it. Observe the 
(sophistic) nature of the assertion that: 
Die PDS ist ein Kind vom Herbst '89. Die Krafte der Emeuerung brachen mit 
Ideologic, Programm und Struktur der stalinistischen SED und leiteten die 
Entwicklung zu einer demokratischen Partei ein. 8 5 (my italics) 
We remember the programmatic assertion (cited above) that: 
Die Ursprunge unserer Partei liegen im Aufbruch des Herbstes 1989 in der 
DDR, als wir aus der SED dazu beitragen wollten, die Gesellschaft in der 
DDR umfassend zu reformieren.86 
which is clearly constructed to offer the (unproblematic) suggestion that the whole of 
the PDS is composed of oppositional voices who championed reform in the 
Wendezeit. Falkner and Huber remark that: 
manchmal verharrt sie (die PDS - MD) ... noch in etwas alberner 
RoBtauscherei aus vergangenen Zeiten. So heiBt es in den internen 
Wahlkampfanleitungen 1994 kurioserweise: "Im Gegensatz zu den anderen 
Parteien hat die PDS eine relativ kurze Vergangenheit." Auch im 
Parteiprogramm versucht die PDS, sich allein als Kind der Wende 
darzustellen . . . 8 7 , 
a picture which co-exists uncomfortably alongside that widely proffered by the PDS 
elsewhere, a (legitimising?) picture in which it harks back to its putative KPD and 
SPD origins. As well as allowing the PDS to claim common ground with the SPD 
(again, on the conflationary level of signifier: the problematic dimension of temporal 
disparity is backgrounded!), the reference to a KPD/SPD past simultaneously affords 
the PDS the possibility of by-passing a tainted SED-history and of locating its origins 
in a much older (and mythical?) tradition outside of the immediate and sullied 
context of SED reprehensibility: 
8 4 Weber, op. cit., p. 15 
85Von den Anfdngen ... op. cit., back cover 
8 6 see footnote 3 
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Die PDS ist aus der SED hervorgegangen und diese aus KPD und SPD im 
Osten Deutschlands ... Wer sich wirklich zur Geschichte der SED bekennt, 
muB die game wechselvolle Geschichte von KPD und SPD ... 
beriicksichtigen . . . 8 8 (italics in original) 
Witness, too: 
Die PDS steht in sozialistischen Traditionen... Rosa Luxemburg, Karl 
Liebknecht und Paul Levi bleiben unserepolitischen Vorlaufer.89 (my italics) 
The very rich mix of perspectives we encounter in the PDS's discourse is a key 
component in the difficulty we encounter in speaking about the party (and allows the 
party to invoke a 'dialectical' counter-charge to any charge based upon the isolation 
of a particular perspective; we wil l discuss this point in some detail below.) It is 
unsurprising, then, that commentators upon the PDS all too frequently become 
entangled in the web of differing perspectives, as in the following, where the 
journalist concerned struggles with the contradiction of the PDS being both an 'old' 
and a 'new' party: 
Sei es aus Respekt vor der demokratischen Entscheidung der Ost-Burger oder 
nur aus Machtkalkiil. An der neuen Partei aus dem Osten kommen die Bonner 
nicht mehr vorbei ... Die Magdeburger Sozialdemokraten sollten mit 
Honeckers linken Erben koalieren . . . 9 0 (my italics) 
In its picture of the PDS as a new party made up of a reformist SED-nucleus, the 
PDS has largely left unaddressed the issue that - as numerous political commentators 
have pointed out - a significant portion of the PDS membership has been generated 
from, inter alia, ex-GDR officials who have found in the PDS a politische Heimat, 
and whose membership is in some cases predicated more on a nostalgic reverence for 
the GDR than for any commitment to pursuing a policy of 'reform' or to the notion 
(however vague) of a 'Democratic Socialism'. Where this issue is touched upon, it is 
to suggest that even the inertia and Sprachlosigkeil of the 'die-hards' was positively 
charged; witness the tenuous nature of the following: 
Sie (the SED-'Reformer' - MD) konnten aber auch deshalb die Zugel in die 
Hand nehmen, weil ein Teil der ehemaligen SED-Mitglieder von der 
8 7Falkner/Huber, op. cit., p. 182 
8 8 G y s i : "Was will die PDS in Deutschland?" op.cit., p. 10 
8 9 G y s i , Gregor: Ingolstddter Manifest. Wir - mitten in Europa. Plddoyer fur einen neuen 
Gesellschaftsvertrag. Berlin: Wahbiiro der PDS 1994, p. 15 
90Regieren mit der PDS? In: Der Spiegel, no. 27.1994, p. 25 
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Entwicklung zunachst so sehr verwirrt und vom klaren Scheitern des Systems 
derart beeindruckt war, daB er die Reformer unterstiitzte, auf ihre gute 
Absicht hoffend. Das waren zumeist ehrliche Sozialisten, die ohne selber 
direkt eine Opposition oder Ablehnung zum bisherigen "Realsozialismus" 
artikulieren zu konnen oder zu wollen (!- MD), dennoch begriffen hatten, daB 
eine grundsatzliche Umwertung der bisherigen Position unausweichlich wird, 
sofern man uberhaupt ernsthaft an der sozialistischen Idee weiter festhalten 
w i l l . 9 1 (my italics) 
in which it might be said of those who follow the (putative) reformers that they have 
merely understood that they 'es gerne konnen wollen wurden'. 
The PDS has widely sought to link itself to the reform movement of the Wendezeit 
through the medium of a nebulous notion of inner-party criticism of the regime; this 
criticism can in turn, of course, be re-lexicalised as a form of Opposition to it, 
potentially allowing, on the level of <Opposition> a conflation with the Opposition 
[i.e. as a verbal form] widely used to enframe the (substantially different?) activities 
of the extra-SED reform movement and thus an obfuscation of their respective 
positions. (We wil l examine this point below.) However, political (and linguistic) 
commentaries have repeatedly pointed to the evidence that, unlike calls for change 
from parties outside of the SED, inner-SED calls for "Erneuerung" and "Reform" can 
rarely be seen to be aimed at challenging the one-party state, in other words, the 
leading role of the SED. Indeed, there is considerable evidence to suggest that for 
many of the critical voices in the SED, the existing structures were to be bolstered up 
quite precisely through a revision of their external features (involving, inter alia, 
divesting the party of an ageing leadership!). Good has show conclusively how this 
was certainly the case for the party leadership. Terms such as Reform and 
Erneuerung, Umgestaltung and Dialog were undoubtedly instrumentalised to secure 
the status quo 9 2: the prevalent language of the (extra-party) opposition movement 
was usurped by the GDR leadership to suggest that change and reform had always 
underpinned the GDR's political existence: 
Dieser "Besetzungsversuch" war teil einer allgemeinen Strategic, die eine 
ganze Reihe Begriffe historisch belegen wollte ... Das Pochen auf die 
revolutionare Vergangenheit laBt sich am besten als Abwehrversuch des 
9 1 Wolf , Herbert: Woher kommt... ? op. cit., p. 5 
9 2 see Good, Colin: "Der Kampf geht weiter oder Die sprachlichen Selbstrettungsversuche des S E D -
Staates." In: Sprache und Literatur. no. 67.1991, pp. 48-55 
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Staates gegen die Wiederbelebung ganzer Wortschatzbereiche durch andere 
verstehen.93 
In other words the attempt represented a discursive strategy "nach der das Neue 
keinen Bruch mit der Tradition', sondern nur deren Fortsetzung darstelle , . ." 9 4 . In 
this respect there is evidence that even SED-'reformer' and 'Hoffnungstrager' (as he 
was often called), Hans Modrow, is no exception; objejye how the "verbindende 
Klammer des Antifaschismus"95 is invoked in the following: 
Auf die Frage nach Reformen in der DDR erinnerte Hans Modrow daran, da!3 
die DDR seit ihrer Existenz eine Politik der Reformen betreibe. Eine der 
wichtigsten sei die Bildungsreform gewesen, mit der man den faschistischen 
Ungeist aus den Schulen gejagt hatte . . . 9 6 (my italics) 
The following extract from Good's study is revealing: 
Aber wie sehr sich die Partei auch winden oder mit den neuen Begriffen 
kokettieren mochte: 
Modrow: Ja, weil ich fur mich in Anspruch nehmen kann, nicht erst 
mit der 9. Tagung des ZK uber Veranderungen, sagen wir es ganz 
offen, tiber Reformen nachzudenken ... 
(Stimme der DDR; 'aktuell' am 22.10.1989) 
es war schon friih klar, daB die Versuche der SED, der Krise durch 
Entscharfung der Sprache derer, die sie entfacht hatten, Herr zu werden, die 
aufziehenden Gefahren durch Ent- oder Aneignung der neuen Sprache 
abzuwenden, nicht gelingen sollte.9 7 (my italics -MD) 
Indeed, as Good has pointed out 9 8, the term Erneuerung has a distinct tradition in 
SED-discourse in the "Begriffspaar" (Good) Kontinuitat and Erneuerung (closely 
allied to widely intrumentalised rhetorical constructs in SED-speak such as 
9 3 ib id . , p. 48, p. 49 
9 4 ib id . , p. 50 
9 5 Gerner , op. cit., p. 35. The reliance in PDS discourse on the ideologeme Antifaschismus is discussed 
in chapter 3 below. 
9 6 Extract from: Neues Deutschland, 26 September 1989, cited in: Lau, Karin/Karlheinz Lau: 
Deulschland auf dem Weg zur Einheit: Dokumente einer Revolution. Braunschweig: 
Westermann 1990, p. 14 
9 7 G o o d , Colin: "Der Kampf geht weiter ..." op. cit., p. 53 
9 8 ib id . , pp. 49-50 
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"Vervollkommnung des Erreichten""/"Vervollkommnung der Sozialistischen 
Gesellschaft"100), these terms being part and parcel of a world-view in which the 
sanctity of existing structures is not called into question. 
Reference in PDS circles is frequently made to a strategic paper101 co-authored by 
Michael Brie as 'proof of inner-party dissent. This latter too champions an 
"Erneuerung des Sozialismus" and an "erneuerten Sozialismus"102. Yet again there is 
strong evidence to suggest that here, too, the sanctity of existing structures is not to 
be challenged; observe the standard 'Freund/Feind' Denkmuster in: 
Nur ein Teil der Politiker der BRD und anderer NATO-Staaten geht davon 
aus, daB eine Destabilisierung der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Situation 
in Europa oder in der Welt heute die Losung der anstehenden globalen 
Probleme weiter verzogert oder ganz unmoglich macht, nur ein Teil ist daher 
wirklich an Entspannung, politischer Stabilitat und progressiver Erneuerung 
des Sozialismus interessiert.103 (my italics) 
Observe, too, the re-emergence of the conceptual pair discussed above: "Eine 
Reorganisation des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Systems der sozialistischen 
Gesellschaft ... erfordert... Einheit von Kontinuitat und Erneuerung.(my italics) 
If we are as yet in any doubt as to the authors' commitment to the the hegemony of 
the party, then it is clearly articulated in the following: 
Reformprozesse miissen durch eine politische Kraft gefiihrt werden, die 
Handlungsspielraum besitzt. Dies ist unter den Bedingungen des Sozialismus 
in der DDR heute allein die SED, die auf neue Weise (Erneuerung! -MD) das 
Integrationszentrum fiir politische Parteien und Massenorganisationen, 
Bewegungen und Burgerinitiativen werden muB . . . 1 0 5 (my italics) 
in which we have little more than a re-assertion of the validity of the Nationale Front 
model! There is no invocation of the question of the need for new political forces: the 
"Schaffner and Porsch (op. cit., p. 37) cite the following example from the SED's 1986 Party 
Conference: "Natiirlich verlangt das Leben, das Erreichte zu vervollkommnen." 
, 0 0 S e e : Schaffner and Porsch, ibid., p. 43 
l 0 1 B r i e et al.: Studie zur Gesellschaftsstrategie. op. cit. 
1 0 2 i b i d . , p. 6 
, 0 3 i b i d . , pp. 87-8 
, ( M ib id . , p. 88 
l 0 5 i b i d . , p. 89 
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impression given is that the existing is to be optimised. We observe something 
similar in Hans Modrow's assertion in his autobiography that: 
Uber die Notwendigkeit eines neuen Verhaltnisses zwischen den Parteien, um 
eine breite Basis echter Zusammenarbeit zu schaffen ... wurde nicht 
gesprochen . . . 1 0 6 (my italics) 
The very reference to a determinate "den Parteien" clearly implies that the creation of 
any new party which might have challenged the SED's constitutionally guaranteed 
hold on power is precluded. Notice how close this comes to the tenor of a clearly 
preservationist leaflet issued - in response to the activities of the incipient Neues 
Forum - to party functionaries by a desperate and beleaguered SED in October 1989: 
Fur einen schopferischen Dialog verfiigen wir mit den in der nationalen Front 
der DDR vereinten Parteien und Massenorganisationen... uber alle 
erf or der lichen Formen und For en. Sie gilt es noch umfassender zu nutzen, um 
getragen von politischer Vernunft und staatsburgerlichen 
VerantwortungsbewuBtsein - die Antworten zu finden, mit denen wir dem 
Wohl des Volkes am besten dienen.107 (my italics) 
Markovits and Gorski are in doubt that the Block-Parteien of the Nationale Front 
were mere appendages of the SED; indeed as the 'official opposition' they are 
contrasted, we remember, with the "unofficial opposition"1 0 8 centred around the 
dissident movement This categorisation, it will be argued below, is vital. 
The authors of the Studie zur Gesellschaftsstrategie cited above see the reform of the 
political system in primarily economic terms. This mode of thinking is located 
entirely within the tradition of the Communist ideology of the SED. Good 1 0 9 has 
described in detail the linguistic implications of the "Einheit von Politik, Okonomie 
und Ideologic"1 1 0 which entailed, in particular, a "Politisierung des okonomischen 
Bereiches, die ein Grundpfeiler der kommunistischen Ideologic ist", an "Anwendung 
okonomischer Begriffe auf Bereiche, die nicht undbedingt als 'okonomisch' gedeutet 
werden mussen".111 In other words, given the 'hermetic' ideological interaction 
, 0 6 Modrow: Aufbruch und Ende. op. cit., p. 22 
l 0 7 Extrac t from: Die Tageszeilung Berlin (West) (ed.): DDR-Journal zur Novemberrevolution. 
Berlin 1989, pp. 88-9, cited in: Lau/Lau: Deutschland auf dem Weg zur Einheit... op. cit., p. 14 
1 0 8 see above, footnote 22 
1 0 9 G o o d , Colin: Die deutsche Sprache und die kommunistische Ideologic, op. cit. (see, in particular, 
chapters 5 and 6) 
1 1 0 i b i d . , p. 80 (citation from Neues Deutschland. 11 December 1964) 
1 , 1 ibid., p. 84 
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between politics and economics, a revision of the political system is necessarily seen 
as predicated primarily upon the articulation of a reorganisation of the economic 
system, which leaves intact existing political structures. In this ideology politics is 
economics. (Good has shown, too, how this 'economicisation' also impinges upon 
the private sphere of individuals, at least in terms of verbal constructs.)112 So it is that 
the authors of the Gesellschaftsstrategie declare that: 
Das geeignete Feld fur den Beginn ergebnisorientierter Umstellungen im 
politischen System, in der Wirtschaft und in der Offentlichkeit scheint die 
okologische Reorganisation der Wirtschaft und der Lebensprozesse der 
Individuen unserer Gesellschaftzu sein.m (italics in original) 
The idea, then, of a pluralist party system is not on the agenda. Whether or not a 
democracy thrives on political pluralism is a matter of politological conjecture. What 
is interesting for the critical linguist is that in invoking the highly superordinate term 
reform, the text does not raise - and therefore problematise - the detailed question of 
political structures: this interpretation of reform glosses over the complex causal 
inter-relationship between the political structures and the economic system, i.e. 
avoids the problematic notion that the faults of the economic system may lie in the 
political structures themselves. 
Land and Possekel's excellent study of the origin and nature of inner-SED reform 
movement(s) identifies precisely this: 
Der reformsozialistische Diskurs innerhalb der SED ... vor 1989 hatte ... 
zwar eine allgemeine Kritik der Machtstrukturen des Realsozialismus 
geleistet, aber eine Analyse des eigenen Verhaltnisses zur Macht vermieden. 
Die Option auf eine kiinftige Ubernahme der Macht aus der kommunistischen 
Partei heraus gehorte zum Selbstverstandnis der eigenen Rolle als Akteur 
moglicher politischer Veranderungen. Daraus ergab sich die paradoxe 
Situation, daB sie (the reformist intellectuals in the SED - MD) ein modernes 
politisches System ... mit den Mitteln der Gegenmoderne (einfuhren 
wollten). 1 1 4 
1 1 2 i b i d . (see especially chapter 5) 
Wolfgang Leonhard paints a similar picture in chronicling his politicisation in the pre-war Soviet 
Union: "In der Sowjetunion ist das Leben ja viel starker politisiert als in jedem anderen Lande der 
Welt. E s gibt kaum eine Frage, die nicht 'politisch' betrachtet wird ..." Cited from: Leonhard, 
Wolfgang: Die Revolution entlaftt ihre Kinder. Koln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch 1990, p. 33 (my italics) 
1 , ; , B r i e et al.: Studie zur Gesellschaftsstrategie. op. cit., p. 91 
1 , 4 Land/PossekeI, op. cit., p. 422 
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What is crucial too, as we touched apon above is that the PDS has been keen to cite 
examples of inner-SED disaffection to invoke its democratic credentials (and to 
suggest an active and leading role in the friedliche Revolution) under the banner of a 
generic inner-SED 'reform' movement which subsumes and by-passes individual 
conceptions of reform, in particular those which might not be compatible with the 
widely accepted notion in a united Germany that democracy is based upon a pluralist 
spectrum of parties. It is against this background that we must assess and relativise 
Gysi's invocation of "intellektuelle Vorarbeit" in the following extract from an 
exchange with Joschka Fischer: 
Fischer: ... Wir haben es ja auch noch mit einem Wunder zu tun: Es handelt 
sich da ja nicht um eine liebenswerte Protestpartei aus der ehemaligen DDR, 
sondern die steht in der Kontinuitat der SED. Fur mich ist bis heute schwer 
nachvollziehbar, wie die alte Staatspartei SED innerhalb weniger Stunden und 
Tage vom Saulus zum Paulus werden konnte. 
Gysi: Alles Klischees! Ich kann dir erklaren, was du da fur ein Wunder haltst. 
Es hat sich namlich nicht in Stunden abgespielt. Spatestens sett 1985 haben 
Intellektuelle in der SED Vorarbeit dafiir geleistet.115 (my italics) 
It might be argued, of course, that the authors of the Gesellschaftsstrategie were 
going as far as they could under the prevailing conditions, i.e. that to tackle the 
leading role of the party would have meant political and personal suicide. If, 
however, we accept that the PDS has sought to create a discursive model linking 
inner-SED reform to the kind of reform that would ordinarily be expected by, and 
accepted as 'democratic' in, Western democracies, then there is significant evidence 
in the case of Hans Modrow alone to undermine the absoluteness of the conceptual 
model that the PDS has sought to create. I f we accept, too, that the authors of the 
Gesellschaftsstrategie failed to invoke the question of the need to re-examine 
existing structures because they were in no 'bargaining position' to do so, this 
'defence' would certainly seem more problematic in the case of the 
"Hoffnungstrager"116 Hans Modrow who, as the GDR's new Ministerprasident from 
November 1989 to March 1990 and subsequently Ehrenvorsiizender of the PDS, was 
ideologically far less shackled than his predecessors. In their crucially revealing 
article examining the linguistic features of governmental declarations in Germany, 
Schaffner and Porsch reveal clearly that in the case of governmental declarations 
, , 5 F r o m : "Streitgesprach mit Joschka Fischer." cited in: Kohler/Harnisch: Gregor Gysi: Freche 
Spriiche. op. cit., p. 102 
' , 6 Modrow: Aufbruch und Ende. op. cit., p. 12 
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issued by Kohl, Biedenkopf and de Maiziere, the solution to the (ex-) GDR's 
problems are metaphorically linked to the conceptual domain of construction. 
The aim was to build a society built on new foundations and different values. 
This explains all the references to 'renewal, restructuring, reconstruction, 
transition from X to Y ' . 1 1 7 
Schaffner and Porsch point out that in the government declaration - the first of its 
type in the GDR - given to the Volkskammer by Hans Modrow upon assuming 
office, the latter, by contrast, describes the objectives before him not in terms of 
reconstruction but Erneuerung. The crucial point is that: 
Although we find "renewal [Erneuerung]" in all the speeches, there is, 
however, a difference in the semantic content of the word ... Modrow speaks 
of a renewal of the existing system... When de Maiziere Kohl and 
Biedenkopf speak of "renewal", they mean a new social system with new 
structures, values and mechanisms ... Although Modrow does mention 
PROBLEMS, he is still arguing within the traditional logical relations: the 
system is to be renewed by reforms, but it is still the same social system, i.e. 
the basis of comparison for his kind of socialist society ('a better socialism') 
remains the same.118 (my italics; capitals in original) 
In his autobiographical Aufbruch und Ende, a disgruntled Modrow berates the 
'"fuhrenden Genossen'" (sic: the inverted commas are Modrow's: a clear attempt to 
distance himself from that Fiihrung) for its "absolute Unfahigkeit", for its 
"Konzeptions- und Sprachlosigkeit" and its "Handlungsunfahgkeit"l ,9which carries a 
clear contextual implication that Modrow takes issue not with the nature of the 
system itself, but rather with its ageing Fiihrung. In other words, the solution lies in 
a change of that Fiihrung, not in addressing the very basis of the system. Put another 
way, the very fact that Modrow berates the Fuhrung for lacking "konzeptionelle 
Vorschlage zur Uberwindung dieser schweren Krise" 1 2 0 suggests that the fact of 
there being a set of solutions to overcome the crisis within the given framework of 
GDR society is taken as a natural premise. Interesting, too, is that the state of affairs 
obtaining is categorised as a Krise, a lexeme which is undoubtedly negatively 
charged and betrays Modrow's less-than-positive attitude to the turn which events 
were taking. 
1 l 7Schaffner/Porsch, op. cit., p. 42 
l , 8 i b i d „ pp. 42-3 
1 , 9 Modrow: Aufbruch und Ende. op. cit., pp. 9, 10 
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We observe, too, how the Fuhrung-vetsus-Basis model is at times polarised even 
more starkly: absolution is offered to the rank and file by transferring the focus of 
blame onto an individual or individuals: 
In volliger Verkennung der Situation glaubte Erich Honecker, mit den 
Feierlichkeiten ... die politische Stabilitat des Landes sichern zu kdnnen.12' 
Compare: 
Im Ergebnis harter Auseinandersetzungen brach das Honecker-Regime 
zusammen.122 
Ware die DDR aber 1985 noch zu retten gewesen, wenn Honecker & Co. die 
Politik Gorbatschows nicht als abenteuerlich abgelehnt hatten, sondern der 
Moskauer Linie gefolgt waren?1 2 3 
In other words we again have a model which glosses over the complex question of 
why thousands of party members were willing to offer their complicity in preparing 
for acclamatory celebrations to mark the anniversary of a country for whose political 
system they, according to Modrow 1 2 4 , had already come to express their disaffection. 
This individualisation as a means of transferring blame is not without its 
historiographic parallels: Townson has argued convincingly that formulations such as 
Rudolf Buschner's "Bilanz der Regierung Hitlers": 
... immediately individualise(..) and personalise(..) the epoch relieving the 
author of the need to search for systemic causes . . . 1 2 5 
Townson identifies, too, how the reductive notion of a Machtergfeifung Hitlers 
suggests "the imposition of a minority w i l l " 1 2 6 and circumvents the more problematic 
notion that: 
Hitler did not stand alone ... he was at least tolerated, i f not actively 
supported, across a broad band of the political spectrum.127 
1 2 0 i b i d . , p. 10 
1 2 1 i b i d . 
l 2 2 Meier/Behrend: Der Schwere Weg der Erneuerung. op. cit., p. 5 
, 2 3 G y s i , Gregor: "Letzte Ausfahrt Sozialismus." In: Kursbuch. In Sachen Erich Honecker. no. 111. 
Berlin: Rowohlt 1993, p. 151 
1 2 4 see Modrow: Aufbruch und Ende. op. cit., p. 10 ff. 
1 2 5 Townson, op. cit., p. 173 
1 2 6 i b i d . 
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StraBner calls the process of transferring blame to an individual/individuals the 
"bewahrte argumentative Ausgrenzungsstrategie"128 and identifies the desperate 
attempts of the CDU in Schleswig-Holstein at the time of the Barschel-Affare to 
'limit the damage' by finding inner-party scape-goats upon whom all blame is 
heaped: 
Mit der Reduzierung und vor allem der Personalisierung auf diejenigen, die 
man partout nicht reinwaschen konnte, versucht man dann den Schaden 
moglichst zu begrenzen. Zugleich dient das Opfer der wenigen dazu, die 
Lauterung des ganzen zu demonstrieren, denn von ihnen kann man sich leicht 
distanzieren.129 
We emphasise this point because of the importance, in evaluating PDS 
historiography, of bearing in mind that the discursive features for which the PDS is 
ritually criticised are by no means alien to the discourse of other parties across the 
political spectrum. We will have much to say on this subject below. 
In Aufbruch und Ende, Modrow states, too, that his (and Wolfgang Berghofer's) 
ultimate aim was to secure a "demokratische Umwalzung im Zeichen der 
Perestroika"130 We recall that when Gorbachev's process of Perestroika was launched 
it did not call into question the Communist Party's monopoly on power; political 
pluralism was championed when it became a historical inevitability. 
Political commentators have pointed to other factors which they see as mitigating the 
'democratic' credentials of the Modrow government. Gerner131 describes in detail the 
Modrow government's preservationist attempts to maintain the Staatssicherheit in the 
form of a Verfassungsschutz (having first renamed it an Amt fur nationale 
Sicherheit): 
Vor allem der weiterhin intakte Staatssicherheitsdienst war eine existentielle 
Bedrohung fur die bisherigen Ergebnisse der Revolution. Viele befurchteten 
damals einen Putschversuch dieser Organisation und damit die 
Wiederherstellung des "ancien regime".'3 2 
, 2 7 i b i d . 
1 2 8 StraBner: "MaximenverstoB als Regel ..." op. cit., p. 132 
1 2 9 ib id . , p. 135 
, 3 0 Modrow: Aufbruch ... op. cit., p. 17 
1 3 1 Gerner , op. cit., p. 32 ff. 
1 3 2 i b i d . , p. 32 
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In particular Modrow's decision to appoint Schwanitz (Mielke's ex-deputy!) as head 
of this organisation133 caused widespread resentment, especially with the Runder 
TischU4. Gerner shows how the issue of the Stasi's continued existence was one of 
the major bones of contention between the Runder Tisch and the Modrow 
government: 
Das zentrale Konfliktfeld war jedoch in der ersten Phase die Auflosung des 
Staatsicherheitsdienstes. Das Bemiihen, hierbei moglichst konservierend zu 
wirken, wurde sehr schnell sichtbar. Der Versuch des Ministerpdsidenten die 
"Staatssicherheit" in einen "Verfassungsschutz" umzuwandeln machte 
deutlich, daft die alte Staatspartei nicht "kampflos das Feld rdumen wollte". 
Das Bemiihen, das alte "Schwert und Schild" der Partei zu relten war 
unverkennbarJ35 (my italics) 
Ultimately, Modrow was forced by the Runder Tisch and the force of public protest 
to abandon the idea of a Verfassungsschutz. 
Gerner's account of the attempts to maintain the Staatssicherheitsdienst thus paints a 
very different picture of reality than is contained in the PDS's model which generally 
leaves - or seeks to leave - the impression that there was a perfect overlap between 
the inner-SED protest movement (with which, after all, especially 'reformist' figures 
like Modrow have been linked) and a mythical, monolithic opposition movement; 
while we can never in any way verify or quantify the precise extent of the PDS's 
involvement or overlap with the Burgerbewegungen (the term Opposition after all, if 
we step outside the framework of a widely accepted institutionalised use of such an 
entity in a political system [cf. 'Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition'], enframes no hard 
and fast, immutable denotative core which could in any way be empirically 
quantified; in other words, it is impossible to specify where 'true' opposition starts 
and ends: what does and what does not constitute a satisfactory opposition is thus a 
matter of subjective perception), we can draw attention to interpretations of reality 
which relativise the impression generally left in PDS historiography that it marched 
hand in hand with these Burgerbewegungen. Gerner's model invokes quite different 
polarities: 
'•"see ibid., p. 35 
1 3 4 T h i s organ, convened by the church, was designed to fill the power vacuum which had arisen in 
the aftermath of November 1989 (especially following the withdrawal by the Volkskammer [the East 
German parliament] of the SED's automatic constitutional right to govern in December 1989) until 
such time as elections could be held. It brought together forces from both the Nationale Front (i.e. the 
S E D and the 'Blockparteien') and the Burgerbewegungen. (A detailed account is offered by Gerner, 
op. cit., p. 33 ff.) 
1 3 5 Gerner , op. cit., p. 34 
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Dies (the decision to appoint Schwanitz - MD) erweckte den Unmut und 
Protest der Opposition und lieB das MiBtrauen an Modrow wachsen.136 (my 
italics) 
Diese offensichtliche Hinhaltetaktik (of the Modrow government in refusing 
to come clear on the location of its central database - MD) veranlaBte die 
Opposition amRunden Tisch ein Ultimatum zu stellen.1 3 7 (my italics) 
Die ehemalige Staatspartei, inklusive des Ministerprasidenten, schlug nach 
dem Verzicht auf einen Verfassungsschutz gegeniiber der Opposition einen 
wesentlich moderateren Ton an. 1 3 8 (my italics) 
The following polarised conceptual picture of the 'new' and 'old' forces which 
together made up the Runder Tisch betrays a very clear distinction in Gerner's mind 
between a post-Wew/e 'reformist' SED and the various citizens' action groups/extra-
SED reform groups: 
Dazu wurde auf Einladung der Kirchen ein zentraler Runder Tisch 
eingerichtet, an dem paritatisch die alten und die neuen Krafte vertreten 
Waren ... Die alten Krafte setzten sich aus der SED und den vier ehemaligen 
Blockparteien zusammen ... Die neuen Krafte (waren) ... anfanglich durch 
sieben Organisationen (footnoted as: Vereinigte Linke, Sozialdemokratische 
Partei, Demokratie Jetzt, Neues Forum, Griine Partei, Initiative Frieden und 
Menschenrechte, Demokratischer Aufbruch - MD) prasent . . . 1 3 9 (my italics) 
Sontheimer would challenge a 'broad' interpretation of opposition which allows the 
PDS to become co-initiators of the 'peaceful revolution' by a simple conflation of 
inner-SED opposition with the (on the level of signifiant identical) opposition that 
characterised the activities of the Biirgerbewegungen. His denotation is specific and 
unequivocal: 
Trager der Demonstrationen, deren Speerspitze die Stadt Leipzig wurde, 
waren die vielen kleinen Biirgerbewegungen, die in den unruhigen 
Sommermonaten aus ihrer weitgehenden Isolierung ausgebrochen und mit 
, 3 6 i b i d . , p. 35 
1 3 7 ib id . , pp. 35-6 
1 3 8 ib id . , p. 36 
l 3 9 i b i d . , p. 33 
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wachsendem Mut offentlich als Opposition zum SED-Regime auf den Plan 
getreten waren. 1 4 0 (my italics) 
The reform movement, then, was not a homogenous entity which neatly incorporated 
a uniform, reformist SED! Falkner and Huber observe, in response to Bortfeldt's 
monograph (see footnote 2 above) that: 
... bei der Betrachtung des AuBerordentlichen SED-Parteitags vom Dezember 
1989 und der Zeit danach (werden) alle jene Sprengsatze konsequent 
ausgespart, die die Partei mit ihren Inkonsequenzen und ihren Versuchen zur 
Rettung der alten politischen und okonomischen Macht in die ohnehin 
siedende Gesellschaft warf . . . 1 4 1 
We have seen how even in the case of Modrow - widely championed as a 'reformer' 
- the championing of "Erneuerung" was not ultimately aimed at challenging the 
'WahrheitsmonopoV of the SED. (Hence, no doubt, the agonised attempts to 
maintain the Stasil). 
If we look at the aspirations of the extra-SED opposition/reform movement - its 
enormous diversity notwithstanding142 - we observe, crucially, that the call for 
political "Erneuerung", for reforms, was generally - across the board - aimed at much 
more than (a mere) economic transformation with a corresponding maintenance of 
existing structures: 
Proteste gegen den autoritaren SED-Staat mit den vielfaltigen Formen des 
MiBbrauchs und der MiBwirtschaft sowie Forderungen nach Veranderungen 
des politischen Systems der DDR waren der gemeinsame Nenner der ersten 
Oppositionsgruppen, die es wagten, unter den Augen de Staatssicherheit an 
die Offentlichkeit zu treten.1 4 3 (my italics) 
Witness, for example: 
Die notwendige Demokratisierung unseres Landes hat die grundsatzliche 
Bestreilung des Wahrheits- und Machtanspruchs der herrschenden Partei zur 
1 4 0Sontheimer, Kurt: Grundzuge des politischen Systems der neuen Bundesrepublik Deulschland. 
Miinchen, Zurich: Piper 1993, p. 88 
1 4 , Falkner/Huber, op. cit., p. 183 
1 4 2 Markovits and Gorski's excellent study (op. cit., see esp. pp. 237-63) deals with the aspirations of 
the (extra-SED) reform movement during the Wendezeit in some detail: they show that oppositional 
groups were necessarily highly factionalised given the nature of a repressive system in which groups 
could only operate underground on a localised level. 
1 4 3 L a u / L a u , op. cit., p. 7 
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Voraussetzung. ... Das erfordert die klare Trennung von Staat und 
Gesellschaft und ... Parlamentarische Demokratie und ParteipluralitaV44 
(my italics) 
Compare, too, the following extracts from the Grundungsaufruf of Demokratie Jetzt: 
Vor wenigen Jahren noch gait der "real existierende" Staatssozialismus als 
der einzig mogliche. Seine Kennzeichen sind das Machtmonopol einer 
zentralistischen Staatspartei ... Trotz seiner unbestreitbaren Leistungen fur 
soziale Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit ist es heute offenkundig, daB die Ara des 
Staatssozialismus zu Ende geht. Er bedarf einer friedlichen demokratischen 
Erneuerung.]45 (my italics) 
Wir wollen die wirkliche Wahl zwischen Programmen und deren Vertretern. 
Wir wollen die Gleichberechtigung aller politischen Parteien und Gruppen, 
ausschlieBlich der Faschisten. Wir lehnen den Fuhrungsanspruch der SED 
ab . . . 1 4 6 (my italics) 
In other words the aspirations of the oppositional movements which sprang up in the 
autumn of 1989 strike at the very heart of the GDR state system in challenging the 
leading role of the party. 
We may summarise our arguments here as follows: 
The PDS's conceptual model glosses over vital questions of causality and leaves the 
impression that the PDS is composed entirely of the 'reformist' voices within the 
SED. By linking itself to the Wende-penod and - as a 'Mitgestalter' - to the 
oppositional movements under the banner of a mythical unified reform movement, 
the PDS has sought to put the aspirations of inner-SED 'reformers' - who, the PDS 
suggests, now makes up the PDS! - entirely on a par with those of the oppositional 
movements. We remember the extract (cited above) from the flyleaf accompanying 
the party's second programme and observe the impression created: 
, 4 4 " Z u m Aufruf der Initiativgruppe 'Sozialdemokratische Partei in der DDR'." (Extract from: Die 
Tageszeilung Berlin (West) (ed.): DDR-Journal zur Novemberrevolution. Berlin 1989, pp. 88-9), cited 
in: Lau/Lau: Deutschland auf dem Weg Zur Einheit... op. cit., pp. 7- 8 
, 4 5 c i ted in: Weber, op. cit., p. 214 
, 4 6 " A u s dem Aufruf der Burgerbewegung 'Demokratie Jetzt', 30.9.89." (Extract from: Wir sind das 
Volt Aufbruch '89. Teil I . Halle 1989, p. 36ff.), cited in: Lau/Lau: Deutschland auf dem Weg zur 
Einheit... op. cit., p. 9 
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Die PDS bekennt sich zu jenem aktiven Teil der SED, der mit dem 
Stalinismus brach und gemeinsam mit anderen politischen Bewegungen des 
Herbstes 1989 die DDR umfassend reformieren wollte. 1 4 7 (my italics) 
Observe, here, the use of the nebulous notion of "sich bekennen" which performs the 
important function of forming a conceptual link between, and suggesting a parity of, 
on the one hand, the PDS, and, on the other, inner-SED critics of the regime 
/'reformers'(?), while stopping short of an (untenable?) direct equation of the two: a 
suggestion, after all, is defeasible. In addition to the suggestion that the PDS is 
simply the reformist "sub-set" of the SED, the conflationary potential of lexemes 
such as reformieren and Opposition is clearly tapped to create the unproblematic 
impression that there was a perfect uniformity of conceptions of reform among those 
- whether inside or outside the party - critical of the SED. We have observed that 
there is no such perfect overlap: the case of Hans Modrow - who is, after all, the 
PDS's Ehrenvorsitzender - alone offers compelling evidence that this is not so and 
undermines the absoluteness of the construct. We re-iterate, however, that this is not 
the same as saying that critical voices in the SED whose conception of (the need for) 
political renewal came close to/coincided with the ways in which it was understood 
in the extra-SED opposition groups were non-existent; it is rather the case that the 
reality is not as clear-cut as the impression left by the PDS's black and white model. 
(As we wil l see below, there is further evidence to suggest that the PDS is not 
composed entirely of 'reformers' convinced of the need for a move away from the 
monist thinking which characterised public discourse in the GDR. Falkner and Huber 
have shown how Sahra Wagenknecht - chairperson of the PDS's Kommunistische 
Plattform - is on record as expressly ruling out the notion of political pluralism: 
Aber auch den nach schweren Niederlagen und schweren Fehlern erlernten 
Pluralismus der Partei lehnt die kommunistische Avantgardistin ab: Fur sie ist 
"programmatischer Pluralismus immer die Basis einer reformistischen, nie 
einer revolutionaren Politik." 1 4 8) 
Edelman has pointed to the ideological potential of: 
The Evocation of Mythical Populations as Reference Groups. 
Perhaps the archetypal device for influencing political opinion is the 
evocation of beliefs about the problems, or intentions, or the moral condition 
of people whose very existence is problematic, but who become the 
1 4 7 see footnote 14 
, 4 8 Falkner/Huber: AufschwungPDS... op. cit., p. 160 
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benchmarks by which real people shape their political beliefs and 
perceptions.149 
While these reference groups can be substantiate, frequently they are spurious: 
Politicians' statements about unobservable people are often either impossible 
to verify or quite clearly invalid ... The facts regarding controversial political 
issues are typically so complex and so ambiguous that it is easy to find a set 
of allegations (or claims - MD) that both serve ... [a] rationalising function 
and are not manifestly untrue.150 
In PDS historiography reference has been widely made, as we have said, to a vaguely 
defined inner-SED core of criticism. While it is very hard to pin down the nature and 
extent of the latter (i.e. verify it!), the very 'oppositionality' alluded to allows the 
motivation - whatever it may ultimately have been - underpinning the 'criticism' to 
be subsumed under such categories as Opposition and Reform and, thereby allowing 
the PDS the opportunity in its historiography to link itself with - on the level of 
<Opposition> (inter alia) the dissident*51 opposition groups which spearheaded the 
events of the Wendezeit (even if, as we have seen, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that there was some disparity between inner-SED conceptions of reform and 
those of the Burgerbewegungen). In other words, the wide semantic latitude afforded 
by highly superordinate terms such Opposition and Reform allows the PDS to present 
itself (unproblematically) as an integral part of the active, anti-SED opposition. 
Crucially, too, the PDS's "kritische Stimmen" - sometimes "kritisches Potential" -
model (see the quotation which follows) is part and parcel of that strand of PDS 
discourse in which the PDS seeks to procure legitimacy with its membership by 
offering it personal absolution, here by affording it a vaguely defined but positively 
charged body of motivation with which to identify. (We stress again that we are not 
questioning the fact that there was indeed a body of inner SED-criticism; what is at 
issue, however, is whether there is a perfect and unproblematic overlap between these 
and the PDS as a whole, and between these and the Burgerbewegungen.) The 
following extract from a Leserbrief from the party magazine, DISPUT, typifies the 
conceptual model which party ideologues have sought to create and is evidence of 
the success of its reception among its membership at least: 
1 4 9 Edelman, op. cit., p. 29 
1 5 0 ib id . , p. 30 
1 5 1 T h e terminology here is crucial: this will be dealt with below. 
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Die wenigen, die heute noch dabei sind, gehorten bereits in der DDR dem 
kritischen Potential der SED an ... Der PDS gehoren heute viele, ehemalige 
SED^Mitglieder an, die schon fruher im Kleinen bemiiht waren, die Situation 
der Menschen ertraglicher zu gestalten und die staatlichen Stellen an ihre 
Pflichten gegeniiber den Menschen in der DDR zu gemahnen. In der PDS ist 
man heute nicht mehr aus opportunistischen Griinden, wie viele in der 
DDR 1 5 2 (my italics) 
The same Leser proceeds to remark that the PDS contains individuals who: 
gegen dasselbe kampfen, wie es das Neue Forum und andere Gruppen der 
Burgerbewegungen tun 1 5 3 (my italics) 
Observe how in the following (part of which we have already cited above), inner-
party 'critics' are neatly relexicalised154 as "Reformer": 
In der DDR-Zeit war viel fruher und viel tiefer, als man heute glauben 
mochte, innerhalb eines nennenswerten Teils der SED-Mitglieder die Einsicht 
verbreitet, daft eine weittragende und prinzipielle Revision der damals 
offiziell vertretenen politischen Leitlinien und Praktiken ansteht... Die Leute 
mil solchen Ansichten... konnten aber auch deshalb die Ziigel in die Hand 
1 5 2 " P D S gleich S E D ? " (Leserbrief) In: DISPUT. no. 19. 1993, p. 23 
, 5 3 i b i d . 
I 5 4 K r e s s , Giinther/Robert Hodge (Language as Ideology, op. cit.) show how, in encoding 
communicable perception in language, "we inevitably impose our classifications on others, and on 
ourselves. Language plays a vital part in what has been called the 'social construction of reality'" 
(p. 5) At the heart of any ideology is the competition for acceptance of a given representation of 
'reality', i.e. "the angle of telling" (Simpson, op. cit.; p. 2); Fundamental to this is lexical variation, 
"because ... this involves the occurrence of one option and a rejection of known alternative options" 
(Trew, Tony: '"What the papers say': linguistic variation and ideological difference." In: 
Fowler/Hodge/Kress/Trew: Language and Control, op. cit., p. 155). Trew, (ibid., pp. 117-155) offers 
an excellent study of the transformation of wordings (relexicalisation) and sentences in discourse in 
accordance with ideological perception/motivation/the attempt to motivate. 
Johannes Volmert shows graphically that when it comes to relexicalisation - i.e. a strategy of 
"Umformulierung" (Volmert, "Wahlkampf-Rhetorik ..." op. cit., p. 249), Gysi is a master of the art. 
(The page numbers in brackets which follow refer to J . Volmert's work. His remarks are marked thus: 
"..."; the remarks of the interlocutors he quotes are marked thus: « . . .» . ) In the course of an evening 
"Confrontainment" (p. 245) show, Gysi is pitted against Ludger Volmer of Bundnis 90/Die Griinen, 
who accuses the PDS of having an «ungeklart5it'Programmlage». (p. 249) In seeking to deflect this 
charge, Gysi reformulates it with the attentuative «Programmatisch - is (sic) bei uns sicherlich einiges 
offen .. .» (p. 249) and later again in deeming it «kompliziert» (p. 250): J . Volmert observes that 
"«ungeklart», selbst schon eine moderate Formulierung deutet er (Gysi - MD) urn in «kompliziert», 
ohne sich jedoch auf eine umstandliche Rechtfertigungsstrategie einzulassen - was in dieser Situation 
auch gar nicht moglich und deshalb kaum erfolgversprechend ware", (p. 250) Similarly, in deflecting 
the charge that the PDS has an «ungeklarte Vergangenheit» (p. 248), is «drei Stiicke», a «Gemisch ... 
mit dem man sehr schwer systematisch zusammenarbeiten kann» (p. 250), Gysi again deploys a tactic 
of reformulation in asserting that «wir ja uberjiaupt nicht leugnen, daB wir in einem 
ErneuerungsprozeP stehen» (p. 251, my emhpases);^Volmer has, of course, at no stage challenged 
a putative Erneuerung; the term is invoked by Gysi . An essentially negative perspective upon the 
forces at work in the PDS has been transmuted into a positive one through their distillation into an 
"Ausdruck (Erneuerungsprozefl - MD), den man gemeinhin als positiv wertende Bezeichnung 
betrachten muB". (p. 251) 
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nehmen, weil ein Teil der ehemaligen SED-Mitglieder von der Entwicklung 
zunachst so sehr verwirrt und vom klaren Scheitern des Systems derart 
beeindruckt war, daB er die Reformer unterstutzte, auf ihre gute Absicht 
hoffend.155 (my italics) 
This example shows very graphically how this aspect of PDS historiography very 
largely hinges upon, vague unquantifiable and unverifiable groupings -
"nennenswerter Teil", "viele", "die Leute", "ein Teil" - whose extent and are hard to 
in any way "challenge" and which at the same time allow room for defeasing the 
(absolute?) impression they create. Witness the unverifiability of the following 
passage penned by the former GDR Deputy Kultusminister, Klaus Hopcke: 
Wem (whom? - MD) fruher "Beulen" zugefiigt worden waren (by whom? -
MD), weil er seine personliche Meinung ausgesprochen ... hatte, dem tat die 
neuartige, wirkfich demokratische Willensbildung in der Partei des 
demokratischen Sozialismus von Anfang an gut. Da wurde (note the passive! 
- MD) etwas (what? - MD) durchgesetzt, wonach viele sich schon lang 
gesehnt, was sie erstrebt hatten.156 (my italics) 
This example is particularly interesting inasmuch as, unusually, it engenders 
metalinguistic comment from the author: 
Wenn ich hier schreibe: viele, weiB ich natiirlich, daB das nicht fur alle in oder 
aus unseren Reihen gilt. Manchen Demokratieentwohnten und auf 
Zentralismus Versessenen bereitete die Umstellung so groBe Schwierigkeiten, 
daB sie uns velieBen.157 (Observe how this leaves the impression that the 
'opportunists' have left behind an 'honest core'! - MD; italics in original.) 
What we have here in miniature is a discursive structure which we will encounter 
time and again in PDS writings: a dialectical attempt to pre-empt the objections of an 
imagined interlocutor and thereby disarm them; having created a particular 
impression, the author re-asserts his 'objectivity' through relativisation. While a 
dialectical form may appear 'objective' - and thus be used to bolster political 
legitimacy - Townson has rightly observed that: 
l 5 5 W o l f , Herbert, op. cit., p. 5 
l 5 6 H6pcke , Klaus: "Nahe und Feme des Vergangenen. Sich Erneuern: so heilsam wie schmerzhaft?" 
In: Gysi: M r brauchen einen dritten Weg. op. cit., p. 36 
, 5 7 i b i d . , p. 36 
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in language interaction the initiative participant is usually at an advantage -
she who asks the questions to a large extent determines the answers.158 
We shall look closely at this dialectical feature of PDS historiography in our detailed 
commentary on Bortfeldt's Von der SED zur PDS - Aufbruch zu neuen Ufern. For the 
time being we shall limit ourselves to the observation that this relativisation, while 
appearing 'objective', seems in fact to be used primarily to bolster up the simplified 
conceptual model of the 'honest core'; while admitting that "Andere arbeiten mit 
Miihe daran, Gegenmeinungen 'auszuhalten'"159, the overall - but empirically 
unverifiable - impression created through the use of indeterminate numbers and 
quantities is that with which Hopcke leaves this line of argument: 
Fur sehr viele aber, wenn nicht die meisten, gehort die wahrhaft praktizierte 
Demokratie innerhalb der Partei zu dem auf Anhieb Wohltuenden.160 
As such, then, as "co-reformers", the PDS can claim to be a prime legatee and 
upholder of a vastly simplified - and mythical (?) - uniform, East German 
Demokratiebewegung, whose origins are located in the Wendezeit (and whose 
identifiability with the SED/PDS groups such as Neues Forum would, of course, 
challenge): 
Die PDS ist ein originar ostdeutsches Gewachs, mit zunehmend 
gesamtdeutschem Denken. Wir sind als einzige der im Bundestag vertretenen 
Parteien nicht unter die Glocke einer groBeren Westpartei geraten. Diesen 
Vorleil sollten wir auch nulzen, um ein Stuck ostdeutscher politischer Kultur, 
ein Stiick der grofien Demokratiebewegung des Herbstes '89 und auch 
Traditionen der Runden Tische in der politischen Kultur zu erhalten. 
Politikroutine aus Bonn darf nicht auch noch uns verschlingen.x(>x (my italics) 
Observe, how - (spuriously and ironically?) - a PDS in 'Ostalgie'*62 mode 
foregrounds its status as a quintessential product of the GDR - i.e. its identifiability 
with the GDR - as a basis for putting itself at the forefront of a movement born of 
that GDR, yes, but also of a simultaneous opposition to the practices of the PDS's 
political predecessor! In other words, the PDS's argumentation turns, here, upon the 
1 5 8 Townson, op. cit., p. 197 
1 5 9 H6pcke , op. cit., p. 36 
, 6 0 i b i d . , p. 36 
l 6 , L o t h a r Bisky in: Oechelhauser, Gisela: Lothar Bisky: "So tief biicke ich mich nicht." Berlin: Dietz 
Verlag 1993, p. 114 (interview with L . Bisky) 
l 6 2 T h e term widely used to denote nostalgia for the G D R or certain features of it, yielding the 
adjective ostalgisch. 
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lowest common denominator of a GDR identity. To that end the GDR identity of the 
Demokratiebewegung is bolstered and maintained by it being set in conscious 
opposition to an overweening Western political culture, i.e. incorporated within the 
framework of an East-West conflict; the PDS frequently alludes to a mythical, 
'morally superior' level of democracy seen by East Germany in the Wendezeit, a 
democracy soon sullied, it generally argues, by Western interference. (The 
problematic fact that West Germany's policy of accepting East German refugees as 
citizens of its own country [cf. East Germans' storming of the Federal Republic's 
embassies in Prague and Budapest in Autumn 1989] was a vital variable in the 
equation of forces which gave impetus to precisely that democratic movement in late 
1989 is not invoked.) Observe too, however, Bisky's simultaneous mindfulness of the 
need for the PDS to transcend precisely that East-West divide if it is to have pan-
German relevance; hence the invocation of the reductive and nebulous notion of 
"gesamtdeulsches Denken" - doubtless an attempt to redress the discursive balance. 
The PDS must be mindful, after all, of target audiences other than those in the East if 
it is to be a force of pan-German relevance. We will examine below the fundamental 
discursive problems which this poses for the PDS. 
CONFLATING FRAMES O F R E F E R E N C E 
The PDS has been boosted in its historiographic attempts to link itself to the 
"Green"163 reformist (dissident) movement by the fact that on a superficial level 
certain 'policy features' hint at a common identity (primarily, of course, on the level 
of signifiant). These are explored in detail by Markovits and Gorski: 
* 1. both the "Greens" and the PDS have consistently argued in favour of an 
"erneuerten S0z/a/i*smws7"demokratsicher Sozialismus " i.e. championed a vision 
closely bound up with <socialism> as sign. And though, in the following, Gorski and 
Markovits fail to address the notion (which we would, of course, challenge!) of 
whether there really is such a thing as a "pristine socialism,"(! -MD), they have 
rightly observed that: 
Even at this early stage, it had become very evident that Neues Forum's 
founders and sympathisers were not interested in departing from Socialism, 
let alone adopting Western-style capitalism. Whereas the exact terminology 
of the "third way" had not yet entered this milieu's vernacular, the concept 
had clearly been established: retain the good, that is pristinely socialist (?! -
MD) features of the German Democratic Republic and develop them further 
6 3 W e 
use the term here as used by Markovits and Gorski. (see footnote 22) 
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in a second German state which was clearly independent of the Federal 
Republic. This new GDR was to protect and uphold civil rights, allow the 
formation of a multiparty system (N.B! - MD) and foster the proliferation of 
diversity in opinion and lifestyles.164 (my italics) 
Compare, too: 
Die Oppositionsgruppen der "ersten Stunde", die die friedliche Revolution 
vorbereiteten und moglich machten (notice this historiographic account's 
ascription of the 'credit' for initiating the events that led to November 9) 
fanden bei den Wahlern (in the elections to the Volkskammer of March 1990 -
MD) eine erstaunlich geringe Resonanz. Ihre Vision war und ist bis heute eine 
reformierte, demokratische Alternative einer sozialistischen DDR 1 6 5 (my 
italics). 
On the level of sign (<demokratischer Sozialismus>), at least, there is nothing to 
separate the democratic socialism of the Partei des Demokratsichen Sozialismus 
A 
wifcj£ the " demokratsljher Sozialismus" we encounter in the following: 
Deren (the GDR's - MD) bis dahin vorwiegend passive Burger eilten von nun 
an in Massen zu den offentlichen StraBendemonstrationen im ganzen Land, in 
denen zunachst ein anderer, wahrhaft demokratischer Sozialismus und 
schlieBlich unverhohlen die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands gefordert 
wurden.166 (my italics) 
The PDS's historiographic picture is Roosted by numerous observations, such as the 
following, encountered in other historiographic accounts: 
Within the SED/PDS during this 1989-1990 period there was a struggle to 
overthrow the inner-party regime, thereby making the SED a viable 
instrument for a reformed socialism.^1 (my italics) 
De-contextualised, the external from of this last, positively charged, yet extremely 
vague observation glosses over enormously complex questions of the extent (observe 
the lack of any identifiable agent!) and nature of conceptions of reform/socialism), 
hints at a unified inner-party reform movement with a uniformity of objectives and 
6 4Markovits/Gorski, op. cit., p. 248 
6 5 L a u / L a u , op. cit., p. 6 
^Soniheimer, op. cit., p. 88 
6 7 K r i s c h , op. cit., p. 166 
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allows the PDS, on the level of sign, <reformed socialism;*, to identify itself with the 
Greens. Compare, too: 
Die SED-Fuhrung war unter den Druck einer unruhig gewordenen Basis 
geraten, die eine Reform der Partei anstrebte.168 (my italics) 
This last quotation is incorporated into the context of a historiographic account which 
is, in fact, very cautious about invoking the reformist credentials of the SED or the 
SED/PDS. Taken 'out of context', it could very easily be incorporated into - and used 
to boost - a polarised historiographic, conceptual model of the type (Fuhrung-v ersus-
"reformist" others [these 'others' in turn 'overlapping' with the extra-SED opposition 
movement]) which, as we witnessed above, has been widely proffered by the PDS. 
What it clearly shows is that without relativisation through wider contextualisation 
(in which, as we will attempt, shortly, to show, temporal and spatial perspectives are 
crucial), highly superordinate terms gloss over complex causal backgrounds; they 
present lowest common denominators which are often more 'manageable' for the 
historian and politologist (here, it would appear that the author uses "reform" simply 
to convey that within the frame of reference of the SED there were forces which 
departed from the prevailing party line - there is no attempt to put this opposition on 
an equal footing with that of the extra-SED opposition movement), yet readily 
manipulable by the political actor. The latter can 'confuse' or by-pass the frames of 
reference in which the conflated concepts respectively occurred - and cause historians 
and politologists to become confused and / or to struggle with their terminological 
repertoire if they are not sensitive to the conflation! Taken in isolation, the quotation 
above leaves us with the impression of a monolithic, 'reformist' Basis which might 
easily - through conflation - be (unproblematically) identified with the equally (in 
terms of the verbal form in which their motivation is enframed at least) 'reformist' 
Biirgerbewegungen. The positive signifier reform fails to address a complex causal 
background in which frames of reference are highly significant: from whose 
perspective was the Basis considered reformist, against which yardstick is this 
reformism to be measured? 
We observe something similar in: 
Meanwhile party members at middle and lower levels, who had to defend and 
justify ever more unpopular policies, were themselves prompted to rebel.169 
, 6 8Sontheimer, op. cit., p. 90 
l 6 9 K r i s c h , op. cit., p. 167 
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Again we have - on a superficial level - a picture of 'reformist' rank and file at 
loggerheads with the leadership, a picture which promotes the PDS's conceptual 
model. What is problematic for us here is that we cannot preclude the fact that in 
some cases this rebellion - which included calls for "reform" - had a definite 
'preservationist' dimension. In other words it incorporated, inter alia, an opposition 
to what was perceived as an incompetent leadership jeopardising the sanctity of the 
one-party state rather than any opposition to the fundamentals of the system. Put 
another way, there is an argument that "reform" was called for not as an end in itself, 
but rather was a means of securing limited cosmetic changes designed, quite 
precisely, to save and indeed strengthen the one-party system. 
The following will make abundantly clear the 'usefulness' to the PDS of a 
telescoping of perspectives, incorporating both a temporal and spatial dimension170: 
if we look at: 
In early November, the entire GDR cabinet resigned and was replaced by one 
headed by a leading SED reform figure, Hans Modrow171 (my italics) 
we observe that the crucial point here is that Hans Modrow was widely dubbed a 
"reformer" within the frame of reference of the GDR (and, more narrowly, of the 
SED). He did go further than many of his SED colleagues. As we have seen, 
however, from the perspective of hindsight, from a present day perspective, from a 
perspective outside that of an SED-controlled GDR there are those who would claim 
that there is much to relativise Modrow's credentials as a reformer in the sense that 
we would understand the term in a political system underpinned by at least a formal 
commitment to pluralism, i.e. in the sense of a "grundlegende Reform des Systems 
im westlich-demokratischen Sinne"172. Recognition of this fact has led some 
1 7 0 A n excellent discussion of temporal and spatial point of view in narrative fiction is proffered by 
Simpson, op. cit., esp. chapter 2 
1 7 , K r i s c h , op. cit., p. 170 
1 7 2Sontheimer, op. cit., p. 91 
It is interesting to observe how, in the following, Moreau appears to struggle with precisely this 
problem of overlapping perspectives: "Die taktischen Fehler von Egon Krenz starkten die 
Ausgangslage seines Konkurrenten Hans Modrow. Dieser konnte die Unterstutzung und das 
Vertrauen Moskaus fur sich verbuchen und scharte einen Oppositonsfliigel urn sich (Wolfgang 
Berghofer, Gregor Gysi, Markus Wolf)." (cited from: Moreau, Patrick: PDS. Anatomie einer 
postkommunistischen Partei. Bonn, Berlin: Bouvier Verlag 1992, p. 455; my italics.) Observe, here, 
how that opposition is in fact primarily located within the narrow context of the S E D , within that 
frame of reference; that opposition is not the opposition represented by the Burgerbewegungen, a 
point which the signifier, unqualified as it is by Moreau here, glosses over. Observe how in the 
paragraph thereafter Moreau, interestingly, shifts the perspective: "Die von der S E D - P D S immer 
wieder beschworenen, von der Regierung Modrow aber selten verwirklichten Reformen zielten nicht 
auf eine wirkliche Demokratie, sondern waren nur Mittel zur Rettung und Stabilisierung des Ancien 
Regime." (ibid.; my italics). Here the reformist credentials of that "Oppositionsfliigel" are measured 
from the perspective of a much broader frame of reference, that of the new political environment into 
which the PDS ( S E D / P D S ) now finds itself. 
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commentators to relativise Modrow's reformist credentials by deeming him a 
"sogenannter Reformer" or by entering (as we have sometimes done) the term 
Reformer, where associated with his name, in inverted commas. Sontheimer is much 
more cautious in his handling of a reformist Modrow; in viewing Modrow from 
within the narrower perspective of the GDR, as in the following, the author seems 
sensitive to the possibility of a potentially obfuscatory conflation of the type we have 
highlighted in (very evidently) avoiding the category Reform: 
Modrow war Bezirkschef der SED in Sachsen gewesen, hatte aber den 
Eindruck erweckt, nicht so massiv in das Netz des Unrechtsregimes der SED 
eingesponnen zu sein... Im Ruckblick zeigte sich, daB sie (die Regierung 
Modrows - MD), nicht der Motor einer durchgreifenden Erneuerung des 
politischen Systems sein wollte und konnte, sondern sich unsicher zwischen 
dem massiven Bedurfnis des Volkes nach Veranderung und den Beharrungs-
und Schutzinteressen der alten Machtstruktur hin und her bewegte . . . , 7 3 (my 
italics) 
- a political balancing act, incidentally, which, in one form or another, the PDS has 
been performing ever since. 
The importance of this "Bezugsrahmen" - as Burkhardt calls it 1 7 4 - cannot be 
overstated. Burkhardt points to a similar confusion of perspectives in calling for 
much greater discernment to be shown in assessing the behaviour of individuals 
within a GDR context through the prism of contemporary (extra-GDR) standards and 
norms. With regard to the particular question of involvement with the Ministry for 
State Security he observes a widely held, reductive presupposition that: 
"jede Form der Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit ist 
moralisch verwerflich." ... Gerade diese selten in Zweifel gezogene Pramisse 
bediirfte dringend der genaueren Uberprufung, denn selbst bei moralischer 
Verurteilung des SED-Staates im allgemeinen und der Staatssicherheit im 
besonderen sind sehr viele unterschiedliche Formen und Motive von 
Zusammenarbeit und Verstrickung denkbar, die nicht notwendigerweise alle 
verwerflich sein miissen. Schliefllich konnte niemand vorhersehen, dafi es 
einmal einen November 1989 geben wiirde, nach dem die politische 
Gesamtlage vollstandig verdndert ware. Kurt Biedenkopf hat das durchaus 
gesehen, wenn er in einem Interview mit der "Wochenpost" sagte: «Es kommt 
1 7 3Sontheimer, op. cit., p. 91 
, 7 4 Burkhardt , Armin: "Vergangenheitsiiberwaltigung." In: Reiher, Ruth/Riidiger Lazer (eds.): Wer 
spricht das wahre Deutschl Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag 1993, p. 131 
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dazu, daB wir immer davon ausgehen, alle hatten gewuBt, "daB das zu Ende 
geht". Das ist aber falsch. Wenn ich das Verhalten eines Menschen im Jahre 
1987 mit der Erfahriing des Jahres 1991 beurteile und nicht mit der 
Erfahrung des Jahres 1987, als Herr Honecker Staatsgast in Bonn war, dann 
ist das ein vollig unterschiedlicher Bezugsrahmen.»]15 (my italics) 
Land and Possekel's account of the emergence of the SED, too, invokes the category 
of Reform: 
Die PDS entstand aus der SED in zwei Schritten. Nach ... der Etablierung des 
"Kronprinzen" Egon Krenz, gingen re/ormwillige SED-Mitglieder innerhalb 
der Partei in die Offensive.176 (my italics). 
On this level there is nothing to separate PDS reformers from the reformers of the 
Burgerbewegungen. It is precisely on this level (i.e. at this degree of generality) that 
a PDS historiographic account could profitably stop. However, wider 
contextualisation reveals that the inner-SED drive for reform has very clear limits: 
Ziel war die Absetzung des gesamten alten Politbiiros, eine Neubeslimmung 
der SED-Politik ...177 (my italics) 
While there is, then, an overlap in crucial signifiers underpinning the different 
historiographic accounts - erneuerter SozialismusI Reformer - we have observed the 
considerable disparity in the signified. 
* 2. both the "Greens" and the 'reformist' SED/PDS consistently voiced their 
opposition to unification and adopted a stance of calling for a reformed, independent 
GDR. A central conceptual construct in the discourse of the Biirgerbewegungen was 
the widely proffered notion enframed as the dritter Weg (beyond the prevailing 
'capitalist' and 'socialist' polities), a key feature of which was the desire to maintain 
the GDR as an independent unit. 
As regards this policy feature, too, of 'maintaining the GDR', there is little, on a 
superficial level to separate the PDS and the Biirgerbewegungen The following 
exemplify the 'overlap' in this policy feature and the fact that the 'reformist' 
SED/PDS was not alone in wishing to keep the GDR in existence: 
l 7 5 i b i d . , pp. 130-1 
1 7 6 Land/Possekel , op. cit., p. 416 
1 7 7 i b i d . 
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Fur die Modrow-Regierung und die meisten Vertreter des Runden Tisches 
ging es zunachst noch um eine Rettung bzw. demokratische Fortentwicklung 
der DDR als eigenen StaaO78 (my italics) 
Wie der "Aufruf 'Fur unser Land1" vom 26.11.1989 ... zeigte, gab es in der 
DDR fur diese Option (that of an independent GDR - MD) durchaus eine iiber 
enge parteipolitische Grenzen hinausgehende soziale Basis. Lepsius erinnert 
daran, daB etwa ein Drittel der DDR-Bevolkerung ihren Staat erhalten 
wollte.179 (my italics) 
It is precisely the important 'pro-GDR' element at the denotative core of the dritter 
Weg notion which would allow a 'reformist' SED/PDS, on the basis of the broad 
overlap between it and the Burgerbewegung in respect of this issue, to lay subsequent 
claim to the construct for its own discourse (thus, of course, promoting the conflation 
of the PDS's position with that of the Burgerbewegung). Witness: 
so hielt die PDS in ihrer Entstehungsphase ... weiter an der Eigenstaallichkeit 
der DDR fest ... "Die Krise des administrativ-zentralistischen Sozialismus in 
unserem Land kann nur dadurch gelost werden, daB die DDR einen dritten 
Weg jenseits von stalinistischem Sozialismus und Herrschaft transnationaler 
Monopole geht", so Gysi auf dem letzten SED-Parteitag im Dezember 
1989 ... 1 8 0(my italics) 
The text from which the above account (from a leading sociologist) is extracted 
contains no further relativisation as to the respective roles of the 'reformist' 
SED/PDS and the Burgerbewegung; problematic underlying disparities between 
them (which emerge from a wider contextualisation) with respect to the envisioned 
form which, over and above maintaining the GDR as a geo-political entity, the dritter 
Weg was to take, are not dealt with. Underpinning the notion of the dritter Weg was, 
however, much more than a simple commitment to maintaining the GDR. Over and 
above this element, we can, in fact, observe a crucial denotative distinction between 
the dritter Weg of the Biirgerbewegungen and that of the 'reformist' SED/PDS. We 
might, in this regard, make the following crucial observation: in his inaugural speech 
at the founding convention of Neues Forum (i.e. when it was inaugurated as a party 
on September 1991) Werner Schulz made the vital observation that he did not want 
the GDR back as it had been, that he was proud that the latter had met with its 
, 7 8 Sontheimer, op. cit., p. 91 
1 7 9 K o c h , Thomas: "Die PDS im VereingigungsprozeB." In: Brie et al. (eds.): Die PDS - Empirische 
Befunde... op. cit, p. 187 
, 8 0 i b i d . , p. 181 
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demise181. In other words, the desire for an independent GDR which was all the 
while expressed by the East German Greens was motivated less by a reverence for 
the GDR system that was, than by a desire to use the territory of the former GDR as 
a building block upon which to build something new; this contrasts with the pro-
GDR stance evinced by the 'reformist' PDS/SED which, as we have seen, generally 
stopped short of calling into the question the very fabric of the one-party state, and 
indeed has often been tinged - particularly in KPF182 circles - with unmistakable 
nostalgia for the old order: the GDR, observes the KPF's chairperson, Sahra 
Wagenknecht, was: 
selbst noch in ihrem argsten Niedergang - das friedlichere, sozialere, 
menschlichere Deutschland.183 
Put simply, the pro-GDR stance of the Greens is indubitably future-orientated, that 
articulated in SED/PDS circles has not been not without a preservationist - and later, 
in some circles, restorationist - dimension.184 The dritter Weg of the respective 
camps looks identical; the denotation underlying the identical verbal form is not. 
* 3. both expressed their distaste at what they perceived as domination and 
"colonialisation" by the West 
* 4. both the incipient PDS and the East German "Green" movement (as described by 
Markovits and Gorski) have consistently championed the notion of "civil society": 
Given the excessive etatism of virtually all versions of the German Left, the 
group's (the East German "Green" movement's - MD) emphasis on the 
primacy of civil society as the most essential locus of progressive politics 
certainly seems significant.185 
We will discuss below the PDS's championing of the "zivile Gesellschaft" as 
espoused in the writings of Antonio Gramsci. 
1 8 , S e e Markovits/Gorski, op. cit., p. 261 ff. 
1 8 2 T h e PDS's Kommunistische Platlform. 
1 8 3Wagenknecht, Sahra: "Anforderungen an die PDS." In: Milteilungen der Kommunistischen 
Plaltform des PDS. no. 58. Berlin 12/94, p. 5 
l 8 4 I t is telling that at a PDS election rally, attended by the writer, held on East Berlin's Alexanderplatz 
shortly before the elections to the Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus of October 1995, FDJ-shirts and other 
S E D / G D R memorabilia was still being sold at PDS stalls. 
1 8 5 Markovits/Gorski, op. cit., p. 253 
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Markovits and Gorski's categorisation is crucially revealing. The (extra-SED) 
oppositionists of the pre-Wende and Wende period are largely presented as 
dissidents! dissenters: 
... the dissidents who opposed the GDR's Stalinism... Opposed to 
unification in all its forms, these dissenters carried the politics of dissidence 
well beyond the structures of the new Deutschland . . . 1 8 6 (my italics) 
Eight individuals would represent the Greens' cause in the 1990 Bundestag: 
Wolfgang Ullmann and Konrad Weiss (Initiative Demokratie Jetzt); Werner 
Schulz and Ingrid Koeppe (Neues Forum) ... In the course of less than two 
turbulent years, these dedicated and brave dissidents of the Honecker regime 
had become representatives in the freely elected parliament.187 (my italics) 
For them, then, opposition is essentially dissidence; observe the syntactic-semantic 
parallelism in: 
Making matters worse was the fact that those who were clearly the "good 
guys" (by which the authors mean the groups which made up Biindnis 90 -
MD)- the resisters, the regime dissidents, the oppositionists were once again 
to be marginalised . . . 1 8 8 (my italics) 
In their historiography this dissidence draws upon a tradition - however disparate - of 
flcf/ve_^)pposition, involving considerable personal rafcand frequently resulting in 
personal exposure to the SED's regime's repressive measures*®3 - which stretches 
back well before the Wende period: 
Biindnis '90 ... was decidedly non-Stalinist ... and - singular among all the 
political actors in East Germany - it could claim an impeccable degree of 
dissent vis-a-vis the old regime. The Bundnis '90 activists were victims (NB! -
MD) of the old order, not its secret service agents now masquerading as 
ardent Christian (or on occasion even social) democrats ... The other two 
partners of Neues Forum forming this alliance (i.e. Bundnis '90 - MD) 
possessed equally impressive credentials as Neues Forum in terms of being 
active opponents of the East German dictatorship. Initiative for Peace and 
Human Rights had in fact been one of the oldest human rights organisations 
l 8 6 i b i d . , pp. 237,238 
1 8 7 ib id . , p. 258 
1 8 8 ib id . , p. 252 
1 8 9 w h i c h could not, after all, have been implemented without the complicity of sections of the 
population over and above an SED-Fiihrung. 
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in the GDR. Co-founded in 1985 by the well-known philosopher Wolfgang 
Templin, this organisation's members were active participants in the 
revolution of 1989.190 (my italics) 
Edelman has pointed to the key role of categorisation in shaping perception: 
Political and ideological debate consists very largely of efforts to win 
acceptance of a particular categorisation of an issue in the face of competing 
efforts on behalf of a different one.'91 
This categorisation is not accidental. Trew has shown how the concepts we use to 
describe things are linked together in a network; things are perceived in terms of each 
other: 
Even the simplest, most basic description of a particular thing or event, any 
judgement about its nature, involves classifying it and registering its 
similarities and analogies with other things. It is judged to be one of a kind, 
and if the judgement is correct then the particular fits into the network of 
connections that things of that kind have with things of other kinds.192 
In other words, by using alternative concepts to describe "the same" thing, we can 
link - with the concomitant possibility of procuring ideological advantage - that thing 
to what Schaffner and Porsch call different "conceptual domains".193 
Language, after all: 
mediates our view of the world in both production and interpretation. It is not 
that there is an underlying reality which we transform to suit our needs; it is 
rather that there are competing realities which become reflected in the various 
structures which we employ to talk about the world.1 9 4 
(As a short aside, a most graphic illustration of this point is contained in the 
following extract from Leonhard's work [cited above] in which the author describes 
1 9 0 i b i d . , p. 253 
1 9 1 Edelman, op. cit., p. 25 
1 9 2 T r e w , Tony: "Theory at Work." In: UEA Papers in Linguistics, no. 6. Norwich: University of East 
Anglia January 1978, p. 40 
1 9 3Schaffner/Porsch, op. cit., p. 33 
John Humphries' admonition of Britisch Agriculture Minister, Stephen Dorrell, for categorising the 
B S E issue a "scare" (and thus attempting to have it perceived as such) offers a graphic illustration of 
the point: "You call that a scare? -10 people have died!" Humphries, in: Panorama Special Edition. 
B B C 1. 25 March 1996. 
1 9 4 W i l s o n , op. cit., p. 14 
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his gradual politicisation as the son of a German Communist emigre in the pre-war 
Soviet Union: 
Schon nach kurzer Zeit war es uns in Fleisch und Blut iibergegangen, eine 
Erhohung der Lebensmittelpreise in den kapitalistischen Landern als "neues 
Zeichen der verscharften Ausbeutung der Arbeiter" zu werten, die Erhohung 
von Lebensmittelpreisen in der Sowjetunion dagegen als einen "wichtigen 
volkswirtschaftlichen Beitrag zum Aufbau des Sozialismus; baufallige Hauser 
im Westen wurden von uns sofort als "Beweis fiir den grauenhaften 
Lebensstandard der Werktatigen" bezeichnet, dieselben baufalligen Hauser in 
Moskau waren Uberbleibsel der Vergangenheit.195) 
In a GDR context, then, the tradition of dissidence is widely perceived in 
historiographic accounts to be firmly rooted in the Lutheran church: 
... die revolutionaren Umbruchprozesse sind nicht aus dem "Nichts" 
entstanden. Hauptsachlich unter dem Dach der evangelischen Kirche 
formierten sich vornehmlich junge Menschen, die sich kritisch mit der 
Wirklichkeit des Staates auseinandersetzten.196 
Witness the anaphoric equation of opposition and dissidence in: 
... opposition in the German Democratic Republic had been growing during 
the eighties, predominantly in church-based and other related, broadly 
speaking "alternative", groupings, such as ecological and peace 
movements ... official texts attempted to legitimate the arrest and harassment 
of such dissidents in the church-based groups as Vera Wollenberger in 1988 
by subtly appropriating and colonising the discourse of this incipient 
opposition.™7 (my italics) 
and dissidents are widely perceived to be 'victims', the objects of 'repression', those 
who actively (cf. Markovits and Gorski above) opposed the regime (i.e. publicly call 
into question, at considerable personal risk, the very fundamentals of the system). 
, 9 5 Leonhard , op. cit., p. 28 
l 9 6 L a u /Lau, op. cit., p. 5 
The tradition of dissidence in the Lutheran Church is examined in some detail by Markovits/Gorski 
(see esp. chapter 8) 
, 9 7 G o o d , Colin: Language and Totalitarianism. The Case of "East Germany." Unpublished Inaugural 
Lecture, University of Surrey, 27 November 1991. (Reproduced in part as "Sprache im totalitaren 
Staat: Der Fall DDR." In: Reiher, Ruth (ed.): Sprache im Konflikt. Berlin, New York: de 
Gruyter 1995, pp. 263-76) 
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It is noticeable how PDS historiography rarely invokes the category of dissidence, 
preferring rather the broader categories of reformer and oppositoneller to the 
narrower dissident, so strongly linked as this is widely perceived to be (in the context 
of the GDR) with a very distinct - but (for a PDS wishing to identify itself with the 
extra-SED opposition) problematic - tradition of 'active' political resistance under the 
auspices of the church and, not infrequently, victimisation by the state. Trew would 
call the shift from perceiving the reform movement's activities as dissidence to the 
perception of them as (a generic) opposition a "substantial rewording", one which 
"may involve a shift from one theory or ideology to another" and "widening the 
range of possible participants"198; in reverse, the shift in perception from opposition 
to dissidence "introduces new restrictions on the range of participants ... which can 
go with it"199. Widening the range of participants is part and parcel of what Trew 
describes as a whole process of explaining events through the medium of "a higher 
level of generality or abstraction"200. 
Markovits and Gorski et al. would thus question whether 'gripes' at certain external 
features of the system constitute active opposition to the regime of the type they 
ascribe to the extra-SED reformers. It is telling that out of a random sample of 10 
current members of the PDS who were also members of the SED, and who claim to 
have stood in opposition to that SED (or, perhaps more correctly, its Fiihrung) - i.e. 
to be part of that party's "kritisches Potential" - 9 of those questioned revealed that 
they had not taken to the streets during the demonstrations which resulted in the 
demise of the S E D . 2 0 1 One of those asked responded to the observation that the PDS 
has sought to usurp the mantle of the Biirgerbewegung as follows: 
Ich bin der Meinung, daB viele damalige SED-Genossen, die heute der PDS 
angehoren, die Erneuerung in der SED und ihre eigene Rolle glorifizieren, 
auch in diesem Sinne, daB sie versuchen sich mit Neues Forum usw. 
gleichzusetzen. Es wird vergessen, daB viele erst auf die Idee gekommen sind, 
1 9 8 T r e w : "Theory at Work." op. cit., p. 53. Trew compares the "substantial rewording" with the 
"conservative rewording" which "remains within the terms of the given theory or ideology", (p. 53) 
'"ibid. — 
2 0 0 i b i d . p. 52 
2 0 1 Survey conducted by the writer; Berlin 1995 
cf. Bortfeldt (Von der SED zur PDS ... op. cit.; p. 10): "Die Revolution im Herbst 1989 war wahrlich 
nicht von dieser Partei ausgegangen. Mit diesem Schmach miissen alle (! my italics - MD) einstigen 
SED-Mitglieder leben." This comes within the context of a historiography which seeks, we shall 
argue below, to dialectically generate an impression which simultaneously redresses the problematic 
proposition (that the 'reformist' S E D were not co-initiators of the Wende) proffered on an expressis 
verbis level. 
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als der Zug schon rollte (ich sehe das bei mir selber, aber ich glorifiziere mich 
nicht, ich habe schon an den Verhaltnissen geklebt . . . ) . 2 0 2 
On the level of <opposition> the PDS (as the inner-SED opposition can identify 
itself with the dissident movement; to style itself a dissident force, against a 
background in which dissidence in the GDR is located in a very distinct and 
particular tradition of oppositionality would, on the other hand, exceed the bounds of 
political credibility. In the historiographic picture painted by Gorski and Markovits 
the categorisation allows for a clear distinction between the "Green" movement (this 
terminology itself constituting a convenient reduction, of course) on the one hand 
and the SED (PDS) on the other. Note the polarities in: 
... the ruling SED wasted little time in lambasting these developments as 
"counterevolutionary" and "inimical to socialism" ... the party made a special 
effort to deploy its youth organisation as the most vocal critic of the 
increasingly dissident scene.203 (my italics) 
(This offers further evidence of what many historiographic studies have perceived as 
the untenability of the PDS's Fiihrung-vs.-otheTS construct; the extra-SED opposition 
was opposed by much more than just the party Fuhrung.) 
In the PDS world-view the categorisation blurs what in historiography elsewhere is 
perceived as a clear distinction between dissidence and (passive?) critique and leaves 
a grey area of broad overlap. Gorski and Markovits further categorise the SED as the 
"Leninist" as opposed to "non-Leninist" left, and in so doing themselves evince the 
(inevitable?) simplifying tendencies inherent in any historiography. Compare the 
crass over-simplification in: 
The PDS and its supporters, hard-line communists ... the PDS's unabated 
Leninism . . . 2 0 4 (my italics) 
We wil l argue below that the PDS is anything but a homogenous entity with a unified 
hard-line world-view whose motivation can be easily and unproblematically reduced 
to these categories. 
2 0 2Interview conducted by the writer, March 12, 1996 with Dr. Sabine Hartwig, delegate for Weimar 
at the party's 4th Parteitag (January 1995) 
203Markovits/Gorski, op. cit., p. 249 
2 0 4 op. cit., pp. 260, 261 
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WHODUNNIT?: OBSCURING AGENCY 
What emerges from the PDS's attempts to deal with its past is a body of discourse 
which - like so much of PDS discourse - is at once complex and contradictory. 
Mit ihrem Verhaltnis zur Vorgangerpartei SED tut sich die PDS nach wie vor 
schwer.205 
The essential oxymoron - the duality, the contradictoriness - of the PDS's position in 
offering a dual perspective of itself as an 'old' and 'new' party - was neatly summed 
up by Hans Modrow in the following remark made to the party executive at their 
meeting of 25 August 1990 2 0 6: 
Die PDS ist eine neue Partei, die sich zu ihrer Geschichte bekennt. 
Here we have a party pursuing two contradictory objectives: of establishing an 
identity separate from that of the SED, yet simultaneously taking on board the history 
of that very party. We have seen how the party has in part sought to deal with this 
contradiction through the message that the very fact of its assuming this burden is 
evidence of its political integrity - and thus of its status as a 'new' party. We have 
touched, too, upon the pursuit of causal circumvention: a condemnation of the past 
which is simultaneously accompanied by attenuation or relativisation, in particular 
through the transfer of blame. 
The duality is evident at every level of PDS historiography. It is brought out in the 
speech act above: it is inner-textual, as our detailed examination of Bortfeldt's 
monograph will show; and it is inter-textual. At times an attempt is made to secure 
legitimacy through a direct and 'honest' assertion of the assumption of personal 
blame or condemnation of this or that feature of the SED regime, elsewhere an 
attempt is made to secure legitimacy through the contradictory assertion that the PDS 
was actively involved in the opposition movement, that it is the SED's 'gelauterter 
Kern' and that it has divested itself of its hard-line communist orthodoxy. 
On the one hand we do indeed encounter remarks condemnatory of the SED regime 
and remarks in which the PDS both distances itself from the SED and abjures SED 
policy: 
205Falkner/Huber, op. cit., p. 182 
2 0 6Modrow, Hans: "Wir wollen ein Deutschland, besser als DDR und BRD." In: Modrow, Hans/Klaus 
Steinitz: Fur ein neues Deutschland, besser als DDR und BRD. Fur Arbeit, wirtschaftlichen 
Aufschwung und soziale Sicherheit. Berlin: Parteivorstand der PDS 1990, p. 18 
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Beanspruchte die SED fur sich die Rolle einer "Vorhut", so will die PDS Teil 
der Linken in Deutschland und Europa werden . . . 2 0 7 
Mit der PDS wird es keine Verklarung der gesellschaftlichen Realitaten in der 
DDR geben. Wir werden uns alien Bestrebungen widersetzen, die 
antidemokratischen, antiemanzipatorischen, illiberalen und antiokologischen 
Realitaten in der DDR zu leugnen.208 
Bereits im Dezember 1989 haben wir auf dem AuBerordentlichen Parteitag 
mit der SED-Programmatik radikal gebrochen.209 (We re-iterate that an 
illocutionary act of declaring a breach, as was in fact the case [the 'breach' 
having been decided by way of a formal resolution] is not the same as 
'actually' breaking with that programme; we will pursue this point in 
chapter 3 - MD) 
On the other hand, we observe a definite reluctance elsewhere to apportion blame to 
that selfsame SED, especially where it is presented, through a transfer of blame, as a 
'purified' body upon which, the PDS suggests, it has drawn; noticeable here is the 
fact that the SED is rarely invoked as an agent which brought about those features of 
the SED past which the PDS condemns. Fundamental and problematic questions of 
causality are thus circumvented: the SED was, after all, made up of individuals who 
each, in their individual way, contributed to its workings and many of whom are now 
in the PDS. To legitimise itself with these members the PDS must go some way to 
vindicating their personal biographies. 
The PDS has attempted to deal with the duality (of having on the one hand, if it 
wants to be accepted as a 'democratic' player in the 'new' polity, to condemn the 
regime through expressions of horror at its reprehensible features (at "groBen 
Fehlern, Irrtiimern und leider auch schlimmen Verbrechen"210), while on the other 
having to stop short of addressing the - for its members - painful question of how 
these came about and who caused them) through another feature of what we wil l 
continue to call the discourse of 'causal circumvention': syntactic constructions 
which, as numerous commentators have pointed out, delete or obscure agency, i.e. 
which identify and express abhorrence at the effects, but which ultimately 'hedge' 
with respect to who or what caused them and leave us with the impression that the 
SED regime's faults were the product of something of a force majeure. 
207Wer ist das, die PDS? op. cit., p. 6 
2 0 8 Bisky et al.: "Sozialismus ist Weg ..." op. cit., p. 28 
2 0 9Modrow, Hans: "Wir wollen ein Deutschland ..." op. cit., p. 18 
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The party programme is a case in point. Falkner and Huber make the vital 
observation that the PDS's 1993 programme makes mention of the SED only once 
and berates the PDS for the fact that: 
Analysiert man die Aussagen der PDS zur Vergangenheit auf ihre 
Hauptrichtungen, so findet man den Totalitarismus in den Farben der SED 
durchaus zutreffend beschrieben. Allerdings stellen sich die Prozesse stets 
weitgehend anonym dar ... Ungestellt bleibt zumeist die Frage, warum die 
Stalinisierung von SED und DDR mit dieser Mitgliedschaft - auch mit denen, 
die jetzt zur PDS gehoren - moglich war . . . 2 H 
Pfahl-Traughber observes that in the PDS's 1993 programme 
wird doch noch nicht einmal ansatzweise nach den Ursachen fur die 
Deformierung des Sozialismus in der DDR gefragt. 2 1 2 (my italics) 
In this agentless discourse impersonal verbal and reflexive constructions abound. As 
constructions with only one (what Halliday has called) "inherent participant"213 
(Trew calls them constructions incorporating "non-transactive214 process terms"2 1 5), 
their ideological potential lies in the fact that: 
das 'Wirklichkeitsmodell', das sie zum Ausdruck bringen, eine Version von 
Kausalitat ausdriickt, die "eine implizite oder inharente Kausalitat ist, spontan 
und selbst verursacht".216 
The following is typical: 
Die Politik des Massenmords und einiger anderer der schlimmsten Seiten des 
Stalinismus hat es in der DDR nicht gegeben, aber Repression, Zentralismus 
und Dirigismus, Intelligenzfeindlichkeit, die MiBachtung von Demokratie und 
2 , 0 Bisky et al.: "Sozialismus ist Weg ..." op. cit., p. 28 
211Falkner/Huber, op. cit., pp. 182-3 
2,2Pfahl-Traughber, op. cit., p. 361 
2 , 3cited in: Good, Colin: Presse und Soziale Wirklichkeit. op. cit., p. 21 
2 , 4 F o r a fuller discussion see chapter 4 below. 
2 l 5 c . f . Trew: "... transactive process words can combine with two linguistic items, syntactic agent and 
affected participant (and a sentence with a transactive verb represents a causal process in which one 
thing - or group of things - affects another). Non-transactive process words combine with only one 
item (and sentences with non-transactive verbs represent events as processes with only one 
participant)." Cited from: "Theory at Work." op. cit., p. 52 
2 , 6 Good: Presse und soziale Wirklichkeit. op. cit., p. 22 (citing Kress/Hodge) 
83 
Menschenrechten zogen sich durch die gesamte Gesellschaft der DDR und 
der SED. 2 1 7 (my italics) 
Witness, too, the Eigenkausalitat218 in the following extracts from the party's 1993 
programme 
Es gab jedoch auch Fehler, Irrwege, Versaumnisse und selbst Verbrechen ... 
Es gelang nicht, die erforderliche okonomische Effektivitat zu erreichen und 
sie mit wirtschaftlicher und politischer Demokratie konsequenter 
okologischer Orientierung zu verbinden ... 
Es kam zu einer falschen, in groBem MaBe von MiBtrauen gegen die 
Bevolkerung des eigenen Landes erfiillten Sicherheitspolitik.219 (my italics) 
Agentless passives, too, are a characteristic feature of PDS historiography: 
Betroffen und nachdenklich angesichts der Irrtumer, Fehler und Verbrechen, 
die im Namen des Sozialismus begangen wurden... 
Bis zur Unkenntlichkeit entstellt wurde das, was als Aufbau des Sozialismus 
gedacht war, durch die von Willkiir, Grausamkeit und Burokratie erfullte (by 
whom? - MD) Herrschaft des Stalinismus ... 
Eine iiberzeugende alternative gesellschaftliche Produktions- und 
Lebensweise mit dem Ziel solidarischer Individualitatsentfaltung und im 
Einklang mit der Natur wurde nicht geschaffen.220 (my italics) 
as is a high level of nominalisation:221 
Alle Versuche zur Erneuerung und Rettung des Sozialismus wurden letztlich 
blockiert. (Observe, here too, the agentless passive.) ... 
2 , 7 Bisky, Lothar: "PDS '95: Solidarisch. Alternativ. Bundesweit. Fiinf Jahre PDS: Aufgaben und 
Herausforderungen." In: DISPUT. no. 3-4. 1995, p. 4 (speech given to 4th Party Conference, 
January, 1995) 
2 1 8 See Good, Colin: Zeitungssprache im geteillen Deutschland. Miinchen: Oldenbourg Verlag 1989, 
p. 47 
2^Programm der Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus. 1993. op. cit., pp. 9, 10 
2 2 0 ibid., pp. 4,10 
2 2 ,whose reductive mechanisms we shall examine in some detail below (see esp. chapter 4) 
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Burokratische Verstaatlichung beherrschte das gesellschaftliche Leben. 
(Observe, here, how an inanimate nominalisation occupies the syntactic actor-
position.) ... 
Hinzu traten Bevormundung der Rechtsprechung, Verletzungen der Freiheit 
von Wissenschaft und Kultur, Mediengangelei.222 (my italics) 
This noticeable lack of agency (backgrounding as it does, highly problematic 
questions as to just who was responsible for the reprehensible features the PDS 
catalogues) is highly reminiscent of SED discourse: 
Abstract agents were highly typical of the official SED discourse before the 
autumn of 1989.2 2 3 
Trew has shown clearly how obscuring agency is part and parcel of a system of 
transformations in which processes - often problematic - can be explained (away) 
through "reference to causes of a higher degree of generality or abstraction than one 
that figured at the start".224 
Ultimately this agentless discourse of causal circumvention creates the impression 
that an SED regime can be neatly divorced and isolated from the individuals who 
upheld it. Where agents are named, they are either individuals or abstract "mythical 
others"(Good)225. Good et al. point in particular to the instrumentalisation of the 
category of Stalinism (Stalinist) as a 'Buhmanri' (see example footnoted as no. 220 on 
page 83) even more abstract than a Fuhrung: 
222Programm der Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus. 1993. op. cit., p. 10 
223Schaffner/Porsch, op. cit. p. 46 
We are not attempting to suggest here that the obscuring agency is in any way exclusive to the 
discourse of the SED or the PDS, nor do we cite this observation to suggest that the discourse of the 
PDS bears little or no difference to that of the SED; PDS discourse across the board (naturally) 
displays a much wider ideological diversity and incorporates a far greater range of discursive 
practices than the 'monolithic', 'ritualised' discourse of the SED, caught as it (broadly) was in the 
ideological stranglehold of the monist ideology of dialectical materialism. What we are suggesting, 
however, is that the SED sought to overcome the problematic disparity between its political theory 
and political practice in the GDR through recourse to a high level of abstraction: to those mechanisms 
in language which (might!) allow problems and inconsistencies to be smoothed over (on a discursive 
level at least) at a high degree of generality. The discourse of the PDS is likewise fraught with 
problem and contradiction: in chapter 3 below we attempt to show how party ideologues have sought 
to create a 'unifying discourse' which attempts to deal with the highly problematic heterogeneity of 
the PDS's membership and voter-base and which seeks to find a uniform basis for the (necessarily 
abstract!) visionistic 'democratic socialism' which the party has taken on board. This 'unifying' 
discourse, we attempt to show, necessarily operates at a high degree of generality. Likewise, the 
PDS's historiographic attempt to grapple with the problem of acknowledging/assuming SED 'guilt' 
while all the while playing it down is likewise predicated upon the abstractive mechanisms to which 
recourse is widely made in any ideology in the attempt to deal with problematic anomalies. 
2 2 4 Trew: "Theory at Work." op. cit., p. 52 
2 2 5 Good, Colin: PDS - Partei der Diskursiven Strategien? Seminar paper delivered at the University 
of Durham, January 1995 (reproduced in part as "Uber die 'Neuen Linken'..." op. cit., pp. 265-85) 
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Ein Begriff, dem in dieser neuen Version von Vergangenheitsbewaltigung 
immer mehr Bedeutung zukommt ist Stalinismus. "Wir haben mit dem 
Stalinismus, mit einem staatsbiirokralischen Sozialismus gebrochen" (Gysi). 
Uber die Aufrichtigkeit dieses Anspruchs kann zwar der Linguist nicht 
befinden. Aber der Diskurs zeigt klar, daG Stalinismus... instrumentalisiert 
worden ist. 2 2 6 (italics in original) 
Little attempt is made in PDS historiography to deal with the issue that a 'Stalinist' 
system, too - as Weber suggests in the quotation cited above - presupposes personal 
involvement. 
Al l the features of the discourse of 'causal circumvention' outlined above - the 
sweeping and pathetic, (rhetorically effective) assumption and recognition of 'blame' 
and blameworthiness coupled with the simultaneous discursive somersaults 
performed in attenuating the very blame assumed, the degree of abstraction (broad, 
highly superordinate terms, suspension of agency etc.) - have led numerous political 
commentators to see in PDS historiography more of an attempt to create a veneer of 
effecting a 'Vergangenheitsbewdltigung' 'than any real desire to face a painful head-
on confrontation with a problematic past; Moreau's observation is typical: 
Die neue Namensgebung, die Kriminalisierung der alten Fiihrung und die 
offentliche Schuldanerkennung der SED/PDS sind ... keine ernsten 
Abschnitte in einer tiefen Erneuerung der Partei, sondern Anzeichen ihrer 
unter Zwang erfolgten Anpassung an ein immer feindseliger werdendes 
politisches, soziales und gesellschaftliches Umfeld. 2 2 7 
We wil l return below, however, to the question of the reliability of Moreau et al's 
one-sided, reductive attempts to use these features characterising the PDS's discourse 
in relation to its history as a basis for arguing - as Moreau et al have consistently 
done 2 2 8 - that the PDS is 'anti-democratic'. 
2 2 6 Good: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 272 
2 2 7Moreau, Patrick: "Die PDS: eine postkommunistische Partei." In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. 
B 5.1992, p. 36 
2 2 8 cf .: "Die Verpackung der SED veranderte sich, ihr antidemokralischer Inhalt aber blieb." Moreau, 
ibid., p. 43 (my italics) 
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EXCURSUS: HEINR1CH B O R T F E L D T ; VON DER SED ZUR PDS -
AUFBRVCH ZU NEUEN UFERN? - A D E T A I L E D COMMENTARY. 
Broadly, PDS historiography can be seen as a dialectical attempt to bring together 
perceptions of how it 'really' was (in the GDR and in the Wendezeit) which co-exist 
uncomfortably. We now proceed to a detailed examination of Heinrich Bortfeldt's 
crucial monograph of 1990. This work, we shall attempt to show, offers a revealing 
catalogue of all the features of PDS historiography outlined above; as such it presents 
us with a graphic, microcosmic model of what the PDS has generally sought to 
achieve in its historiographic discourse overall; in other words, we witness a 
dialectical attempt to create a conceptual 'super-model' appealing to the broadest 
possible range of parties to the debate upon the history of the PDS and its political 
forerunner. 
Bortfeldt's monograph on the PDS's emergence from the SED in the period between 
the Wendezeit and the Volkskammerwahlen of March 1990 clearly encapsulates the 
crux of the problem facing the PDS since its inception: of walking the tightrope 
between past and present, 'old' and 'new': 
Eines muBte jedoch klar sein. Wer lieber die Rechtsnachfolge einer 
stalinistisch gepragten Staatspartei antritt, statt sie aufzulosen, muBte sich im 
klaren sein, daB er die gesamte Erblast dieser alten Partei mit sich 
umherschleppt. (page 31) 2 2 9 
Interestingly, the monograph remains silent on the problematic notion that the PDS's 
decision to become legal heir to the SED might have been financially motivated: 
instead the chosen angle of telling is one which perceives it as a self-inflicted burden, 
as a kind of self-flagellation, as evidence of the PDS's head-on confrontation with its 
past. 
Bortfeldt's monograph seeks to surmount the (arguably) insurmountable: to effect a 
substantiable divorce between the SED-PDS (the two acronyms having until 
February 1990 been linked by a hyphen!), while the self-conscious task of having to 
painstakingly set off one against the other in an attempt to establish a new, 
democratic identity for the fledgling PDS perforce effects a link between the two -
with the concomitant danger of serving only to reinforce a common identity. 
The tone of Bortfeldt's work - and indeed a significant number of similar PDS-related 
writings in this period - is in parts almost 'confessional' (this goes hand in hand with 
2 2 9 A1I subsequent page numbers in brackets refer to Bortfeldt's work. 
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a strand of quasi-religious allusion running through the monograph: this shall be 
given fuller treatment below). In other words, Bortfeldt is at pains to show that the 
sins of old and the mistakes made by an incipient PDS have been recognised and are 
being actively atoned for; in this respect the work has something of a cathartic 
function, allowing its author to gradually exorcise the ghosts of the past. Far from 
shying away from the PDS's problematical inheritance, Bortfeldt actively invokes it. 
At face value, therefore, it would seem that he is seeking to discuss the evolution of 
the PDS in as objective a manner as possible. The very title in the form of an 
interrogative reveals something of the approach adopted in attempting to deal with a 
dubious past and the questionable identity of a 'new' political party: Bortfeldt is 
eager to emphasise that his treatment of the evolution of the PDS is anything but 
dogmatic, it is open to question and discussion. Indeed, on its front cover the 
monograph is presented as a Diskussionsangebot der PDS. What we can expect, then, 
is a dialectical form and this is precisely what we get: the seemingly rational 
treatment of thesis and antithesis. The work is a Diskussion inasmuch as at crucial 
stages Bortfeldt seems to pre-empt an imagined interlocutor. The very 'objective' 
form, then, provides him with a potentially powerful discursive tool: while donning 
the mantle of 'objectivity' by treating thesis and antithesis, Bortfeldt can, where 
necessary, undermine - or partially discharge - any objection or counter-argument 
which might arise in the mind of the reader (the 'interlocutor') simply by himself 
identifying (with) and/or invoking it - thereby exemplifying the 'new' and 'honest' 
approach. 
Section 1, Das Vorspiel, deals with an implicit question: to what extent do the 
ordinary rank and file members of the party - nebulously enframed as the 
"Mitgliedschaft" - bear responsibility for the vices 'objectively' exposed? This is a 
vital question inasmuch as Bortfeldt must establish a fundamental core of integrity 
within the ordinary party membership around which the PDS can grow. On one level, 
the party and its membership are perceived as blameworthy. They are weak and 
ineffectual, "orientierungslos", plagued by "Verunsicherung", "verschreckt und 
irritiert" (page 8), "ohnmachtiger, aber auch zorniger ... angstlich, verunsichert und 
auch irritiert" (page 9). This inertia (however motivated) stands in stark contrast to 
the activities of the "Biirgerbewegungen, die die Situation im Lande nicht mehr 
ertragen konnten" (page 7), who had the courage to challenge the regime and whose 
activities Bortfeldt, having donned the mantle of honest objectivity, cannot but deem 
"die ersten machtvollen Demonstrationen" (page 9). The SED membership, by 
contrast, "hielt sich von der StraBe fern ... blieb am StraBenrand stehen" (page 9), in 
other words the role of the party Genossen, he suggests, was essentially a passive 
one, and in being "auf Zentralismus fixiert" (page 8), were merely puppets of the 
centre, according it blind faith (note again the religious overtones): "Noch glaubten 
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viele daran, daB die Fiihrung einen Ausweg wisse" (page 8; italics mine). In other 
words Bortfeldt seems to make no bones about exposing the party of old in all its 
reprehensibility, as, for example, in his exposure of SED election-rigging (page 6), or 
in berating the Fuhrung for supporting the ruthless suppression of the student protest 
in China (the idea is spelled out twice). However, it comes as little surprise that an 
antithesis is presented: Bortfeldt clearly seeks to offer the Mitgliedschaft absolution 
through a discursive attempt to narrow the focus of blame by transferring it to the 
Fuhrung; at a couple of stages the focus is further narrowed when it is suggested that 
one individual - Honecker - is the true culprit: cf. page 9, "Der Parteimoral entsprach 
es auch nicht, gegen den eigenen Generalsekretar zu demonstrieren". In the first 
section references to the Fuhrung abound. (It might well be argued that in the telling 
insistence with which the word is repeated, Bortfeldt is exploiting the very negative 
connotations associated with the lexeme Fuhrer and its cognates in the public 
discourse, of the GDR, which, in the wake of the Third Reich was assiduously 
avoided as part of the GDR's 'anti-fascist' state policy. 2 3 0) In general blame is laid at 
the feet of the Fuhrung, sometimes packaged as the "Regierung"/"Mitglieder der 
Regierung" (page 4), the "Regierenden" ('zwischen dem Volk und den Regierenden 
befindet sich die Polizei' - citation of the words of Giinter Simon, page 4), or "das 
Politburo'Vdas Politburo des ZK" (page 7). This is summed up on page 8: 
In Wirklichkeit hatte diese Parlei- und Staatsfiihrung mit ihrer Verweigerung 
von Reformen das Land an den Abgrund eines Burgerkriegs gebracht. (italics 
mine) 
(Who, we might well ask, has deemed these [ultimately peaceful] demonstrations a 
"Biirgerkrieg"? How can the country be engaged in 'civil war' if the people and the 
SED-Basis, as Bortfeldt suggests, form a united front against an egregious Fuhrung. 
Is there not room here for perceiving in this lexical choice evidence of Bortfeldt's 
own less-than- positive attitude to the protest movement?) 
On page 3 the problem lies in the "Schizophrenic in der Haltung der SED-Fiihrung", 
the "halstarrige SED-Fuhrung geriet immer mehr in die Isolierung". On page 8 the 
Parteifuhrung is berated for having "keinerlei Konzept, wie der neuen Situation zu 
begegnen war". This again carries the implication that in fact the situation might have 
been salvageable had a more competent Fuhrung been in power, and hints that the 
problem is perceived as lying not in the very nature of the political system itself, but 
2 3 0 F o r a detailed discussion of Antifaschismus in the GDR, see: Schlosser, Horst Dieter: Die Deutsche 
Sprache in der DDR zwischen Stalinismus und Demokratie. Historische, politische und 
kommunikative Bedingungen. Koln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik 1990, p. 31 ff. 
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rather in the mismanagement of a few incompetent individuals. We find something 
similar in: 
Trotz groBer Unzufriedenheit hatten nur wenige erkannt, daB diese Partei von 
Grund auf ... verandert werden muBte. (page 10) 
Reforming the party alone does not ultimately challenge the sanctity of the one-party 
state. There are numerous references to those punished, or even expelled by a 
dictatorial party for daring to voice their discontent and refusing to toe the party line. 
Bortfeldt goes into great detail in quoting the relevant statistics. Clearly he wishes to 
identify the existence of a broad basis of opposition from - and, by extension, to a 
broad basis of moral rectitude - within. In this regard there are numerous references 
to "Austrittswellen" and "Austritte" of party members which began in 1988 (p. 4). 
(The danger here, of course, is that those remaining in the party will be seen as the 
die-hards, the careerists; Bortfeldt must take care to show that this is not so, as part of 
the nucleus for the fledgling PDS wil l come from those remaining with the SED. 
Later, for different discursive purposes, an incipient PDS would brand those who left 
the party in the Wendezeit and after "Wendehalse" to boost the impession of the the 
party as a residual core of committed idealists). 
In contrast to the Fiihrung, then, stand the "Mitglieder der Partei, die Kritik an der 
Parteifuhrung und ihrer Politik ubten", those whom the leadership condemned as 
"Norgler, Meckerer und Kapitulanten" (page 4); Bortfeldt is keen to show that there 
was a critical body within the SED, a body of "Realisten und Kritiker" (page 6), even 
if it did lack the courage to articulate its criticisms. The Nischengesellschaft 
metaphor is invoked to describe inner-SED life: "audi in der SED gab es Nischen" 
(page 10); the ability, Bortfeldt suggests, to recognise a reprehensible state of affairs 
and discuss these in private was not the exclusive preserve of ordinary members of 
the public dissatisfied with their lot. The whole problem, Bortfeldt feels, lay in the 
"Ausschaltung (by whom? - MD) der Parteibasis von zentralen 
Entscheidungsprozessen" and in the "Entfernung der Parteifuhrung von den 
Realitaten und dem tatsachlichen Leben in den Parteigruppen und der Basis" 
(page 9); having engaged the "objectivity mode", Bortfeldt cannot but, as we have 
seen, refer to the party membership as supine and disorientated. However, he 
carefully avoids condemning it out of hand, trying rather to effect something of a 
discursive change of emphasis: this is a party all at sea, a party which is suffering, a 
party in chains because of a dictatorial leadership, a party wishing to articulate its 
true desires (whatever these may be) but unable to do so - in short, a party to be 
pitied. We remember the modal choice on page 9: 
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Sie (viele SED-Mitglieder) muflten zusehen, wie die neugegriindeten 
Bewegungen und Parteien ... die Probleme des Landes aufgriffen, die auch 
ihre Probleme waren. 
The implication is that an oppressed and frustrated membership has been bludgeoned 
into submission by a dictatorial agent (the Fuhrung) rather than being intrinsically 
entrenched in a 'Stalinist' approach. It is a membership which is well-meaning, yet 
powerless and intimidated: 
Das 7. Plenum des ZK der SED vom Dezember 1988 und der angekundigte 
Umtausch der Parteidokumente dienten genau dem Ziel, kritisches Potential 
in der Partei mundtot zu machen, es einzuschuchtern, zu disziplinieren 
(page 6) ... Die Bezirks- und Kreisorganisationen fiihlten sich alleingelassen. 
(page 8; italics mine) 
Whether this is accepted, or whether the latter serves only to make the Milgliedschaft 
appear all the more pathetic is doubtless ultimately a matter of personal response. 
What is evident, however, is that a schema of definite and indefinite constructions 
allows Bortfeldt to hedge on the problematic question of the extent of membership 
involvement. The true magnitude of the numbers involved - i.e. of those in the party 
who did or did not support democratic processes - can really only remain a matter of 
speculation. At times Bortfeldt seems to suggest as much in using the following 
attenuative language to qualify any suggestion that an absolute number - i.e. all 
members of the party - shared a particular view or acted in a particular way; the very 
vagueness of the constructions, however, allow Bortfeldt to create the desired 
impression, while leaving him room for defeasibility: "in Teilen der SED", "viele 
SED-Miglieder" ... "Die Parteiversammlungen ... waren vielerorls eine offene 
Anklage gegeniiber der Parteifuhrung" (page 9; my italics). At crucial stages, then, 
there is a clear implication that an absolute number could be involved, i.e. that the 
vague body that is the Mitgliedschaft was as a whole supportive of the changes/was 
critical of the status quo, more unequivocally so in: 
Die Sprachlosigkeit der Fuhrung und das Verdrangen der Probleme wurden 
fur die SED-Mitglieder immer beklemmender (page 8; my italics) 
and as a matter of interpretation in: 
Mitglieder der SED, die fur eine politische statt militarische Losung 
pladierten, wurden von den Hardliners als knieweich, als schlappe Liberale 
abgestempelt. (pp. 6-7) 
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Similarly on page 9 it is "die Partebasis" - i.e. as a whole (?) - which is 
"ohnmachtiger aber auch zorniger". 
In other words, while the objective mantle wil l not allow a defence of the rank and 
file in terms of absolutes throughout, there is, through the absolute language used at 
key stages, a clear invitation to see the membership as a whole as persecuted. At the 
same time Bortfeldt hints that that the party is founded upon a body of latent 
oppositional strength, which can later be tapped in building up the PDS. 
That there is a clear aim to offer the membership absolution (whatever numbers are 
ultimately involved) through 'objective confession' can be clearly gleaned from the 
final paragraph of the first section. The members of the former SED will have to live 
with the Schmach (p. 10) of that party's failure to take part in transforming GDR 
society. Having made this point, having pre-empted the antithesis by invoking it as 
his own objective observation, Bortfeldt now feels vindicated in adducing the crux of 
his argument, emphasized all the more through its textual positioning at the very 
climax of this section. The message with which he leaves us is that: 
der Verlauf und der friedliche Charakter dieser Revolution ware nicht 
erklarbar ohne die Duldung, das Sympathisieren, auch das aktive Mittun nicht 
weniger Mitglieder dieser Partei (p. 10; my italics), 
which of course - upon close inspection - can be seen to stand uncomfortably 
alongside Bortfeldt's own 'objective' recognition of the membership's supineness! As 
in a court case, however, the 'defence' is given the opportunity to sum up last - with 
the distinct advantage that its arguments wil l remain freshest in the minds of the jury! 
It will again be a matter of personal response whether the reader will or wil l not 
accept this causality, this interpretation of 'reality', will or wil l not accept that such 
an observation has been borne out through what has been related hitherto. A truth/lie 
schema is meaningless; for Bortfeldt the important point is that he has left the reader 
with a positive image of the SED rank and file, some of whom - as the party is 
gradually honed down and transformed - wil l play an active role in the moral 
rejuvenation of the fledgling PDS. 
On page 9 Bortfeldt argues that ever since the detente process of the seventies more 
and more people in the GDR were moving away from Stalinist modes of thinking 
and were instead turning to democratic values and the recognition of human rights. 
We observe the enormous vagueness in the "deutliche Wandlungen" that were 
intensified - Bortfeldt maintains - through the perestroika policies set in motion by 
Gorbachev and - /Crucially for Bortfeldt - were taking place both "in der DDR-
Gesellschaft und in der Mitgliedschaft" (page 9; italics mine). Notice the structure 
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again, however, the discursive 'back and forth': it appears that Bortfeldt feels that he 
might have overstepped the mark in adducing a 'positive' thesis and he consciously 
subverts his own position by adducing an antithesis: 
Aber die SED war auch ein "Kampfbund Gleichgesinnter". Bei alien 
stalinistischen Strukturen, die sich negativ auf das Mitgliederleben ausgewirkt 
hatten, war es fur manch einen mehr als das Ende einer Karriere, aus dieser 
Gemeinschaft ausgeschlossen zu werden ... Die Revolution war wahrlich 
nicht von dieser Partei ausgegangen. (page 10; inverted commas in original) 
It is hardly surprising, then, that we find Bortfeldt somewhat caught up in the duality 
of his own dialectical discourse. We have already mentioned that there is at times 
reason to question causal links; at other times we witness what can only be described 
as blatant contradiction and confusion. How, we ask ourselves, does the view put 
forward on page 9, namely that "Das Menschenrechts- und Demokratieverstandnis 
war dadurch in diesem poststalinistischen System aufgebrochen", this being 
symptomatic - as we have seen - of developments within the party too, tie in with the 
observation made only a few lines earlier that "die meisten Parteimitglieder waren 
obrigkeitsglaubig bis zum bitteren Erwachen" (italics mine). The answer is that there 
is no answer: we are left to effect a discursive synthesis for ourselves. To some the 
approach will doubtless convey a positive overall impression of 'honesty objectivity' 
and 'rationality'; others will perceive it as contradictory and obfuscatory. To 
successfully legitimise itself a party must win acceptance of its discourse (or, more 
correctly, its discourses) as credible. 
What we must bear in mind throughout is that this work is a political pamphlet: while 
its external form might be such that it is presented as an 'objective' account of 
SED/PDS history, it can be seen to have a clear aim: to establish legitimacy - in 
StraBner's view a primary aim of any political writ ing 2 3 1 . The problem for Bortfeldt -
and the abiding problem for the PDS - is that this legitimacy has to be secured in 
different ways and before a diverse set of target audiences: 
1) through an 'honest' recognition of personal blame and SED reprehensibility, 
especially in the eyes of the 'democratic' political establishment clamouring for the 
SED/PDS to be 'brought to justice'. 
2) at the same time through a - possibly contradictory - attenuation of that picture 
inasmuch as the PDS must establish before the establishment that it has a minimum 
see: StraBner: "MaximenverstoB als Regel ..." op. cit., p. 138 
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of integrity, of democratic credentials to set itself up as a player in the new political 
system. 
3) At the same time the PDS must secure legitimacy with its membership - especially 
those who have found in the PDS a politische Heimat - by representing its interests 
and playing down condemnation of the GDR, the SED and the individuals who made 
up that party. The importance to the party of the traditionalists in its member-base is 
evident in the recognition (from Bortfeldt himself) as late as 1994 that: 
Bisky, Gysi und Brie grenzten sich energisch von kommunistischen 
Vertretern der "reinen Lehre" ab; Andererseits ist die PDS auf die 
Traditionalisten in der Partei als organisatorische Basis angewiesen.232 
(inverted commas in original) 
4) In addition, the PDS must legitimise itself as representative of the interests of the 
largely East German voter-base upon which it is reliant - which has involved a 
concomitant propagation of GDR nostalgia and a continued relativisation of the 
faults of the GDR state system: we shall deal more fully with this point below. 
In a nutshell, Bortfeldt's pamphlet contains an inherent (and irreconcilable?) tension: 
on the one hand there is a need to 'honestly' expiate the sins of the past and come to 
terms with the SED 'Erblast', on the other enough positive qualities must be found in 
order to substantiate and vindicate the decision to keep the party in existence and lay 
the framework for its subsequent healthy development. It is hardly surprising, then, 
that the work is at times contradictory and nebulous in character, as Bortfeldt 
struggles to maintain an acceptable dialectical balance. 
A telling example of the at times confused signals the work transmits is the very 
question of the party's role within the new spectrum of political pluralism. On the 
whole Bortfeldt seems to suggest that the PDS, unlike its predecessor, is happy to 
accept its role as one party among many, is happy to earn acceptance through its 
newly-found integrity: 
Es entstand der Eindruck, daG hier keine alte Monopolpartei tagte, sondern 
eine Solidargemeinschaft, die wuBte, daB sie fur lange Zeit von der Macht 
ausgeschlossen sein wiirde und sich Vertrauen ganz neu erwerben miiBte ... 
(page 31) 
232Bortfeldt, Heinrich: "Auf daB der Wind sich drehe!" In: Deutschland Archiv. 4/94, p. 342 
(commentary on the 3rd Parteitag of the PDS) 
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(Note, here, the impersonal, agentless "Es enstand ...", which conveys an impression 
of universality: the 'Erscheinungsbild' is an objective reality, it is suggested, evident 
to all, not merely the subjective impression of the author.) 
Witness also: 
Dieses Programm wurde geschrieben fur eine Partei, die keine Staatspartei 
mehr war und sich verstehen wollte als eine linke Oppositionspartei, links von 
der SPD. (p. 33) 
Compare, however, the language of the Vorspiel, (page 3) in which there are 
unmistakable hints of what Good et al have called "alte Denkmuster". There is an 
undeniable suggestion that the central role of the SED could have been preserved had 
the right initiatives been taken in time, had the party been transformed from within. 
The failure of "real existierender Sozialismus" was unavoidable not because the one-
party system per se might have been undemocratic (this isue is simply not 
problematised) and thus reprehensible, but because the system - and by extension the 
SED - lacked "Innovationskraft und Demokratie". (p. 3). The ideas expressed here 
are reminiscent of those of Mikhail Gorbachev who, in trying to secure 'democracy' 
in the Soviet Union on the basis of a reformed Communist party, was for a long time 
unwilling to relinquish that party's monopoly on power. Compare Bortfeldt's: 
In der Verweigerung gegeniiber einer DDR-eigenen Perestroika gab die SED 
nicht nur das Heft das Handelns aus der Hand, sie verlor an Initiative, an 
Glaubwiirdigkeit. (page 3; my italics) 
The implication is clear: had the SED acted wisely and used the 'options' available to 
it, it might well have had "eine andere Rolle im TransformationsprozeG ... als sie 
dann tatsachlich einnahm". (page 3) 
There is an unmistakable tone of nostalgia in these words - in respect of a "Krise" 
which, according to the wording of the first paragraph was only "in gewisser Weise" 
pre-programmed: the implication is that it could have been stopped in time within the 
existing systemic framework. One cannot help asking whether Bortfeldt is not making 
virtue from necessity here, whether he has not, in fact, become a proponent of shared 
political power because of the inevitability of events - in much the same way as the 
PDS later came to support unification, albeit as the culmination of a gradual process, 
despite its initial hard-line anti-unification stance. 
At telling moments, then, a clear political message breaks through the external 
'objective' form, sometimes incorporating alte Denkmuster. At times this manifests 
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itself in sweeping absolutes which are anything but objective in character. So it is 
that Bortfeldt makes the highly questionable assertion that: 
Derjenige (Honecker - MD), der die Hauptverantwortung fiir die Krise in der 
SED und im Lande trug, durfte noch seinen Nachfolger wahlen ... (page 12; 
my italics) 
Page 30 sees something of a turning point. Suddenly the party seems to shed its 
indecision and ineffectuality when the Basis (note, again, an unquantifiable collective 
nominal) comes rushing to its aid. The party has achieved, Bortfeldt suggests, a new 
purity through the initiative of its very core, the honest members of the rank and file 
who stand in stark contrast to the once corrupt and dishonest Fuhrung. Note the 
pseudo-religious overtones in the following: 
In diesem kritischen Moment gingen von der Basis, von Initiativgruppen, 
entscheidende Impulse zur Retlung dieser Partei aus. Es war eine Kraft mit 
einer konstruktiven Funktion entstanden, an die nur noch wenige geglaubt 
hatten an dieser Bewegung war der fast zerstorte Gysi spiirbar gewachsen, sie 
hatte dieser Partei ... neuenAtem eingehaucht. (page 30; my italics) 
Again the positive impression conveyed by the construct turns on unspecified 
numbers and quantities. Observe the inherent causality of the impersonal "es war ... 
entstanden" (how?/through whose agency?) which makes an essentially problematic 
transition look causally self-evident. The sudden change in tone is unmistakable. The 
language used to describe the party and its activities is now imbued with a much 
more dynamic and vital quality as the 'new' party sheds the mantle of the persecuted 
and prepares to meet the challenges ahead. It is a force at once rejuvenated and 
revitalised, and much of the language used to describe it has an inherently positive 
semantic value: 
Uber diesem Parteitag schwebte nicht das Schwert der Auflosung. 
Optimismus und Zuversicht waren inzwischen eingezogen. Es herrschte sogar 
Aufbruchstimmung... [Es] prasentierte sich in mancher Hinsicht (note the 
vagueness! - MD) eine neue Partei. Unter den 595 Delegierten befanden sich 
viele junge Leute ... Die Atmosphare war offen und sogar ausgelassen ... fur 
einen Blick zuriick blieb wenig Zeit. (page 31; my italics) 
Here an obvious comparison is drawn between the detailed description of the 
'Erscheinungsbild' of this Wahlparteitag and the extraordinary party SED-PDS 
congress of early December 1989. Witness the seemingly 'incidental' detail 
incorporated into the description of the latter: while on a superficial level it might 
seem superfluous (having a 'fictive' quality) clearly it is not. The picture of the 
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earlier Party Congress serves as a foi l , a yardstick by which to measure the progress 
made by the party at the time of the Wahlparteitag (24/25 February 1990). Gone by 
February 1990 is the earlier mood of self-abnegation characteristic of the sufferer and 
martyr, the pathos inherent in Bortfeldt's observation that: 
Die Delegierten (at the aufierordentlicher Parteitag - MD) saBen auf harten 
Holzstuhlen bei stickiger Luft. Die Nachte wurden durchdebattiert, da kaum 
Nachtquartiere bereitgestellt waren ... bei den Marathonsitzungen war 
Kondition gefragt. (page 23) 
The 'new' language stands in stark contrast to that of the earlier sections which 
presented a picture of a party both persecuted and in the throes of agonised 'soul-
searching' and self-definition, a party to be pitied. This "Agonie" (p. 27), this 
agonised quest for absolution and a new image has, as has already been observed, an 
unmistakable religious dimension: note, for example, the very title of section 5, 
"Auflosung oder Nichtauflosung. Die SED-zwischen Agonien und 
basisdemokratischem Neubeginn" (p. 27); like Hamlet in his famous soliloquy the 
party must consider the moral implications of possible suicide - in its case political 
suicide by dissolving the party. Now that a turning point has been effected, a firm 
foundation-stone has been laid for the party's development and while a more cynical 
reader might be more dubious as to the soundness of the causality of this swiftly 
effected 'resurrection', Bortfeldt clearly feels that it leaves him in a new position of 
strength to air views which are at once far less gingerly and unequivocal. So it is that 
in section 7 the old language of antipathy towards West Germany re-emerges - e.g. in 
styling (not without grounds?) Kohl's attendance at a political rally in Erfurt as West 
German "Einmischung" (p. 34) in what are essentially East German political 
proceedings. Inasmuch as it has had the "Mut" (p. 34) this quality is emphasized 
again and again) to raise itself to a new level of moral integrity through an agonised 
cathartic process of suffering - all adversity and hostility notwithstanding - the PDS 
can be compared favourably, Borteldt suggests, with other parties who have relied on 
'external' help, on help from the old class enemy, West Germany: 
Demgegenuber wirkte der Wahlkampf derjenigen, die die Regie ihren 
Schwesterparteien aus der Bundesrepublik uberlieBen, iiberwiegend 
hausbacken.(page 34) 
Through the wit of its main political mouthpiece, Gregor Gysi, the party has acquired 
a dynamism, Bortfeldt suggests, which puts its political rivals in the shade. The 
examples of Gregor Gysi's wit selected for citation are unequivocally anti West-
German in tone: the PDS's party programme is not imported (!) from West Germany 
(still seen very much in traditional SED terms as a foreign capitalist and imperialist 
97 
power), their honorary Chairman is an East German citizen. While Bortfeldt is 
careful to ascribe these utterances to Gysi, their very incorporation without further 
comment from the author suggests that these are sentiments which Bortfeldt shares. 
(This is particularly the case where Gysi's Kohl anecdote is related on page 35: the 
latter seems misplaced in a 'serious' historiographic pamphlet whose external form 
clearly aims to convey broad objectivity. Through his very textual selection Bortfeldt 
has made it clear that he shares Gysi's view that Kohl, in his corpulent person, 
embodies what is perceived as self-satisfied, West German materialism (c.f. "Wir 
haben Mut zum Traumen und zwar nicht nur von der DM"; page 35). 
Numerous commentators have argued that it is precisely the PDS's anti- West-
German stance, its function as a mouthpiece for East German interests233, which 
gives the PDS its identity. Indeed, Bortfeldt seems to suggest as much on page 28: 
Mitte Januar wurde auch offensichtlich, daB eigenes Gestaltungspotential fur 
eine erneuerte, radikal-demokratisierte DDR nicht mehr gegeben war, was 
grundsatzliche Identitatsprobleme fur die SED-PDS aufwarf. 
Here Bortfeldt touches upon a problem which the PDS has sought to grapple with 
discursively ever since: how to be a representative of East German concerns and yet 
have an appeal in a united Germany. Mindful of this, then, and of the 'objective' 
dialectical form he has championed, Bortfeldt immediately and self-consciously pre-
empts possible objections as to the one-sidedness and narrowness of such a 
generalised point of view. Immediately he usurps the counter-claim which a 
dialectical opposite number might make: 
Sie (die PDS - MD), stand als Anwalt fur das Bewahrenswerte in der DDR 
und fur die sozial Schwachen. Dabei wurde jedoch ein Bild von der 
Bundesrepublik gezeichnet, das an alte Einseitigkeiten erinnerte ... (page 35) 
This appears something of a remarkable statement in the light of what has preceded 
it, unless, however, we bear in mind the need to appear 'objective' on at least a 
superficial level. It is precisely this tension - the need for 'objectivity' on the one 
hand and the need to get across clear, politically motivated messages as to the basis 
for the PDS's raison d'etre on the other which, as has already been stated, makes the 
monograph contradictory and vague in parts. The form however, allows Bortfeldt to 
take two steps forward and one step back. He might retract soiroTof the force of a 
point he has made - be it directly or indirectly - but the point is nevertheless made. 
2 3 3 W e will discuss below the problems inherent in trying to specify semantically the frequently cited 
notion of "East German interests." 
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What is important is the creation of an impression. A jury member might be asked to 
ignore inadmissible evidence, but can its members really be expected to obliterate it 
from its mind? 
This is a pattern we see running right through the monograph. On page 24 Bortfeldt 
cites Schumann's defence - at the extraordinary conference of the SED-PDS - of the 
millions of 'upstanding' members of the party rank and file: 
Dem Systembezug standen jedoch Aussagen gegeniiber, die Millionen SED-
Mitglieder von der Mitverantwortung freisprachen. Ihnen, die sich "allzeit 
guten Glaubens, mit Herz und Hand fur den Sozialismus auf Deutschem 
Boden" eingesetzt hatten, wurde eingeraumt, "eine gute Spur in der deutschen 
Geschichte gezogen zu haben." (Bortfeldt citing Schumann) 
The counter-view is immediately pre-empted, as a self-conscious Bortfeldt moves to 
redress a possible over-statement of his case. Witness the attenuation in the polarised, 
causally tenuous subjektiv/objekliv model cited above: 
Subjektiv haben viele SED-Mitglieder zweifellos Gutes gewollt und 
tatsachlich geleistet, objektiv haben sie damit aber das System gestarkt, das 
sie so nicht gewollt haben. (page 24) 
- a clear example of the awkwardness of trying to achieve both legitimacy through 
exoneration and legitimacy through condemnation and/or recognition of 
reprehensibility at one and the same time! 
The 'objective' dialectical form - the projection of a multiplicity of different and 
contradictory images and the adopting of essentially opposed positions - makes PDS 
historiography very hard to challenge (any challenge to a given proposition [thesis] 
can be readily countered through selective identification of a counter-proposition 
[antithesis] presented elsewhere) unless we are prepared to step outside of the 
substantive framework and question the intensity of the dialectic and the fusability of 
thesis and antithesis. This mode of argumentation is, of course, in no way exclusive 
to the PDS; Bortfeldt's work offers a graphic example of a discursive form ritually 
used to marshal support for a given ideology. 
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THE PDS AND THE GDR 
Political commentators have generally agreed that the PDS has set itself up as 
something of - and made political capital out of its status as - a mouthpiece for the 
'interests'2 3 4 of East Germans: 
Aus ihrem Wahlprogramm (of 1990 - MD), das auf dem Wahlparteitag vom 
24./25. Februar geschlossen wurde, geht, wie auch aus dem von Gysi 
gehaltenem Referat, folgende Strategic hervor. "Die PDS gehort zu den 
Kraften in unserem Lande, die sich entschieden gegen die Vereinnahmung der 
DDR durch die BRD zur Wehr setzen." Die Partei versuchte sich als Anwalt 
fur die Interessen der DDR-Biirger darzustellen und setzte dabei primar auf 
die angstlichen und unsicheren Wahler.2 3 5 (my italics) 
(Doubtless the PDS's consistent self-portrayal as an "Anwalt" alludes to the status of 
its most vocal mouthpiece, Gregor Gysi, as a renowned lawyer for East German 
dissidents236; we can leave open the question of whether, as the media has 
consistently sought to suggest, the latter abused his position.) 
If the above picture suggests that the PDS has championed (what we will continue, 
reductively, to call) East German interests on wholly tactical grounds, the we must 
relativise the picture by observing that numerous instances of very positive and 
committed acts of assistance by PDS members have been registered: 
in Sachsen-Anhalt hat Ministerprasident Hoppner, der mit Duldung der PDS 
regiert, keine schlechten Erfahrungen gemacht . . . 2 3 7 
Was den Wahlstrategen der CDU/CSU aber vor allem ein Dorn im Auge ist, 
ist die engagierte Basisarbeit der PDS-Mitglieder in den neuen Landern. Auf 
vielen Ebenen entfalten sie Aktivitaten, die Kontakte schaffen, 
GemeinschaftsbewuBtsein fordern, Hilfe geben und ein Forum fur - wie 
immer geartete - MeinungsauBerungen bieten ... Die breite Verankerung in 
Nachbarschaften, Clubs, Vereinen, Verbanden, Gewerkschaften zeigt den 
2 3 4see footnote 233 
2 3 5Gerner, op. cit., p. 38 
2 3 6 cf.: "Wahrend des Wahlkampfes schlupfte Gysi, geschatzter und popularer Rechtsanwalt, in die 
Rolle eines Anwaltes der DDR. Diese Rolle iibernahm auch die PDS. Sie stand als Anwalt fur das 
Bewahrenswerte in der DDR und fur die sozial Schwachen." Bortfeldt: Von der SED zur PDS. 
op. cit., p. 35 
2 3 7D6nhoff, Marion Grafin: "Keine Bosewichte. PDS: Nicht verteufeln, sondern mitregieren lassen." 
In: DieZeit. no. 46. 10 November 1995 
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West-Parteien auf, was sie in fiinf Jahren deutscher Vereinigung versaumt 
haben.238 
The PDS has doubtless been aided by what many commentators from both East and 
West have perceived as an overbearing and self-righteous stance among some West 
Germans239 in their attitudes to the East and by what Austrian observer, Richard 
Christ, perceives as: 
die stupende Unkenntnis, mit welcher der Westen im Osten die Geschafte 
fuhrt . 2 4 0 
Ironically, it is, on one level, precisely because of its identifiability with the SED and 
the GDR that the PDS - as a quintessentially East German product - has been able to 
secure popular support among East Germans and on this level, the PDS has been 
keen to boost its identifiability with the GDR, if not the SED: 
The frustrations of German Unification have led to serious resentments on the 
part of the former East Germans vis-a-vis the dominant West Germans ... It is 
ironic that the PDS, the direct successor of the Stalinist SED derives much 
support ... by being a clear East German creation in a world where everything 
of substance seems to be West German.241 
Wittich puts it like this: 
Die PDS wird zwar in der ostdeutschen Bevolkerung weitgehend als 
Nachfolgerpartei der SED wahrgenommen, aber das ist, vor dem Hintergrund 
verbreitet wahrgenommener sozialer Ungerechtigkeit, eigener gebrochener 
und veranderter Biographien - nicht nur ein Nachteil. Fur Teile des 
ostdeutschen Wahlvolkes reprasentiert sie damit auch selbst gelebtes Leben. 
Vor allem aber wird sje in einigen wichtigen, sozio-kulturellen Milieus 
Ostdeutschlands als Weggefahrte wahrgenommen, als eine Partei und als 
Gruppe von Menschen, die ebenfalls von den Umbruchen und Irritationen der 
letzten Jahre betroffen wurden und die sich dazu politisch verhalten.242 
2 3 8Volmert: "Die 'Altparteien' ..." op. cit., p. 176 
2 3 9 " E i n Teil der ostlichen Wahler wahlte die PDS vermutlich aus Trotz: so schlecht war das alles doch 
gar nicht, auch wir haben damals viel geleistet: und ein anderer Teil ... tut dies aus Protest gegen die 
'arroganten Westler', die glauben, alles besser zu wissen". Marion Grafin Donhoff, op. cit. 
2 4 0see: Christ: "Die deutschen Ostler." op. cit. 
2 4 ,Markovits/Gorski, op. cit.; p. 262 
2 4 2see Wittich: "Mitglieder und Wahler der PDS." op. cit., p. 80 
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This very fact offers some explanation as to why the Biirgerbewegungen who, after 
all, also championed East German interests against the West German 'juggernaut'2 4 3 
have failed to secure as much of the popular vote as the PDS. Moser argues, too, 
however, that West Germans' reluctance towards introspection in respect of their own 
past is bolstered by the (unreasonably? - MD) expectant and demanding attitudes of 
many unsure and insecure Easterners whose perception of the reality of unification is 
channelled through the reductive category of colonialisation and related concepts: 
Die moralische und wirtschaftliche Selbstherrlichkeit vieler Westdeutschen 
brauche ich hier nicht noch einmal zu beschreiben. Eine gewisse Verhartung 
gegen die Einkehr bei sich selbst kommt aber auch zustande durch die 
klagende, anklagende und fordernde Haltung vieler Ostdeutscher. Es ist dort 
2 4 : , For a thought-provoking account of some of what has been perceived as some of the linguistic 
manifestations of this 'juggernaut' attitude, see Kramer, Undine, "Von Ossi-Nachweisen und 
Buschzulagen" In: Reiher/Lazer: Von Buschzulage... op. cit., pp. 55-67; briefly, Kramer points to the 
use of terms such as Buschzulage as evidence of an attitude of "schwer revidierbare 
Uberlegenheitsgefiihle" (p. 63) on the part of some West Germans towards the GDR. The latter term, 
initially used to refer to the special remuneration given to colonial officials for serving in the colonies 
has been used pejoratively in the Post-Wende era to refer to the 'indemnification' given to West 
German officials for being prepared to help in the reconstruction of the territory of the 'colonised 
East' and for 'putting up' with the putative hardship entailed; its use, argues Kramer, "stigmatisiert ... 
das gesamte Gebiet der ehemaligen DDR und pauschal die Menschen, die dort leben" (p. 58) and is 
part and parcel of a "sprachliche Grenzziehung" (p. 58) which necessarily promotes a psycho-social 
German divide - "... gerade weil sprachliches Verhalten stets auch soziales ist". (p. 63). She observes 
with some consternation the evidence of the term's increasing normalisation, inasmuch as by 1996 the 
Berliner Zeitung - by contrast with previous years - was using it without signalling its discomfort with 
the term through its insertion in inverted commas or its italicisation. Kramer points to evidence of a 
"sprachliche Mauer" (p. 55)/"sprachIichen Abgrenzung" (p. 59) in the use of the terms ost, west and 
deutsch. Ost appears to be used for relativisation purposes much more frequently than west, even 
though frequently the "Komponente ost in der Zusammensetzung mit deutsch ... fur die Information 
des Lesers nicht notwendig ist". (p. 59). This, she concludes, hints at the fact that the starting point is 
per se from the West German perspective, a logical consequence of the fact that "im allgemeinen 
Sprachgebrauch der Bundesrepublik das Wort deutsch lange synonym zu westdeutsch verwendet 
wurde", (p. 60) and reflects that the asymmetrical use of the terms ost and west are manifestations of a 
latent prejudice "durch das eine Gruppe (namlich die ehemaligen DDR-Deutschen) von einer anderen 
Gruppe (den Bundesdeutschen) negativ markiert wird ... (p. 60) Ostdeutsch wird in diesem 
Zusammenhang zu einem aggregierten Begriff, der eine psychische Distanz der Gruppe der 
Deutschen West zur Gruppe der Deutschen Ost schafft." (p. 61) Likewise, the term deutsch is 
frequently used in reference to West Germany alone, in respect of which phenomenon Kramer cites 
the following telling example: "einige deutsche Politiker (machen) in Deutschland Urlaub ... wahrend 
andere in die Lausitz fahren." (p. 62) It is to be hoped, Kramer concludes, that this Westlastigkeit is 
based more upon a lack of reflection than a "Dominanzanspruch einer Gruppe ... und die soziale 
Geringschatzung der anderen". (p. 62) (Kramer does push a point, however, in protesting that the use 
of Frankfurt as synonymous with Frankfurt am Main is discriminatory towards Frankfurt/Oder, given 
the relative size and importance of the two cities. The inhabitants of Moscow [Scotland], for example, 
would doubtless not object to a natural association between the sign Moscow and the Russian capital.) 
On the whole, however, Kramer points to evidence that the hope lies primarily in the younger, 
emerging generation, for whom the psycho-social divide appears to becoming increasingly irrelevant. 
This would tend to bear out, Kramer observes, Professor Ruth Reiher's observation that "die 
gegenwartig noch iiberwiegenden negativen Bewertungen im Laufe der Zeit eine groBere Streuung 
erfahren und sich im Zuge einer Annaherung der Wertesysteme nivellieren". (cited by Kramer, p. 64). 
This does not bode well for a PDS which, as we shall see below (chapter 3), appears to rely heavily 
upon precisely this psycho-social divide. (MD) 
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gerade unter Intellektuellen iiblich, die Vereinigung beharrlich unter dem 
Aspekt der Ubernahme, der Kolonialisierung, der Eroberung zu sehen.244 
No political force has been more vociferous in categorising (and thereby encouraging 
perception of) unification as an act of imperialism, an "AnschluB", (thereby alluding 
to the National Socialist regime's annexation of Austria) than the PDS: 
Durch den AnschluB an die BRD in Gestalt von fiinf neuen Bundeslandern ist 
ihre (the former GDR's - MD) kiinftige Entwicklung vorbestimmt, wenn man 
von den nichtkalkulierbaren sozialen "Unkosten" und den unvorhersehbaren 
Riickwirkungen auf die alten Bundeslander absieht.245 
What is more ironic still in terms of the PDS's status as a mouthpiece for East 
Germans is the fact that Moser, from a psychoanalytical perspective, perceives East 
Germans' "klagende, anklagende und fordernde Haltung" vis-a-vis West Germany as 
a sub-conscious means of 'getting back' at their SED overlords2 4 6: their pent-up 
anger at the SED regime is re-directed at those in authority (the West Germans who 
run the institutions!) in the new system; it is the PDS as the official legatee of that 
system which has been sensitive to this trend, tapped the "angestaute Wut" (Moser; 
see footnote 246) and made political capital from it. For Moser, the mutual 
recriminations are the butt of political instrumentalisation: 
Es ist manchmal schwer ... auBerhalb des Beschuldigungskampfes zu bleiben 
und darauf zu vertrauen, daB vernunftigere Krafte zum Tragen kommen. 2 4 7 
We note here again the essential duality of the PDS position: on the one hand its very 
attempts to secure legitimacy with an East German reference group whose interests it 
has chosen to champion requires that it bolster up its East Germanness through the 
propagation of 'ostalgia'; clashing with this attempt to secure legitimacy is its 
attempt, of course, to secure legitimacy with the political establishment as a whole, 
which requires that it offer evidence of its 'newness', its willingness to divorce itself 
from - and condemn - its SED and GDR past. Constructions such as that cited above: 
2 4 4Moser, Tilmann: Politik und seelischer Hintergrund. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 1993, 
pp. 62-3 
245Neubert, Harald: War der 'Realsozialismus' zu retten? Berlin: Kommission Politische Bildung des 
Parteivorstandes der PDS 1991, p. 4 
2 4 6 c. f . Moser (op. cit., p. 63): "Man geht vielleicht nicht ganz fehl, wenn man vermutet, daB es auch 
groBe von friiher angestaute Wut auf die Machthaber der Partei gibt, die nun auf die Westdeutschen 
verschoben wird ..." 
2 4 7 ibid. 
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In besonderem MaBe tragen wir die Verantwortung fur die Geschichte der 
SED und der DDR, aus der wir hervbrgegangen sind 2 4 8 
are thus doubtless crafted to send the 'dualist' signals upon which the PDS must rely: 
the latent presupposition is that there must be something reprehensible about the 
SED/GDR if the PDS has to (pathetically) assume responsibility for it. This suggests 
that the PDS is recognising - and distancing itself from - the SED and its 'sins'. At 
the same time, the assumption of the 'Altlast' reinforces the PDS's very identifiability 
with the SED (i.e. anything but its move away from that party!), a link which, by all 
accounts, must be made if the PDS is to tap the "angestaute Wut" referred to above. 
The PDS thus relies on the German-German psycho-social divide and yet must work 
against it (or at least be seen to do so) at one and the same time. Doubtless there is 
room for the argument that the PDS has sought to deal with this dualism through the 
very insistence of its mti-Spallung stance; the sheer force and frequency with which 
the latter category (Spaltung) and it cognates is invoked in the discourse of the PDS 
serves to re-emphasise the very divide against which the party says it is its mission to 
work - and thus offers evidence of its continued value to the PDS: 
Wir sind im staatlich vereingten Deutschland angekommen (Note the pun! -
MD). Und dieses Deutschland ist gespalten - okonomisch, sozial, kulturell 
und auch psychisch ... auch Europa ist auf neue Weise gespalten . . . 2 4 9 
In the following, for example, Spaltung is ascribed to the political establishment as 
an active policy: 
die Herrschenden setzen auf Spaltung: West gegen Ost, deutsche gegen 
Auslander, Lohnabhangige gegen Sozialhilfeempfanger. Die eigentlichen 
gesellschaftlichen Widerspruche werden so verschleiert . . . 2 5 ° 
and the category is hammered home in the picture of societal disarray presented: 
Entsolidarisierung und Spaltung... setzen auf Spaltung... Die PDS findet 
sich weder mit der Ost-West Spaltung noch mit der sozialen Spaltung und erst 
2 4 8 Bisky, L . et a!.: "Sozialismus ist Weg ..." op. cit., p. 28 
2 4 9Gregor Gysi: "Wer Zukunft will, muB die Gegenwart Verandern. Ausschnitte aus einer Rede auf 
der 2. Tagung des 2. Parteitages in Berlin am 21. Juni 1991". In: Harnisch, Hanno/Hannelore Heider: 
Gregor Gysi. Einspruch! Gesprache, Briefe, Reden. Berlin: Alexander Verlag 1992. 
250Parteivorstand der PDS: "10 Thesen zum weiteren Weg der PDS." In: PID. no. 48. 1994, p. 19 
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recht nicht mit der politischen Methode der Spaltung ab ... einen 
tatsachlichen Beitrag zum Abbau der wmext&Spaltung . . . 2 5 1 (my italics) 
In a nutshell, a cynical observer might argue that what is essentially a divisive and 
destructive message is presented in constructive terms by a PDS in 'Brutus-is-an-
honourable-man mode'. 
We wil l argue below that essentially the championing of East German interests has 
been a double-edged sword for the PDS: in the short term the 'strategic' dimension 
of this approach has served as a basis for the PDS to mobilise a not inconsiderable 
segment of the East German population (20%) while in the long term its status as a 
Regionalpartei runs the risk of ultimately leaving it politically redundant with the 
further convergence of the two Germanies. 
While Gerner observes that one of the decisive factors in the demise of the GDR was 
the leadership's inability "eine eigenstandige nationale Identitat in der DDR 
herzustellen"252, there is no little irony in the fact that in this respect the PDS has 
shown considerable success. Not infrequently the PDS paints a picture of the GDR 
which sees the party harking back to the days of yore; here the PDS makes frequent 
reference to isolated features (indeed laudable in themselves!) of the GDR system, 
such as low rents, full employment and child care facilities, sometimes explicitly: 
Wir sind, weiB Gott, keine Anhanger mehr der friiheren 
Kommandowirtschaft. Aber ich frage mich, weshalb diese 
Kommandowirtschaft Sozialleistungen erwirtschaften konnte, die bei 
Annaherung an die reiche BRD an die armere DDR (sic.) fur deren 
Bevolkerung soziale Einschrankungen bringen soli! Ich dachte, da kommt 
mehr bei raus.253 
Viele schatzen die DDR aufrichtig fur ihr antifaschistisches 
Selbstverstandnis, weil das Privateigentum an Produktionsmitteln im 
wesentlichen abgeschafft war, es keine Ausbeutung von privaten Eigentumern 
gab, aktive Friedens- und Abriistungspolitik betrieben wurde (leider erganzt 
durch ein militantes Erziehungssystem), die sozialen Unterschiede wesentlich 
geringer als im Westen waren ... Arbeitslosigkeit praktisch nicht existierte ... 
2 5 l ib id . 
2 5 2Gerner, op. cit., p. 19 
2 5 3Gregor Gysi in his speech on the PDS's 1990 electoral programme for the Volkskammerwahlen. 
Cited in Gerner, op. cit., p. 38 
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Vergessen wir nicht, selbst ein so scharfer Kritiker der Verhaltnisse in der 
DDR wie Robert Havemann erklarte, im besseren Deutschland zu leben.2 5 4 
(an argument whose extreme is located in the world-view of Sahra Wagenknecht and 
the Kommunistische Plattfortn255), and sometimes indirectly: 
Die deutsche Sprache wurde durch schreckliche Neuschopfungen verunziert. 
Im Osten tauchen Begriffe wieder auf, die viele Menschen nur fur feme 
Welten giiltig glaubten: Betriebsstillegung, Konkurs, Pleite, Arbeitslosigkeit. 
DaB es hierbei nicht urn Wortspiele geht, hat inzwischen jeder gemerkt. Die 
genannten Wortungetume stehen fur die schlechter werdende wirtschaftliche 
und soziale Situation.2 5 6 
Trew has shown how the causality behind complex processes can be re-interpreted 
through "deletion or rewording"2 5 7. Ultimately, through the simple process of textual 
selection, of the selective mediation of 'facts' or isolated features, the PDS presents a 
picture of GDR 'reality' which yet again circumvents a complex causal background. 
Gerner describes in detail the catastrophic economic situation in which the GDR 
found itself by 1989 2 5 8 and comes to the conclusion that: 
Es ware eine "RoBkur" notwendig gewesen, eine grundsatzliche Anderung der 
Wirtschaftspolitik in der DDR, urn Leistung und Verbrauch wieder in 
Ubereinstimmung zu bringen. Dazu hatten Sozialleistungen massiv abgebaut 
werden miissen, und unrentable Betriebe hatte man schlieBen miissen.259 
In other words, unemployment might indeed have become a very real factor in the 
GDR too, had it remained in existence. The PDS cuts out this background260 in its 
Ostalgie. This is not to invalidate the arguments of those who favoured a slower path 
to unification or to deny the validity of the grounds for perceiving the presence of an, 
at times, overweening West German 'juggernaut'; however, the economic situation 
in which the eastern half of Germany currently finds itself is predicated upon a 
complex interrelationship between present and past, in other words this complex 
2 5 4 G y s i : "Was will die PDS in Deutschland?" op. cit., p. 12 
2 5 5 see footnote 183 
256Wer isl das die PDS? op. cit., p. 22 
2 5 7 Trew: "Theory at Work." op. cit., p. 55 
2 5 8Gerner, op. cit. (see p. 30 ff.) 
2 5 9 ibid., p. 31 
260por gr aphic evidence of the GDR's miserable economic situation by the Wendezeit, see: "Die 
Volkswirschaft in der Realitat." In: Lau/Lau: Deutschland auf dem Weg zur Einheit ... op. cit., 
p. 64 ff. 
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'reality' cannot be simply and unproblematically reduced to the ex-GDR's economic 
situation in the new Germany, to the unification process. The 'ostalgic' strand of the 
PDS's discourse of causal circumvention frequently seeks to do precisely this: to 
suggest, by simply cutting out the 'complicating factors', that unification alone is 
responsible for the economic woes which has befallen certain sections of the 
population. Markovits and Gorski have pointed out that East German 
Lokalpatriotismus, as they call i t 2 6 1 , was particularly manifest in the politics of the 
Gerechtigkeitskommitees262 of mid-1992: 
the committee issued an appeal in which it deplored widespread 
unemployment, sharp increases in rent and other costs, reduced social 
services and the prospect of losing long-occupied homes. Above all, the 
appeal made it clear that the committee regarded all of these calamities 
befalling the East Germans as the direct results of the unification process, as 
well as the ensuing West German dominance.262, (my italics) 
Although its founders Diestel and Gysi emphasised the Uberparteilichkeit of the 
Gerechtigkeitskomitees, there is much evidence to suggest that these were largely 
PDS-led2 6 4. Moreau sees them as part of an overall PDS Biindnispolilik265. Moreau is 
doubtless not wrong to observe the tactics both surrounding their founding ("Die 
Tatsache, daB die Griindung der Gerechtigkeitskomitees im Sommerloch erfolgte, 
sicherte dem Ereignis zudem die fast ungeteilte Aufmerksamkeit der Medien") and in 
their name ("wer ist schon gegen Gerechtigkeit?")266. The highly superordinate 
nature of the category Gerechtigkeit makes it virtually unchallengeable: it is a 
Leerformel, of the type described by Topitsch 2 6 7, a key-word, as Townson calls i t 2 6 8 , 
a lowest common denominator which unites through positive connotation rather than 
through any tangible denotation. (We will discuss in chapter 3 below the wide 
26 ,Markovits/Gorski, op. cit., p. 262 
2 6 2 " I n the middle of July 1992, a group called the Committee for Fairness constituted itself to protest 
what East Germans consider their mistreatment at the hands of West Germans and the federal 
government." ibid. 
2 6 3 ibid., pp. 262-63 
2 6 4see Moreau/Neu: Die PDS zwischen Linksextremismus... op. cit., pp. 42-4; Markovits/Gorski, 
op. cit., pp. 62-3 
2 6 5 I n keeping with his consistent sharply right-wing view of the PDS as a party with the uniform aim 
of infiltrating and undermining the existing 'democracy', Moreau sees these Gerechtigkeitskomilees 
as "nur ein Aspekt der subversiven Tatigkeit der PDS". {Die PDS zwischen ... op. cit., p. 45); we will 
return to this question below. 
2 6 6 ibid., p. 43 
2 6 7see Topitsch, Ernst: "Uber Leerformeln. Zur Pragmatik des Sprachgebrauches in Philosophie und 
politischer Theorie." In: Topitsch, E. (ed.): Probleme der Wissenschaflstheorie. Festschrift fur V. 
Kraft. Wien Springer 1960, pp. 233-64; we will return to Topitsch below. 
2 6 8Townson, op. cit., p. 203 
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recourse in PDS discourse to highly superordinate terms.) Here, then, the PDS makes 
unification the monocausal scapegoat for the East Germans' fate 2 6 9. We wil l witness 
below, however, that for quite different discursive purposes in 1994 German (re-?)-
unification was re-cast as an emancipatory process (see chapter 5). 
Ultimately the PDS has been boosted in its Ostalgie by the fact that: 
Gegenwartig belasten vorwiegend noch Alltagsprobleme das Leben der 
Burger der DDR. Die Geschichte gerat unter den aktuellen, dramatischen 
Geschehnissen, fur den einzelnen leicht in den Hintergrund, es gibt andere 
Sorgen. Doch nichts ware fur die weitere Entwicklung schadlicher als die 
Verdrangung der letzten vierzig Jahre270 
and in particular upon the fact that: 
Allerdings wird die 40-jahrige Diktatur in der DDR auch nach dem 
Verschwinden des zweiten deutschen Staates nicht folgenlos bleiben. "DDR-
Biirger" wird es noch eine Zeitlang geben, obwohl es den Staat DDR nicht 
mehr gibt. 2 7 1 
Having made itself the Anwalt of "Hundertausende [, die] ins soziale Abseits und 
damit an den Rand der Gesellschaft geschickt (werden)"272, in its status as a 
quintessential product of the GDR, the PDS has relied in its discourse upon the 
suggestion that its fate at the hands of a hostile political establishment is a 
microcosmic model of the fate suffered by East Germans in general at the hands of 
an overbearing and uncaring Federal Republic. Bortfeldt observes that: 
Die Ostdeutschen ... wenden sich artikulierter gegen ... negative 
Pauschalisierung gelebten Alltagslebens in der DDR und lassen eine 
verstarktes "Wir-Gefuhl" erkennen; auch das verschuttete SelbstbewuBtsein 
kommt wieder zum Vorschein. Selbstgefalliger Umgang mil Ostdeutschen 
2 6 9 c . f Moreau (Die PDS zwsichen... op. cit., pp. 43-4): "Im Griindungsmanifest der 
Gerechtigkeitskomitees wurde an die Diktion des PDS-Programms angekniipft. Die Burger in den 
neuen Bundeslandern fuhlten sich als 'Menschen zweiter Klasse'. 'Deindustrialisierung, Zerstorung 
der Landwirtschaft, Massenarbeitslosigkeit, sozial unvertragliche Mietsteigerungen' und vieles andere 
mehr hatten 'die Hoffnungen zerstort, die mit der deutschen Einheit verkniipft waren.' Die 
Ostdeutschen muBten 'ihre Interessen selber aussprechen und wahrnehmen. Dazu rufen wir auf ... 
«Komitees fur Gerechtigkeit» zu bilden, die iiberparteilich sind und zu denen jede und jeder Zutritt 
hat'." 
2 7 0Weber, op. cit., p. 242 
2 7 1 ibid., p. 243 
2nWer ist das, die PDS? op. cit., p. 24 
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einerseits und Verteufelung der PDS andererseits lassen nur einen 
Solidarisierungseffekt untereinander entstehen.273 (my italics) 
Observe the suggestion, again, that an absolute number of (i.e. all) East Germans 
may be involved. 
This line of argumentation culminates in the observation that: 
Wer im Osten politisch Erfolg haben wi l l , muB sich den Problemen der 
Ostdeutschen als Partner zuwenden und sich politisch mit der PDS 
auseinandersetzen.274 
This is Bortfeldt's unmistakable political message: the PDS is the (one and only) 
'Sprachrohr' for East German interests, voting PDS is the shibboleth for a GDR 
identity (despite the fact, of course, that 80% of East Germans have taken their vote 
elsewhere!). While, of course, the PDS does represent a significant section (whose 
nature we examine in some detail in chapter 3) of the East German population, the 
PDS's Sprachrohr construct turns on a 'false converse'; while it is true that 
Support for PDS > implies (statistically) East German origin (if we treat as 
insignificant the 1% of the West Germans who have voted PDS) 
the converse that 
being East German in origin > implies support for PDS 
is manifestly not (given that 4/5 of the East German electorate have chosen to vote 
for other parties). Put simply X implies Y, but Y does not imply X; the PDS is one 
symbol of a GDR identity, but it is not the one and only symbol. 
It is only consistent, then, that in its Ostalgie-related discourse the PDS should offer 
definite signals of anti-unification and anti West-German sentiment. As we have 
observed, the unification process has consistently been deemed an Anschlufi . For the 
purposes of bolstering up an East-West divide we witness the re-emergence of 
thought patterns characteristic of cold war discourse. At times the complex causality 
underlying the GDR's reprehensible features275 and that country's ultimate demise is 
reduced to the interference of the West: 
273Bortfeldt: "Auf dali der Wind sich drehe!" op. cit., p. 342 
2 7 4 ibid. 
2 7 5 T h e issue of the complex causality behind the GDR's demise is examined in great detail by Gerner, 
op. cit., chapter 1. 
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In den 50er Jahren fuhrte zum Beispiel der kalte Krieg, die politischen und 
okonomischen Angriffe aus dem Westen gegen die DDR zu einer gewissen 
Akzeptanz der Sicherheitssysteme. Die langjahrige Nichtanerkennung der 
DDR fuhrte auch zum Verstandnis fur ubertriebene staatliche Symbolik. 2 7 6 
(my italics) 
Observe how the - putative - stifling of the (mythical?) Demokratiebewegung 
referred to above is also reduced to the monocausal factor of Western interference: 
Die Volksbewegungen in den osteuropaischen Landern fiihrten am Ende der 
80er Jahre zum Zusammenbruch der erstarrten politischen Herrschaftssysteme 
und setzten fur kurze Zeit wesentliche Demokratisierungen des 
gesellschaftlichen Lebens in Gang. Heute zeigt sich: Die herrschende 
kapitalistische Produktionsweise und die dominierenden politischen Systeme 
verhinderten, daft die demokratischen und sozialistischen Ideale dieser 
Bewegungen verwirklicht werden konnten.211 (my italics) 
(There is room here for - at the very least! - problematising the notion that the vast 
majority of the East German people favoured unification with the West!) 
With reference to the PDS's 1993 programme, Pfahl-Traughber observes, with some 
justification, that: 
Uberhaupt zeichnet sich die Auseinandersetzung der PDS mit der DDR-
Vergangenheit durch eine uberaus selektieie Wahrnehmung aus ... 
Hinsichtlich des Scheiterns des sowjetischen Modells macht das Programm 
ausschlieBlich auBenpolitische und gesellschaftliche Rahmenbedingungen 
verantwortlich: "in einem sozialokonomisch, politisch und kulturell 
zuriickgebliebenen Land, standig bedroht von einer kapitalistischen Umwelt" 
wurde "der Versuch, eine sozialistische Ordnung zu schaffen" ... von Anfang 
an beeintrachtigt. DaB die dann als Entartungserscheinungen genannten 
Formen von "Willkiir, Grausamkeit und Biirokratie" (Massenmord und Terror 
werden nicht genannt) auch etwas mit der Ideologic und den 
Organisationsprinzipien der Bolschewiki zu tun hatten, problematisiert der 
Programm-Text nicht 2 7 8 (my italics: observe how Pfahl - Traughber, too, 
appears to recognise that naming is not addressingl) 
2 7 6 G y s i : "Was will die PDS in Deutschland." op. cit. 
27'1 Programm der Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus. 1993. op. cit., p. 4 
278Pfahl-Traughber, op. cit., p. 362 
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and thus identifies the causal circumvention which we have already highlighted. 
Pfahl-Traughber argues emotively, too, that the PDS's expressions of distaste at the 
GDR's reprehensible features: 
zeigt zwar, daB die PDS sich in einer gewissen Distanz zum DDR-System wie 
zum Stalinismus in der ehemaligen Sowjetunion sieht ... Dabei kann aber 
nicht per se von einem VeranderungsprozeB grundsatzlicher Art gesprochen 
werden, stellen die zitierten AuBerungen nur allgemein bekannte historische 
Tatbestande dar ... Sie (the expressions of distaste - MD) finden sich im 
Rahmen einer eindeutig positiven Beschreibung der DDR: Es wird im 
Zusammenhang mit der Staatsgriindung von berechtigten (mythical? - MD) 
"antifaschistisch-demokratischen Veranderungen im Osten Deutschlands" ... 
gesprochen. DaB die Entstehung der DDR wenig mit demokratischen 
Entwicklungen und mehr mit der Errichtung einer Diktatur unter der Fuhrung 
der SED zu tun hatte, scheint der PDS selbst heute noch nicht bewuBt zu 
sein. 2 7 9 
Consistent, too, with the PDS's attempts to on one level offer absolution, as we have 
seen, to the SED-Basis, is the sweeping discursive exoneration given to East 
Germans across the board 2 8 0. Again absolution is offered through individualisation; 
what the PDS circumvents here is the problematic question of how the aggregate of 
the parts - i.e. of all these individually laudable (and unverifiable!) aspirations - could 
form such a problematic whole. Observe the re-emergence of the subjektiv gut 
gewolltes model in 
Auf der anderen Seite werden wir die Bemiihungen und die Ergebnisse der 
Tatigkeit von Hunderttausenden Mitgliedern der SED, Hunderttausenden 
Biirgerinnen und Biirgern der DDR fur eine sozial gerechtere und humanere 
Gesellschaft niemals in Abrede stellen oder geringschatzen ... Niemand hat 
^ das Recht sie zur Leugnung ihrer Biographien zu zwingen, ihre Biographien 
geringzuschatzen und darauf zu verzichten, ihre Erfahrungen fur die 
Gestaltung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu nutzen.281 
Notice, here, the syntactic parallelism: SED (/PDS) : Burger und Burgerinnen der 
DDR; coupling the activities of its political predecessor with those of East German 
2 7 9 ibid., p. 361 
2 8 0 This is in no way to suggest that the PDS should be hell-bent on trying to invoke and 'prove' the 
'guilt' or complicity of citizens of the GDR. It is rather the case that the PDS here, too, simply 
circumvents a problematic causal background. 
2 8 l Bisky, L. et al.: "Sozialismus ist Weg ..." op. cit., p. 28 
I l l 
citizens in general the PDS, as the SED's political successor, is reinforcing its 
position as the mouthpiece for East Germans. Observe, too, that if this conceptual 
model is established in an East German mind, then any attempt to challenge personal 
biographies within the ranks of the PDS (as in the case of involvement with the 
Ministry for State Security) will be viewed as a challenge on the collective East 
German biography per se. Yet again the argumentation turns on the lowest common 
denominator, highlighted above, of a GDR identity. We have drawn attention to the 
"Solidarierungseffekt" highlighted by Bortfeldt. It must be emphasised here that 
while the 'tactical' dimension of this last message might be considered 'morally' 
questionable (i.e. playing on and inciting insecurities as a means of gaining popular 
support), the substantive nature of the PDS's opposition to a certain West German 
tactlessness is not groundless: there can be little doubt that prevailing attitude of an a 
priori (moral?) superiority among some West Germans, what (West German) 
psychoanalyst Tilmann Moser has identified as "die Heftigkeit der westlichen 
Beschuldigung und der hohe Grad von Herablassung"282 (which finds its physical 
expression in Markovits and Gorski's "juggernaut") has served the PDS's ostalgic 
cause. This, argues Moser, is one of the main factors which threaten the pursuit of a 
healthy pan-German Vergangenheitsbewaltigung. Giinter Gaus has identified a long 
tradition of a certain West German condescension towards the East. The latter, head 
of West Germany's Standige Vertretung in the GDR for six and a half years, wrote 
his seminal work on the GDR 2 8 3 as a means, he states in his introduction, of 
counteracting the prevailing West German clich6 of a polarised GDR: an egregious 
state party on the one hand and on the other a grey, faceless and oppressed people 
deprived of a private biography, of private happiness, by an "allmachtige, 
allgegenwartige Staatspartei"284; in a nutshell, his stated aim is to counteract a 
primitive(s) Bild von der DDR als perfekter Gewaltmaschine, die den 
Menschen kaum Luft zum Atmen laBt 2 8 5 
and in which individuals are subordinated to the "so dominante wie undifferenzierte 
bipolare Kategorien"286 - described in some detail by Patzold and Patzold2 8 7 - of 
2 8 2 M o s e r , op. cit., p. 52 ' 
2 8 3 G a u s , Giinter: Wo Deutschland liegt. Eine Ortsbestimmung. Munchen: dtv 1987 
2 8 4 i b i d . , p. 8 
2 8 5 i b i d . , p. 116 
2 8 6 R e i h e r , Ruth: Sprache im Konflikl. op. cit., p. 15 (introduction) 
2 8 7 see : Patzold, Jorg/Margita Patzold: "Gemeinsame Sprache, geteiltes Verstehen. Anmerkungen zur 
Systematik von Verstandigungsschwierigkeiten zwischen Deutschen Ost und Deutschen West." In: 
Reiner: Sprache im Konflikt. op. cit., pp. 244-62 
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either Tetter (or Milldufer) on the one hand, or Opfer (or Widerstdndler) on the other. 
In his eminently balanced account, Gaus argues that the two Germanies have much 
more in common than is often apparent from official West German propaganda. 
Central to his thesis is his observation that: 
auch druben, im anderen deutschen Staat, die private Nische der bevorzugte 
Aufenthaltsort der Biirgerinnen und Burger der DDR ist - wie bei uns, wie 
iiberall. 2 8 8 
The refusal to recognise the centrality or indeed the existence of the "Nischen 
innerhalb des Sozialismus der DDR"- in other words the people's "Ruckzug ins 
Private"2 8 9 coupled with a demonstration of the minimum of allegiance required by 
the authorities - is not, argues Gaus, only to be found among GDR's ideological 
hardliners, for whom the official teachings of Marxism-Leninism - the "Sein und 
BewuBtsein einer entwickelten sozialistischen Gesellschaft" with its "neuen 
Menschen"290- do not officially allow for the much clearer delineation between 
public and private that characterises the West German political system291. Gaus 
observes that: 
Die bunderepublikanischen Agitatoren gegen die DDR, Politiker wie 
Publizislen, die auf diesem Feld arbeiten, haben ebenfalls ihre 
Schwierigkeiten mit der mitteldeutschen Nischengesellschaft: weil deren 
Freiraume ihre Darstellung der DDR als einem Ort, an dem es nur Schergen 
und Opfer292 gibt, widerlegen. Die hiesigen Agitatoren sind bemuht, die 
Menschen druben in unserem Bewujitsein (through, in part, simplified 
conceptual structures which turn on rigid bipolar categorisation - MD) zu 
entprivatisieren: sie in unseren Augen zu grauen Schatten in einem 
The authors show how, in an interview between a West German television journalist and East German 
author, Erwin Strittmatter, the 'conflict' between the two parties is located largely in the 
unwillingness of the latter - as an author whose works found favour with the East German state - to 
allow the journalist to subordinate his personal, East German biography to the simplified bipolar 
conceptual schema of Tater/Mitldufer versus OpferlWiderstandskampfer which underpins her 
conceptualisation of the relationship of the individual East German citizen to the East German state 
and which is so much a part of her West German socialisation. 
2 8 8 G a u s , op. cit., p. 7 
2 8 9 i b i d . , pp. 115,116 
2 9 0 i b i d . , pp. 115,116 
2 9 1 see Good: Die deutsche Spraclie und die kommunistische Ideologie. (op. cit.) for a study of the 
linguistic implications of this politicisation of the Privatsphdre: In the G D R the term politics was 
widened to refer to aspects of individuals' lives which in West Germany would generally be regarded 
as having little or nothing to do with politics. 
2 9 2 W i t h respect to the 'earlier' Vergangenheitsbewdltigung, Moser, too, points to the danger of a 
bipolar simplification, in questioning the usefulness of a "Proklamation von moralischen Urteilen, die 
daran festhalt, ein Volk in Bocke und Schafe einzuteilen". op. cit., p. 57 
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allgegenwdrtigen, allgewaltigen Willkiirstaat zu machen. Dazu passen dann 
nicht die Privatheit der Nischen, das private Gliick und Ungliick in ihnen, die 
Staatsferne, in der ein groBer Teil des Lebens in der DDR statthat.293 (my 
emphases) 
Interestingly, Gaus observes that while the existence of the Nischengesellschaft was 
initially denied by large sections of the West German political establishment, the 
Federal Republic's assumption of diplomatic relations with the GDR made this 
increasingly untenable: the subsequent gradual and grudging acceptance of its 
existence was, argues Gaus, predicated upon an expedient misinterpretation of the 
term as a: 
Besonderheit des kommunistischen Regimes ... als die notgedrungene Flucht 
ins Private, durch welchen Beigeschmack die agitatorische Brauchbarkeit 
wiederhergestellt wird. Gerade das, eine Besonderheit der DDR, sind die 
Nischen jedoch nicht 2 9 4 
and points to 
Ausnahmen davon (from having the "Existenzmittelpunkt im privaten 
Bereich" - MD) hiiben wie driiben, ein besonderes Engagement im 
allgemeinen, offentlichen Fragen, und gar noch ein solches Engagement 
auBerhalb der dafiir vorgesehenen Normen, SED und ihre Ableger dort, 
etablierte Parteien und Verwandtes hier. 2 9 5 
The simplified packaging of the GDR as a totalitarian state of oppression served to 
reinforce the prevailing ideology of what Gaus ironically calls "der totalitare 
Antikommunismus ... die irrationalen Angste vor linken Ideen generell in unserem 
burgerlichen Mehrheitsgemut , . . " 2 9 6 , as a foil for what was thus presented as a 
'perfect' Federal Republic; voicing his "Skepsis gegenuber dem eigenen Nest", Gaus 
berates a West German withdrawal into an "eigene Scheinwelt"297 and observes that 
many of West Germany's four million unemployed would be only too glad to use the 
Schrebergarten to improve their standard of living, the very Schrebergarlen whose 
yields were a fixed item on the GDR's hochslrangigen Jahreswirtschaftsbericht and 
2 9 3 G a u s , op. cit., p. 116 
2 9 4 i b i d . , p. 117 
2 9 5 i b i d . 
2 9 6 i b i d . , p. 118 
2 9 7 i b i d . , pp. 118, 119 
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thus a constant butt of official West German humour2 9 8. In getting beyond the 
abiding clich6, argues Gaus, he hopes to 'undemonise' the power of the SED in the 
minds of West Germans: 
Bedenkt man, wie viele Westdeutsche mit ihrem totalitdren 
Antikommunismus von nuchtern-normalen Kategorien des politischen 
Denkens in Europa entfernt sind, dann erhellt sich der nutzliche Sinn solcher 
Entdamonisierung.299 (italics in original) 
For Gaus, the resonance enjoyed by his work among ordinary East German citizens 
(even though it was not officially available in the GDR) is predicated upon their 
recognition that he had sought to move away from the stereotyped picture of the 
GDR often painted in the West: "Sie fuhlten sich ernst genommen".300 
The substantive thrust of the PDS's 'Totschlag' arguments is thus not wholly 
groundless. It is this very fact which has allowed the PDS to effect a discursive 
distraction: to confuse the very real justification for 'self-defence' against the West 
German 'juggernaut' with a less-than-justified attempt to circumvent the question of 
the nature of Mitlaufertum within society. While it is true that East Germans are not 
accountable to their counterparts in the West, they are accountable to themselves and 
future generations. A healthy Vergangenheitsbewalligung requires causal questions 
to be addressed not suppressed. Weber pinpoints the probfem: 
Die Diktatur wurde von Personen ausgeiibt, von solchen die sich aktiv 
schuldig machen, aber audi von horigen Mitlaufern. Die hierarchischen 
Strukturen des totalitaren Stalinismus bestanden im Machtmonopol der 
Parteifuhrung, die sich anmaBte "immer recht" zu haben. Bei diesen Gremien 
liegt die Verantwortung und Schuld fur Unterdruckung und Verfolgung. Doch 
die Machthaber und ihre Handlanger konnten sich auf viele Karrieristen oder 
"Glaubige" stutzen, die das System mittrugen. Die Bereitschaft zu einer 
veranderten Sicht, zu demokratischem Umgang und zum "aufrechten Gang" 
erfordert die kritische Analyse sowohl der politischen Strukturen alsjzuch der 
personlichen Verhaltensmuster, denn beides hat die 40-jahrige SED-
Herrschaft ermoglicht.301 (my italics) 
2 9 8 i b i d . , p. 120 ff. 
2 9 9 i b i d . , p. 8 
3 0 0 i b i d . , p. 9 
3 0 , W e b e r , op. cit., p. 243 
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Moser goes further. For him a healthy pan-German Vergangenheitsbewaltigung™2 
requires, too, that West Germans effect, in their dealings with Easterners, a 
practicable balance, that they counteract a "Widerstand gegen eine Einkehr bei sich 
selbst", as a precondition for "die Fahigkeit zu sittlicher Solidaritat, die die 
Moglichkeit zu Verurteilung und vorubergehendem AusschluB vom offentlichen 
Leben offenlaBt".3 0 3 
It is precisely this last possibility - that of a sane and healthy 'moral' judgement 
unhindered by emotive categories - that an ostalgic PDS would have foreclosed on 
the grounds that Western arrogance has gone too far. In other words, something in 
the reductive, bipolar conceptual schema underpinning Western attitudes has 
afforded the PDS seemingly pertinent grounds for arguing one extreme, the (blanket) 
unchallenageability of personal biographies ("Recht auf die eigene Biographie"), 
despite its wholly contradictory assertion elsewhere that it wil l not shirk that past and 
will address it head on. 
Pfahl-Traughber has identified in the PDS's discourse in relation to it GDR past what 
he perceives as sophistic textual constructions incorporating (unverifiable and 
unquantifiable - MD) "Gegensatze die nicht notwendigerweise etwas miteinander 
zu tun haben"304. He observes that despite, on an expressis verbis level, arguing 
vehemently in favour of "keine Verklarung der gesellschaftlichen Realitaten in der 
DDR", the "5 Punkte" programme (a Positionspapier presented by leading party 
ideologues for ratification at the party's 4th Conference in January 1995) proceeds to 
invoke the sophistic notion that: 
Wir werden der These vom "Unrechtsstaat DDR" widersprechen, weil sie in 
ihrer Konsequenz bedeutet, der DDR das Existenzrecht abzusprechen und 
ihren Burgern vorzuwerfen, sich auf ein Leben in der DDR auf der Grundlage 
ihrer Verfassung und Gesetze eingestellt zu haben.305 
The (hidden!) agent here is, doubtless, 'the West': the argument turns upon a 
presupposed East-West conflict in which the role allocation is that described by 
Patzold and Patzold: an offensive West versus a defensive East. 
Pfahl-Traughber responds with some justification that: 
3 0 2 W e are well aware, here, that this term has widely been deemed an unfortunate one: see chapter 2 
below. 
3 0 3 M o s e r , op. cit., p. 52 
3 0 4Pfahl-Traughber, op. cit., p. 363 
3 0 5 B i s k y , L . et al.: "Sozialismus ist Weg ..." op. cit., p. 28. Cited in: Pfahl-Traughber, op. cit., p. 363 
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Die Feststellung, die DDR sei ein Unrechtstaat gewesen, bedeutet nicht 
automatisch, alien Biirgern der DDR etwas vorzuwerfen.3 0 6 
We see a similar, sophistic "Gegensatz" in the following, in which the unverifiability 
(and spuriousness?) of the9 asserted proposition is again underpinned by a removal of 
agency: 
Mit der These vom "Unrechtsstaat DDR" wird versucht (by whom? - MD) die 
DDR und Hitlerdeutschland gleichzusetzen. Diese Gleichsetzung (by whom? 
- MD) verzerrt und verfalscht die gesellschaftliche Realitat in der DDR 
ebenso, wie sie den Faschismus verharmlost.307 
With particular reference to the "5-Punkte" programme, one critic responds to this 
line of argumentation as follows: 
Mit der glanzenden Idee vom "Recht auf die eigene Biographie" ist es der 
PDS-Fiihrung gelungen, den Militanten eine Balancierstange fur die Zwecke 
lebensgeschichtlicher "Bewaltigung" in die Hand zu driicken. Aber wie steht 
es mit den Verallgemeinerungen, die aus der Geschichte der DDR zu Ziehen 
waren? Einerseits ein avantgardistisch-zentralistisches Monstrum andererseits 
doch auf keinen Fall Unrechtsstaat (weil das eine Gleichsetzung mit dem NS-
Staat bedeute - warum eigentlich?).7,08 (my italics) 
The demise of the GDR and the issue of dealing with its 'Stalinist' past has given 
fresh impetus to the ongoing question of addressing the National Socialist legacy and 
has rekindled a modified version of the HistorikerstreiP09; while the thrust of that 
debate was initially essentially centred around whether or not Germany's past could -
or should - be relativised in terms of the atrocities committed under the Stalinist 
regime, since unification there has been an increasingly heated debate as to the 
3 0 6Pfahl-Traughber, op. cit., p. 363 
3 0 7Parteivorstand der PDS: "10 Thesen ..." op. cit., p. 23 
3 0 8 Semler , Christian: "Kautsky dringend gesucht!" In: Die Tageszeitung. 16 January 1995 
3 0 9 A highly readable introduction to this complex polemic, which began in the mid-eighties, is to be 
found in: Paterson, William: "The Present of the German Past - a British Perspective." In: Politics and 
Society in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, vol. 2. no. 1/2. Spring 1990, pp. 39-45. 
In 1986 the historian Ernst Nolte "argued that it was now time to introduce some 'grey tones' into the 
analysis of the Third Reich; to free historical analysis from its domination by simple moral categories 
and to relocate the Holocaust as only one of a whole pattern of twentieth-century genocides." 
(Paterson, op. cit., p. 40). The 'revisionism' of Nolte et al. was strongly challenged by leading 
sociologist and political philosopher, Jurgen Habermas. 
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grounds for comparison between a 'Stalinist' GDR and the Third Reich 3 1 0. It is 
against this background that we must view the sophistic "Gegensatze" cited above. 
The PDS argument turns upon a spurious presupposition that any desire to question 
or challenge a problematic GDR past is automatically predicated upon a hell-bent 
equation of the GDR and the Third Reich. To this end the PDS invokes a term which 
(unlike its antonym) is not an established concept in constitutional theory and has a 
decided ring of mythicality: tellingly, no mention is made of just who it is that has 
levelled the accusation of "Unrechtsstaat" at the GDR and who it is that has sought to 
equate the two. In respect of the exculpatory aims of some - especially on the right -, 
the substantive thrust of the PDS's claims is, of course, not without grounds. Gaus 
points to a tendency in the vociferous anti-communism of West German public 
discourse towards presenting the GDR as a totalitarian police state without 
relativisation, thereby putting the GDR on a par with the Third Reich; Gaus argues 
that the GDR was not a WillkurstaaP" (to the extent that the Third Reich was or in 
the way that characterised what Weber has called a "Stalinismus im engeren 
Sinne"3 1 2 - MD); despite an extensive police presence there was a tacit agreement 
between the regime and the Nischenbewohner who: 
wissen sehr genau - und auf das Wissen ist VerlaB - wie weit sie gehen 
konnen, was sie tun und was sie lassen sollen, damit sie unbehelligt bleiben ... 
Es gibt den Druck einer standigen Aufpasserei nicht ... das Gefuhl, mit 
willkiirlichen MaBnahmen konne jederzeit in die Nischen hineingegriffen 
werden, druckt nicht auf die Stimmung der groBen Mehrheit, es existiert nicht. 
Man wirft nicht reflexhaft vor jeder Unterhaltung einen Blick uber die 
Schulter, um zu sehen, wer hinter einem steht . . . 3 1 3 
3 , 0 T h e r e has, of course, too, been a long tradition in the discourse of the Federal Republic in which it 
sought, in the process of what Townson (op. cit., p. 166) calls Abgrenzung, to "brand the new East 
German state with the mark of fascism by applying fascist terminology to it ... There is a clear 
tendency here to regard the German language as used in East Germany as the natural successor to the 
language of Fascism, this being a linguistic extension of the - politically very useful - view that the 
political system in the East German state shared the characteristics of National Socialism - a very 
useful argument, because it absolved West Germans of the need to reflect on the true origins of 
German Fascism." (Townson, op. cit., pp. 169, 177; my italics) 
The reverse was, of course, also true inasmuch as "Die Massenmedien der D D R lenkten die 
Aufmerksamkeit stets auf ein bestimmtes Vokabular, das dann als Beweis fur die Existenz 
nationalsozialistischen Sprachguts in westdeutschen Texten herangezogen wurde. Als 
paradigmatisches Beispiel fungierte das Wort Fiihrer in Zusammensetzungen wie Betriebsfuhrer und 
Geschaftsfuhrer. Cited from: Good: "Sprache im totalitaren Staat: Der Fall DDR." op. cit., p. 269. 
3 1 'Gaus, op. cit, p. 116 
3 1 2 Weber , op. cit., pp. 13,15 (see footnote 83) 
3 l 3 G a u s , op. cit, p. 124 
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Again, however, as with the question of addressing personal biographies, the PDS 
blurs the distinction here between, on the one hand, legitimate grounds for seeing in 
the GDR a state in which, in the perception of many, there was indeed a high level of 
Unrecht with, on the other, the aims of some politicians (of the right, in particular) 
who can be said to instrumentalise emotive terms like Unrechtsstaat (as part of their 
sweeping undifferentiated view of a totalitarian GDR 3 1 4 ) for political ends, i.e. whose 
aims in beating the PDS with the 'communist' stick are more about self-legitimation 
and political gain than an attempt to deal constructively with the past as an end in 
itself. (In this narrow world-view, any conception of the notion of an Unrechtsstaat 
would doubtless be bound up with challenging the very legitimacy per se of any 
('socialist') system which deviates from, and thus questions, the sanctity of what is 
perceived as an unimpeachable West German norm. 3 1 5) 
3 1 4 0 n this point, see in particular chapter 4 below. 
3 , 5 I t is highly questionable, incidentally, whether the emotive and ambiguous notion of an 
Unrechtsstaat automatically - where applied to the G D R - implies an equation with the Third Reich. 
Carsten Schatz of the PDS's AG Junge Schwule argued that he had heard the term Unrechtsstaat only 
in connection with the Third Reich and that any use of the term in connection with G D R was 
therefore a means of reinforcing a connection between the Third Reich and the G D R in peoples' 
minds. However, a street survey conducted (by the writer, October-November 1995) with a random 
sample of 20 Berliners (7 from the East and 13 from the West), who were asked for an immediate 
response to a) the term Unrechtstaat and then b) to the notion of an Unrechtsstaat. DDR, revealed the 
following telling results: in the case of a) only one of those interviewed mentioned the Third Reich 




THE DISCOURSE OF CAUSAL CIRCUMVENTION (II): 
AN "UNDEMOCRATIC" HISTORIOGRAPHY? 
Having examined the features of the 'causal circumvention' underpinning PDS 
historiography, we return to the question of the appropriateness of using these as a 
basis upon which to assess the PDS's "democratic" credentials. 
SUPPRESSING THE PAST 
The features we have observed - in particular with respect to the circumvention of 
individual complicity - might be said to bear out, in part at least, the view, in its most 
absolute form espoused by Markovits and Gorski et al., that: 
the PDS-led view ... would like nothing better than complete silence 
regarding the SED's and Stasi's crimes against the East German people.1 (my 
italics) 
We have witnessed a definite trend in PDS historiography towards 'dealing' with the 
past with speech acts of (seeming) condemnation, but which frequently leave the 
impression that they are designed to effect a short, sharp and painless break with that 
past without invoking painful questions of causality - especially as the party struggles 
to secure its political survival.2 Naming, as we have mentioned, is not addressing. 
However, does this constitute grounds for branding the PDS "undemocratic"? There 
is a substantial argument to suggest that this is indeed the wrong perspective. I f the 
epithet of undemocratic can be applied to the PDS on this basis, then there is 
compelling evidence that it can be similarly applied to certain sections of West 
Germany's political establishment, in particular the right: Markovits and Gorski are 
not without grounds in arguing that the German Right's '"this time we'll do it 
correctly'"3 stance in respect of the 'new' Vergangenheitsbewaltigung facing 
Germans - i.e. its seemingly vehement desire to punish Communists to make up for 
past sins of omission in failing to adequately deal with Nazi criminals and their 
legacy -: 
'Markovits/Gorski, op. cit., p. 259 
2 F o r a detailed discussion of this struggle see Krisch, op. cit. 
3Markovits/Gorski, op. cit., p. 259 
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is cynical for two reasons: First it conveys the image that the Right now 
harbours some kind of remorse concerning the leniency with which the Nazis 
were treated in the Federal Republic. In reality, this travesty of justice 
occurred precisely at the behest of this very Right which is now clamouring 
for the punishment of the Communists. Second, by turning on East Germany's 
Communists with an unprecedented vengeance, the German right tries to 
convey to the world that Communism, i f anything, was even worse than 
National Socialism, thereby once again trying to exculpate Germany from its 
Nazi past.4 
In other words, Gorski and Markovits perceive evidence of a 'cover-up' on both 
sides in the new Historikerstreit. 
For Volmert, the right's (and, in part, established left's) vehement, hysterical, 
moralistic, "einseitig~(i.e. WesrGefman~MD) &eTrieb~ene~'Bew&tigung~der DDR-
Vergangenheit'", its "peinlich genaue und unnachgiebige Ausleuchtung der DDR-
Vergangenheit" (which Burkhardt - see below - has called a 
"VergangenheitsM&erwaltigung") is an over-compensation for "verdrangte 
Schuldkomplexe" in failing to pursue a "konsequenten Aufarbeitung der 
Faschismusgeschichte": 
Was im Westen niemals ernsthaft und nachhaltig versucht wurde, wird nun -
in der Rolle des "Siegers" - am Objekt des "roten Totalitarismus" 
nachgeholt.5 
Indeed, argues, Burkhardt, the (unfortunate) term Vergangenheitsbewaltigung has 
itself been part and parcel of a suppression strategy: 
Wer die Vergangenheit bewaltigt, der steckt sie - salopp gesprochen - in einen 
wohlverschnurten Karton und bringt sie in den Keller der Geschichte ... Eine 
Schuld wie die der Deutschen, laBt sich nicht "bewaltigen", d.h. abschlieBen 
und hinter sich bringen ... Die bloBe Existenz des Wortes 
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung suggeriert dabei, daB sich die Vergangenheit in 
der Tat bewaltigen lieBe. Das ist jedoch ein TrugschluB. Retrospektives 
Bewaltigen im strengen Sinne ist unmoglich. Nur Gegenwart und Zukunft 
lassen sich (moglicherweise) bewaltigen ... Auch Aufarbeiten, so der 
4 ibid. 
5Volmert "Die 'Altparteien' ..." op. cit., p. 174 
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bevorzugte Terminus der Neuen Linken, laBt sich das Vergangene eigentlich 
nicht.6 
Whilst mindful of Burkhardt's caveat, we wil l continue to use the term for the sake of 
expediency. The complex issue of a pan-German Vergangenheitsbewaltigung is dealt 
with from a psychoanalytical point of view by (West) German Tilmann Moser. 
Describing the ongoing psychological consequences of suppression - whose 
mechanisms he describes in some detail - of the National Socialist past, Moser is in 
no doubt that "Die moralische Aggressivitat der westlichen Forderung, driiben die 
Vergangenheit zu bewaltigen" represents, in part, an attempt at delegating 
responsibility for its own "unbewaltigten Vergangenheit des Nationalsozialismus": 
Mit Delegation - ein familientherapeutischer Begriff - ist die Abtretung einer 
Last oder einer Aufgabe gemeint, die ein Familienmitglied stellvertretend fur 
alle ubernehmen soli. 7 
Ultimately, Moser agrees with his East German colleagues in perceiving the dangers 
inherent in what is deemed a West German Schattenprojektion, described as: 
(meist unbewuBte) Vorgange ... bei denen ungeliebte, gehaBte, gefiirchtete 
Seelenanteile einem anderen untergeschoben und dort, geliebt, verachtet, 
bewundert oder bekampft werden konnen.8 
In other words, Moser is here reinforcing Gorski and Markovits' observation that the 
process of condemning the Stalinist past is not free from an attempt to avoid dealing 
with the National Socialist legacy and the painful question of West German 
suppression of a sordid past.9 
Markovits and Gorski single out the East German Greens (in which, as we have said, 
they include all those groups - such as Neues Forum - who made up East Germany's 
'dissident' movement) as occupying a moral higher ground in calling for retribution 
in respect of this "sordid chapter of German history" 
6Burkhardt, Armin, " Vergangenheitsiiberwaltigung." op. cit., pp. 126, 141-2 
7Moser, op. cit., p. 49 
8ibid., p. 51 
9 O f that suppression Burkhardt ("Vergangenheitsuberwaltigung." op. cit., pp. 126-7) has said: 
"Trotzdem blieben Kriegsschuld, Kriegsverbrechen, Unterdriickung und Massenmord fur lange Zeit 
das zentrale Tabuthema der Bundesrepublik, und vor allem der Nachkriegsgeneration wurde Mitte 
der60er Jahre klar, daB die Geschichte der Nazi-Zeit und die GbergroBe Schuld der Deutschen von 
den Eltern und GroBeltern nicht aufgearbeitet worden waren. Wohl weil die Schuld von den meisten 
heute nicht mehr als personliche begriffen wird, hat sich das Verhaltnis der Deutschen zu ihrer 
Vergangenheit inzwischen zwar gewandelt, aber es ist vielleicht wirklich nur ein besonderer 
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for the sake of justice and the rights of individuals whom the East German 
regime victimised and not for the sake of politics, which in the Left's case has 
meant silence and in the Right's case has meant revenge.10 (my italics) 
Good has shown how equally in West Germany, where the established parties' 
credentials as 'democratic' players are generally taken as a given in the established 
political arena: 
in the period of the late 40 and 50s, and even into the 60s, the National 
Socialist past and the crimes committed against humanity were absent'' from 
public discourse or else, where they were spoken about publicly, this tended 
to be either in the form of expressions of loathing at the crimes that had been 
committed or else in figurative language, which presented the phenomenon as 
some sort of spontaneous natural occurrence ('Eigenkausalitat'l - MD), 
visited upon the German people ... what was common to the discourse of 
what Haug called Der Hilflose Antifaschismus was the occlusion of questions 
concerning the nature of participation of the population . . . 1 2 
- features not a million miles removed from those we find in the contemporary 
agentless discourse of the PDS in which on the one hand discursive absolution is 
given through individualisation ("Recht auf die eigene Biographie"!) while at the 
same time we find speech acts in which the PDS both expresses its disapproval of the 
GDR regime and promises that there wil l be no obfuscation in respect of the past. 
What Townson has said of a certain type of response to the National Socialist past: 
It would indeed be wrong not to express horror and disgust at the deeds 
perpetrated by the German fascists, but the critique, the coming to terms with 
the past cannot stop at the expression of disgust13 
might equally be said of the PDS's historiographic discourse. From a 
psychoanalytical perspective, Moser calls this a discourse of "Unantastbarkeit": there 
is, he argues, a "machtige Denkstromung" prevalent in West Germany in which loud 
declarations of blanket condemnation and apportioning of blame are used quite 
Verdrangungstrick, die ungeliebte Geschichte dem Kulturbetrieb zu iiberantworten, der sie dann in 
Ausstellungen, auf dem Theater, in Film und Fernsehen mumifizieren kann. 
, 0Markovits/Gorski, op. cit., p. 259 
"Burkhardt (op. cit., p. 127) observes that "Auch die Linguistik nach dem Kriege entzog sich 
zunachst der Pflicht der Aufarbeitung des Geschehenen. Sie ergriff die erste sich bietende 
Gelegenheit, die ungeliebte jiingere deutsche Vergangenheit iiber Bord zu werfen. 
I 2 Good, Colin: Language, Politics and Ideology, op. cit. 
, 3 Townson, op. cit., p. 173 
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precisely to obscure a deeper - causal - reappraisal of the past; the very 
unchallengeability of the (often highly emotive) categories concerned allows for the 
circumvention of uncomfortable background questions of causality; this, argues 
Moser, makes the veneer of 'Aufarbeitung' a matter of political expediency: 
Es gibt also einerseits eine machtige Denkstromung, die an einer globalen 
Beschuldigung der Deutschen fur Krieg und Holocaust fesfhalt, andererseits 
aber gar nicht daran interessiert ist, die Verstrickungen wirklich zu erhellen 
und das Hineingleiten in das UnfaBbare zu verstehen. Wissenschaft und 
Aufarbeitung treten damit in einen Gegensatz zu einem politischen Credo: 
namlich der standig proklamierten Mahnung, die Naziverbrechen der 
Deutschen als unhinterfragbar einmalig und geschichtstranszendent zu 
sehen.14 (my italics) 
The very force of this "Denkstromung", then is, in a sense, a means of effecting a 
short, sharp, less uncomfortable break with the past: the psychological consequences 
are, however, lurking under the surface. Paradoxically, argues Moser, the 
"Verweigerung der Einfuhlung" which is at the heart of surface acts of condemnation 
entails increased accusations of a refusal to confront the past head on. 1 5 
The SED dealt with its National Socialist past by presenting it as a uniquely West 
German phenomenon: the Federal Republic was presented as the sole heir to the 
Third Reich in particular by virtue of its "capitalist" status: in terms of Marxist-
Leninist orthodoxy fascism was, as we observed above, a feature of 
Spatkapitalismusi6 and the conceptual obfuscation in this circular, self-referential 
mode of argumentation thus allowed the GDR to claim 
the sole position of being the direct descendant of the "good" Germans and 
the moral Germany17 
i.e. the descendants of Germany's 'progressive' KPD and working class tradition. 
Markovits and Gorski have shown that this process even extended to having East 
German schoolchildren believe that East German soldiers fought among the ranks of 
the Red Army and to a complete circumvention of the issue of the genocide of the 
Jews: 
1 4 Moser, op. cit., pp. 52-53 
1 5 ibid. , p. 53 
1 6 See Schlosser, op. cit, p. 31. We will return to this issue in chapter 3. 
, 7Markovits/Gorski, op. cit, p. 242 
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Jews were never acknowledged as particular victims of National Socialism ... 
East Germans were more than happy not to have to deal with that issue. They 
revelled in the state's myth that - miraculously - Nazis and fascists existed 
only to the left of the Elbe river. The Holocaust was purely a West German 
problem in the eyes of East Germany's political elite. 1 8 
Jews were compensated "never as Jews, only as anti-fascist victims of fascism"19. In 
the Federal Republic, however, public discourse, while not denying the existence of 
the phenomenon, not infrequently bypassed, as we have seen, uncomfortable 
questions of causality and, in part, transferred the focus of blame by hinting that the 
Third Reich lived on in the GDR. (The process was facilitated, of course, by the 
conceptual conflation afforded between "'National Socialism' as a totalitarian regime 
up to 1945 and that form of 'Socialism' which was imposed on East Germany after 
1945"20.) In this respect public discourse in the Federal Republic can be said to 
display similar traits to the discourse currently deployed by the PDS: acts of 
condemnation on the one hand, causal circumvention on the other. 
Equally significant is the fact that the GDR's "official opposition" (to use Markovits 
and Gorski's terminology) - the Block Parteien21 - were unproblematically swallowed 
up by their Western 'counterparts'. Markovits and Gorski assert that it: 
was nothing short of tragic to see how the formal bloc parties which had been 
spineless backers of the SED regime for nearly forty years had suddenly 
emerged with massive West German assistance as the major political players 
in a West German dominated GDR. 2 2 
If the PDS has generally sought in its discourse to 'extinguish' problematic elements 
of a problematic past, the same, argues Austrian observer Christ, can be said of the 
established parties: 
1 8 ib id . 
I 9 ib id . 
2 0 Townson, op. cit., p. 172 
2 1 For a discussion of the status of these Blockparteien in the political system of the G D R see, 
Sontheimer, op. cit., pp. 79-80: "Die D D R war Staat der S E D . Die ubrigen Parteien wurden zwar 
nicht eliminiert, weil man sich den demokratischen Anschein eines Mehparteiensystems erhalten 
wollte, doch sie wurde auf die unterwiirfige Anerkennung der politischen Fiihrungsrolle der S E D 
verpflichtet und lebten als sogenannte Blockparteien ganz im Schatten der S E D . Diese UberlieB ihnen 
zwar einige subalterne Funktionen und Mandate, hatte aber von ihnen bis zuletzt keine echte 
Opposition zu befiirchten. Die Blockparteien waren faktisch gleichgeschaltet ... Fur die ersten 
Wahlen im Oktober 1950 gab es bereits eine Einheitsliste der Nationalen Front, dem (sic! - M D ) 
Biindnis aller Parteien und Massenorganisationen, d.h. im Grunde keine echte Wahlmoglichkeit 
mehr." 
2 2Markovits/Gorski, op. cit., p. 252 
\ 
125 
... - wie sauber sind denn die anderen Parteien in Punkto Herkunft ihrer 
Mitglieder? In der DDR existierten sogenannte Blockparteien, Feigenblatter 
vorgeblicher Demokratie ... Wo ist diese buntgescheckte, liebedienerische 
Gefolgschaft der SED abgeblieben ... ? Nun die Ost-CDU ist zu Teilen - samt 
ihrem Parteivermogen - in der Bonner Schwesterpartei aufgegangen. Kohl hat 
ihnen den Segen erteilt, womit ihre Vergangenheit geldscht war. 
Erfullungsgehilfen der SED? Keine Erinnerungen mehr daran... ware es 
gerecht einem SED-Mitglied Wandlungsfdhigkeit abzusprechen, die beim 
SED-horigen CDU-Mitglied wie selbstverstandlich vorausgesetzt wird?23 
(my italics) 
The West German CDU, in particular, was no doubt helped by the mere fact of 
sharing a common acronym with its East German namesake: in Saussurian terms, a 
common signifier allowed obfuscation of the fact that behind that signifier were two 
quite different signifieds! While there is room for debate over the issue of the block 
parties' identifiability with the SED, the question is worthy, at the very least, of 
problematisation. In his survey of some two hundred articles over a broad spectrum 
of the German press at the time of the PDS's astonishing electoral successes in mid-
1994, Volmert observes a poignant textual 'omission' on the part of the 
"Protagonisten (CDU and FDP - MD) der Ausgrenzung (of the PDS - MD)": 
Die Sprecher der CDU und FDP vermieden in ihrer Propaganda jeden 
Hinweis darauf, daB sie nach dem Zusammenbruch der DDR die SED-nahen 
"Blockfloten" mitsamt ihrem Vermogen ubernommen haben, daB dort fast ihr 
gesamter Mitgliederbestand mit dem der Vorgangerparteien identisch ist. 2 4 
(my italics) 
Selecting what and what not to say is, as we have said, at the heart of any ideological 
mediation of 'reality'. 
Richard von Weizsacker observes something similar at work in the fact that on the 
one hand the PDS is not infrequently condemned out of hand as undemocratic via 
negatively loaded epithets such as postskommunistisch (no more vociferously than by 
Moreau)25 while on the other 
die mit uns befreundete ungarische Regierung ... von einer politischen Kraft 
gefiihrt (wird), welche nach unserem hiesigen Jargon postkommunistisch 
2 3 Chris t : "Die deutschen Ostler." op. cit. 
2 4 Volmert: "Die 'Altparteien' ..." op. cit., p. 175 
2 5 see Moreau: PDS. Anatomie einer postkommunistischen Partei. op. cit. 
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heiBt. Ahnlich steht es heute in Polen, mit dessen Regierung wir ebenfalls 
verbunden sind . . . 2 6 
and notes that for the purposes of providing the necessary parliamentary majority in 
the Hauptstadtdebatte the 'democratic' credentials of the PDS were not called into 
question by grateful members of the pro-Berlin camp. 
On this basis, Gorski and Markovits would challenge the 'democratic' credentials of 
the established parties. Among these, the West German Greens stood out, they argue, 
in holding off from moving into the East to "devour their fledgling East German 
counterparts"; for them it is the Greens' "respect for autonomy" - their relative 
lateness in emerging on the East German scene - which is truly democratic: 
To most Greens, this annexation was much too fast, too undemocratic and, 
above all, market propelled.27 
True, this last quotation blurs the distinction between the authors' stance and that of 
the Greens, but the overlap emerges within the context of the study as a whole: 
The dictates of the Federal Republic "colonised" the GDR, whose indigenous 
political forces were losing their autonomy by the day ... 
This upright and moral stance (the decision not to form an electoral alliance 
with the East German Green movement until after the pan-German elections 
of 1990 - MD) cost the West German Greens their parliamentary presence.28 
Biindnis 90, formed from the fusion of Neues Forum, Initiative Demokratie Jetzt and 
Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte in February 1990 consistently invoked its 
rigid independence from West German 'intervention' as the very centrepiece of its 
democratic commitment.29 
Christ sees the labelling of the PDS as an undemocratic force on the basis of both its 
origins and its historiography as primarily a matter of political tactics rather than a 
concern with the substance upon which that accusation is based. In this respect, he 
points, to the telling nature of the temporal context: it is particularly and precisely at 
2 6 Weizsacker, Richard von: "Weder klug noch fromm." In: DieZeit. no. 46. 10 November 1995. 
2 7Markovits/Gorski, op. cit., pp. 236, 256, 235 
2 8 ib id , pp. 256, 236 
2 9Markovits/Gorski cite Wolfgang Ullman of Demokratie Jetzt: "We have no partners and we are 
proud of it ... it would be a peculiar understanding of democracy if we had to let West German 
politicians tell us what to do ..." ibid., p. 253 
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the time of the "Sachsen-Anhalt-Modell"30 in the period preceding the Federal 
elections of 1994 that the Right launched its anti-PDS "rote Socken" campaign with a 
vengeance and became particularly vehement in calling the PDS's credentials as a 
democratic player into question: 
Und nun zur Lektion iiber Demokratie ... Dazu muB man wissen, was die 
Wahl zum Magdeburger Landtag ausgelost hat ... Volksfront! schreit die 
Union emport, weil sie wittert, es konnte ein Modell fur die 
Bundestagswahlen sein. Und was passiert? Die PDS, eine im Bundestag 
vertretene Partei, wird in ihrer Legalitat angezweifelt! Eine Partei, fur die in 
einem Bundesland jeder fiinfte Wahler votiert hat! Was heifit hier 
Demokratiel ... Eine Partei wahlen, die uns von der Macht bringen will ... 
das gibt's nicht!31 (my italics) 
Falkner and Huber present a similar picture: 
Zur Zeit hat der Ruf nach dem Verfassungsschutz wieder Hochkonjunktur. 
Seit den Erfolgen der PDS in ostdeutschen Landern und Kommunen wittern 
die "wehrhaften" Demokraten hinter dem smarten Lacheln Gysis die aus der 
Gruft der Weltgeschichte gestiegene hafiliche Fratze des Kommunismus. 
Kurz nach den Wahlen in Sachsen-Anhalt war es die in Berlin erscheinende 
Tageszeitung "Die Welt", Springers Kampfblatt fur etwas grober geschnitzte 
Konservative, die gleich an zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Tagen das Bild vom 
Sicherheitsrisiko PDS bemiihte. Zunachst wurde aus einem Lagebericht des 
Kolner Bundesamtes fur Verfassungsschutz zitiert, in dem die PDS unter 
Hinweis auf die Kommunistische Plattform und deren revolutionare Ziele als 
"Partei ohne eindeutig demokratische Grundorientierung" charakterisiert 
wird". 3 2 (my italics) 
Before this 'turning point' the tenor in party headquarters, argue Falkner and Huber, 
3 0 T h e events surrounding the regional elections in Sachsen-Anhalt are dealt with in some detail in 
chapter 4; briefly, the PDS fared particularly well in these elections, prompting deliberations inside 
the SPD as to the possibility of forming a red-green 'Minderheilsregierung' 'tolerated' by the SPD. 
The rigljt was aghast at this scenario, seeing in it a possible 'Modell fur den Bund'. 
^Chr i s t : "Die deutschen Ostler." op. cit. 
Von Weizsacker makes a related point in identifying the problems inherent in the fact that a party 
often has the democratic mandate of those who take the positive ideals - which others see as mere 
political tactics or, in the case of the PDS, nostalgia - at face value; the PDS has, in part, indeed been 
given the democratic mandate of some young idealists who believe in the PDS as a vehicle capable of 
securing a certain brand of 'Utopian' socialism (irrespective of whether we see their idealism as 
misguided or not - MD): "was heiBt da postkommunistisch, wenn ein junger Brandenburger oder 
Berliner einen Weg zum Sozialismus auf den demokratische Prufstand stellen will? Es wird vielleicht 
schwer fiir ihn sein, sich damit zu bewahren, aber soli er es nicht als Demokrat versuchen diirfen? 
Cited from: Von Weizsacker: "Weder klug noch fromm." op. cit. (my italics) 
3 2Falkner/Huber, op. cit., pp. 170-1 
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lautete ... unisono: Das Problem PDS wiirde sich schon von selbst 
erledigen.33 
The branding of the PDS as undemocratic is thus, Falkner and Huber argue, 
predicated primarily on political tactics as opposed to soundly substantiated 
substantive grounds. 
In this scenario, the established parties - especially the right - have taken their own 
"democratic" credentials as a given: this wil l be discussed in further detail in 
chapter 4. 
This becomes all the more telling when set against a background in which there is 
evidence that the political establishment had in fact hitherto profited from the PDS's 
integrative function. Falkner and and Huber have argued powerfully that in acting as 
something of a magnet and vent for disaffected members of the 'old guard' the PDS 
prevented groups which might have challenged Germany's 'democratic' order from 
'going it alone' and adopting a more fundamentally 'subversive' stance. As such the 
PDS, argue many, can be said to have indirectly strengthened Germany's democratic 
system. In attempting to answer why the conference of Interior Ministers failed in 
December to agree to the CSU's initiative to have the PDS watched by the 
Bundesverfassungsschutz, Falkner and Huber observe that: 
Vielleicht schreckte man einfach davor zuriick, eine Partei, der mitten im 
Umbruch objektiv eine groBe soziale Funktion bei der Integration und 
Bindung der ehemaligen DDR-Elite zukam, voreilig in die 
verfassungsfeindliche Ecke zu stellen. Ohne die PDS hatten sich viele der 
abgewickelten MfS-, NVA- und SED-Kader moglicherweise oder sogar sehr 
wahrscheinlich "unkontrolliert" in militanten Bunden gegen das 
demokratische System der Bundesrepublik zusammengeschlossen. DaB von 
diesen Gruppierungen am Ende viel groBere und tatsachliche Bedrohungen 
fur die Stabilitat der Bundesrepublik ausgegangen waren als von der 
Stromungspartei PDS, steht auBer Frage.34 
Berlin electoral analyst Richard Stoss is in no doubt that: 
(Die PDS - MD) ... tragt wesentlich zur politischen Stabilitat und inneren 
Einheit Deutschlands bei ... selbst die, die sie als stalinistisch oder 
kommunistisch attackieren, konnen auf ihre systemstabilisierende Wirkung 
•"ibid., p. 173 
3 4 ib id . 
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nicht verzichten. Immerhin dient sie als politische Heimat und 
parlamentarische Vertretung in den Gemeinden. Damit sorgt sie dafiir, daB 
diese Leute in unserem parlamentarischen System reprasentiert werden.35 
Neugebauer and Stoss argue that a party's representative and integrative functions are 
dialectically intertwined: in representing a certain body of interests a party - whether 
consciously or unconsciously - asserts those interests within the frame of reference of 
the polity as a whole: integration takes place precisely here, in the complex 
interrelationship between part and whole 3 6: 
Die international vergleichende Forschung konnte vielmehr nachweisen, daB 
mit der Reprasentationsfunktion tendenziell auch die Integrationsfunktion 
verbunden ist. Parteien tendieren unabhangig von ihrer sozialen Basis, ihrer 
Interessenfarbung und ihrer Politik dazu, ihre Anhanger in die bestehende 
Ordnungzu integrieren . . . 3 7 
In articulating the interests of a significant East German minority united essentially 
by its: 
Zugehorigkeit zu einem regional (und sozial) abgegrenzten Milieu, die 
Teilnostalgie beziiglich der DDR, die Wahrung von Interessen der DDR-
Eliten in der neuen Gesellschaftsordnung und schlieBlich die antiwestliche 
und modernisierungsfeindliche Grundhaltung38 
the PDS, argue Neuegebauer and Stoss: 
dient als Ansprechpartner fur das antiwestliche Potential im Osten, vertritt 
deren Interessen, Ziele und Werte und setzt sie in Programme und Politik 
urn ... Die PDS nimmt mithin als regional begrenzte, aber politische 
3 5 St6ss , Richard: "Gelassener mit der PDS umgehen." In: Focus, no. 46. 1995. (interview) 
3 6 " I n dem Begriff des Teiles' liegt notwendig eingeschlossen der Bezug auf eine 'Ganzheit'. Nur 
wenn es eine gemeinsame Grundlage fur die auf spezifische Wunsche ausgerichteten Parteien besteht, 
wird der politische Kampf nicht zum Auseinanderbrechen der Gesamtheit fiihren. Nur wenn es 
Entscheidendes gibt, das eint, kann Trennendes ausgeglichen werden ... Parteien konnen sinnvoll nur 
agieren, wenn ihre Auseinandersetzungen in einen gemeinsamen Wirkungsraum eingebettet sind." 
Neumann, Sigmund, cited in: Neugebauer/Stoss, op. cit., p. 15 
3 7Neugebauer/St6ss, ibid. 
3 8 ib id . , pp. 304-5 
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einfluBreiche Milieupartei wichtige Representations- und 
Integrationsaufgaben wahr . . . 3 9 
This view is shared by sociologist Thomas Koch; the latter argues that though prima 
facie the PDS may be considered to be (subjectively) promoting German-German 
discord, the very fact that the PDS has been active in heightening East German 
citizens' awareness of their democratic rights and possibilities in the new polity and 
has consistently invoked (and challenged) the unification treaty as a basis for its 
claims means that on one level it can be said to have objectively strengthened the 
Federal Republic's democratic system. He observes that: 
die in den alten Bundeslandern bewahrten und auf den Osten iibertragenen 
Institutionen Regelsysteme und Organisationsformen (bieten zwar) 
vielfaltige Moglichkeiten der Interessenartikulation, doch um sich dieser 
Moglichkeiten zu bedienen, fehlte es an entsprechenden Regelkenntnissen, 
an Know-how und Routinen, an finanziellen Ressourcen . . . 4 0 
and that the PDS has gone a long way towards filling the gap: 
Die erstaunliche und von vielen Beobachtern zunachst nicht erkannte 
Verankerung der PDS in der ostdeutschen Gesellschaft beruht unter anderem 
darauf, daB Mitglieder und Sympathisanten der Partei sich in einer Vielzahl 
von Verbanden, Vereinen, Initiativen engagieren ... So eignen sie sich 
Orientierungs- und Verfiigungswissen iiber Regeln, Reviere und Rituale der 
neuen Ordnung an und vermitteln es weiter. Dam it leisten sie einen wichtigen 
Beitrag zur realen Binnenintegration in Sinne der Wahrnehmung gegniiber 
Moglichkeiten der kommunikativen Vernetzung, der Vermischung und 
Definition von Interessen.41 
This is underpinned by the fact that, as we will see in chapter 3, the PDS has a very 
large, politically highly aware, intellectual base. 
The discourse of causal circumvention, then, contains obvious 'obfuscatory' (or, 
depending upon one's perspective, 'palliative') elements: agentless acts of 
condemnation and the transfer of blame. It can be seen in part as the PDS aiming to 
effect a discursive fusion between the need to procure legitimacy through being seen 
to distance itself from the past on the one hand and the need to act as a mouthpiece 
3 9 ib id . , p. 303 
4 0 K o c h , Thomas: "Die PDS im VereinigungsprozeB." In: Brie et al. (eds.): Die PDS - Empirische 
Befunde ... op. cit., p. 189 
4 l ib id . , p. 197 
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for the interest of its ex-SED membership/East German voter-base on the other. For 
many commentators, however, the fusion is unconvincing as its tactical dimension so 
distinctly blurs the boundary between what is a 'true' recognition of the 
reprehensibility of the SED past ('conviction') and what are mere considerations of 
strategy. 
In the light of the considerations outlined above, however, the appropriateness of 
challenging the PDS's democratic credentials on the basis of the historiographic 
features outlined must be handled with some caution. We must emphasise at this 
juncture that our interest here is not in providing a hard and fast answer to the 
question of whether or not the PDS is indeed 'undemocratic'. Addressing that 
question is beyond the purview of what is, first and foremost, a linguistic study. Our 
interest is primarily in examining the discursive environment in which the question is 
posited, i.e. howl and by whom.? What Burkhardt has said in relation to handling the 
complex issue of personal involvement with the Staatsicherheitsdiensl is equally 
germane at this juncture: 
Der Linguist kann sich nicht in Fragen der juristischen Bewertung von 
Einzelfallen einmischen, aber er kann auf Erscheinungen im offentlichen 
Sprachgebrauch hinweisen, die geeignet sind, eine angemessene Diskussion 
anstehender Probleme zu be- bzw. verhindern.42 
What emerges very strongly from our examination of the political establishment's 
approach to the question of using PDS historiography as a basis for assessing its 
status as a 'democratic' party is that the PDS's historiographic discourse has been 
widely assessed by politicians and political observers in isolation from a problematic 
contextual background in which similar discursive features are to be witnessed in the 
established parties' own dealings with the past - be it in respect o f the earlier 
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung or the 'new' one. Furthermore, as Volmert has clearly 
shown43, the established parties (especially the right) have generally started from the 
(for them) unproblematic premise - widely informing textual presuppostionality - that 
they are per se "democratic", while generally failing to invoke the catalogue of 
assumptions and criteria on which their understanding of the highly superordinate, 
intensionally shallow (but connotatively supremely positive) term is based. In this 
polarised, symbolic world of good ("'democratic') versus bad ("undemocratic"), 
where the substantive has widely given way to the emotive, any firm basis for 
establishing the poles has rarely been invoked: 
4 2Burkhardt: "Vergangenheitsiiberwaltigung." op. cit., p. 128 
4 3 see: Volmert: "Die 'Altparteien' ..." op. cit.; we look closely at Volmert's findings in chapter 4. 
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Der Mangel an wissenschaftlich ausgewiesenen Fragestellung, begrifflicher 
Prazision, methodischer Klarheit und systematischer Analyse in der PDS-
Literatur ist ungewohnlich. Dies gilt insbesondere fiir die beliebte und in der 
Regel einzige Fragestellung im weithin dem Extremismus-Ansatz 
verpflichteten Schrifttum, ob die Partei glaubhaft mit der DDR-
Vergangenheit gebrochen hat und heute mit den Beinen auf dem Boden der 
freiheitlichen demokratischen Grundordnung steht ... Bei einer methodisch 
anspruchsvollen Untersuchung wiirde man ... einen Kriterienkatalog 
erwarten, um Einstellungen, Forderungen oder Verhaltensweisen eindeutig als 
demokratisch oder antidemokratisch (hier: als linksextrem) zu qualifizieren.44 
It is against this background that we must be careful to assess and relativise any 
labelling of PDS historiography as "undemocratic". 
Townson has described in detail the function and effect of 'key words' such as 
Demokratie in political discourse.45 The latter is a prime example of what Topitsch 
has called: 
bestimmte sprachliche Formen (,die - MD) durch die Jahrhunderte als 
belangvolle Einsichten oder sogar fundamentale Prinzipien des Seins, 
Erkennens und Wertens anerkannt wurden - nicht obwohl sondern gerade 
weil und insofern sie keinen oder keinen naher angebbaren Sach- oder 
Normgehalt besitzen.46 
Their vague denotational core frequently procures them a mythical quality, a quality 
which makes them, as Topitsch has pointed out, virtually unchallengeable, "neither 
verifiable nor falsifiable"4 7. As part of what Pareto calls Worlmusik48, their function 
is primarily emotive. In the words of Townson 
Key words form an important part of a power strategy: they are used to 
persuade, gain and maintain support, to control ... Their effect (that of key 
words like Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit, Demokralie - MD) is achieved by 
4 4Neugebauer/St6ss, op. cit., p. 12 
4 5 Townson, op. cit. (see esp. pp. 197-204) 
4 6 Topitsch, op. cit., pp. 233-4 
4 7 Townson, op. cit., p. 203 
4 8 cited in: Topitsch, op cit., p. 261 
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connotation, which is promoted from a secondary to a primary 
characteristic . . . 4 9 
Townson cites Cattaneo who observes that these Leerformel (Topitsch), while 
frequently invoked to "create a favourable atmosphere" are instruments in a 
power/legitimising strategy: "our political life is dominated by irrationality and 
myth". 5 0 
<l 
One of the great myths, StraGner observes, is that the democratic system in the 
Federal Republic is predicated upon the honesty of politicians. Indeed, the very title 
of his incisive essay examining the (obfuscatory) ways in which the CDU 
(particularly in Schleswig-Holstein) handled the Barschel-Affare - "MaximenverstoG 
als Regel. Zum Grundprinzip politischer Kommunikation"51 - hints at the conclusion 
he draws form his attempt to secure "die Erhellung des Prinzips politischer 
Sprachhandlung"52: namely, that the habitual flouting of the Gricean truth maxim is 
part and parcel of the political arena's workings. Strassner's essay gives a graphic 
account of politicians instrumentalise concepts like honesty and integrity - as integral 
features of their democratic mandate - quite precisely as a means of distracting and 
diverting, of obscuring. Put simply, the instrumentalisation of honesty and related 
concepts on an expressis verbis level is not infrequently used to obfuscate, to obscure 
(a substantive) honesty itself. We shall have more to say about the maintenance of a 
mere veneer of honesty below. For the time being we shall limit ourselves to the 
observation that political actors are so successful in maintaining that veneer, that they 
have indeed engendered and sustained a myth - with a concomitant expectation 
among the general public as spectators - that the political arena is one in which "nach 
den Schillerschen Prinzipien vom Theater als moralischer Anstalt verfahren wird" 5 3 . 
StraBner argues compellingly that this is not so: 
In der politischen Kommunikation geht es nicht um ein Befolgen der Regeln, 
die aus den grundlegenden ethischen Voraussetzungen abgeleitet werden und 
die in dei—normalen Kommunikation von den Mitgliedern der 
Sprachgemeinschaft eingeklagt werden konnen, wenn auch nur moralisch, 
nicht juristisch. Es geht in der Politik um Erfolg, der offensichtlich nicht 
erzielt werden kann durch streng sachbezogene, wahre, einsichtige, 
4 9 Townson, op. cit., p. 203 
5 0 ib id . 
5 , Stra6ner, op. cit. 
5 2 ib id . , p. 129 
5 3 Moser, op. cit., p. 52 
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nachvollziehbare Aussagen, Begrundungen, Erklarungen, Beweise, 
Argumente. Es geht nicht um die Wahrheit, sondern um ein Lugen, Betriigen, 
Tauschen, Ablenken, Heucheln, aufs Kreuz legen, das aber als eigene 
Wahrheit ausgegeben wird ... Die sprachliche Handlungsweise entfernt sich 
von der des Alltags, setzt darauf, Gedanken zu verwischen und beim 
Adressaten nur ein allgemeines Gefiihl des sicher Gefuhrten und Geleiteten 
auszulosen. Dazu dienen Leerformeln, Stereotypen, Schlagwdrter . . . 5 4 (my 
emphases) 
Demokratie is one of those Schlagwdrter, a Leerformel in a Topitschian sense. For 
StraBner the vital point is that in the 'political theatre' the (Gricean) co-operative 
principle operates within much narrower parameters: 
Sprache (wird) von Politikern Ewar zielgerichtet eingesetzt aber nicht im 
Sinne einer {Cooperation mit mit den Biirgern, sondern nur mit den eigenen 
Gesinnungs- und Parteifreunden.55 
We might expect (i.e. demand) honesty from a 'moral' perspective: but as realistic 
spectators in the theatre of politics we should not expect (i.e. expect to find) it there; 
one of the features of our 'democracy' is arguably its ability to sustain a relatively 
broad ideological freedom despite politicians' general lack of respect for the wants 
and desires of the political spectators they purport to represent. We have seen that the 
features of causal circumvention evident in the PDS's (obfuscatory) historiographic 
world-view are equally to be witnessed in the established parties' treatment of a 
problematic history; the 'democratic' credentials of these parties are not, however, 
called into question. Von Weizsacker et al. have called for the PDS to be accorded 
the same chance as the other parties have had to assert itsj democratic credentials and 
thus for the Richtungskampfe in the PDS to be taken seriously.56 
If we challenge the PDS's ofjfuscatory tactics from a notional 'higher' moral 
perspective, we might %rgue that its historiographic discourse is 'undemocratic', 
wftere democracy - as one of the present system's quintessentially positive symbols -
is taken to be predicated upon absolute truth. If this is our perspective, however, the 
problem is that it speaks for all parties leaving us at best with a hopeless task of 
relativisation. All parties have recourse to, and take advantage of, "das ganze 
Instrumentarium manipulativer Taktiken und Strategien"57. Where we must be 
5 4StraBner, op. cit., pp. 137-8 
5 5 ib id . , p. 137 
5 6 see: von Weizsacker: "Weder klug noch fromm." op. cit. 
5 7Stra6ner, op. cit., p. 138 
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particularly careful in responding to the notion of an 'undemocratic' PDS 
historiography is when democracy or its antithesis - the latter lexeme having so 
persistently and forcefully been invoked against the PDS - is part and parcel of a 
political strategy of self-legitimisation, where that aim is not to illuminate but to 
obscure, where it part of simplified, polarised conceptual structure of a notional 
Communist (and therefore 'anti-democratic') Buhmann challenging an 
unimpeachable 'democratic' establishment58. Put simply, we must be careful to 
assess in what context and by whom that charge is levelled, and be wary of reductive, 
over-zealous and emotionally charged responses which amount to little more than 
Burkhardt's Vergangenheitsuberwaltigung59. As Schelenz rightly observes: 
Das MiBtrauen gegeniiber der Sprache ist der Ansatzpunkt der politischen 
Sprachkritik.60 
Von Weizsacker has questioned the right's attempt, via the 'old' tactic of conflation 
(all socialists together!) to use the PDS as cudgel with which to undermine the 
democratic credentials of those on the Left prepared to consider making political 
overtures to i t 6 1 : 
5 8 T h i s polarised, 'cold war' conceptual world is looked at more closely in chapter 4 below. 
5 9 I n his linguistic study ("Vergangenheitsuberwaltigung." op. cit.) of the discourse generated by the 
dismissal of the Humboldt-University's Rector, Professor Fink, on account of alleged (but barely 
substantiated) connections with the Ministry for State Security, Burkhardt shows clearly how the 
whole issue was largely devoid of any concrete evidence; the ensuing polemic was fuelled largely by 
the "... vorgefaBten Meinung und der politischen Einstellung des jeweiligen Sprechers/Schreibers und 
von Unterstellungen, wie sie fur den sogenannten 'Enthullungsjournalismus' nicht untypisch sind ... 
ohne die Fundierung durch iiberprufbare Fakten lauft aber die emotionale Solidaritatsbekundung 
inhaltlich ebenso leer wie die aggressive Beschuldigung und kategorische Ausgrenzung". 
(pp. 130, 135) The debate was thus handled by both supporters and opponents of the Professor on a 
largely emotionalised, symbolic level, on which, Burkhardt argues, it was perceived "weit eher als 
Politikum denn als Juridikum". (p. 137; my italics) This generated a polarised polemic, in which Fink 
became a "Symbolfigur nach beiden Seiten" (p. 135); Fink's supporters - for whom the latter was a 
symbol of 'renewal' - offered hasty (but helpless, visceral) declarations of solidarity (a "Vor-
Vertrauensbekundung", p. 134) while his opponents levelled equally insubstantiated accusations of 
complicity and guilt ("Vor-Verurteilung", p. 136) (which, in departing from the 'Rechtsstaat' 
principle of 'innocent until proved guilty' can only be put down, Burkhardt argues, to a visceral 
"Verschworungshysterie" (p. 133); Burkhardt observes that "Die in der Vergangenheit real 
existierende Stasi wird als (Verschworungs)-Mythos in die Gegenwart hineingeholt ... auf die man 
Schuld abladen kann und auf die sich die Aggression ad hominem richten laBt ... hier sind geheime 
Angste und offenkundige Affekte am Werk, die eine ruhige Rationalitat der Auseinandersetzung 
verhindern. (p. 133) What Burkhardt observes, then, is that the polemic surrounding Fink is a 
metaphor for the way in which the past has ritually been dealt with: its complex issues are pressed 
into a highly emotionalised and politicised either/or, for/against schema: "Vor-Vertrauensbekundung 
und Vor-Verurteilung sind die beiden Formen dessen, was ich 'Vergangenheitsuberwaltigung' nenne: 
den meist von sehr gegenwartigen Interessen bestimmten Versuch, sich der Vergangenheit zu 
bemachtigen, ohne sie dabei anzublicken." (p. 137; my italics) 
6 0 Schelenz, op. cit., p. 24 
6 , "Wenn es aber um eine Kommunal- oder Landtagswahl in den ostlichen Bundeslandem 
einschlieBlich Berlin geht, dann dient die PDS als Wahlkampfkeule in der Hand der einen westlichen 
Partei, um mit ihm auf das Haupt der anderen westlichen Partel einzuschlagen. Ohne Zweifel hat dies 
der eine dieser beiden Lager kurzfristig Erfolge gebracht, zumal es das andere Lager tief verunsichert 
hat. Am meisten aber hat es der PDS selbst genutzt". (von Weizsacker: "Weder klug noch fromm." 
op. cit.) 
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Wenn jemand der Meinung ist, daB eine der zu unseren Wahlen zugelassenen 
Parteien nicht demokratisch sei, dann m6ge er zum Verfassungsgericht gehen 
und das Undemokratische dieser Partei dort einklagen. Dieses aber zu 
unterlassen, daftir auf der anderen Seite in einem Wahlkatnpf zu profitieren, 
dafi man eine Partei pauschal als undemokratisch bezeichnet, halte ich fiir 
keinen sauberen Weg. Das ist weder intellektuell noch moralisch, noch 
politisch sauber (sic! - MD: observe the telling tacit recognition of a disparity 
between politics and morality) 6 2 (my italics) 
If it is argued that PDS historiography is undemocratic because its ostalgic dimension 
extols the virtues of the GDR and thus of a non-pluralist state with a considerably 
higher degree of ideological control than we are subject to in Western democracies, 
the picture must be relativised with the following observations: on the level of sign, 
the reductive notion of DDR-Nostalgie conflates - and thus fails to differentiate 
between - a wealth of different propositions, in particular between a form of GDR 
nostalgia which craves restoration of the GDR as a 'Stalinist' SED-led political 
system on the one hand, and a wistful form of nostalgia for certain external features 
(often perceived through rose-coloured spectacles) of the country of one's 
socialisation on the other. While we do find positions, such as that of Sahra 
Wagenknecht cited above, which have a 'Stalinist' or 'restorationist', dimension, 
there is room, at least, for seeing the picture from another perspective: 'Ostalgie' is 
as much tactical as it is ideologically motivated; in other words, it is as much about 
creating a GDR 'cultural identity' based upon a selective (pscho-socially highly 
effective) pastiche of the regime's better features as a basis for offering the PDS's 
membership a Seelenmassage and for (opportunistically?) marshalling support from 
disappointed Easterners (to allow the party to survive in the present polity!) as it is 
any commitment to, or concerted attempt to promote or restore, the Communist SED 
politics of the GDR polity that was, or to subvert (to use Moreau's emotive 
terminology, see below) the present order; we will see below the evidence which 
suggests that the party's ideological leaders accept the present, United German polity 
as the basis for their political actions; what Moreau's sharply right-wing world-view 
will not accept, however, is any position which questions the ultimate sanctity of the 
fundamentals of the present order; in this world-view, this is a priori subversion (see 
chapter 4 below). There is a valid argument that the PDS's influential ideological 
leaders who, as we shall see below, have widely been deemed "modernists", 
"reformers" and "social democrats", may well have allowed a GDR nostalgia running 
into restorationism to go unchecked in the attempt to hold the party together; we 
remember the words cited in chapter 1: 
6 2 ib id . 
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Die Stromungen in der PDS sind vielfaltig, widerspriichlich, kaum 
iiberschaubar. Zwar waren etwa neun von zehn PDS-Mitgliedern auch schon 
in der SED, aber da gibt es Traditionalisten und Reformer, solche, die aus der 
Vergangenheit gelernt haben, und andere, die sie eher verklaren ... Ein zu 
schneller ErneuerungsprozeB und die Klarung der Widerspriiche wiirde die 
Partei zerreiBen.63 
From this perspective, the substantive nature of the SED and its political regime can 
essentially be seen as an irrelevance. The invocation of the SED is a symbolic one, 
one used to inform a(n arguably) more important mental association: that of a GDR 
identity. Mathematically this might be represented as follows: 
PDS = ex-SED = GDR (because of the strong identity between party and state in the 
GDR 6 4) 
thus 
PDS = GDR. 
It seems that CDU-sponsored Moreau's reductive picture of the 'ostalgic' element of 
PDS historiography65, incorporated into his overall account of a monolithic PDS 
whose entire motivation he in turn presses into the emotive and simplistic mould of 
'subversion'66, fails to problematise this dimension: the highly complex interplay of 
tactics and conviction, the probelmatic circumstance that the ideological 
leadership's67 less than unequivocal stance vis-a-vis GDR reprehensibility might well 
in part (at least) represent a tactical attempt at effecting a practicable Spagat between 
the highly complex forces at work in the party, which, - to simplify hugely! - may be 
broadly -divided into 'traditionalist' and 'pragmatic'/'modernist' ('social 
democratic'?) wings. The following extract from Falkner and Huber's account is 
revealing of this tense co-existence, and the leadership's need to be mindful, in its 
policy formulation, of a range of contradictory inner-party positions: 
6 3 Nawrocki: "Genosse Rentner." op. cit. 
^cf.: "Die Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands ist der bewuBte und organisierte Vortrupp der 
Arbeiterklasse und des werktatigen Volkes der sozialistischen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik." 
Cited from: Programm der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Berlin: Dietz Verlag 1989, 
p. 5 
6 5 cf . : "Bei dieser DDR- und Kommunismus-Nostalgie, die auch von einem GroBteil der PDS-Wahler 
geteilt wird, handelt es sich nicht um eine voriibergehende Modeerscheinung, sondern um einen Beleg 
dafiir, daB die PDS sich als unfahig erwiesen hat, die eigene Geschichte aufzuarbeiten und zu 
bewaltigen. Die Dominanz reaktionarer Einstellungsmuster zeigt, wie schwer das Erbe der S E D 
immer noch wiegt. Die PDS bleibt in ihrer Mehrheit, wie das Neue Forum sie charakterisiert, eine 
'Partei der ewig Gestrigen.'" Moreau/Neu: Die PDS zwischen Linksextremismus... op. cit., p. 19 
6 6 ib id . (see esp. pp. 8, 14, 84) 
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Auf dem PDS-Februarparteitag von 1991 hatte es Gysi denn auch noch 
spurbar schwer, sich mit seiner konstruktiv gemeinten "antikapitalistischen 
Position" bei gleichzeitiger Ablehnung einer alles in den Dreck ziehenden 
"Fundamentalkritik" am neuen Deutschland nachhaltig Gehor zu verschaffen. 
Und nicht umsonst sah er sich auch zu einer deutlichen Verteidigung seiner 
Einschatzung genotigt, die SED sei im Laufe ihrer Entwicklung zu einer 
reaktionaren Partei verkommen. Beifall gab es an dieser Stelle nicht. 6 8 
Put simply this highly problematic contextual background quite simply serves to 
relativise Moreau's absolute account. Markovits and Gorski's "complete silence" 
picture takes on a very different perspective i f we perceive the leadership as 
essentially attempting to chart a course between two poles (in themselves fluid and 
with all manner of gradations in-between): on the one hand, the 'traditionalists' who 
are lihconviriced^of the -claim that" the-SED-led GDR was-in any-way . more 
unlibertarian than the Federal Republic, or of the need for the PDS (as SED 
successor) to adopt an apologist stance69: 
Die ostdeutsche Bevolkerung hat ... die reale Erfahrung, welche 
grundlegenden sozialen Rechte in der DDR schon realisiert und heute wieder 
verloren gegangen sind ... 
We remember Sahra Wagenknecht's observation that: 
Im Vergleich zur BRD war die DDR in jeder Phase Ihrer Entwicklung - selbst 
noch in Ihrem argsten Niedergang - das friedlichere, sozialere, menschlichere 
Deutschland. Wir haben daher keinen AnlaB, uns bei den biirgerlichen, den 
westdeutschen Kapitalismus von Beginn an tragenden Parteien CDU und 
SPD fur unsere Herkunft und Geschichte zu entschuldigen70; 
6 7 b y which we mean persons such as Gysi, Bisky, Brie: see chapter 3 below. 
6 8 Falkner/Huber, op. cit. p. 178 
6 9 " E i n e dritte Position, die in der Offentlichkeit vor allem durch die Kommunistische Plattform 
innerhalb der PDS reprasentiert ist, kann mit Vorsicht als ideologisch restaurativ bezeichnet werden. 
E s wird prinzipiell an den Grundstrukturen des friiheren Staatssozialismus als 'eigentlichem 
Sozialismus' festgehalten. Die damit verbundenen Auffassungen umgreifen ein sehr weites Spektrum, 
von einem demokratischen Staatssozialismus bis hin zu einem krassen Sozialismus, der in jeder 
Liberalisierung, erst recht in Pluralisierung oder Demokratisierung die Ursache fur den Untergang des 
Staatssozialismus sieht." Brie, Michael, "Das politische Projekt PDS - eine unmogliche Moglichkeit." 
In: Brie et al. (eds.): Die PDS. Empirische Befunde... op. cit., p. 29 (italics in original) 
7 0Wagenknecht, Sahra: "Anforderungen an die PDS." op. cit., pp. 2, 5 
Falkner/Huber (op. cit., pp. 151-67) offer very graphic evidence of the KPF's increasingly hard-line 
"Stalin-Apologetik" (p. 154), citing, inter alia, Sahra Wagenknecht's assertion that: "Das in der 
Stalinzeit entstandene und spater von den osteuropaischen Landern in den Grundziigen 
ubernommene ... Gesellschaftsmodell ist die auf Grundlage unterentwickelter beziehungsweise 
zerstorter Produktivkrafte, allgemeiner Not und existentieller Gefahrdung der Grundfesten des neuen 
Systems historisch notwendige und - soil eine biirgerliche Gegenrcvolution wirksam verhindert 
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on the other, the 'radical reformist' wing of the party, who have'consistently and 
vociferously called for the leadership to offer a much more outspoken condemnation 
of the party's GDR past. This faction finds a particularly outspoken mouthpiece in the 
party's strongly libertarian71 AG Junge Genosslnnen who have called, in particular, 
for a head-on confrontation with the personal complicity issue which the leadership 
has consistently been seen, publicly, to circumnavigate72. The following extract from 
Falkner/Huber's study reveals how - in contrast with the discourse of causal 
circumvention outlined in chapter 1 - the JG are unequivocal in perceiving the events 
spearhead by the Biirgerbwegungen in positive terms ("success") [despite, of course, 
the former's disaffection with the turn which events would subsequently take], and 
are unequivocal in identifying precisely these Burgerbewegungen as the bearers of 
that success: 
"Die Vergangenheit hat gezeigt', so heiBt es im sogenannten 
"Widerstandspapier" (= a paper delivered at the JG's Magdeburg Conference 
werden - einzig mogliche Form eines realisierten Sozialismus." (p. 158). This earns from 
Falkner/Huber the observation: "Noch einmal im Klartext: Wo immer Kommunisten in einer 
Zusammenbruchssituation das Ruder iibernehmen, miissen sie sich nach MaBgabe der Studentin und 
Politikerin Wagenknecht zu den Praktiken des Stalinismus greifen." (ibid.) 
7 1 O u r understanding of this term will become clear in chapter 3 below. 
7 2 T h e following extract from a motion passed at the JG's Federal Congress in Magdeburg in 
December 1994 (just before the party's crucial 4th Parleitag in January 1995) is revealing: "Ohne den 
kritischen Umgang mit unserer Geschichte wird eine weitere Erneuerung der PDS nicht moglich sein. 
Dies gilt besonders fiir 40 Jahre D D R , aber auch fur die Zeit der Anfange der Arbeiterbewegung bis 
hin zur Ubergangsphase von S E D zu PDS. Im Zentrum muB dabei nach wie vor die Aufdeckung der 
Strukturen und Mechanismen von Herrschaft und Unterordnung, Anpassung und Verdrangung, 
Repression und Ausgrenzung in der sozialistischen Bewegung stehen. Denn nur auf dieser Basis ist 
sowohl eine glaubwurdige Kapitalismuskritik als auch die Verhinderung eines (weiteren) Riickfalls in 
traditionelle Denk-, Handlungs- und Organisationsformen moglich. Das schlieBt ausdriicklich ein, die 
eigene Stellung und das eigene Wirken, also die personliche Verantwortung in diesem System nicht 
nur zu erklaren, sondern auch auf Grundlage heutiger (Ein)Sichten kritisch zu bewerten. 
Wissenschaftliche Aufarbeitung ersetzt diese personliche Bewaltigung nicht, sie kann sie nur 
begleiten. Besonders in der fur die PDS so schwierigen Frage des Umgangs mit politischen 
Biographien einzelner Mitglieder wird deutlich, daB eine Bewaltigung der eigenen Vergangenheit nur 
dann moglich ist, wenn diese auf Grundlage einer radikalen Kritik an D D R und Stalinismus erfolgt. 
Das schlieBt eine differenzierte Bewertung der DDR-Geschichte ein. Ohne eine solche Kritik ist ein 
differenzierter Umgang nicht moglich. Resultat sind Nostalgie, Verklarung, Rechtfertigungs- und 
Legitimationszwang. Notwendig ist vor allem eine konsequente Abgrenzung vom Hang zu autoritarer 
Politik und stalinistischen Positionen einzelner Mitglieder der PDS. Das schlieflt fur uns eindeutige 
und unmiflverstdndliche Erklarungen zu solchen Positionen ein. (This offers clear evidence that the 
Junge Genosslnnen, too, are unconvinced by the leadership's attempt to fuse differing inner-party 
positions - MD). Die verbale BeschluBlage des Sonderparteitages der S E D vom Dezember 1989 reicht 
dazu nicht mehr aus. Der eindeutige stalinistische Grundkonsens der PDS muB in der politischen 
Auseinandersetzung deutlich werden." Cited from: "Positionen zur zukiinftigen Politik der PDS. 
BeschluB der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Junger Genosslnnen in und bei der PDS." In: ak. 
no. 374. 11 January 1995 
Indeed, there is ample evidence that the JG can itself be broadly divided into two camps, 'East' and 
'West', with (perhaps ironically) the East German members generally calling for a much more 
confrontational approach to condemning what they perceive as an unlibertarian G D R . The differences 
emerged starkly at the JG's 3-day Conference in November 1995 at which Angela Marquardt (its 
[East German] spokesperson) called (yet again!) for a much more radical critique of G D R history; this 
prompted a response which one commentator percipiently describes as follows: "Diese offentliche 
Makelei mochte West nicht, das diene nun wirklich nicht der Sache, sondern dem Klassenfeind ... 
Die Ost-Replik, von Menschenverletzungen bis Militarismus, klang, als ob die C D U sich an Gysi 
reibt." Cited from: Lingenthal, Rainer: "Grabengefecht - Junge Linke Ost und West im Klassenkampf 
untereinander." In: Wochenpost. no. 48. 23 November 1995 
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in January 1994 - MD) von Magdeburg, 'daB dort, wo Opposition sich der 
gesellschaftlichen Logik ... entzieht, sich nicht an die Rolle halt, die von ihr 
erwartet wird, tiberraschende Erfolge erzielt werden konnen.' Und 
unmiBverstandlich wird dann gesagt, worauf man sich dabei bezieht: 'Gandhi 
oder die Biirgerbewegungen in der DDR sollen dafiir beispielhaft genannt 
werden. Auf Gewalt reagierten sie mit zivilem Ungehorsam und entstiegen 
damit dem ihnen zugedachten Feindbild'.7 3 
(This touches upon another crucial element in the democratic/antidemocratic debate: 
Falkner and Huber identify the invocation and championing of Gandhi and the 
Burgerbewegungen as strong evidence of the fact that the JG's commitment to 
'alternative' politics, its refusal to become sucked into what it perceives as the 
corruptive machinery of bourgeois, capitalist society "stiitzt sich ... auf eine durchaus 
nicht gewalttatige Tradition"74.) 
The picture painted here makes abundantly clear the need to bear in mind that a party 
discourse is the aggregate of its competing 'component' discourses. There is no 
uniform party discourse. While the leadership and leading ideologues might attempt 
to create a unifying 'super-discourse' with which to project the party's more public 
image (a discourse which takes in and attempts to combine different elements from 
the discourses of the party sub-groups and is particularly evident in 'unifying' 
programmatic75 text-types), we must always be mindful of the discursive 
7 3Falkner/Huber, op. cit., p. 169. Falkner/Huber offer a very sane account of how the JG, in its 
dealings with "autonome Gruppen" for whom it has an obvious affinity and sympathy, is the "in die 
PDS hineinreichenden Teil jener Grauzone zwischen der demokratischen und der radikalen bis 
extremistischen Linken". (p. 168) They offer evidence of how the JG has consistently hedged upon 
the question of the need to have recourse to violence, but observe that the group's political 
'Selbstverstandnis' is not directly predicated upon it and that hitherto (by 1994 - MD) no acts of 
violence perpetrated by JG members or sympathisers have been registered. This offers some 
relativisation, they show, of the picture frequently offered by the right, in which inner-PDS contacts 
with extreme left groups has consistently been adduced as further evidence of the PDS's subversive 
practices. 
7 4 ib id . , p. 169 
7 5Pfahl-Traughber's study (op. cit.) of both PDS programmes, the party's Verfassungsentwurf and the 
"5 Punkte" (see footnote 45, chapter 1; footnote 3, chapter 5) of January 1995 is predicated upon the 
valid observation that a study based upon "Programmatische Texte als Untersuchungsgegenstand" 
alone can yield only a "begrenzter Erkenntnisgewinn, was mit dem besonderen Charakter der 
Untersuchungsgegenstande zusammenhangt ... E s handelt sich um offizielle Texte der PDS, d.h. hier 
wird das Bild der Partei, daB sie sich selbst gegeben hat, zum Gegenstand einer Analyse gemacht. 
(For the linguist interested in perceptions of reality this is of course crucially revealing - MD.) Eine 
Gesamteinschatzung kann so allein nicht vorgenommen werden, bleiben doch iiber eine 
Auseinandersetzung mit den Texten hinausgehende Aspekte notwendigerweise bei der Betrachtung 
auBen vor. Zu diesen Aspekten gehort insbesondere das Verhaltnis von Partei program m und 
Parteiwirklichkeit, das grundsatzlich fur die Analyse der Programme politischer Parteien von 
Bedeutung ist, verkunden diese doch gerne wohlklingende Erklarungen, um so die breite 
Offentlichkeit ansprechen zu konnen. Fur die Partei am Rande des politischen Spektrums mit einer 
Vergangenheit wie der PDS gilt dieser Vorbehalt noch besonders, muB sie doch aus taktischen 
Grunden bestrebt sein, sich ein serioses Image zu geben." Pfahl-Traughber, op. cit., p. 359 (my 
underlining) What Pfahl-Traughber fails to address, however, is in what ways the PDS programmatic 
aims represent a departure from the 'tactics' of other parties whose 'democratic' credentials are taken 
as a given. 
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compromise involved .and of the existence of problematic sub-discourses. In the 
following chapter we will examine the particularly high-level of factionalisation in 
the PDS and attempt to show in what ways a unifying 'super-discourse' has been 
generated in the attempt to deal discursively with the fundamentally opposing 
discourses operating beyond (what we will identify as) the lowest common 
denominator of a demokratischer Sozialismus. 
Moreau's reductive picture of PDS motivation seems simplistic at a time when the 
PDS is agonising over its political profile. (He wil l have become painfully aware of 
the pitfalls of premature and sweeping predictions, having deemed the demise of the 
PDS by the time of the Federal Elections in 1994 pre-programmed!76) 
CONCLUSION 
We can make sense, then, of the discourse of causal circumvention if we see it as a 
complex interplay of what we might call 'legitimacy strands', as an attempt by the 
PDS to legitimate itself by catering, at one and the same time, to the wants and needs 
of whole range of dfferent target audiences, both inside and outside the party; as such 
the PDS is attempting to successfully fuse a whole range of different perspectives of 
itself. StraBner, as we observed above, has pointed to the centrality accorded by 
politicans and political parties to self-legitimisation.77 The attempt to bring these 
strands together can be see on the inner-textual 'local' level, in other words is: 
inner-lexeme: cf. in broad categories such as Opposition and Reform (which 
conflate problematic frames of reference) 
inner speech act/sentence: cf. Es gab Irrtumer... (recognition of 
reprehensibility fused with, at the same time, a refusal to apportion blame!), 
on the inner-textual 'global' level, by which we mean that opposing signals at 
different stages in the text are brought together within the framework of the 
dialectical structure identified above; cf. Bortfeldt's text: 
on the one hand, the SED membership "hielt sich von der StraBe fern..." (see 
p. 87 above) 
7 6 "Der Untergang dieser Partei scheint kurzfristig unvermeidbar." Moreau: "Die PDS: Eine 
postkommunistische Partei." op. cit., p. 35 
7 7StraBner: "MaximenverstoB als Regel ..." op. cit., p. 138 
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on the other: " der Verlauf und der friedliche Charakter dieser Revolution 
ware nicht erklarbar ohne die Duldung, das Sympathisieren, auch das aktive 
Mittun nicht weniger Mitglieder dieser Partei ... (op. cit. p. 91 my italics) 
and, as we shall see below, on an inter-textual level, where modified messages are 
presented to different target audiences. 
Our study of the discourse of 'causal circumvention' has sought to show by what 
linguistic means the PDS has attempted to achieve a viable fusion of these highly 
problematic and frequently contradictory strands. Though by no means exhaustive, 
the table at the end of this chapter sets out some of these strands schematically and 
illustrates their uncomfortable co-existence. 
The attempt, however, is one thing, the success of that attempt quite another. 
Numerous commentators have been uncomfortable with the degree of what they see 
as the contradiction, duality, hedging and ambivalence in PDS historiography, 
offering evidence that they are unconvinced by the attempted fusion. As Grace has 
observed: 
although our language does influence our perception, it does not do so to the 
extent that we cannot overcome it if there is sufficient motivation for us to do 
so.7 8 
The fusion of positions in PDS historiography has been largely perceived in 'tactical' 
terms, and as such, as a 'tactic', as something 'insincere', it blends in perfectly with a 
perception, in its extremest form enframed in the world-view of Moreau, that: 
Der begrenzte politische Wandel, (of the PDS - MD) ist deshalb im Grunde 
nur eine Verteidigungs- oder Uberlebensstrategie, die Antwort auf ein als 
feindlich empfundenes politisches, wirtschaftliches und soziales Umfeld. Von 
innerer Uberzeugung war dieser Wandel sicher nicht geleitet.79 
As we said above, the 'tactic' takes upon a different perspective when set against the 
contextual background of a leadership struggling to hold the party together and deal 
with the inner-party Richlungskampfe. Where we must, then, be aware - and wary!-
is where, as is ritually the case in the political arena, objections of 'tactical 
manoeuvring' on the part of the PDS are unproblematically pressed into reductive 
(politically motivated) conceptual schema, in other words where these inform, for 
example: 
'cited in: Wilson: Politically Speaking, op. cit., p. 14 
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- a polarised democratic/antidemocratic schema, in which the emotive terms 
function largely on a connotative (as opposed to substantive) level, the democratic 
credentials of the established parties are accepted (unproblematically) at face value, 
and the similarity of traits in the latter's discourse to those manifested in the 
discourse of the PDS is not problematised. (If the PDS can be nealty packaged as 
"Stalinist" on account of its historiographic 'hedging', does this then mean that the 
right, which could also be seen to avoid confronting a problematic past head-on, is 
"Hitlerist?") 
or, by way of a further example: 
a - rather meaningless - truth/lie schema such as that underpinning Moreau's 
accusation that the PDS has single-mindedly pursued a distortion of 'reality', "im 
Wege einer einzigartigen Geschichts/o/^c/jM/ig"80; politicians and political observers 
are apt to start from the (positivist) premise that there is an 'objective reality' which 
an objective language can recreate: it is hard for the critical linguist who starts from 
the premise that there is no objective reality outside of the competing discourses 
which lay claim to i t 8 1 inasmuch as language and 'reality' inform each other in a 
dialectical process (a view, shared, however, by no means all linguisticians) to accept 
Moreau's objections in this form 8 2 The crucial aim of politically motivated language 
is, after all, 
jede andere als die in der jeweiligen Ideologic enthaltene Wirklichkeit 
auszuschalten, die Realitat so abzubilden, erfahrbar zu machen, wie er der 
weltanschaulichen Denk- und Sehweise zukommt.8 3 
As such language is an integral part of reality. It is constitutive of i t . 8 4 It is not the 
case th^Hhat a process can be enframed in ontologically 'correct' terms. What we 
can Question, however, is the level of generality, of abstraction inherent in the PDS's 
version of reality, and the mechanisms used to procure it. (It is barely possible to 
7 9Moreau/Neu: Die PDS zwischen Linksextremismus... op. cit., p. 82 
8 0 ib id . , p. 10 
8 , O n e of Townson's central theses is "the denial of an 'objective reality1 outside language and 
independent of it" (op. cit., p. 123), which he proffers in convincing opposition to the position 
adopted by the "positivists, who 'viewed the world of experience as possessing a coherent structure 
unimposed by the perceiver' and believed that 'we can speak correctly about objects and situations, 
which for Shapiro is 'predicated on the indefensible theory of meaning and is a misleading way to 
represent the relationship between speech and phenomena"1, op. cit., p. 21 
8 2 A s Good has rightly observed: "The relationship between language and politics, language and 
ideology and, therefore, language and history, is a dialectical one." Good: Language, Politics and 
Ideology, op. cit. 
8 3StraBner, Erich: Ideologie-SPRACHE-Politik. Tubingen: Niemeyer Verlag 1987, p. 36 
8 4 Townson, op. cit., p. 32 
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sustain the argument, for example, that the PDS's claims that the party incorporates 
ex-SED reformers departs from a broad, notional parameter of 'truth'. I f something is 
felt to be 'wrong' with this assertion it is surely not that it represents a 'lie'.) 
Moreau's picture of PDS historiography and 'ostalgia' sees it as a solely tactical 
construct predicated upon the uniform and single-minded motivational factor of 
postcommunist 'subversion'. This speaks for Moreau's perception of the PDS per se: 
into this conceptual world fits Moreau' understanding of the PDS's single-issue 
interest groups (IGs and AGs) as exclusively Gramscian constructs, aiming solely to 
locate the Spannungsfelder in society and 'stir up trouble' (see chapter 3 below). 
What Moreau's reductive account fails to invoke is the enormously problematic 
dimension of what happens when individuals within a party do act out of personal 
commitment as opposed to strategy: while there is no way of empirically divorcing 
tactics from a 'genuine' conviction, can all the work of the IGs and AGs, the 
numerous - and well-documented - acts of assistance provided by the PDS to East 
Germans at local level really be pressed into the sole motivational category of 
Storaktionen aimed at ultimate subversion? Can they never be an end in 
themselves?85 Can 'honest' recognitions of personal shortcomings such as that of Dr. 
Hartwig cited above only be about postcommunist tactics? Moreau's eagerness to 
select only those perceptions of PDS-related reality which conform to his reductive, 
pre-conceived ideological model is particularly evident in the 'catch 22' in which he 
has the party leadership: where some would perceive the hybrid formulations of the 
type we encountered above as evidence of a (tactical) 'pandering' to the position of 
'traditionalist' forces in the party, to Moreau it is nothing more than a mark of its 
reprehensible, 'true', "anti-democratic"86 status, of its lack of any 'real' commitment 
to the German democracy or to a 'true' desire to confront the past; it is an insidious 
subversive tactic. Where, however, that same leadership attempts to use its influential 
position within the party to divest it of 'traditionalist' positions (as was particularly 
evident in the period preceding its 4th Parteitag in January 1995 - see chapter 5 
below) Moreau's ideological standpoint precludes any perception of such a process as 
a possible drive for change or a 'genuine' desire to rid the party of troublesome 
factions; neither, (if we see the leadership's activities in more cynical terms) wil l 
Moreau's world-view allow it under any circumstances to stand as little more than a 
pragmatic (many have argued opportunist) attempt to make the PDS maximally 
politikfdhig and 'voteworthy' in the established arena. In his cold-war world, it is 
8 5 A t a PDS Basisgruppe-meet'mg in Weimar in 1994 the author was witness to a booksale aiming to 
raise money to provide milk for Cuban children as part of the PDS's Cuba Si campaign. He had no 
reason to doubt the genuine commitment - as an end in itself - of those involved in the campaign. 
8 6 "Die Verpackung der S E D veranderte sich, ihr antidemokratischer Inhalt aber blieb." Moreau: "Die 
PDS: Eine postkommunistische Partei." op. cit., p. 43 
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emotively enframed as nothing but a manifestation of a dictatorial, SED-style 
concentration of power, of an "Allmacht des Parteiprasidiums"87, of a reprehensible 
refusal to accept positions which elsewhere Moreau has himself adduced to offer 
evidence of the PDS's "undemocratic" status. Put simply, where the party leadership 
allows 'traditionalist' positions to go unchecked, this is evidence of its 
postcommunist nature; where it attempts (for whatever reason) to force through 
positions which co-exist uncomfortably with that "traditionalism" this is evidence 
of ... yes, its postcommunist nature, its continued commitment to a hard-line 
Leninism: 
Diese Machtkonzentration in den Handen weniger erinnert an die bekannte 
Praxis des Leninismus. Es zahlt nur die Effizienz; Oppositionelle werden 
neutralisiert oder aus der Partei gedrangt ... 
Die Tatsache, daB die Kommunistische Plattform nur zwei Sitze im Parteirat 
hat, andere kritische Stromungen sogar keine, beweist, daB dem Presidium 
der PDS gelungen war, sich auch diese Instanz, die die innerparteiliche 
Demokratie starken sollte, weitgehend gefiigig zu machen (! - M D ) 8 8 (my 
italics) 
(Into Moreau's 'subversion' schema fits his understanding of the leadership's 
'tolerance' of the KPF [in the attempt to hold the party together? - MD] as a 
"Doppelstrategie" and a "Tarnstrategie"89, as an attempt to exploit the KPF as a foil 
for a 'truly' socialist PDS. While there is room for debate as to the substantive nature 
of Moreau's assertion, it is noticeably cast in the emotive rhetoric of cold-war spy-
thrillers.) 
Josef Klein has proffered an interesting relativisation of the absoluteness of a 
Moreau-style perception of 'how it really is' with regard to power-relationships 
8 7 c f . "Das Presidium setzte sich zusammen aus dem Parteivorsitzenden, seinen Stellvertretern, den 
Leitern der Kommissionen, dem Schatzmeister und den Fraktionsvorsitzenden der Partei in der 
obersten Ebene, sowie weiteren gewahlten Mitgliedern. (Vgl. 28 Abs. 2 des Statuts der PDS vom 
Februar 1990). Der Parteivorstand wurde 1991 von 70 auf 18 Personen reduziert. Danach wurde das 
Presidium abgeschafft. Dem Vorstand gehorten fortan nur noch Anhanger der Linie Brie-Bisky an ... 
Die innerparteilichen Verhaltnisse sind durch einen streng limitierten Pluralismus 
(Pseudopluralismus) gekennzeichnet. Die Allmacht des Parteipcisidiums, heute ist es nur noch eine 
kleine Gruppe innerhalb des verkleinerten Parteivorstandes (Gysi, Brie, Bartsch, Bisky), ist 
ungebrochen. Der offiziell abgelehnte 'demokratische Zentralismus' kehrt also durch die 'Hintertur' 
zuriick". (Cited from: Moreau/Neu: Die PDS zwischen Linksextremismus..." op. cit., pp. 12,7; my 
italics.) 
8 8 ib id . , pp. 12,13 
8 9 ib id . , p. 50 
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within the PDS; in his review of Moreau's work Was will die PDS?90 he acutely 
observes that: 
ob jedoch der Hinweis, daB das Presidium den Vorstand kontrolliert, einen 
ausreichenden Beleg (for the operation, as was argued in Moreau's work, of a 
"fur kommunistische Parteien typisches Prinzip" - MD) darstellt, mag 
angesichts der gangigen Praxis in anderen Parteien durchaus bezweifelt 
werden.91 (my italics) 
Doubtless the far left in the 'New Labour' party would agree. 
So far we have - consciously - made the task of dealing with PDS historiography 
easy for ourselves by seeing it largely from the perspective of party ideologues 
seeking to handle the ambivalence inherent in the PDS's position. We have talked 
generally of a PDS, with little regard to the high degree of ideological 
factionalisation within the party. What must be continually borne in mind is that, as 
we have touched upon above the PDS - like any party - is not a homogenous entity. 
Acronyms for political parties are per se reductions of reality which gloss over the 
fact that a body of party 'ideology' is, as we have said, a complex amalgam of 
different and (in particular in the case of the PDS) conflicting discourses. The point 
might appear an obvious one, but it is often sidelined by political spectators eager to 
find simple modes of interpretation for highly complex issues and who thus, as 
appears to be the case with Moreau, press their perception of party reality into the 
categories of a rigid, preconceived schema. The PDS is a party more factionalised 
than most. To fail to assess the huge body of discourse which has emerged under its 
auspices against the contextual background of its Richtungskampf is to form a 
simplistic and ill-informed picture of this multi-Faceted party. Moreau describes in 
some detail the different groups at work within the PDS but on the whole presses 
them into thp mould of a PDS monolith with the uniform aim of subverting the 
current order. 
Certain sections of the right have been keen to brand the PDS as a whole 
linh^extremistisch on the basis of the 'sensational' activities of its Kommunistische 
Piattform. The use of extremistischlexlrem both implies Verfassungsfeindlichkeil92 
9 0 see: Moreau, Patrick: Was will die PDS? Frankfurt/Main: Ullstein 1994 
9 l Schmidt, Josef: "Die Lasten der Vergangenheit." In: DasParlament. 9 June 1995 
9 2 Schelenz (op. cit., p. 117) draws a distinction between extremistisch and radikal: "extremistisch 
(und damit verfassungsfeindlich) sind politische Parteien und Aktivitaten strenggenommen nur dann, 
wenn sie sich nachweislich gegen die freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung richten und als deren 
Gegner im Verfassungsschutzbericht aufgefuhrt werden." 
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and alludes - via a conflation of the signifier extremistisch - to a common ground9 3 
between the PDS and far right wing groups such as the Republikaner (commonly 
styled rechtsextremistisch). Unsurprisingly, Moreau warns the democratic 
establishment that: 
Die PDS ist heute die einzige linksextreme politische Organisation, die 
innerhalb des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik eine Rolle spielen 
konnte.94 
it is interesting to note that the Verfassungsschutz is more careful to relativise in its 
categorisation: it talks not of a linksextremistische PDS per se, but of 
"Linksextremistische Positionen in der 'Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus'"95 
(my italics), thus stopping short of calling into question the democratic credentials of 
the PDS as a whole. The distinction is a crucial one. It points to the fact that the 
Verfassungsschutz, too, is aware of the problematic Richtungskdmpfe in the PDS, the 
Strdmungen, to which we now turn. 
9 3 T h i s Falkner/Huber (op. cit., p. 171) perceive as "die bei Konservativen in Deutschland so beliebte 
Gleichsetzung von Rechts- und LinksauBen, die nebenbei bemerkt, haufig auf eine Verharmlosung 
rechtsextremistischer und neofaschistischer Gewalttaten hinauslauft". 
9 4 Moreau, Patrick: "Das Wahljahr 1994 und die Strategic der PDS." In: Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte. B 1.1994, p. 21 
95Verfassungsschutzbericftt 1993. Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, p. 55 
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1. 'honest' dealing with 
history 
2. establish credentials 
as democratic player In 
new political system 
3. establish legitimacy 
with membership 
'polltische Heimat" 
4. establish legitimacy 
with ex-GDR populace 
statement ot active dealing 
with past 
stated assumption 'sins of 
past'; i.e. SED-Erblast; 
apology to G D R people 
statement of active dealing 
with past 
PDS is a 'new1 party; 
divorces itself from S E D ; 
P D S is reformist nucleus of 
S E D 
PDS is a product of the 
Wendezeit; 'by-pass' S E D -
history: S P D origins 
transfer of blame 
PDS was 'actively' involved 
as 'reformers' 
"subjektiv gut gewolltes" 
statements of 
condemnation of S E D (with 
some relativisation) 
statements of 
condemnation of GDR 
'acceptance' of unification 
PDS berates itself for lack 
of personal involment in 
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anti West German 





A SOCIALIST OPPOSITION?: 
T H E DISCOURSE O F L O W E S T COMMON DENOMINATORS 
Das Parteiprogramm ist das Balanceergebnis eines grundlichen, nicht zuletzt 
von der Parteibasis getragenen Streits. Nichts sollte stattfinden, was diese 
Balance gefahrdet. Die PDS ist weder eine sozialdemokratische Partei noch 
eine kommunistische Partei. Doch sie vereint in sich nicht zuletzt 
Kommunisten und Sozialdemokraten.1 
The aim of the present chapter is to examine the PDS's particular brand of socialism 
and the question of whether it forms a viable basis upon which to come to terms with 
the - as we will attempt to show - highly complex and problematic heterogeneity of 
both the PDS's membership and voter-base. At the heart of the party's "schon lang 
bestehende konzeptionelle und mentale Heterogenitat"2 are fundamental differences 
as to what kind of opposition to direct at, or what kind of oppositional role to adopt 
within, the new polity: an opposition based on an orthodox 'class warfare' mode of 
conceptualising society, or an opposition based upon a recognition that these 
categories are outmoded in a post-industrial society?; an opposition based upon an 
acceptance of the present polity and its structures ,as a building-block to a better 
society or a fundamental rejection of the validity of these structures?; an opposition 
which allows involvement in strategic political alliances or an opposition which 
perceives such involvement as essentially corruptive? (This last aspect will be given 
particular treatment in chapter 4.) The PDS's oppositionality, we will argue, 
represents a complex amalgam of all - and more - of these (by no means mutually 
exclusive!) positions. We wil l attempt, too, to show how, faced with this unwieldy 
body of inner-party discrepancy, leading party ideologues have sought to locate a 
'unifying' discourse, a discursive level which takes in and smooths over the 
fundamental contradictions with which the party is riven; in other words, we wil l 
attempt to show how they have sought to deal with the vastly differing inner-party 
conceptions of Weg and Ziel and the question of how best to marry them. This, we 
will argue, has (necessarily) yielded a highly abstract and causally vague body of 
language (of which highly superordinate keywords such as Opposition and - as is our 
particular interest here - Sozialismus are an integral feature), whose essential 
mechanisms we will seek to highlight. At the same time we look at the party's 
1 Wagenknecht, Sahra: "Anforderungen an die PDS." op. cit., p. 2 
2 L a n d , Rainer/Ralf Possekel: "Orthodoxie und Modernitat ..." op. cit., p. 415 
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equally heterogeneous body of voters and ask whether the sheer diversity of their 
motivation in voting for the PDS can be linked with a broad, unifying commitment to 
a demokratischer Sozialismus whose substantive nature (i.e. denotative content) 
might form a viable basis for a radically new society. Throughout our examination of 
the invocation of Sozialismus as a unifying basis for the PDS's 'oppositional' vision, 
and of the ways in which the party is a "komplizierter Zusammenhalt mehrerer 
differenter Gruppen"3, we will attempt to draw attention to the very real limitations 
with which we are faced in trying, in language, to capture that complexity, as 
language is never a mirror of, but rather reduces - and indeed is itself a key 
consitutent in - the complex processes which together make up the world around us. 
It is hoped that this will highlight the pitfalls of drawing - as has all to often been 
done - simplistic conclusions about this chameleon party. 
RESCUING T H E SIGNIFIANT SOCIALIST 
Der sozialistische Charakter der PDS ist in ihrer Geschichte begriindet, von 
ihren Mitgliedern gewollt, von ihren Wahlerinnen und Wahlern akzeptiert, in 
ihrem Programm und Statut festgeschrieben und in ihrem Namen 
hervorgehoben.4 (Observe here the unquantifiability and unverifiability of 
these statements - MD; my italics) 
Kari Palonen has shown that the PDS is one of a number of parties which, in moving 
away from Communism (as potent symbol of a very specific and tarnished post-war 
tradition) following the turbulent events of 1989/90, styled itself a party belonging to 
a generic movement categorised as socialist, a move which incorporated: 
historisch betrachtet, eine Lockerung der Abgrenzung ... die im 
ideologischen Namen enthalten ist, sie stellt damit sozusagen einen Versuch 
dar, zur Situation um den Ersten Weltkrieg zuriickzukehren. Es wird an 
diejenigen appelliert, denen die Grenzen zwischen Sozialdemokraten und 
Kommunisten schon immer als nur relative erschienen.5 
More specifically: a widening of the category socialism allows the PDS6 and other ex 
'communist' parties to move away from the narrower frame of reference in which 
3ibid., p. 416 
4 Bisky, L . et al.: "Sozialismus ist Weg ..." op. cit., p. 26 ff. 
5Palonen, Kari: "Der Parteiname als Synekdoche?" In: Reiher, Ruth (ed.): Sprache im Konflikt. 
op. cit., p. 452 
6 by which we mean, in particular, those party ideologues charged with the task of making the PDS's 
political vision relevant to the new political environment. 
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socialism was incorporated in the Marxist-Leninist teachings of the GDR 
("Sozialismus war und ist in der kommunistischen Theorie nur eine historische 
Ubergangsstufe zum Kommunismus").7 In 'by-passing' this frame of reference, 
socialism now draws upon a much older tradition which, in Germany, might allow 
the PDS - as a legitimising tactic?- to claim common ground with the Social 
Democrats (especially through the conflation afforded by the signifiant <social>. We 
remember the attempt to identify common ground in: 
Die PDS ist aus der SED hervorgegangen und diese aus KPD und SPD im 
Osten Deutschlands. Wer sich wirklich zur Geschichte der SED bekennt, muG 
die ganze wechselvolle Geschichte von KPD und SPD und der noch breiteren 
Arbeiterbewegung ... beriicksichtigen.8 (italics in original) 
where PDS overlaps with SED - which overlaps with KPD & SPD - which in turn 
overlaps with SPD - thus allowing a reading whereby PDS overlaps with SPD. 
Widening the category here, however, means making it vaguer: while the extension 
of the category Sozialismus is broader, the intension - its denotative content - is 
perforce vaguer; that is, it exists, as we shall see below, on a(n even) higher level of 
abstraction. 
Championing socialism allows the PDS to retain a central ideologeme from the 
'bread and butter' discourse of old, an ideologeme whose symbolic, connotative 
function wil l be a useful 'comforter' to those party 'hard-liners' ("die bei der Stange 
gehalten werden miissen, damit die Partei nicht zugrunde geht"9) who are less than 
satisified with the PDS's gradual move away from the rigid ideology of orthodox 
Marxism-Leninism as the party adapts to the demands of its new political 
surroundings. At the same time, however, the ideologeme socialism, while clearly 
tapping into the discursive legacy of the SED, lends itself more readily to the 
invocation of a wider tradition than does the narrower category of communism, so 
tarnished as it is in its reference to a much more distinct tradition1 0. (We will 
examine below the evidence of leading party ideologues' increasing disaffection with 
the term communist and its attempts to divorce the PDS from it.) In other words, it is 
easier to locate (a widened) socialism in the new polity; it is a lowest common 
denominator in the attempt to bridge the gap between old and new, it is a level upon 
7Schlosser, Horst-Dieter, op. cit., p. 32 
8 G y s i , Gregor "Was will die PDS in Deutschland." op. cit., p. 10 
9 Good, Colin: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 266 
1 0 cf . , for example, the SED's programmatic statement: "Der Kommunismus - unser Ziel." (cited from: 
Programm der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. op. cit., p. 103) 
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which a traditional Marxist-Leninist world-view might be adapted to the demands of 
the new environment. The very party name Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus is 
emblematic of the attempt to bridge that gap: a central element of orthodox Marxist-
Leninist discourse is combined with one of the central ideologemes, whose mythical 
qualities we touched upon above, of Western political discourse'1: 
Da alle Sozialisten bleiben (sic), aber in einer Demokratie mitmischen 
wollten, einigte man sich auf den Namen "Demokratischen Sozialismus".12 
Our attention now turns to the PDS's self-styled role as a socialist opposition and to 
an examination of the language of the PDS's 'socialist' vision. We will attempt to 
show that in this respect the political discourse of the PDS has recourse to a vague, 
highly abstract, highly superordinate, catch-all body of language capable of glossing 
over fundamental inner-party differences in world-view, of unifying disparate, 
contradictory (and potentially mutually exclusive?) party factions. The sign 
socialist/socialism is itself an integral part of that abstraction. As we touched upon 
above, we understand the term superordinate as used by Schaffner and Porsch who, 
in discussing the linguistic features of the "Bericht, Debatte and Direktive" in the 
public discourse of the SED, pinpoint the use of "the most general (superordinate) 
terms whose semantic content could hardly be specified". In effect, they point out, 
such superordinate keywords, "maximally vast in ... extension, and maximally 
reduced in ... intension"13 are part and parcel of a strategy of propositional reduction, 
of abstraction, designed to present a simplified and harmonious world-view primarily 
on the level of signifiant. The ideological potential of a potent sign - a keyword 
(Townson) - like socialism, which reduces and suggests homogeneity and uniformity, 
is thus that it can be harnessed to circumvent and gloss over fundamental causal 
problems, contradictions and antagonisms residing in the signified; these are simply 
buried below the potent surface form - and can thus be circumvented discursively. 
It is hard to see how, unless on the level of sign, a - say - 'hard-line' 'Marxist-
Leninist' (some would say 'pro-Stalinist') socialism such as is espoused, for 
example, by the party's Kommunistische Plattform, might be married to a more 
widely drawn socialism formally committed to a plurality of world-views. 
From its inception, the PDS has, as we have said above, championed "die Idee des 
Sozialismus". The reasons for doing so doubtless represent a complex amalgam of 
1 'Which is not to say, however, that the lexeme did not figure largely in the political discourse of the 
S E D too! 
1 2 Eppler , Erhard: "Rotkappchen und die PDS." In: Der Spiegel, no. 1. 1995 
1 3Schaffner, Christina/Peter Porsch, op. cit., pp. 37, 38 
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motives: a tactical attempt to maintain political credibility inasmuch as an ex-SED 
which all too rudely abandons its orthodox Marxist Leninist legacy could easily be 
accused of political opportunism; a (partly tactical) attempt, as we have said, to make 
the past relevant to the present; an attempt at self-preservation, at offering those 
disaffected with the changes14 a tSeelenmassage\ a 'politische HeimaC in which 
their past is vindicated; and last, but not least, a 'genuine' commitment to a 
'visionistic' 'socialist' Utopia, however nebulous and as yet amorphous this vision 
may as yet be. 
Having championed socialism, the PDS must both legitimise and attempt to define 
what lies behind it, in other words articulate a viable 'socialist' vision, following, in 
the emotive words of Moreau, the "definitiven Sieg des Kapitalismus iiber den 'real 
existierenden Sozialismus'"15 and a generally acknowledged RechtsrucW6; that 
socialism as a concept must be broad enough to find appeal on both an inner- and an 
extra-party level. We will attempt to show that the thrust of the PDS's discourse in 
this respect has been to de-antagonise: to use language to present a harmonious 
vision - enframed as socialist - in which the classic problems between Weg and Ziel 
are circumvented, at least linguistically, in the attempt, too, to overcome the high 
level of inner-party fictional isation and ideological disparity and find a basis on 
which to hold the party together. 
Having taken socialism on board, how has the PDS sought to rescue the category and 
legitimise it? Firstly by emphasising that what obtained in the GDR was not 
socialism, but 'socialism gone wrong'. Indeed this aberration is frequently neatly 
packaged and thrown away as real existierender Sozialismus: 
In Wahrheit aber ist nicht Marx tot, sondern Stalin, und fehlgeschlagen ist 
nicht der Sozialismus, sondern nur dieser besondere, real existierende ...17 
(my italics) 
There is perhaps some irony in the fact that the expression so widely 
instrumentalised by the SED as a pillar upon which to support the (mythical) world 
of the entwickelte sozialistische Gesellschaft and so much the butt of ironical 
l 4Marten-Finnis calls these "Konservative - ehemalige Staats- und Parteifunktionare des alten 
Regimes, die in der PDS eine neue politische Heimat gefunden haben (und) durch die PDS eine 
Bestatigung ihrer Biographie erfahren (wollen)". Marten-Finnis, Susanne: Pressesprache zwischen 
Stalinismus und Demokratie - Parteijournalismus im "Neuen Deutschland" 1946-1993. Tubingen: 
Niemeyer Verlag 1994, p. 138 
1 5 Moreau, Patrick: PDS. Anatomic... op. cit., p. 148 
, 6 G o o d , Colin: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 266 
l 7 H e y m , Stefan: "Neue Hoffnung fur die DDR" In: Heym, S.: Stalin verlaflt den Raum. Leipzig: 
reclam-Verlag 1990, p. 271 
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observations from Western political observers should now be subject to a similarly 
ironic invocation by the SED's political successor: Good has identified that one of the 
PDS's prime linguistic ploys has been to apply the "discredited language of the 
GDR ... to the new situation".18 (We remember, too, the PDS's heavy reliance in its 
historiography on the concept of the Wendehals, a term initially activated during the 
Wendezeit to discredit the PDS's own political predecessor: see chapter 1.) 
Compare, too, the neatly separable poles in: 
Sozialismus - darunter verstehen wir eine Gesellschaft, in der die Entfaltung, 
Freiheit und Wiirde des einzelnen Voraussetzung fur die Entfaltung, Freiheit 
und Wurde aller ist. Diese Vision ist durch die gleichnamige, aber 
entgegengesetzle Praxis des Realsozialismus diskreditiert . . . 1 9 (my italics; 
observe, too, the degree of superordinacy of the terms of this socialist vision! 
- M D ) . 
(Elsewhere, as we have seen above, an 'impure' socialism has been cast off as a 
'Stalinist' aberration, as a "(staatsbiirokratischer) Stalinismus" or as 
"Staatssozialismus"20. Similarly, the attempt is frequently made - via a polarised 
conceptual schema - to rescue Marx, through a conscious setting-off of the master's 
theories in their (mythical) 'pure' form against the 'debased' form enframed in 
wissenschaftlicher Kommunismus i.e. in the "von Stalin gepragte[n] dogmatische[n] 
Schema des sogenannten Marxismus-Leninismus"2*. (my italics) Note how this is 
clearly implied in the following: 
Es gibt eine Gruppe von Genossinnen und Genossen in der PDS, die groBen 
Wert darauf legen, durch ihre Mitgliedschaft und ihre politischen Aktivitaten 
eine Bestatigung ihres bisherigen Lebens, ihrer Biographien zu erfahren ... 
Indem sie ihr Leben verteidigen, verteidigen sie gewollt oder ungewollt 
haufig zugleich eine Geschichte, die in diesem Umfang Verteidigung nicht 
verdient. Ihr programmatischer Ansatz ist meist ein nicht nur marxistischer, 
sondern auch ein marxistisch-leninistischer (einschliefilich der hochst 
l 8 G o o d , Colin: PDS - Partei der Diskursiven Strategien? op. cit. 
1 9 G y s i : "Was will die PDS in Deutschland." op. cit., p. 9 
2 0 see footnote 69, chapter 2 
2 ,Neubert, Harald: Von Sozialismus und Demokratie - Antonio Gramsci. Berlin: Kommission 
Politische Bildung des Parteivorstandes der PDS 1990, p. 4 
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zweifelhaften Momente), weil auch dies zur Bestatigung ihrer Biographien 
erforderlich ist . . . 2 2 (my italics) 
A vociferous proponent of the notion of a 'true' socialism has been Stefan Heym 
(whom the PDS in 1994 championed as a parteiloser Kandidat in its offenen Listen2* 
and who proceeded to represent the PDS/Linke Liste in the Federal parliament after 
winning outright in his Berlin electoral district in the 1994 federal elections). In 
October 1989 Heym had enframed (as we have in part cited above) the notion of an 
undebased socialism as follows: 
In Wahrheit aber ist nicht Marx tot, sondern Stalin, und fehlgeschlagen ist 
nicht der Sozialismus, sondern nur dieser besondere, real existierende: der 
andere bessere, in dessen Namen so viele tapfere Menschen ihre Ideen gaben 
und ihr Blut, steht noch aus. Und der Gedanke liegt nahe, jetzt da sich der 
Wandel anbahnt im Umfeld der Republik, dem wirklichen Sozialismus, in 
dem die Menschen Briider werden und Hand in Hand Freiheit und 
Gerechtigkeit, ihr Leben gestalten, auch hier zum Durchbruch zu 
verhelfen . . . 2 4 (my italics; observe here, again, the highly superordinate terms 
of Heym's socialism: it is a harmonious (and simplistic) world, indeed a 
distinctly eighteenth century Enlightenment note is struck, resonant as the 
"Menschen Briider werden" is of Schiller's "An die Freude": we shall have 
more to say about abstract definitions below.) 
This leaves intact a vague (and mythical?), unsullied generic and 'real' socialism to 
which the PDS can lay claim upon the basis of the conflationary potential residing in 
the signifier Sozialismus; a <socialist> unity party and a party of Democratic 
<Socialism> can - at the very least on the level of signifiant - tap into a <socialist> 
tradition. (Elsewhere, of course, the PDS's right to a priori lay claim to a generic 
socialist tradition - to style itself "Trager solcher (sozialistischen - MD) Ideale"25 -
has been challenged, no more vociferously than by an SPD fearing encroachment 
upon its political terrain.) The idea of a 'true' socialism abounds in PDS writing; 
2 2 G y s i , Gregor: "Brief an die Mitglieder." In: PID. no. 49. 1992, pp. 2-5 (Cited in: Moreau/Neu, Die 
PDS zwischen Linksextremismus... op. cit., p. 19) 
2 3 see chapter 4 
2 4 H e y m : "Neue Hoffnung ..." op. cit., pp. 271-2 
2 5 " D a s sozialistische Ideal, das heiBt der Traum von einer sozial gerechten, solidarischen, friedlichen, 
humanen, okologischen und demokratischen Gesellschaft ohne Krieg, Hunger und Elend, in der jeder 
Mensch seine Fahigkeiten entwickeln kann und reale Chancen zur Bedurfnisbefriedigung besitzt, ist 
ebenfalls unsterblich. Die sozialistischen Parteien als Trager solcher Ideale durfen sich nicht 
auflosen.". Gysi: "Was will die PDS?" op. cit., pp. 9-10 
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elsewhere it is cast as "die sozialistische Ursprungsidee"26 or simply "die Idee des 
Sozialismus": 
Andere friihere SED-Mitglieder dagegen, welche unter dem Eindruck der 
"Wende" fur die Idee des Sozialismus iiberhaupt keine Chancen mehr sahen, 
haben ... seinerzeit die PDS ebenfalls sehr bald verlassen.27 (my italics) 
On this level, then, the socialism of the PDS - whose socialist credentials, whatever 
they may be, are presupposed, is a propositional reduction par excellence: the 
enormous body of complex questions which underlie any visionistic notion (the 
classical disparity between Weg and Ziel\) can be quite simply circumvented by 
ignoring them; they lie hidden behind a potent, visionistic sign, a key-word whose 
bold surface form suggests uniformity of purpose (particulary useful for a PDS 
struggling to overcome its factionalism!), simplifies, presents us with a simplified 
fixed and unproblematic goal with a specific departure point, a goal yet to be 
achieved but achievable; in this world-view socialism is something fixed and 
immutable, it transcends the notion that it (socialism): 
takes many and diverse forms, and is a continually developing concept.28 
What the polarised model of a 'true' socialism at odds with a debased socialism does 
is to (deliberately?) background - and thus fall to address - the complex inter-
relationship between socialism in theory and socialism in practice, the question of 
whether or not those systems obtaining in the GDR and in other Eastern bloc 
countries might not be the inevitable outcome of any attempt to channel a society 
along the lines of a pre-conceived, rational, 'socialist' schema29. 
Legitimising socialism has involved, too, recourse to the 'socialist' writings of 
ideologues who, while they may be located in a broad 'Marxist' tradition, are not 
immediately locatable in a Marxist-Leninist context, particularly by virtue of the fact 
that their work was banned during the 'Communist' GDR period: as such, then, their 
2 6 cf . : "Der Begriff des Sozialismus ist diskreditiert, Wer ihm anhangt, kommt in den Verdacht, 
stalinistische Zeiten zuriickzuwiinschen. So sehr wir das verstehen, es bleibt doch auch Tatsache, daB 
die sozialistische Ursprungsidee nichts von ihrer Aktualitat eingebuBt hat." (Cited from: "Programm 
der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus". In: Wahlparteitag der PDS, 24/25. Februar 1990. 
Materialien. Berlin 1990, p. 88 
"Wolf , H.: Woher kommt... ? op. cit., p. 5 
2 8 M c L e a n , Iain (ed.): The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. Oxford: University Press 1996, 
p. 459 
2 9 A profound literary presentation of this point, of the difficulty in channelling the complex human 
psyche with all its conflicting and contradictory motivations along the lines of a Utopian, systemic 
vision, is presented by Dostoevsky in Notes from the Underground, in which a central theme is quite 
precisely that humans do not always act in their rational self-interest and indeed choose to fly in the 
face of it. 
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work is perceived by leading PDS ideologues to be as unsullied as the Socialism 
promoted by the PDS. Antonio Gramsci is a case in point and wil l be discussed in 
some detail below.3 0 
A UNIFORM I D E O L O G Y ? SOCIALISM AND T H E PDS'S MEMBERS AND 
V O T E R S 
The PDS's members 
Die PDS ist ein Kunstprodukt, die ist sozusagen ein Zerfallsprodukt einer 
ehemaligen Staatspartei. Die Leute, die da drin sind, stellen geistig ein 
dermaBen buntes Feld dar - von traditionellen Linken bis zu Leuten, die unter 
anderen politischen Bedingungen bei den Sozialdemokraten waren oder sogar 
viel weiter rechts: Leute, die friiher dafiir gesorgt haben, daB alles schon 
ordentlich und ruhig ist, daB es keine Kriminalitat gibt, daB die Jugendlichen 
nicht zu lange Haare haben - Kleinbiirger. Die waren unter anderen 
gesellschaftlichen Verhaltnissen in irgendeinem bayerischen oder 
westdeutschen Dorf CDU-Wahler . . . 3 1 
The following is typical of how, in PDS discourse, uniformity of socialist vision 
exists largely on the level of sign: 
Die PDS - das ist der bislang erfolgreiche, wenn auch nicht konfliktfreie 
Versuch, den unverzichtbaren demokratischen und emanzipatorischen 
Grundansatz sozialistischen Denkens und Handelns wiederzubeleben und 
damit das Streben nach einer solchen Alternative aus der Sackgasse des 
gescheiterten Realsozialismus herauszufiihren.32 (observe again, how 
"Sozialismus" is rescued through the invocation of the debased 
"Realsozialismus"; my italics) 
3 u " E s war zu einer verhangnisvollen Praxis geworden, daB viele Parteien in der kommunistischen und 
Arbeiterbewegung, darunter auch die S E D , lange Zeit lediglich die Traditionslinie von Marx, Engels, 
Lenin und zunachst auch Stalin anerkannten alle praktischen Erfahrungen, die nicht ins Bild paBten 
(sind) mit Borniertheit und Intoleranz verworfen oder wenigsten ignoriert worden. Was den 
italienischen Kommunisten Antonio Gramsci angeht, so hat er sich auf seine Weise ebenfalls kritisch 
das theoretische Erbe von Marx und Engels sowie der fiihrenden Kopfe der II . Internationale zu eigen 
gemacht. Erst in jiingster Vergangenheit setzte sich die Erkenntnis von der auBerordentlichen 
Bedeutung Gramscis fiir ein modernes Geschichts- und Politikverstandnis, fur eine demokratische, 
sozialistische Politik und Kultur durch. " Neubert H.: Von Sozialismus und Demokratie... op. cit., 
pp. 3-4 
3 , M i c h a i l Nelken, in: interview with the author, November 1995 (op. cit.) 
3 2 B r i e , Andre/Michael Brie/Judith Dellheim et al.: Zur Programmatik der Partei des demokratischen 
Sozialismus. Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1997 
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The above contains a discursive strategy which we encounter time and again in PDS 
discourse: the - as it were- 'throwaway' sub-clause ("wenn auch nicht konfliktfreie 
Versuch"), in which fundamental disparities among the PDS's members and voters in 
the understanding of what lies behind the sign socialist are simply side-stepped 
through subordination to a less focal position in the sentence. Observe the structural 
subordination of "Unterschieden" to the unifying "einig" in the main clause of the 
following 
Bei alien Unterschieden in der PDS sind sich alle einig: gewaltfreie 
Veranderung und nur demokratische, andere gibt es nicht.3 3 (my italics) 
Compare, too, the attempt to gloss over the crucial and fundamental inner-party 
tensions by casting them as something of a rather irrelevant question of shading: 
Bislang gait fur alle Sozialisten, gleich welcher Couleur, (! - MD) als ganz 
unstrittig, daB die wesentlichen Gebrechen dieser Welt so oder so und 
zwangslaufig aus dem Wesen des heute wieder global herrschenden 
kapitalistischen Systems entspringen.34 (my italics) 
However: 
Die Unterschiede der Gruppen sind jedoch mehr als nur Nuancen einer 
Grundfarbe. Schattierungen gibt es in jeder Partei. Bei der PDS geht es 
jedoch um mehr.35 
The sheer heterogeneity of the PDS's membership and voter base is not only 
frequently glossed over by the PDS; it is common for reductive political 
commentaries to side step the PDS's problematic factionalisation36 and to treat the 
3 3"Koalitionsbereit?" In: Wochenposi. 1 December 1995 (interview with Lothar Bisky) 
3 4 W o l f , H.: Woher kommt...? op. cit., p. 17 
3 5 K o c h , Thomas: "Die PDS im VereinigungsprozeB." op. cit., p. 195 
3 6 A n y model of the sheer heterogeneity of the PDS membership must take account, too, of its 
complex mix of social and socio-economic groups. Wittich ("Mitglieder und Wahler der PDS." 
op. cit., pp. 58-80) has shown that "hinsichtlich ihrer sozialen Zusammensetzung ist die PDS ein 
relativ heterogenes Gebilde" (p. 70) of many in themselves heterogeneous sub-groups: e.g. 
pensioners, those in early retirement, unemployed, white-collar employees who have been able to 
make the transition to employment in the new structures on account of the (in particular 
administrative) skills acquired in the G D R , self-employed persons and "Akademiker in Forschung, 
Wissenschaft, Bildung, Kultur, Rechtspflege, u. a. die z.T. mit ihrer individuellen Biographie 
sozialistischen Ideen eng verbunden sind. Diese Gruppe ist in sich auBerordentlich heterogen. Sie 
umfaBt sowohl 'sozial Erfolgreiche', wozu jene zahlen, deren berufliche Qualifikation auch unter 
marktwirtschaftlichen Verhaltnissen verwertbar ist, bzw. jene, die per hoherer Qualifikation und 
Flexibilitat andere verdrangen konnten. Sie umfaBt aber auch 'soziale Absteiger'. Diese Gruppe ist 
auch politisch in sich heterogen. In den politischen Diskursen und Richtungskdmpfen innerhalb der 
PDS stellt sie Akteure alter Richtungen. (ibid.) (my emphases) 
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PDS as an easily manageable monolith with a uniform, easily identifiable political 
aim; Neugebauer and Stoss rightly observe that: 
das Schrifttum uber die PDS meist unterkomplex ausfallt, weil die 
zwieschlachtige Gestalt der PDS als Rechtsnachfolgerin der SED und als 
politische Partei in einem demokratischen Parteiensystem nicht erkannt und 
analysiert wird. In den Augen der meisten Autoren stellt die PDS ein 
"Politikum", eine Bedrohung oder eine Enttauschung dar.37 
Moreau, while describing in minute detail the factions existing within the PDS, 
largely ignores this dimension in drawing the highly reductive conclusion that the 
PDS's single-minded and uniform aim is to subvert the establishment: 
Die Behauptung des bekannten Extremismusforschers Patrick Moreau, "die 
PDS bekampft das herrschende System mit alien Mitteln" erscheint uns 
jedenfalls maBlos ubertrieben und wird auch nicht vom Autor hinreichend 
belegt".38 
In one of the most incisive studies39 on the forces at work in the PDS and on the 
party's intellectual origins in the SED, Land and Possekel shed much light upon the 
complex amalgam of political groupings which make up the PDS. As their 
observations are invaluable, the following brief survey of some of the main forces at 
work in the party membership will rely heavily on their findings. 
In Land and Possekel's representation of the party membership structure, a model 
comprised of two broad groupings - ideologically motivated intellectuals versus a 
large body of non-ideological pragmatists - overlaps with a more refined model, 
where "mehrere intellektuelle Minderheiten" (p. 415) 4 0 are identified, each striving 
for "konzeptionelle Hegemonie". (p. 415). The categories identified by Land and 
Possekel are as follows: 
* the traditional 'bread and butter' communist 'hard-liners' (often called the 
'traditionalists') adhering loyally to the categories and conceptual structures of the 
discourse of GDR-style Marxism-Leninism, championing notions such as the avant-
garde role of the party (party hegemony), a planned economy, the unity of party and 
state ("Die fur die staatssozialistische Gegenmoderne essentielle Metastruktur" 
3 7Neugebauer/St6ss, op. cit., pp. 11-12 
3 8 ib id . , p. 13 
3 9Land/Possekel: "Orthodoxie und Modernitat ..." op. cit. 
4 0 T h e page numbers given in brackets here refer to Land/Possekel's study, op. cit. 
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(p. 420)) and the traditional determinist mode of communist thinking. The categories 
in which they perceive the world are deeply rooted in the era of Communist anti-
fascist resistance and the founding period of the GDR. Their most vocal mouthpiece 
is the Kommunistische Plattform^. 
* the pragmatists: for Land and Possekel these form the majority of party members, 
the "ihrem Selbstverstandnis nach eher unideologischen, pragmatisch orientierten 
Funktionseliten der ehemaligen DDR." (p. 418) 4 2 It is this large but on the whole 
visionless group that the fledgling PDS leadership was eager to incorporate into the 
party ranks on account of their "Profunde Sachkenntnis ostdeutscher Gegebenheiten" 
(p. 418) which has helped steer the PDS to important successes at local level. After 
all: 
Es war ein offenes Geheimnis, daB diese Personen ihr Verhaltnis zur SED 
nicht iiber ideologische Dogmen bzw. ihre Kritik bestimmten. Sie vertraten 
kein politisches Reformkonzept. Zu DDR-Zeiten war ihre Mitgliedschaft in 
der SED vor allem von der Moglichkeit bestimmt, praktisch agieren zu 
konnen - als Wirtschaftsmanager, als Lehrer, als Verwalter. Der Habitus 
dieser Leute erinnert in keiner Weise an Revolutionare oder idealistische 
Umsturzler 4 3 ... In dem MaBe, wie diese Personen im Zuge der deutschen 
Vereinigung aus dem Staatsapparat, den Schulen, dem Hochschul- und 
Wissenschaftsbereich, sowie zum Teil aus der Wirtschaft gedrangt wurden, 
nahmen sie das Projekt der PDS an. Es bot das, was sie brauchten: eine 
unrevolutionare und diesseitige Politikperspektive, die das Agieren unter den 
nunmehr Bedingungen einer westlichen Gesellschaft legitimierte. (p. 418) 
4 1 Party ideologues have been keen to stress, however, that the KPF's representation in the PDS is very 
limited: "Die Kommunistische Plattform, selbst gespalten in der Frage des Verhaltnisses zum 
Stalinismus, teilweise auch einem Luxemburgismus oder Trotskismus anhangend, konnte nie mehr 
als 5% der Delegiertenstimmen auf Parteitagen mobilisieren. Ist es dann nicht sinnvoll, sie 
eingebunden zu wissen in eine demokratische Partei?" Brie, Michael: "PDS Ante Portas." op. cit., 
p. 939 
4 2 c f . „Die Mehrzahl der Mitglieder war friiher in der S E D und ist fortgeschrittenen Alters. Allerdings 
stammen viele Neumitglieder aus der jungeren akademischen und alternativen Szene, viele auch aus 
der Kulturszene des Ostens. Die Altmitglieder werden als der sogenannte stalinistische Kern 
identifiziert, also rank and file von Staatssicherheit, Armee, Zentralkomitee und obere 
Verwaltungsbiirokratie. Aber sowohl Zuschreibung wie auch das Urteil stimmen nur zum Teil: In der 
PDS sind auch viele SED-Mitglieder, die 1989 keine hoheren Funktionen bekleidet hatten und zum 
Reformflugel gehort hatten, der Gorbatschow oder Janos Kadar zum Vorbild hatte. AuBerdem sind 
viele der seit 1990 'abgewickelten' akademischen und staatsverwaltenden Funktionseliten in der PDS 
vertreten; sie sind eher Biirokraten als Stalinisten." Reich, Jens: "Das Ziinglein an der Waage." In: Die 
Zeit. no. 27. 1997 (my italics) 
4 3 T h i s observation must be set against the attempt in PDS historiography - to which we drew attention 
in the previous chapter - to suggest that those who have remained in the PDS are idealists ardently 
committed to a socialist cause (whatever this may be). 
161 
It is precisely this group who have been keen to avoid divisive and crippling debates 
as to the political course which the party should chart, which might put in jeopardy 
their politische Heimat. It is this group of active party members motivated primarily 
by, as we shall argue below, a vague "reservatio mentalis"44 vis-a-vis the new system 
(equally prevalent among the PDS's membership) who are responsible for the 
'donkey-work' which has underpinned PDS success at local level 4 5: 
Die Ergebnisse der Kommunal- und Bundestagswahlen von 1994 zeigen, daB 
die Starke der PDS inzwischen weniger auf dem Modernismus ihrer Fuhrung 
beruht als auf der Sachkompetenz der pragmatisch orientierten, eher 
konservativen und DDR-nostalgischen Mehrheit, die sich iiberwiegend aus 
Vertretern ehemaliger DDR-Funktionseliten rekrutiert. (p. 424) 
* The '"Moderne Sozialisten' oder 'Modernisten'" (p. 416; inverted commas in 
original) who accept the "Grundstrukturen der 'Moderne'" (p. 415) as a basis for their 
political vision and activity, and who wish to market the PDS as a "Reformpartei ..., 
die eine neue, zweite Modernisierung des Westens mit weitgehenden 
emanzipatorischen Prozessen verbindet (p. 415) ... ihr Weltbild (ist) durch eine 
Rezeption westlicher Moderne(theorien) beeinfluBt ..." (p. 416) It is these party 
members such as Gysi, Bisky and Brie ("schon vor 1989 innerhalb der SED ... 
intellektuelle Hoffnungstrager fur eine Reformpolitik4 6" (p. 417)) who have taken 
over the leadership of the party in alliance with the pragmatists with whom they have 
sought to keep the KPF and other 'orthodox' communists in check. ("Das Tandem 
Bisky-Gysi steht fur die Allianz der pragmatischen Mehrheit mit der modernistischen 
Fuhrungsgruppe." (p. 418)) They are responsible for devising the intellectual 
constructs which allow the party to be held together. We will attempt to show below 
the importance of the medium of language for achieving this. Their politics have a 
'visionistic' dimension, aimed in part at articulating a basis for an improved world-
order. What is difficult here, as with the assessment of any political utterances, is that 
political convictions are based upon a complex amalgam of both ideals and 
opportunism in varying and unquantifiable measures. Determining whether the calls 
4 4 T h e preferred term of Neugebauer/Stoss; see below 
4 5 Wittich (op. cit.) has shown that this group has a strong "Rentner and Vorruhestandler" component 
with time on their hands to devote themselves to promoting the party cause, especially at election 
times: "Das offentliche Bild, das die PDS an der Basis und auf regionaler Ebene bietet, wird vor allem 
durch die Gruppen der Vorruhestandler und der Rentner bestimmt. Sie sind bei den Veranstaltungen 
zu sehen, sie stehen an den Standen usw. Auf iiberregionaler Ebene dagegen, beim Auftreten 
einzelner PDS-Mitglieder in den Medien, in parlamentarischen Gremien usw. prasentiert sich die PDS 
vor allem mit den jiingeren Angehorigen der Angestellten- und Akademikergruppen, sie bietet also 
hier ein anderes Bild" (p. 71) 
4 6 S e e the previous chapters for a discussion of the problems involved in assessing the nature of this 
Reformpolitik. 
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for an improved world-view represent conviction or opportunism (here made all the 
more complex by the fact that the PDS's political survival is per se predicated upon a 
very necessary acceptance of certain features of the new political environment) is a 
highly problematic task; we have no way of getting into the minds of political actors 
and finding out what they really think. We can, at best, be made aware of the pitfalls 
of drawing all too swift conclusions based upon the acceptance of surface utterances 
at face value. 
* the anticapitalist fundamentalists: those who fi t neither neatly into the category of 
communist hard-liners nor into that of modernisers. Their essential characteristic is 
vehement intellectual opposition to the new political environment and a much more 
pronounced rejection of the status quo than generally characterises the modernists. 
However, their opposition to the present does not necessarily mean championing the 
past. In this group we might include certain members of the Junge Genosslnnen who, 
while radically opposing the leadership's basic peace with the new system, are 
radically opposed to the hardline communist/Stalinist(?) politics of the KPF and are 
eager to pursue a more radical confrontation with the past and condemnation of the 
political practice of the SED. They are those who champion: 
eine antikapitalistische Fundamen^alopposition, radikale Kritik, die bewuBt 
auf eigene Gestaltungsanspruche verzichtet. (p. 415) 
What Land and Possekel fail to problematise, however, is the - necessary -
reductiveness of their model. While these categories pinpoint general and broadly 
identifiable trends in the PDS they are by no means hermetically isolated from one 
another, by no means mutually exclusive. They are useful points of orientation but 
they can never come near to recapturing the complex tapestry that is the PDS. Firstly, 
they are of course by no means exhaustive; secondly they are arbitrary, not fixed and 
immutable.47 Human motives, motivations and convictions do not fall into neatly 
identifiable units but are rather interrelated in a complex and empirically 
indeterminable amalgam. So it is that Bisky and Gysi are frequently deemed 
"pragmatists" in wishing to adapt the PDS to the demands of the contemporary 
political environment. (Indeed, we have used - and will use - the term to mean 
precisely this in the present study.) However, in Land and Possekel's model this 
4 7Neugebauer/St6ss (op. cit.), for example, deal with the PDS's complex inner-party heterogeneity 
with the following system of categories: "Die innerparteilichen Machtverhaltnisse sind 
unubersichtlich. Erkennbar sind drei, in sich wiederum differenzierte, ideologische Grofigruppen: 
moderne Reformer, traditionalistische Sozialisten und basisdemokratische Fundamentalisten. Sie 
treten als Plattformen, Arbeitsgemeinschaften oder sonstige Gruppierungen auf und bilden eine 
gesonderte Entscheidungsebene, die quer zum vertikalen Parteiaufbau liegt. Wahrend die Reformer 
und die kleine Gruppe der Fundamentalisten den Parteivorstand besetzen und dort auch mehr oder 
weniger gut miteinander auskommen, bilden die Traditionalisten die eigentliche innerparteiliche 
Opposition, eine Partei in der Partei." (p. 302; my italics) 
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categorisation is, as we have seen, inappropriate, as the sign pragmatist has been 
given a very distinct - but arbitrary!- definition within the context of their model 4 8. 
Context is everything. The 'anitcapitalist fundamentalists' are frequently referred to 
as "Radikalrefomer". The boundaries between the categories used for the different 
groupings are thus by no means rigid. What this highlights, then, is the fundamental 
difficulty we encounter in speaking about the PDS - and indeed about all complex 
processes. Language, as we concluded in the preceding chapter, is simply not in a 
position to recreate the complex party fabric or indeed any 'reality': as soon as we 
fashion the real word in categories we reduce, we: 
represent the world as a system of recognisable objects: habituated categories 
of perception and action which simplify the society's management of itself 
4 8 Manfred Gerner (Partei ohne Zukunft? op. cit.; see esp. pp. 134-45), for example, proffers a model 
of different motivations for membership of the PDS. In a nutshell these are 1) a "soziale 
Komponente". (p. 135) Gerner relates how studies have shown that very large numbers of PDS 
members interviewed revealed that they had joined the PDS because it afforded a safe haven in the 
turbulent new political environment; in one study cited by Gerner more than 90% of members of the 
Landesverband Sachsen cited the fact that the PDS afforded them a politische Heimat as the main 
reason for their membership. 2) A fundamental rejection of the 'capitalist' present; i.e. a significant 
body of members revealed that they had joined the PDS out of opposition to prevailing 
circumstances. 3) A 'political' motivation: "Neben den bisher skizzierten Motiven spielen auch 
politische Aspekte im engeren Sinne eine Rolle, die auf die Mitgestaltung der Gesellschaft durch die 
Partei hinauslaufen. Die Organisation PDS erhalt somit auch eine funktionale Bestimmung - sie wird 
als Mittel der Politik betrachtet." (p. 137) The overarching motivating factor uniting these fluid and in 
no way neatly separable categories is for Gerner a sense among the membership of "defeat": "Die 
gesellschaftliche Entwicklung seit 1989 wird "nahezu ausschlieBlich als kollektive Niederlage 
reflektiert, als Niederlage der Partei, als Niederlage der ganzen Bewegung." (p. 135) This doubtless 
corresponds to what Neugebauer/Stoss perceive as a "reservatio mentalis" vis-a-vis the new political 
environment (see below). His attempt to make sense of all of these factors culminates in the 
transposition onto his model of a further (necessarily reductive) model where the distinction is largely 
perceived to be between young and old: "Es laBt sich der SchluB Ziehen, daB aufgrund dieser 
"biologischen Uberalterung1 die Mitgliederstarke weiter abnehmen wird. Die ungiinstige 
Alterspyramide korreliert auch mit der Motivation und dem Aktivitatsniveau. Viele altere Genossen 
sehen in der Partei ihre politische Heimat, in der sie mit Gleichgesinnten vereint sind. Die PDS ist fur 
diesen Personenkreis in erster Linie ein 'Nostalgie-Club'. Gerade hier haben sich alte Denkstrukturen 
aus der SED-Zeit erhalten. Nach auBen wird dieser Personenkreis kaum aktiv. Nur eine Minderheit 
der PDS-Mitgliedschaft ist aktiv. Das sind vor allem jiingere Genossen, die ihre Motivation fur das 
Engagement in der Partei in erster Linie aus politischem Gestaltungswillen heraus beziehen." (p. 145). 
Observe, here, how Gerner's conclusion that the active members of the party are the young departs 
from Wittich's observation that Renter and Vorruhestandler determine the public image of the PDS at 
local and regional level (manning stands etc.) - i.e. are the politically active. The discrepancy 
doubtless resides, here, in the two authors' different conceptions of what it is to be 'politically active' 
(yet again pointing to the difficulty of semantic specification and the importance of context!), Gerner 
perceiving it in a more narrow sense to be bound up with a "Gestaltungswillen" not necessarily 
present among those who turn up at political rallies and man stands. It typifies the contradictions 
which necessarily emerge when we compare different constructions of reality which rely on differing 
conceptual models incorporating the categories arbitrarily invoked by the individual author. (Even 
where there is an overlap in the surface form of the categories underpinning differing models, the 
subjective understanding of their denotative scope will vary from construction to construction.) 
Gerner does, however, touch upon the crucial fluidity of any attempt to press complex human 
motivation into the mould of a linguistic category: "Auflerdem diirfte im konkreten Fall nicht ein 
Motiv alleine den Ausschlag geben, sondern ein gauzes Biindel von Antrieben dafur verantwortlich 
sein, daft man Mitglied der PDS ist." (p. 138; my italics) We can identify broad trends, yes, but no 
schema can ever capture or empirically quantify complex human motivation. We can use categories 
as signposts to point us in the right direction: recognising the fluidity and reductiveness of all 
categorisation is, however, vital. 
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and its habitat ... In a nutshell, we see the world in terms of the categories 
through which we and our society have constituted i t . 4 9 (my italics) 
What this shows, too, by extension, is the danger of ascribing PDS motivation to 
broad, sweeping and reductive categories (often enframed in polarised models) which 
do not do justice to the party's complexity. (To talk, for example, of a division into 
pragmatists and traditionalists glosses over the fundamental heterogneneity within 
these groups themselves - circumventing, for example, the 'radical'/'non-radical' 
dimension - and the problem we have of capturing the complex, overlapping 
psychological motivation of the Strdmungen which comprise them.) We must stress, 
then, that the categories highlighted above are in no way exhaustive. They are 
emblematic of a convenient manageability which is at the heart of all of our attempts 
to capture the complex processes of life. (In chapter 5 below on the inner-party 
debates which came to a head in the weeks preceding the party's crucial 1995 
conference we take the process of discrimination a stage further in looking more 
closely at the different groups at work in the PDS, in the hope that it will bear further 
witness to this complexity, notwithstanding the attempt of party ideologues to locate 
a broad basis of ideological uniformity.) 
Land and Possekel argue that it is the modernist intellectual wing of the PDS which 
is responsible for holding it together. ("Ohne sie hatte keine die heterogene 
Mitgliedschaft integrierende Identitat gefunden werden konnen." (p. 417)) They are 
its "Fuhrungskern" (p. 417) and (crucially) have the programmatic upper hand.50 
Land and Possekel show that this wing contains many of the reformist51 voices of the 
SED. Tracing the genesis of the inner-SED reformist discourses, of the evolution of 
the political identity of these modernists, they pinpoint the gradual emergence, from 
the late seventies onwards, of modernist ideals among young intellectuals in GDR 
institutions of higher education, especially after hopes of liberalisation following 
Honecker's accession to power proved unfounded. The reception of non-Marxist 
4 9 Fowler , R: "Linguistic Criticism." In: UEA papers in Linguistics, no. 11. Norwich: University of 
East Anglia Press, January 1980, p. 2 
5 0 I t is, then, broadly these 'modernist intellectuals' to whom we largely refer in talking of "PDS 
ideologues" searching for a unifying discourse. We are well aware of the reduction here. Hans 
Modrow, for one, often perceived as the mediator between pro-communist elements in the party and 
the 'modernist' faction centred around Bisky, Gysi and Brie, was a crucial co-author of the "... fiinf 
wichtigsten Diskussionspunkten der gegenwartigen Debatte der PDS" which formed the centrepiece 
of discussion at the 4th Party Conference in January 1995. (see chapter 5, footnote 3 below) 
Doubtless his inclusion represented an important symbolic attempt to achieve a consensus by drawing 
widely upon the different currents running through the party; cf. Gerner: "Hans Modrow spielt 
besonders fur altere PDS-Mitglieder eine wichtige Rolle; sein Auftreten diirfte auf diesen 
Personenkreis ermutigend wirken - ist er doch ejn Reprasentant der 'alien Garde', der das Image des 
'ehrlichen Hans' fur viele hat. Eine typische AuBerung ist beispielsweise folgende: 'Solange der 
Genosse Modrow in der Partei ist, bin ich auch in der Partei.'" (Gerner, op. cit., p. 138) 
5 1 see footnote 46 
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thinkers played an increasing role in the drive to fashion a '"Sozialismus mit 
menschlichem Antlitz'." (p. 419; inverted commas in original) The perestroika period 
brought these reform discourses out of the woodwork. There were increasing calls for 
communist ideals to be subjected to an overhaul52 (alongside calls for reform 
substantiated on the basis of an 'ethical' criticism of party adherence to Leninist 
norms and on the basis of the requirements of the scientific and technical revolution). 
Land and Possekel see the "kleine, heute in der PDS programmatisch dominierenden 
Intellektuellengruppe" (p. 419; italics in original) as emanating primarily from that 
group of intellectuals in the GDR who proffered theories championing certain 
principles of what Land and Possekel call "modernism"; among the features Land 
and Possekel identify are: 
* individualism: Michael Brie, for example, championed it in rejecting the 
hypersynochronisation of GDR society and its underestimation of the importance of 
autonomous subjects 
* markets: the command economy was called into question ("Die Entstaatlichung 
von Unternehmen und ihre Reorganisation ... gait nicht mehr als ein taktisches 
Zugestandnis an den Kapitalismus, sondern geradezu als Voraussetzung fur 
Emanzipation." (p. 420) 
* Land and Possekel show how figures such as Rosemarie Will increasingly imbibe 
the Rechtsstaat concept of a separation of party and state, calling for an ("Abschied 
von der These, wonach das Recht vor allem Instrument der herrschenden Klasse und 
ihres Staates sei." (p. 420) 
These features are doubtless precursors to the programmatic equivalents we now find 
in the current PDS programme and show the - numerous - appraisals of the PDS's 
programmatic commitment to them as being purely 'tactical' to be simplistic: 
Das Bekenntnis zur Marktwirtschaft und Rechtsstaatlichkeit ist in den Augen 
der tonangebenden Intellektuellen der PDS also nicht etwa primar taktischer 
Natur. Auf der Ebene gesellschaftstheoretischer Entwiirfe haben sie sich von 
jeglicher orthodoxer Sozialismusnostalgie befreit. (p. 422) 
While Moreau is not wrong to identify an undoubted 'functional' and tactical 
dimension in the PDS's programmatic championing of these features, his attempt to 
reduce the complex background causality which motivates their presence in the PDS 
5 2 which Land/Possekel (op. cit.) see as reminiscent of social democracy's struggle with a Communist 
interpretation of Marxism. 
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programme simply to a strategy of subversion - of which he has consistently accused 
the whole of the PDS - is tenuous to say the least: 
Die Parteiprogramme der PDS, die einen weiten Bogen von okologischen 
uber demokratische bis hin zu sozialen Zielsetzungen spannen, haben im 
Sinne dieser Unterwanderungsstrategie einen rein funktionalen Charakter. 
Der Kern der PDS-Tatigkeit konzentriert sich auf die subversive Praxis.53 
(my italics) 
However, Land and Possekel argue that the modernism of the intellectuals of the late 
SED period was fraught with a complex duality: while championing key features of 
modernism, they never relinquished the notion of the vanguard role of the party, 
never addressed their own position in the drive towards reform (a point we touched 
upon in the preceding chapter): 
Daraus ergab sich die paradoxe Situation, daB sie (reformist intellectuals in 
the SED; MD) ein modernes politisches System gewissermaBen durch die 
kommunistische Diktatur einfuhren wollten: Errichtung eines modernen 
politischen Systems mit Mitteln der Gegenmoderne ... (p. 422) 
Fur einen Moment sah es im Herbst 1989 so aus, als wiirde die Revolution 
die Macht in die Hande der SED-Reformer treiben. Sie wollten die SED 
reformieren und die Gesellschaft transformieren, ohne auf die Macht und den 
Staat zu verzichten. Ein avantgardistisches Verstandnis der eigenen Rolle in 
der politischen Praxis bedingte eine Hypertrophierung der Partei und die 
Bereitschaft, im Interesse des Parteierhalts weitergehende Kompromisse 
einzugehen. Diese Perspektive ist dafiir verantwortlich, daB die 
Reformsozialisten noch im Herbst 1989 die Opposition der Burgerrechtler 
geringschatzten. Sie waren auBerstande, zu begreifen, daB die Zulassung der 
Opposition und deren Beteiligung an der Macht gerade die Voraussetzung 
dafiir gewesen ware, Reformfahigkeit iiberhaupt herzustellen ... Diese 
Blockade erklart auch die erstaunliche Nachsicht, mit der die kurzsichtige 
Politik des Machterhalts der Modrow-Regierung toleriert wurde. (p. 422-423) 
This is of crucial significance in answering the question why, as Land and Possekel 
point out, the modernist intellectuals of the SED did not in the main go over to the 
Greens or the SPD but largely remained with the PDS. It is precisely this complex 
psychological commitment to the party and its avant-garde role which was doubtless 
a key factor in prompting the modernists to enter into an alliance with the large and 
5 3Moreau/Neu: "Die PDS zwischen Linksextremismus ..." op. cit., p. 14 
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disaffected mass of largely unideological DDR-Funktionseliten. Land and Possekel 
argue that in throwing themselves into the effort to hold the party together (as the 
PDS), the modernist intellectuals of the PDS effected a "Selbstblockade" (p. 423) and 
condemned themselves to a perpetual balancing act a> "Moderatoren des 
Kompromisses" (p. 423) (especially in pandering to the GDR biographies of the 
party's disaffected members - MD; we witnessed in the preceding chapters the PDS's 
historiographic attempts to offer its members blanket absolution). For this reason any 
genuine commitment to articulating a new, forward-looking, modern socialism is 
subordinated to, or at least heavily mitigated by, practical concerns. "Die Fixierung 
auf das Projekt PDS" (p. 424) meant stagnation: 
So ist innerhalb der PDS die Debatte iiber die prinzipiellen Ursachen fur das 
Scheitern der Sozialismusidee, um Neuansatze im Zusammenhang von 
Moderne und Emanzipation und um die Weiterfuhrung der 
Reformbewegungen der 80er Jahre zum Erliegen gekommen (p. 423) ... Der 
Reformdiskurs ist in der Allianz der "Modernisten" mit diesem Fliigel 
weitgehend auf der Strecke geblieben. (p. 424) 
A highly complex tension thus resides in the discourse of the modernists (those in the 
party responsible for its programmatic character, the 'ideologues'): on the one hand a 
desire to hold the party together at all costs entailing the need to engineer 
compromise; on the other, a desire to make the PDS a modern socialist party which 
in itself contains a complex mix of motives: on the one hand a genuine commitment 
to a better world, the roots of which can be traced back to the inner-SED reformist 
discourses of the eighties; on the other, a commitment to these ideals for tactical and 
opportunist reasons (these intellectual having realised that to stand any chance of 
gaining influence in the new political environment they have to at the very least be 
seen to accept certain basic features of modernism). It would be simplistic, however, 
to see the 'visionistic' element of the incipient discourse of the PDS as merely 
tactical; as Land and Possekel rightly observe, the social pull of communist parties 
cannot merely be reduced to categories such as career ism, privilege and repression: 
immer spielte auch die Vision einer neuen und besseren Gesellschaft, eine 
geschichtsphilosophisch gestiitzte Zukunftserwartung eine wichtige Rolle. 
(p. 419) 
So it is with the modernist intellectuals in the PDS. It is quite precisely this 
problematic dimension underlying their political motivation which Moreau 
consistently chooses to ignore. We wil l attempt to show below that having, as Land 
and Possekel rightly identify, taken on the task of mediating and relativising, the 
modernists have condemned themselves to the highly distracting task of articulating 
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a reformist discourse which can operate only at a very high degree of abstraction, 
where the language is 'broad' enough to take in and smooth over - discursively at 
least - the huge contradictions and tensions residing in the party, 
The PDS's voters 
Koch has identified a singular lack of homogeneity among both the PDS's 
membership and its voter base: In response to Angela Marquardt's54 declaration that 
"Die Bundesrepublik wil l mich nicht und ich will die Bundesrepublik nicht," he 
observes: 
Auch in dieser selbstbewuBten wie ablehnenden Haltung konnen sich viele 
Mitglieder und Anhanger wiederfinden, wenngleich sich jene Abwehr aus 
sehr verschiedenen Motiven speisen diirfte. Handelt es sich um eine 
Kausalbeziehung oder stand die Ablehnung der Bundesrepublik von Anfang 
an fest? Erwachst sie aus einer Systemopposition gegeniiber den herrschenden 
Verhaltnissen oder ist kulturelle Fremdheit die Ursache? Resultiert sie aus 
antiwestlichen Ressentiments, aus einem Unbehagen an der 
parlamentarischen Demokratie oder griindet sie sich auf eine weitreichende 
Reformalternative? Wir finden im Umfeld der PDS von alldem etwas.55 (my 
italics) 
Given the sheer diversity of motivation for support and/or membership of the PDS -
much greater than for any of the established parties - Koch can only find any degree 
of uniformity upon a high level of generality: that of "kein affirmatives Verhaltnis56 
to the Federal Republic. This corresponds, as we shall see below, to what 
Neugebauer and Stoss have called a general "reservatio mentalis" (see below) among 
the PDS's members and supporters with respect to the Federal Republic. Jens Reich 
casts the unifying dimension in terms of a similar abstraction: 
Sie ist die einzige Partei, welche die neue ostdeutsche landsmannschaftliche 
Identitat, eine Trotz- und Abwehr mentalitat uneingeschrankt artikuliert.5 7 (my 
italics) 
5 4 Ange la Marquardt has been the leading light of the party's AG Junge Genosslnnen and been 
responsible for youth and student issues in the party executive. She was elected Stellvertretende 
Bundesvorsitzende in January 1995. 
5 5 K o c h , Thomas: "Die PDS im VereinigungsprozeB." op. cit., p. 186 
5 6 ib id . , p. 186 
5 7 R e i c h : "Das Zunglein an der Waage." op. cit. 
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We will have much more to say about the PDS's voter-base below when we ask the 
question whether this level of abstraction can really form the basis for the uniform, 
'systemic' vision suggested by the potent sign socialist, or whether it is not rather the 
case that the ideologeme is itself an integral part of a set of language strategies 
designed to find lowest common denominators upon which to background complex 
causal issues. 
OVERCOMING DIVISION - IN LANGUAGE A T LEAST 
The ideological heterogeneity which characterises the PDS is a good deal more 
complex than is suggested by the following (reductive) attempt of Bisky's to play in 
down through the invocation of a polarised 'generational conflict' model in which 
the 'front' is drawn between young and old: 5 8 
Jungere sind in ihren Politikvorstellungen oft wesentlich kritischer als Altere. 
Auch die PDS hat einen Generationenkonflikt.59 
How has the PDS attempted to overcome its singular diversity? Firstly by extending 
the category of socialism so widely as to make its denotational import (minimal in its 
intension) correspond to little more than a (simplistic) opposition to the here and 
now; witness, for example: 
Die wirkliche Gesamtalternative, welche tatsachlich die heutige Gesellschaft 
in ihrem Gebrechen und Unertraglichkeit ablost, heiBt aber nun einmal 
"Sozialismus", wobei es ganz gleichgultig ist, welche konkreten Definitionen 
5 8 Wittich (op. cit.) has drawn attention to the danger of simplistic acceptance of the media's general 
reductive picture of the PDS as the "Partei der 'Alten'" (Wittich, p. 58; my italics) which conflates two 
broad conceptual domains: i.e. "old" in biological terms, and "old" in terms of ideologically 
outmoded. However "Nahere Betrachtung aber offenbart Widerspriichliches; Zwar sind etwa zwei 
Drittel ihrer Mitglieder alter als 55 Jahre, aber nur ein Drittel ihrer Wahler gehort dieser Altersgruppe 
an (p. 58). Die PDS findet in den jiingeren Altersgruppen deutlich mehr Akzeptanz als sich in der 
Mitgliedschaft ausdriickt. Anders ausgedriickt: sie ist als Wahlangebot fur Jungere attraktiver, als sie 
es als Organisationsangebot ist. Zumindest unter dem Aspekt der Altersstruktur deutet sich zugleich 
an, daB die PDS, die die Masse ihrer Wahler im Osten hat, sich hier etwa an die gleichen 
Wahlergruppen wendet wie die SPD im Westen" (pp. 75-6). In a nutshell, some 2/3 of the PDS's 
membership is older than 55; some 2/3 of the PDS's voters are, in fact, younger than 55; the answer to 
the discrepancy doubtless lies, inter alia, in the fact the membership incorporates a disproportionately 
large number of pensioners, "vor allem aus Arbeiter und Angestelltenberufen. Sie vor allem sind 
Trager der Tradition der Arbeiterbewegung. Die Treue zu dieser Tradition bindet an die Partei" 
(p. 70); these Rentner, while contributing to the comparatively large proportion of Rentner who vote 
for the PDS (see Wittich, p. 77), form, of course, in terms of the reference group 'PDS membership', 
a much greater part of the overall picture. 
"Koalitionsbereit?" (interview with Lothar Bisky) op. cit. 
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man im tibrigen sonst noch mit dem Sozialismusbegriff verbunden hat oder 
noch verbinden wird.60 (my italics) 
Here again, what - as we shall see - are absolutely fundamental differences inside the 
PDS as to what form socialism should take are buried below the widely drawn 
surface form - the signifier socialism - and thus simply circumvented discursively. 
The attempt to tap the lexeme's unifying potential is nowhere more evident than in 
the following fascinating observation: 
Die in der Offentlichkeit gangige Einschatzung, es sei in der PDS seit einiger 
Zeit der offene Streit zwischen den "Reformern" und den "Konservativen" 
(sprich: Altkommunisten), ist zwar nicht ganz falsch (note the litotes - MD), 
jedoch weniger als die halbe Wahrheit. (note the unverifiability! -MD) Es 
wirken innerhalb der PDS seit langerem einige sich unterscheidende (note the 
attenuative lexical choice! There are doubtless grounds for arguing that "sich 
widersprechende" might have been a more appropriate perspective - MD) 
Stromungen, die sich im Grunde nur darin einig sind, dafi sie "den 
Sozialismus" wollen. (! - MD) Sie gliedern sich nicht nur in die Positionen der 
"Reformer" und der sich als Kommunisten verstehenden Anhanger einer 
kompletten Radikalablosung des Kapitalismus (insbesondere in der 
"Kommunistischen Plattform").61 (my emphases; inverted commas in 
original) 
The determinate "den Sozialismus" conspires to make what is a fluid and abstract 
vision look like a fixed goal which can be uniformly pursued. Wolf's conception of 
socialism here (all the more significant as his work is offered the personal 
endorsement, in the introduction, of party Chairman and leading PDS ideologue, 
Lothar Bisky), is an attempt to locate a level of unity predicated upon the lowest 
common denominator of commitment to a socialism whose essential substance is 
merely that it is that which the present system is not. It is not hard to offer the 
semblance of a united front when the only criterion for that unity is an antipathy 
towards certain features of the present system, when commitment is primarily to 
socialism on a level where it is little more than an abstract symbol of a vague and 
better future. Whether the aggregate of isolated and entirely disparate instances of 
disaffection in the here and now can be translated into a uniform and systemic vision, 
the basis for an improved world-order, is an entirely different matter. The PDS's 
'anti-present' discourse has frequently earned the party the charge that "sich die 
6 0 Wolf , H.: Woher kommt... ? op. cit., p. 15 
6 l ib id . , p. 12 
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PDS-Politik nicht aus Inhalten generiert[e]"62, i.e. of being programmatically 
destructive, of having no positive concrete and constructive vision to offer. In his 
speech to delegates at the third party conference Bisky drew attention to the PDS's 
abiding problem: 
Im iibrigen finde ich, daB wir im Formulieren dessen, wogegen wir sind, 
deutlich profilierter in der Offentlichkeit erscheinen als mit prazisen 
Aussagen wofur wir positiv eintreten. Dieses Verhaltnis sollten wir durch die 
Arbeit am Wahlprogramm deutlich verandern, zumindestens giinstiger 
gestalten. Das erleichtert es potentiellen Wahlern, selber zu erkennen, warum 
man PDS wahlen soil. 6 3 
As we shall see below, however, the sheer contradictions faced by the party have 
yielded a party programme which has prompted one commentator to observe that: 
Die PDS besitzt eine programmatische Breite, die gut fur zwei Parteien 
reichen wtirde.6 4 
Bound up with the PDS's 'alternative to the status quo' socialism is the related 
position, frequently articulated, that it is not bound to any particular world-view: 
Die Mitgliedschaft in der Partei ist aber nicht an ein bestimmtes 
weltanschauliches Bekenntnis gebunden.65 (my italics) 
- a surprising and not uncontradictory assertion from a party at one and the same time 
programmatically committed to a vision uniformly, packaged as democratic 
socialism. 
As StraBner has rightly shown, however, the purported denial of an ideology or an 
ideological commitment is in itself a fundamentally ideological act.66 Gysi's 
statement above to the effect that the PDS is not tied to a "bestimmtes 
weltanschauliches Bekenntnis" stems from 1990; by way of diachronic comparison, 
observe the continued relevance - in 1995 - of this message in: 
6 2 L a n g , Jiirgen: "Nach den Wahlen 1994: PDS - Strategic im Wandel?" In: Deutschland Archiv. 
no. 4. 1995, p. 371 
6 3 B i s k y , Lothar: "Drei Jahre Wirtschafts- und Wahrungsunion - Alternativen der PDS." In: DISPUT. 
no. 13-14. 1993, p. 4 
6 4 Kupper , Mechthild: "Biographie Wagen." In: Wochenpost. 7 December 1995 
6 5"Programm der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus." 1990. op. cit., p. 90 
6 6StraBner: Ideologic - SPRACHE - Politik... op. cit. (see esp. chapter 1) 
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Wir, die wir von einer "einheitlichen Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung" 
kamen, haben doch zu lernen, daB man theoretisch streiten, aber doch 
gemeinsam fur bezahlbare Mieten eintreten kann. Die PDS-Mitgliedschaft ist 
laut Statut nicht mehr an eine bestimmte Weltanschauung gebunden.61 (my 
italics) 
Note how the PDS again invokes and uses the discredited past of its forerunner as a 
motivating factor in the present. Observe too, the attempt to present unity on the level 
of the Sachfrage of affordable rents; there is no attempt here to invoke the 
problematic interrelationship between rents and the economic system at the heart of a 
prevailing ideology (we will have much to say on the PDS's invocation of 'practical 
issues' in the next chapter). 
Witness, too, the rhetorical fusion of 'anti-ideology' and 'anti-present' in: 
Die PDS ist keine Weltanschauungspartei. Sie vereint Menschen aus 
unterschiedlichen sozialen Gruppen und gesellschaftlichen Milieus. 
Menschen verschiedener linker (note the unifying lowest common 
denominator -MD!) Politikrichtungen und unterschiedlicher 
Weltanschauungen. Sie versteht sich nicht nur als Interessenvertreterin sozial 
Benachteiligter (observe the sheer 'catch-all' breadth of the category!), 
sondern spricht alle jene an, die sich mit den gegebenen sozial ungerechten, 
okologisch zerstorerischen und patriarchal ischen Verhaltnissen nicht abfinden 
wollen. 6 8 (my italics) 
By denying an ideological commitment the PDS again makes virtue from necessity 
and kills at least two birds with one stone: utterances which signal a move away from 
rigid, ideologically-grounded thinking can be used to bolster up the suggestion of the 
PDS's 'renewal', its move away from the dogmatic and monist past of the SED; the 
PDS can take advantage here of the fact that the notion of ideological commitment 
has, after all, a distinctly negative resonance in Western political discourse, bound up 
as it frequently is, with notions of dogma and illusion: 
Wenn uns der Begriff Ideologie in politischen Auseinandersetzungen 
begegnet, zielt er fast immer auf eine Herabsetzung, auf eine Diffamierung 
des Gegners. Aussagen werden als ideologisch abqualifiziert, weil sie 
angeblich wirklichkeitsfremd oder auch wirklichkeitsverdeckend sind, durch 
Vorurteile oder interessenbedingte Voreingenommenheit bestimmt, weil sie 
6 7"Koalitionsbereit?" op. cit. (interview with Lothar Bisky) 
6 8Parteivorstand der PDS: "10 Thesen ..." op. cit., p. 24 
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bewuBt Tatsachen verschleiern, wirkliche Absichten und Ziele unkenntlich 
machen sollen ... Als Ideologic werden Auffassungen bezeichnet, die sich als 
die allein wahren verstehen.69 (my italics) 
More important is the fact that on the level of the lowest common denominator of 
anti-ideology the PDS can gloss over its internal contradictions and come to terms 
with - as the media has frequently put it - its Sammelbecken status; how else, if not 
on the level of language, do party ideologues take on the task of marrying, for 
example, the 'revolutionary' (and not unequivocally anti-restorationist) stance of the 
party's Kommunistische Plattform enframed in the bead-and-butter categories of class 
warfare with, say, the party's more 'revisionist' elements, some of whom, at least, 
have broken with the deterministic mode and are prepared to see the party pursue a 
socialism predicated upon an "Optimierung des Bestehenden"70. 
Elsewhere the notion of an 'anti-ideology' is repeatedly framed, as Good7 1 rightly 
observes, as a healthy "Pluralismus",72 the SED's ideological difficulties with 
which 7 3, as we observed in chapter 1, has been so problematic an aspect of the SED 
legacy for a PDS coming to terms with its 'history'; in a nutshell, then, the PDS 
recognises the potential of lexical choice in mediating one and the same 'reality': 
potentially divisive, de-stabilising and irreconcilable Meinungsverschiedenheit is 
relexicalised as "Pluralismus" - thus providing a level on which antagonisms and 
disparities can be glossed over. At the same time, the instrumentalisation of the 
notion has doubtless helped to elicit sympathy for the PDS as a 'moderate', 'open-
minded' and 'modest' party. Plurality has become a veritable centrepiece of PDS 
ideology: 
Vor Beginn der 2. Tagung des 2. Parteitages (der PDS - MD) im Juni 1991 
rauften sich das Presidium und die Landesvorsitzenden zusammen, um zu 
6 9StraBner: Ideologic - SPRACHE - Politik... op. cit., p. 1 
7 0 cf . : "Michael Brie machte auf dem 3. Parteitag deutlich, daB Revolution beibehalten, aber neu 
definiert werden miisse: «Man miisse aufhoren, Revolution immer nur als einfache Negation, als 
Umkehrung der bestehenden Verhaltnisse zu sehen. Revolution konne auch als Optimierung des 
Bestehenden verstanden werden.» Cited from: Good: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit. p. 275 
7 1 Good: PDS - Partei der Diskursiven Strategien? op. cit. 
7 2 After all, "Diese Gruppen (grass roots movements and platforms inside the PDS - M D ) brachen mit 
einem Grundprinzip marxistisch-leninistischer Parteien, nach dem innerparteiliche Fraktionen 
verboten waren" Phillips, Ann L . : "Umwandlung der S E D - Die PDS ein Jahr danach." In: Berichte 
des Instiluts fur oslwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien. 42/91, p. 9 
7 3 "Die D D R war keine pluralistisch organisierte Gesellschaft. Infolge der absoluten Dominanz einer 
Partei bestimmten ausschlieBlich deren Ziele und Wertungen Inhalt und Form der offentlich-
politischen Kommunikation. Das hervorstehende Merkmal der offentlichen Kommunikation war 
fehlende Diskursivitat. Nicht kontroverse Meinungen wurden 'fur die Biirgeroffentlichkeit gedacht 
und sprachlich formuliert.' Statt dessen wurden die von der Partei gedachten Ziel- und 
Wertvorstellungen proklamiert und argumentativ begrundet." Reiher, Ruth: "Das 'Zu-sich-selber-
Kommen'." In: Reiher/Lazer (eds.): Wer spricht das wahre Deutsch? op. cit., p. 148 
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versuchen, der Offentlichkeit ein geschlossenes Bild der PDS zu 
vermitteln ... In der Offentlichkeit wurde damals vielfach eine Spaltung der 
PDS erwartet. Deren Fiihrung zeigte sich allerdings entschlossen, drohende 
Dissoziationstendenzen durch verstarkte Toleranz gegeniiber 
innerparteilichen Gruppen, Fraktionen und Minderheiten sowie durch die 
Akzeptanz von Mehrheitsbeschliissen zu konterkarieren. Das bedeutete 
allerdings, daB die Widerspriiche nicht gelost, sondern als faktischer 
Bestandteil der PDS anerkannt wurden, da/3 Pluralitat als Methode zum 
Strukturprinzip erklart... wurde.'H (my italics) 
The oxymoron of uniformity in plurality would emerge starkly, as we shall seen 
below, at the time of the party's fourth conference, when party ideologues were faced 
with the problematic task of imposing limits on the PDS's 'anything goes' position, 
i.e. of delimiting "Pluralismus" - a term whose very semantic component makes it an 
essentially limit/ess notion; the same conference, too, at which the PDS could be 
seen to be still riven with internal contradictions, would be highly revelatory of the 
viability of plurality as a basis upon which to locate a political vision. As 
Neugebauer and Stoss observe: 
Mit Beendigung des Dauerwahlkampfs im "Superwahljahr" brachen die alten 
innerparteilichen Konflikte wieder auf. Die Hoffnung der Parteifuhrung, auf 
dem 4. Parteitag im Januar 1995 einen Minimalkonsens herzustellen, erfiillte 
sich nicht.7 5 
What is more, the PDS's ideological leaders have sought to deflect criticism 
(especially from hard-line 'orthodox' quarters within the party) that it has 'sold out' 
on orthodox Marxism by attempting to locate its (formal) commitment to pluralism 
firmly within the context of a 'pure' Marxist tradition: 
In einem seiner (Marx' - MD) ersten Artikel, es ist der erste, der in den 
Marx/Engels-Werken uberhaupt abgedruckt ist, wendet sich Marx gegen die 
preuBische Zensurinstruktion vor alien Dingen mit der Verteidigung dieses 
Pluralismus: "Ihr verlangt nicht, daB die Rose duften soli, wie das Veilchen, 
aber das Allerreichste, der Geist, soil nur auf eine Art existieren durfen? ... 
Ich glaube, wir stehen ganz und gar in der Tradition von Marx, wenn wir 
7 4Neugebauer/St6ss, op. cit., p. 50 
7 5 ib id . , p. 301 
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innerhalb der Partei diese Utiterschiedlichkeit hiiten, achten und als eine 
grofie Chance miteinander ansehen.16 (my italics) 
This is part and parcel of a process, identified by Colin Good, in which the PDS has 
sought to construct "a new version of a founding father, Marx, through a different 
selection from the master's writings" 7 7 in an attempt to amalgamate 'old' and 'new', 
in an attempt, in other words, to graft - through fresh contextualisation"78 -
something of the Marxist(-Leninist) legacy onto the new political environment. 
Observe, how in the following, the call for an "Optimierung des Bestehenden" re-
emerges via the suggestion that Marx would have recognised the reformability of 
capitalism if he had had the benefit of historical experience (the presupposed 
proposition being that capitalism is indeed reformable): 
Marx hat den Kapitalismus ausgezeichnet analysiert. Seine dialektisch-
materialistische Methode ist fur uns unentbehrlich, wenngleich Marx die dem 
Kapitalismus innewohnende Reformierbarkeit nicht erkennen konnte. Der 
Sozialismus war bei ihm eine Vision fur die vom Kapitalismus befreite 
Gesellschaft. Eine Theorie des Sozialismus hat Marx nie entwickelt.79 (my 
italics) 
Interestingly, however, despite the fact that the PDS has on one level abjured any 
uniformity of world-view, despite its formal rejection of the "Modell 'der 
marxistisch-leninistischen Kampfpartei der Arbeiterklasse'80 mit ihrem 
Monopolanspruch auf Wahrheit und Macht", we note the intrusion of language which 
continues to hint at a continued commitment to the reductive notion of a pre-
ordained, uniform schema relevant to - and binding upon? - all, as a PDS champions 
a "gemeinsamen Suche nach der Wahrheit".81 
During the course of a television debate Gysi is presented with the following 
problematic notion by Ludger Volmer of Bundnis 90/fhe Greens: 
7 6 B r i e , Andre: "Zum Programm der PDS." In: DISPUT. no. 3-4. 1993, p. 35 
7 7 Good , Colin: Language, Politics and Ideology, op. cit. 
7 8 ib id . 
7 9 G y s i : "Was will die PDS in Deutschland?" op. cit., p. 13 
80Wer isl das, die PDS? op. cit., p. 6 
8 1 ibid. 
ibid. Compare, for example: "In ihrer gesamten auBenpolitischen Tatigkeit laBt sich die Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands von der historischen Wahrheit leiten, daB ..."(cited from Programm der 
SED, op. cit., p. 83) 
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Aber Herr Gysi, solange Sie die kommunistische Plattform haben, das sind 
Antidemokraten. Das ist uralter, krudester Leninismus. Und bevor Sie sich 
nicht von diesen Leuten trennen, glaube ich, sind Sie nicht 
kooperationsfahig.82 
Pressed by Volmert on why the PDS has refused to eject its problem factions, Gysi 
yet again invokes the language of a discredited 'Stalinist' past to justify the PDS's 
current position; "ejecting problem factions" is relexicalised using the emotive 
"Sauberungsaktion", that notorious euphemism for Stalin's atrocities: 
Wir haben ja eine - sag ich mal - Sauberungsaktion hinter uns, namlich von 
Januar bis Marz 1990, mit vielen Ausschliissen. ... Dann ham (sic) wir 
gesagt ... Wir miissen inhaltliche Entscheidungen treffen.Wir konnen nich 
(sic) in das alte SED- Schema zuriickfallen und uns immer nach unserer 
gerade beschlossenen Linie - sag ich mal jetz (sic) ne (sic) Sauberungsaktion 
starten.83 (my italics) 
(We can leave open here the question of the motivational appropriateness of the term 
- i.e. whether the huge reduction in the PDS's numbers in the immediate post-Wende 
period was not more a question of mass exodus ["Massenaustritte"84] rather than - as 
is suggested here - a party-led expulsion on ideological grounds.) 
The rhetorical invocation by the PDS - as here - of its discredited political forerunner 
and its practices to call into question certain features of the 'new' polity is a common 
feature of PDS discourse; compare: 
Nehmen Sie doch nur das, was die Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung im Umgang 
mit uns betreibt. Mich erinnert das fatal an die Politik der Abteilung 
Agitation des Zentralkomitees der SED. Neue Aussagen werden immer 
wieder aus Pressemitteilungen abgeleitet, die auf der Grundlage von 
Aussagen von CDU-Politikern zustande kommen ... ein Franzose, Patrick 
Moreau, sammelt all diese CDU-inspirierten Pressetexte zusammen und 
verfertigt daraus eine neue Synthese - das fiihrt wiederum dazu, daB alle 
Medien darauf eingehen - schlieBlich argumentieren CDU-Leute wieder 
8 2 Cited from Volmert: "Wahlkampf-Rhetorik ... op. cit., p. 257 
8 3 ib id . , p. 258 
8 4 see: Wittich, op. cit., p. 59 ff. 
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damit ... Ein ganz einfacher Mechanismus, der mir sehr bekannt vorkommt. 
Das ist das SEDhafte an der CDU.SS (my italics) 
The PDS's selective invocation of the SED is revealing: where the immediate 
discursive purpose, then, is one of challenging the practices of the established 
political parties, the SED is actively invoked. On the other hand, a PDS acting as a 
vehicle for vindicating the biographies of its members, some 95% of whom were 
members of precisely that SED, seems much more reluctant to invoke its spectre; as 
such, then, Moreau's characteristically absolute assertion that: 
Uber die Rolle ihrer Vorgangerorganisation SED, die alleine verantwortlich 
fiir die Zustande in der friiheren DDR war, verliert sie [die PDS - MD] kein 
Wort, (my italics) 
can be seen to require considerable relativisation!86 
Closely linked with the notion of pluralism is that of offene Strukturen itself 
inextricably linked with the PDS's attempts, as we shall see in the following chapter, 
to strike the extra-system Bewegung keynote which characterised the Greens a 
decade before. Gysi goes on to observe that: 
Also Sie konnen doch nicht bestreiten, daB die PDS insgesamt eine sehr 
demokratische Partei ist ... Wir haben offenere Strukturen als viele andere 
Parteien. Vergleichen Sie doch mal 'n (sic) Bundesparteitag der PDS mi t 'm 
Bundesparteitag der CDU, dann wissen Sie, wo Demokratie herrscht und wo 
nich. (sic) 8 7 
The PDS has consistently put its ideological factionalisation to good use by 
favourably comparing its (necessarily!) high level of ideological debate and 
(problematic!) diversity with the stasis that is seen to characterise other parties, 
thereby reinforcing its - as we shall see below - neo-Marxist picture of a sluggish and 
immutable establishment and reinforcing its own status as a very necessary motor for 
change. 
8 5 Lothar Bisky, in: "Die Erneuerung wird aus dem Osten kommen." In: Falkner/Huber: Aufschwung 
PDS ... op. cit., p. 313 (interview) 
8 6Moreau/Neu: Die PDS zwischen Linksexlremismus... op. cit., p. 8 
8 7 Volmert: "Wahlkampf-Rhetorik ..." op. cit., p. 259 
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DEFINING SOCIALISM 
Having rescued socialism, the PDS is faced with the inordinately difficult task of 
defining it: 
Die Aufrechterhaltung des Sozialismus-Symbols, die permanenten 
Interpretationskampf mit einschliefit, ist Voraussetzung fur das Uberleben der 
PDS in Ostdeutschland.88 
Having so consciously taken on board a sign so potently visionistic, the PDS is faced 
with the complex task of justifying what lies behind it, of articulating how it might 
be used as a basis for offering any alternative to what is already on offer - and 
broadly accepted - in the establishment. Not surprisingly, we will argue, this has 
entailed the introduction into PDS discourse of a high level of abstraction, of 
propositional reduction, which - linguistically at least - offers the illusion of a 
trouble-free, de-antagonised, visionistic 'socialist' world. The SPD and the Greens, 
by virtue of the simple fact alone that they are an established factor in the equation of 
establishment politics8 9, are to a far lesser degree than the PDS - operating from a 
position of weakness90 - fraught with the debilitating Inter pretationskampf identified 
by Raschke. We re-emphasise at this juncture that the linguistic devices underpinning 
this abstraction are by no means exclusive to the PDS. They are standard to all 
political actors and parties; it is simply that the very particular case of the PDS taking 
on the inordinately difficult task of seeking to overcome the plethora of 
contradictions highlighted above offers so graphic an illustration of features in 
language which facilitate the backgrounding, spurious resolution or circumvention of 
complex causal questions. 
To this end, the discourse of the PDS's socialist vision has recourse to fairly standard 
linguistic strategies which 'de-antagonise' and de-problematise. The PDS does - of 
course - offer definitions of its socialism, but this must be qualified with the 
observation that the 'definitions' we encounter of this in itself highly superordinate 
keyword are frequently - simplistically - framed in other highly superordinate terms, 
8 8 Raschke , Joachim: "Vor dem Umbruch des Parteiensystems? Die nachholende Modernisierung der 
Wahler und die Strategien der Parteien." In: Blatter fur die deutsche und internationale Politik. 
Bonn, 7/95, p. 796 
8 9 F o r one former Green actor's appraisal of the high level of integration and acceptance now enjoyed 
by the Greens in the West German polity, see Krieger, Verena: Was bleibt von den Grtinen? 
Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag 1991 
9 0 G o o d : PDS - Partei der Diskursiven Strategien? op. cit. 
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which while 'sounding nice' 9 1 are vast in their extension and minimal in intension; in 
other words, the 'definitions' rely heavily on key-words of the type identified by 
Townson. The connotative effect of these terms is positive, but their dentotative core 
is likewise extremely hard to pin down: 
Das bedeutet, daB unser Sozialismus-Begriff ein HochstmaB an Demokratie 
und Liberalitat einschlieBt. Es geht nicht um die Frage, ob und wieviel 
Demokratie und Liberalitat sich eine sozialistische Gesellschaft leisten kann, 
sondern darum, daB ihr sozialistischer Charakter von der Realisierung 
umfassender Demokratie und Liberalitat abhangt.92 (my italics) 
Here we have, then, a 'definition', but one which operates at a high level of 
abstraction, making it extremely hard to 'challenge' in terms of its lofty aims or in 
terms of a (meaningless) true/false schema; what we might challenge, however, is the 
level of abstraction involved. Of course, we re-iterate that all political discourse has 
frequent recourse to terms which are highly superordinate in character, but the PDS -
we re-iterate - is in the disadvantaged and unenviable position of having to start from 
the (impossible?) premise of having to justify the need for, and define, a systemic 
vision. (The established parties are not faced with this task: their political mission is 
located firmly in the existing polity which is at best to be revised. Their commitment 
to the 'capitalist' present is taken for granted, indeed rarely is capitalism invoked on 
an expressis verbis level; starting from the here and now and not having to justify a 
vision per se reduces the level of abstraction required. Capitalism after all generally 
describes an existent societal form which can be categorised - i.e. talked about -
'retrospectively', per se reducing the level of generality necessary to enframe it in 
language [insofar as this is at all possible!]. Socialism, in enframing a vision located 
in the future, in being visionistic, can only be categorised in projected terms, 
necessarily promoting mythicality. As such, then, socialism is a label to which 
particularly wide recourse can be had). The terms of the PDS's vision, as presented 
above, hardly facilitate semantic specification inasmuch as they are vague in their 
denotative content and fail to address the complex causal dimension of how and by 
whom the vision is to be achieved. The above 'definition' exists in something of a 
'vacuum': there is minimal contextualisation of the terms in the textual environment 
from which this 'definition' is extracted. Much the same might be said of the 
following presentation of the PDS's "demokratisch-sozialistische Ziele": 
9 , Moreau/Neu (Die PDS zwischen Linksextremismus... op. cit., p. 36) observes how the aim of 
Hopcke, one of the authors of the first party programme, was to make it sound "sympathisch"; which 
political actor or party, we might well ask, does not pursue this aim! 
9 2 B i s k y , L . et al.: "Sozialismus ist Weg ..." op. cit., p. 26 
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Die PDS ist eine Partei, die sich in Deutschland fur demokratisch-
sozialistische Ziele einsetzt. Allgemein geht es ihr um die Gestaltung einer 
friedlichen, demokratischen, okologischen, sozial gerechten und solidarischen 
Gesellschaft.93 
The logical conclusion of a socialism drawn so widely and predicated upon such 
superordinacy, where commitment is primarily to the symbolic nature of the sign 
rather than to any hard and fast underlying substantive denotation, is that that 
socialism becomes a Topitschian Leerformel.94. Topitsch's term is, however, 
somewhat unhelpful inasmuch as no term is completely devoid of denotative 
content; it is rather the case that we are faced with a context-based sliding scale: 
Although it would be wrong to regard them (key-words - i.e. highly 
superordinate terms - MD) as completely devoid of denotative meaning, this 
meaning is not of prime importance - indeed the "actual" references are 
interchangeable, and ultimately it is not possible to state whether a term is 
used "correctly" or "incorrectly" with reference to a given or imagined 
political construct.95 
(To say that socialism - diverse and abstract as its individual conceptions are - means 
'everything and nothing' is not the same as saying that it means nothing at all.) In the 
broad and vague discourse of the PDS, the ideologeme socialism and its cognate 
socialist thus have a 'stabilising' function similar to the that which we encounter so 
graphically in SED discourse, where the terms' intension, too, is frequently minimal; 
and while the particular foregrounding of the socialist sign is doubtless a carry-over 
from SED discourse, the particular feature of using vastly extended, highly reductive 
signs on a largely symbolic level is a typical feature of all political discourse in the 
service of any ideology - we need go no further than the right's use of Freiheit in a 
highly reductive, polarised conceptual schema such as "Freiheit statt Sozialismus"96. 
We might single out the particularly graphic instrumentalisation of the lexeme 
demokratisch in PDS discourse as a signifier whose denotative content is similarly 
subordinated to its - connotative - symbolic value; it is used to bolster; PDS writing 
is literally peppered with the sign. With only a very vague contextualisation of the 
term, as is frequently the case, it is extremely hard to get at its meaning. In the 
9^Wer ist das, die PDS? op. cit., p. 2 
9 4 Topitsch, op. cit., pp. 233-64 
9 5 Townson, op. cit., p. 203 
9 6 see Toman-Banke, Monika: "Die Wahlslogans von 1949 bis 1994." In: Aus Polilik und 
Zeitgeschichte. B 51-52.1994, p. 52 
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following the extension is vast, the intension minimal and the "democratic traditions" 
referred to have something of a mythical quality: 
Ihr (das der PDS - MD) politisches Selbstverstandnis schopft die Partei aus 
den Stromungen der deutschen und internationalen und internationalen 
Arbeiterbewegung, aus den revolutionaren und demokratischen Traditionen 
des deutschen Volkes und aus dem Antifaschsimus.97 (my italics) 
The following is a fairly typical example of how Demokratie/demokratisch exist 
largely on the level of sign: 
Als demokratische Partei tritt die PDS fur ihre Ziele mit demokratischen 
Mitteln gemafi dem Grundgesetz ein. Sie respektiert die Prinzipien der 
parlamentarischen Demokratie. Zugleich sieht sie die Notwendigkeit der 
umfassenden Demokratisierung aller Bereiche der Gesellschaft, zum Beispiel 
durch Starkung von Elementen direkter Demokratie. Nicht der revolutionare 
Sturz der paTlamentansch-demokratischen Grdnung und die Errichtung 
irgendeiner Diktatur, sondern die konsequente Demokratisierung 
Deutschlands ist das Ziel der PDS.9 8 (my italics) 
Positive sounding speech acts are reinforced through the invocation of the positively 
loaded democracy and democratic, but yet again semantic specification is difficult. 
(We wil l comment below upon the high level of nominalisation underpinning the 
PDS's 'democratic socialism'). Witness also, for example: 
Ich habe keine Befurchtungen, daB wir die zweite SPD werden. Das ware 
iiberfliissig. Bei alien Unterschieden in der PDS 9 9 (!- MD) sind sich alle einig: 
gewaltfreie Veranderung und nur demokratische, andere gibt es nicht. 1 0 0 (my 
italics) 
which begs the question of what kind of change is envisioned and what means of 
procuring these might be labelled 'democratic'. Witness, too, the following extract 
from a prolonged interview with Lothar Bisky, where again "demokratisch" is 
invoked as a positive symbol with little denotative specification: 
Gisela: Was ist dein politisches Credo? 
9 7"Programm der Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus." 1990, op. cit., p. 90 
9SWer ist das, die PDS? op. cit., p. 2 
"Observe again, here, the standard dialectical approach, to which we have drawn attention above, of 
countering through pre-emption. 
l 0 0"Koalitionsbereit?" op. cit. 
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Lothar Bisky: Ich halte am dem fest, was ich schon am 4. November 1989 
gesagt habe: Demokratische Interessen haben iiber denen der Partei zu stehen. 
Und aus heutiger Sicht fiige ich hinzu: Parteiinteressen haben sich 
Biirgerinteressen unterzuordnen.101 
It is hardly surprising, then, that in a process where one highly superordinate term is 
explained in terms of another, there is a high degree of self-referentiality. Put simply, 
X is defined in terms of Y and Y is defined in terms of X, a mode of argumentation 
which Topitsch calls a "ZirkelschluB"102. This is exemplified in what we might call 
the conceptual pair DemokratielSozialismus: the two stand in close association 
(barely surprising in the case of a Party of Democratic Socialism^03) and inform and 
define each other, provide each other's context. The following highly reductive - but 
positively charged - title of a PDS monograph functions on a very high level of 
abstraction: " - -
Der Weg zum Sozialismus heiBt Demokratie.104 (my italics) 
Compare, too: 
Jeder Versuch des Vorankommens zu sozialistischen Verhaltnissen ist zum 
Scheitern verurteilt, wenn er nicht demokratisch zustande kommt, wenn er 
nicht ein Mehr an Demokratie hervorbringt.105 (my italics) 
We remember the quotation above: 
Das bedeutet, daB unser Sozialismus-Btgxxfi ein HochstmaB an Demokratie 
und Liberalitat einschlieBt ... ihr sozialistischer Charakter (hangt) von der 
Realisierung umfassender Demokratie (ab). (see footnote 92; my italics) 
'"'Oechelhauser, op. cit., p. 72 (interview with Lothar Bisky) 
, 0 2 Topitsch , op. cit., p. 237 ff. 
1 0 3 T h e following extract from a statement from Stefan Heym as to why he decided to stand as a 
candidate on the PDS's offene Listen offers an interesting implication that Demokratie and Sozialismus 
eframe hard and fast, uniform goals and circumvents the notion of a problematic interrelationship 
between sign and denotation: "Warum trete ich zur Wahl fur den Bundestag ... auf der Offenen Liste 
der PDS? ... Wenn nun Menschen mir heute anbieten, mich fur den Bundestag zu nominieren, damit 
ich sie dort vertreten kann, und zugleich mit ihnen die Ideen, fiir die ich immer geschrieben habe, so 
fiihle ich mich verpflichtet, das Angebot anzunehmen. Das Angebot kommt von der PDS, der Partei, 
die sich als Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus bezeichnet. Fiir Demokratie und Sozialismus bin 
ich immer gewesen, und ich bin es noch. Insofern ist da Ubereinstimmung." cited from: Die andere 
Slimme: Stephan Heym. Berlin: Wahlbiiro der PDS 1994, p. 1 (my italics) (The pamplet in question 
contains Heym's introduction, biographical notes, extracts from his works etc.) 
1 0 4 Werner , Harald/Peter Schott: Der Weg zum Sozialismus heifit Demokratie. Diskussionsangebot der 
PDS. Berlin: Controvers 1992, p. 5 
l05Wer ist das, die PDS? op. cit., p. 9 
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Compare, too: 
Gerade jetzt ist die Zeit gekommen, sich wieder als Sozialist zu bekennen. 
Dieser Begriff ist endlich wieder frei geworden (! - MD). Fur mich besteht 
Sozialismus in mehr Demokratie, mehr sozialer Gerechtigkeit, mehr 
Machtkontrolle.1 0 6 (my italics) 
Democracy is in turn informed by Sozialismus; witness the syntactic-semantic 
parallelism1 0 7 in the following: 
Herbert Wolf nimmt in der Offentlichkeit des Landes zunehmende 
Bediirfnisse nach dauerhaft wirksamen Losungen der gesellschaftlichen 
Probleme unserer Zeit wahr. Uberzeugt, daB solche Losungen nur mit 
radikal-demokratischer, letztlich sozialistischer Politik erreichbar sind . . . 1 0 8 
(my italics) 
Gramscis Erbe ist fur alle demokratischen und progressiven, vor allem fur die 
auf Sozialismus orienlierten Krafte auch heute hilfreich, um nach neuen 
gangbaren Wegen heraus aus den okonomischen, sozialen und 
Menschheitsproblemen unserer Zeit ... zu suchen.109 (my italics) 
In other words, put starkly, Sozialismus = Demokratie and Demokratie = 
Sozialismus. 
Witness, too, how, this self-referentiality is not only 'cross sign'. It also has an 
internal dimension, in that a sign is defined in terms of itself. In the example from 
Wer ist das, die PDS? cited above (see footnote 98) the process of 
"<Demokrat>isier\ing" is to be achieved by the strengthening of "direkte 
<Demokrat>ie". Consistent with this mode of logic is the following: 
Jeder Schritt wirklicher Demokratisierung des Abbaus sozialer 
Ungerechtigkeit, der Erhohung kommunaler Selbstbestimmung ist ein Schritt 
in Richtung Sozialismus. Dabei verstehen wir Demokratie als Einheit von 
reprasentativer, kommunaler, unmittelbarer und Wirtschaftsdemokratie.'10 
l 0 6 Heinr ich Graf von Einsiedel, cited in Schumann: Der Rote Graf. op. cit., p. 22 
l 0 7 T h e term is Good's; see: Good: Die deutsche Sprache und die kommunistische Ideologic op. cit., 
p. 36 
l 0 8 L o t h a r Bisky, introduction to Wolf, H.: Woher kommt...? op. cit., p. 3 
1 0 9Neubert: Von Sozialismus und Demokratie ... op. cit., p. 19 
1 1 0 B i s k y , L . et al.: "Sozialismus ist Weg ..." op. cit., p. 27 
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In other words we are presented here with a definition, yes, but some observers might 
challenge its scope - and identify a certain spuriousness - on the grounds that the 
variable of Demokratie has been left untouched. Mathematically this might be 
represented as something like 6x = 3x + 2x + x, where x has been left undefined. It 
seems meaningless, however, to challenge this 'definition' as a mere 'pseudo-
definition' or a 'non-definition'. It is a definition, however vague it may be; any 
definition is necessarily a reduction, rendering a perception of that definition as 'true' 
or 'false' meaningless: 
auch die exakteste ... Definition ist ein Willkurakt des Definierenden und darf 
nicht als Ersatz fur Wirklichkeit, geschweige denn als Wirklichkeit selbst 
miBverstanden werden. Sie kann, wenn sie ernsthaft ist, die Verstandigung, 
den Verkehr erleichtern. Das ist viel; mehr gibt sie nicht her . . . 1 1 1 
What is at issue here is where that 'definition' lies on an empirically unquantifiable 
level of abstraction, and how 'satisfactory' or 'acceptable' that definition will be to 
the individual perception. What to one is spurious and misleading is to another 
reasonable and convincing. 
Observe how democracy informs itself in the following highly superordinate attempt 
to define demokratischer Sozialismus: 
Bei der Neuformulierung des Inhalts des demokratischen Sozialismus, den 
wir anstreben, miissen wir uns ebenso wie Gramsci davon leiten lassen, daB 
Sozialismus nicht die Verwirklichung eines abstrakten, vorgefaBten 
Gesellschaftsmodells sein kann, sondern das Ergebnis der Losung realer 
Widerspriiche und Probleme der bestehenden Gesellschaft, in deren 
historischer und wandelbarer Konkretheit, im Sinne von Fortschritt, 
Gerechtigkeit, Humanismus, Demokratie.u2 (my italics) 
The 'internal self-referentiality' is equally evident in: 
Demokratische Strukturen sichern, daB die Partei eine handlungsfahige Partei 
ihrer Mitglieder ist, und gewahrleisten demokratsiche Willensbildung von 
unten nach oben.1 1 3 
"'Mackensen, Lutz: Verfuhrung dutch Sprache. Manipulation als Versuchung. Miinchen: List 
Verlag 1973, p. 25 
" 2Neubert: Von Sozialismus und Demokratie ... op. cit., p. 19 
1 , 3 "Programm der Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus." 1990. op. cit., p. 90 
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While it is not illogical to argue that democratic structures might produce informed, 
democratic thinking, the substantive nature of what lies behind 
democracy/democratic as sign is circumvented. By way of an example of the 
difficulty we encounter in pinning down the denotative content of highly 
superordinate terms, Schaffner and Porsch cite the following example taken from 
SED-speak which is striking in its syntagmatic, self-referential similarity to the 
above: 
In the account to the Xl th Congress of the SED (1986), for example, the task 
was set to "shape the socialist relations of production in such a way that they 
promote the dynamic development of the productive forces in the interests of 
strengthening socialism".114 
As Good rightly observes, classically ideological texts are "semantically closed, 
definitional, self-referential and axiomatic".115 The public discourse of the SED 1 1 6 in 
the service as it was of the uniform, closed ideology of dialectical materialism 
necessarily exhibited this self-referentiality to a high degree. It is problematic to say 
the least, however, to argue that the self-referentiality which we encounter in the 
discourse of the PDS is a legacy of SED discourse, inasmuch as political discourse 
in the service of any ideology exhibits self-referentiality to varying and 
unquantifiable degrees. One need only bear in mind the standard academic approach 
of defining the terms which underpin an argument and then weaving the argument 
around the pre-defined terms. These terms operate over a complex sliding scale of 
extension and intension, of propositional reduction: after all, as soon as we interpret 
'reality', as soon as we conceptualise it and attempt to order it we reduce it. As 
Mackensen puts it: 
Wenn wir etwas sagen, produzieren wir die "Welt" in unsern Worten mit der 
komplizierten Methode der "Sprache" nach; wir "worten" sie. Doch ist dieses 
Bemuhen letztlich ein Versuch mit unzulanglichen Mitteln; jede Abstraktion 
1 1 4Schaffner/Porsch, op. cit., p. 38 
1 1 5 G o o d : Language, Politics and Ideology, op. cit. 
1 , 6 W e must stress here, that we mean precisely this - the official discourse of the S E D - and not, as is 
frequently erroneously perceived to be the case, a putative 'language of the G D R ' : "Offentlich 
existierte fur jegliche politische Diskussion nur ein einziger Diskurs. Im privaten Bereich sah das 
anders aus: Eine oft zitierte Metapher spricht von einer Nischengesellschaft, in der die Menschen von 
der Allgegenwartigkeit des Staates in ihrer Privatsphare Zuflucht suchten. Eine der sprachlichen 
Folgen dieser Erscheinung konnte man als die Fahigkeit bezeichnen, von der offiziellen Sprache des 
offentlichen und daher politischen Diskurses auf die Sprache des Privaten umzuschalten. Was an 
alternativen Diskursen vorhanden war, z .B. in den Kirchen, existierte oftmals nur in schemenhafter 
Form." (Cited from Good: "Sprache im totalitaren Staat ..." op. cit., pp. 267-8) 
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vereinfacht; immer isl das Urbild vielgestaltiger als sein Spiegelbild; immer 
stimmt, was wir sagen, nur fur diesen und jenen Fall . . . 1 1 7 (my italics) 
This invokes, then, complex questions of degree and extent, of the level - ultimately 
unquantifiable empirically - of that reduction, of the move away from 'reality'; this is 
all the more problematic as our interpretation of this 'reduction' has a highly 
subjective dimension: what to one is a 'broad' definition is to another spurious, 
scratches the surface. Our arguments vis-a-vis the abstracted language of the PDS 
must, then, be set against these observations, and, given the problems in quantifying 
that abstraction, are perforce predicated on a substantial degree of viscerality. 
These reservations notwithstanding, we wil l continue to argue that the language of a 
PDS facing the inordinately complex task of defining and 'legitimising' a 'socialist' 
vision must perforce operate at a high level of abstraction. The PDS has, then, sought 
to 'define' its particular brand of democratic socialism using standard highly 
superordinate terms. It would seem the wrong perspective, however, to see this 
definition exclusively in 'tactical' terms, merely as PDS sophistry or obfuscation. 
There is ample room for seeing in this abstraction, too, that the PDS is quite simply a 
victim of its very own Sprachlosigkeitu8: while the high degree of superordinacy is 
in one respect a 'solution' - which, as we said above, may indeed have a 'sincere' 
dimension - inasmuch as it helps the PDS deal with the immediate problem of 
circumventing complex causal issues, while it may be perceived as a tactical way of 
dealing with the immediate problem of locating a vision, it is at the same time a 
problem for the PDS, inasmuch as the PDS has had great difficulty irr finding 
categories which are not already the preserve of othej parties. Asked "Fur welchen 
Sozialismus ... die PDS noch (steht)", Bisky responds: 
Lassen Sie mich das in einigen Grundziigen beschreiben. Die Eine-Welt-
Konzeption spielt eine Rolle, auch die Uberwindung der sozialen 
Ungerechtigkeit, die Abwehr der okologischen Katastrophe und die Absage 
an jedwede GroBmachtpolitik. Sozialismus ist fur uns verbunden mit 
Demokratie, Solidaritat, Emanzipation des Menschen, Uberwindung des 
Patriarchats und den Menschenrechten.119 
1 l 7 Mackensen, op. cit., p. 29 
, l 8 I t must be stressed here that the invocation of the loaded term in no way represents an attempt to 
bind the PDS into an extreme left-extreme right conceptual schema, suggestive as the term 
Sprachlosigkeit may be of an inability or refusal to address Nazi atrocities. In this respect, see 
Townson, op. cit., pp. 170, 175 
n 9 " 1 9 9 5 muB es zur Entscheidung kommen." In: Die Tageszeitung. 16 January 1995 (interview with 
Lothar Bisky) 
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which earns the response that "Das wiirden so auch viele SPD-Politiker sagen. Sind 
Sie ein Sozialdemokrat?"120. The abiding problem for the PDS has indeed been one 
of defining a vision 'broad' enough to circumvent the internal problems residing in 
the gap between Weg and Ziel while at the same time forceful and pertinent enough 
to distinguish the PDS from its left-wing rivals. As Marten-Finnis puts it: 
Seit 1990 fragt die PDS neu nach dem Charakter der Epoche, leiht sich aber 
als Antwort die semantischen Felder von den Griinen und westdeutschen 
Linken (DKP, "K"-Gruppen, westliche Frauen-, Dritte Welt- und 
Friedensbewegung) und bringt sich damit um die Chance, eigene politische 
Anspruche zu formulieren . . . I 2 1 
^(hat Marten-Finnis fails to address, however, is the question of in what ways the 
PJJS actually could have_anything 'new' to offer. We will discuss below the 
importance to a party of representing a relevant line of conflict within society, and 
whether there is any room for a PDS in the schema of conflicting values that 
characterise the prevailing order. 
While consistently striving to present a 'united front' to an outside world, 
'internally', the party has recognised the problem (highlighting, of course, the 
importance of bolting this contextual dimension - i.e. whether a text is designed 
primarily for consumption within the 'closed' 1 2 2 world of the party ranks or by a 
'wider public' at large; what many German media commentators have referred to as 
the parteiintemerl-externer dimension - onto any discursive picture of the party): 
der PDS-Vorstand (raumte) schon in seinem schriftlichen Bericht an den 
Februar-Parteitag von 1991 ein: "Fur die programmatische Arbeit besteht eine 
Schwierigkeit gegenwartig darin, die globalen Bedingungen nicht nur zu 
beschreiben und vor ihnen zu warnen, sondern konkrete, linke, politikfahige 
Konzepte fur einen realistischen politischen Weg von hier und heute zu dort 
und morgen zu unterbreiten Damit verbunden ist die Frage, wer denn die 
neuen Subjekte linker Politik sind, die derartige Konzepte realisieren. 
Offensichtlich hilft uns das alte Klassenverstandnis nicht weiter." 1 2 3 
I 2 0 i b i d . 
1 2 1 Marten-Finnis, op. cit., p. 139 
1 2 2 G i v e n the media-pervasiveness of the contemporary world (against which no party is immune) it 
would be naive, of course, not to expect in camera deliberations to 'filter through' (as is the case 
here!) to the 'outside world' of public consumption. 
1 2 3 C i t e d from: Falkner/Huber: Aufschwung PDS... op. cit., p. 184 
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One way in which the PDS has dealt in the short term with the problem of finding 
subjects for a socialist vision has been quite simply to bypass it: a key feature of the 
'visionistic' utterances highlighted in this chapter is, it will have been observed, their 
heavy reliance on devices in language which obscure agency: nominalisation, 
passivisation, reflexivity. The following offers a graphic example of this reliance. 
Wir haben die Vision einer lebenswerten Welt. Als Sozialistinnen und 
Sozialisten wollen wir dazu beitragen, urn jene noch unbeschrittenen Wege zu 
finden, durch die die Menschenrechte auf Freiheit, Solidaritat und 
demokratische Mitbestimmung, auf Arbeit, Wohnung und Gesundheit, auf 
Frieden und Naturerhaltung ... durchgesetzt werden konnen.xu 
Again, however, the suspension of agency straddles a complex boundary between 
tactical motivation and, simply, Sprachlosigkeit. 
An acceptable bringing together of Weg and Ziel requires much more than the 
attempt by leading ideologues at the 4th party conference to circumvent the problem 
by offering a mere expressis verbis equation of the two: 
Sozialismus ist fur uns Weg, Methode, Wertorientierung und Ziel . 1 2 5 
Observe, here, the re-emergence of a synergist dimension (which we see so often in 
PDS discourse - see below) in the attempt to 'hide' the internal contradictions 
through subsumation under a broadly drawn, overarching Sozialismus category. 
Good has concluded that: 
There are no obvious ways for the successor party of the old Socialist Unity 
Party of the German Democratic Republic to locate itself on the left of the 
German political spectrum. Taking up the causes of environmentalist!!, 
women's liberation or the third world is insufficient; too many other parties 
have already occupied these issues for the PDS to make them solely their 
own. 1 2 6 
Into this schema of Sprachlosigkeit fits what we might call the PDS's 'pick and mix' 
socialism, its (hopeful) invocation of a wide range of diverse and disparate socialist 
theories and thinkers under the banner of (an elusive and illusory?) synergy: 
, 2 4 G y s i , Gregor: Ingolstadter Manifest. Wir - mitten in Europa. Plddoyer fur einen neuen 
Gesellschaftsvertrag. Berlin: Wahlbiiro der PDS 1994, p. 1 
l 2 5 B i s k y , L . et al.: "Sozialismus ist Weg ..." op. cit., p. 26 
1 2 6 G o o d : PDS - Partei der Diskursiven Strategienl op. cit. 
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Wir schopfen aus der Geschichte des humanistischen Denkens, insbesondere 
aus den dialektischen und materialistischen Auffassungen von Karl Marx und 
Friedrich Engels, Wilhelm Liebknecht und August Bebel, Eduard Bernstein 
und Karl Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg und Karl Liebknecht, W. I . Lenin und 
Antonio Gramsci und ihrer nachfolgenden vielfaltigen Weiterentwicklung.127 
Witness, too: 
Die PDS steht in sozialistischen Traditionen: Antimilitarismus, soziale 
Verantwortung und Kampf um Demokratie sind Erbteile, zu denen wir uns 
bekennen. Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht und Paul Levi bleiben unsere 
politischen Vorlaufer. 1 2 8 
Observe how the problem of bridging 'progressive' and 'orthodox' positions is 
achieved discursively through a synergist fusion of the maximally extended 
categories of 'modern' and 'classical' theories: 
Die PDS ist eine pluralistische Partei, die an keine Weltanschauung gebunden 
ist. Sie hat nicht eine Theorie, sondern schopft aus den Theorien der Moderne 
- natiirlich aber auch aus klassischen Texten. 1 2 9 (italics in original) 
And while we would disagree strongly with Moreau's hysterical conclusion that the 
broad mix is designed to harness as much support for the PDS as possible in order for 
the party to pursue its (as Moreau would have it) unified, single-minded aim of 
toppling the existing polity 1 3 0 , his observations on the attempt in the first party 
programme to locate broad, lowest common denominators are germane (despite 
failing to problematise the question of how this is any different from what party 
ideologues ritually do when faced with internal contradictions; British observers 
familiar with the 'Blairing of Labour' wil l be only too familiar with the potential in 
discursive breadth for suggesting unity): 
Das Programm hatte einen stark eklektizistischen Charakter. Es stellte eine 
bunte Mischung aus kommunistischen, griinen, sozialdemokratischen, 
feministischen sowie radikal- und basisdemokratischen Elementen und 
Forderungen dar ... Um einen modus vivendi im Verhaltnis der Stromungen 
und Plattformen untereinander zu finden, war die PDS gezwungen, den 
, 2 7 "Programm der Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus." 1990, op. cit., p. 90 
1 2 8 G y s i : Ingolstddter Manifest... op. cit., p. 15 
1 2 9 L o t h a r Bisky, in: "Die Erneuerung wird aus dem Osten kommen. op. cit.,p. 313 (see footnote 85) 
1 3 0 c f . : "(Die PDS - MD) konzentriert all ihre Krafte auf eine destruktive Opposition gegen die 
marktwirtschaftliche Ordnung." (Moreau/Neu: Die PDS zwischen Linksexlremismus... op. cit., p. 8) 
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kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner zu suchen und dabei jede unnotige 
Formal isierung zu vermeiden.131 
Unsurprisingly, the only way of effecting this synergy is on an abstract discursive 
level of inherent causality: in the following a reflexive requiring only one inherent 
participant132 reduces the complex causality behind the synergist vision and conspires 
to make a credo of harmony from disharmony look readily achievable: 
Dariiber hinaus ist der politische Pluralismus in den heutigen so unerhort 
komplexen Gesellschaften eine entscheidende Bedingung, um im Wettbewerb 
sozialistischer, sozialdemokratischer oder radikalokologischer Vorstellungen 
Antworten auf die neuen gesellschaftlichen und globalen Herausforderungen 
zu finden, die sich aus der gegenseitigen Bereicherung der unterschiedlichen 
Konzepte entwickeln kdnnen.m (my italics) 
This level of abstraction is mirrored in the party's second programme134: 
Die konkreten Ziele der sozialistischen Bewegung ergeben sich (as i f by 
magic - MD) aus den realen Widersprilchen und Konflikten und aus den 
her anger eiften Entwicklungspotentialen, nicht aber aus einem abstrakten 
Geschichtsplan.m (my italics) 
in which the category abstraction is itself invoked for rhetorical effect in the context 
of what amounts to a very telling meta-abstraction! 
Observe, incidentally the invocation of Widerspriiche, a central ideologeme of the 
marxist-leninst discourse of dialectical materialism, as a motivating factor in the 
discursive move away from the orthodox categories of the class-conflict model. 
Good has shown how the invocation of central ideologemes from the 'old' discourse 
of the SED, frequently with amended denotation, is a key feature of the PDS's 
'hybrid' 'unifying' discourse, its attempt to marry 'pragmatic' and traditional, 
'orthodox' positions: 
1 3 1 ib id . , p. 36 
, 3 2 F o r a discussion of inherent causality and inherent participants, see "Transitivity in Language", 
chapter 4 below. 
, 3 3 G y s i : "Was will die PDS in Deutschland?" op. cit., p. 17 
l 3 4 O n e of the prime textual functions of a party programme being, after all, to locate as broad an 
inner-party 'common ground' as possible. "Hinsichtlich des politischen Selbstverstandnisses kommt 
den Programmen wichtige Bedeutung insbesondere fur die Binnenintegration der Mitgliedschaft zu, 
welche bei aller Einsicht in politische Riicksichtnahmen sicherlich nur begrenzt Positionen 
hinnehmen wurde, die ihr diametral widersprachen." Pfahl-Traughber: "Wandlung zur Demokratie?" 
op. cit. p. 360 
WSprogramm der Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus. Berlin 1993, p. 12 
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The "tradition" continues to make itself felt in a number of ways. It may be 
dealt with overtly, as a problem ... it may be put to rhetorical use, even as it is 
being denied, or it may be present in what we might call "trace" form in the 
new discourse ... 
The traditional vocabulary of the "class struggle" is clearly difficult to 
abandon, given the need to keep alive the appeal to the outlook of the 
Traditionalisten.136 The key term Kampf, for instance, sometimes makes its 
appearance when it is clearly motivated primarily more by this consideration. 
The phrase von den aktuellen Kdmpfen ausgehen [= Brie, in DISPUT. 
no 3/4 1993; p. 33 - MD] as part of the justification of the new, more realistic, 
pragmatic approach against the charge that such an approach is reformistisch 
or even systemkonform, taps the motivating potential of the old language . . . 1 3 7 
(italics in original) 
Into this schema fits the ideologeme Revolution which we shall proceed to discuss in 
our examination of the influence on the party of Antonio Gramsci. 
DISCURSIVE B R E A D T H - CHAMPIONING GRAMSCI 
Part and parcel of this hybrid discourse is, as we mentioned above, the foregrounding 
of ideologues whose vision, while broadly locatable in a marxist/communist 
tradition, can be moulded more readily to meet the demands of the new political 
environment. One such ideologue given particular prominence by the PDS is Antonio 
Gramsci, whose theories we now turn to in some detail, as there are strong grounds 
for seeing the foregrounding of this ideologue as emblematic and exemplary of what 
the PDS has sought to achieve in language: to overcome contradiction and 
irreconcileability through breadth. His theories are given particular prominence in a 
monograph (published in 1990) by Harald Neubert138, a leading PDS ideologue, who 
is keen to engage the 'healthy pluralist' mode: 
Im Programm der PDS, das auf dem Parteitag vom 24./25. Februar 1990 
angenommen wurde, wird der Name von Antonio Gramsci unter denen 
genannt, aus deren "dialektischen und materialistischen Auffassungen" die 
, 3 6 Lang observes that: "In der Tat ware es fur die PDS - sieht man von statutarischen Hindernissen ab 
- ein leichtes, die 2500 erkennbaren KPF-Sympathisanten (in the PDS - MD) abzustoBen. Aber die 
breite Masse dahinter, die sich in ihrem Glauben an die gute Sache des Staatssozialismus von der KPF 
am besten vertreten fiihlen, sind das Standbein der PDS im Osten. See Lang: "Nach den 
Wahlen 1994 ..." op. cit., pp. 375-76 (italics in original) 
1 3 7Good: PDS - Partei der Diskursiven Strategienl op. cit. 
,38Neubert: Von Sozialismus und Demokratie ... op. cit., p. 3 
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Partei ihr theoretisches und politisches Selbstverstandnis schopft. Die 
Tatsache, daB ... neben Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, August Bebel, Rosa 
Luxemburg, Wilhelm und Karl Liebknecht auch die Namen von Eduard 
Bernstein und Karl Kautsky genannt werden, beweist ein neues Vernal tnis der 
Partei zum geschichtlichen Erbe. Dies ist ein beredtes Zeugnis der 
Erneuerung der Partei. (my italics) 
As we have observed above, naming is easy; addressing is an entirely different 
matter. 
Neubert is keen to stress that Gramsci's vision - though banned in the GDR - is 
locatable in a communist tradition encompassing Marx and Engels, whose symbolic 
invocation alongside Gramsci is doubtless of vital significance as a comforter ("eine 
wichtige Briicke zu ihrer eigenen ideologischen Vergangenheit"139) to the party's 'old 
guard'; Neubert - as we remember (see footnote 30) - is keen to stress the link: 
Was den italienischen Kommunisten Antonio Gramsci angeht, so hat er sich 
auf seine Weise ebenfalls kritisch das theoretische Erbe von Marx und 
Engels, sowie der fuhrenden Kopfe der I I . Internationale zu eigen gemacht ... 
(Neubert; p. 4i 4°) 
Neubert bemoans that the Communist recognised only the "Traditionslinie von Marx, 
Engels, Lenin und zunachst auch Stalin" (p. 3), thereby preparing the ground for 
locating Gramsci in that very line. Observe, again, how the invocation of a (mythical 
and unverifiable?) tradition foregrounds broad uniformity. 
Simultaneously, however, this 'vision' is broad enough to encompass a more 
'revisionist' dimension, more in keeping with the wish of party pragmatists (with a 
position championing an "Optimierung des bestehenden"141) to see the PDS dispense 
with any commitment to a rigid avant-gardism and adopt a political approach more 
tenable in, and adaptable to, the new environment. In a nutshell Gramsci's vision as 
presented - and championed - by Neubert, advocates a move away from a hard-line, 
one-party, avant-garde, monist, 'revolutionary' communism incorporating a violent 
overthrow of the existing order and a seizure of power (in the form of a 
"Manoverkrieg")142 by an elitist few, and champions a 'revisionist' approach in 
, 3 9 Good: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 279 
140A11 page numbers in brackets below refer to Neubert: Von Sozialismus und Demokratie ... op. cit. 
I 4 , see footnote 70 
, 4 2"Gramsci wandte sich de facto gleichermaBen gegen das Konzept Trotzkis von der permanenten 
Revolution wie gegen das Konzept von der Revolution als einem einmaligen offensiven Akt der 
Eroberung der Staatsgewalt ("Manoverkrieg") und pladierte fur den Weg, der uber die politische 
193 
which the achievements of bourgeois society are acknowledged143 and accepted as a 
basis from which to progress - by way of a gradual "Stellungskrieg" - to a "socialist" 
order. Central to this 'vision' is a polarised conceptual structure in which a broadly 
drawn "zivile Gesellschaft" is championed against an equally nebulous "politische 
Gesellschaft". (p. 8). The latter is referred to as the "staatlich-institutionellen 
Organisationsformen der Macht" (p. 8), the former - the unverifiability and 
mythicality of whose group(ing)s we shall examine below - the "okonomischen und 
sozialen Beziehungen, die Basis einer Gesellschaft, die nichtstaatlichen 
gesellschaftlichen Organisationsformen ..." (p. 8). Gramsci ealls for a party to 
exercise "hegemony" (p. 11) - which he contrasts with the very negative "Herrschaft" 
(p. 11) - by winning over civil society as a basis for running political society. The 
difference is between '"Herrschaft1 in Gestalt exekutiver Staatsmacht und die der 
politischen, geistigen und moralischen Fiihrung mittels 'Hegemonic'".144 
Despite its 'reformist' bent, Neubert is still keen to invoke the sign Revolution in 
stressing the 'revolutionary' nature of this vision: 
Auch er war, der allgemeinen kommunistischen Meinung entsprechend, 
damals uberzeugt, daB die sozialistische Revolution auf der Tagesordnung 
stande. (p. 18) 
As Good has observed of related attempts to 'redefine' Revolution: 
Revolution und ahnliche Konzepte waren bereits in der postrevolutionaren 
Phase der Wendezeit problematisch geworden. Dennoch war und ist 
Revolution ein viel zu zentrales Ideologem, um fallengelassen zu werden ... 
Das Wort ist auf jeden Fall ein heiBes Eisen und auBerst ambivalent. Es muB 
in die neue, pragmatische Weltanschauung hiniibergerettet werden ... Es wird 
argumentiert, daB die neue Bedeutung von Revolution in der Geschichte des 
Sozialismusverwurzeltist . . . , 4 5 
What we have, then, is a model which might be proffered in the ideological attempt 
to bridge the divide between the party's orthodox anti-capitalist Marxists and its 
pragmatic wings; after all, there is no general agreement among the 'socialists' in the 
Auseinandersetzung innerhalb der bestehenden biirgerlichen Gesellschaft fiihrt und nichts anderes ist 
als eine von innen heraus bewirkte Transformation der gesamten zivilen Gesellschaft ("Stellungskrieg 
bzw. Positionskrieg"); my italics. (Neubert, ibid., p. 10) 
, 4 3Gramsci "ging. von der Verteidigungswiirdigkeit der Errungenschaften burgerlicher Demokratie 
aus" (Neubert, ibid., p. 18) 
l 4 4Moreau: PDS. Anatomie ... op. cit., p. 151 
,45Good:"Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 275 
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PDS's ranks as to how best to proceed towards socialism (i.e. about the Weg) and 
indeed what the ultimate vision is. It offers an (albeit abstract) level upon which the 
different party factions might work together within the framework of the existing 
order, yet simultaneously invokes the ultimate prospect of a radically new order - i.e. 
one in which 'revolutionary' change will have come about. Observe here, how the 
conflationary potential of the sign revolutionary is tapped: the problem of where 
revolution starts and ends in the minds of different individuals is neatly and simply 
circumvented behind a sign which straddles and blurs the boundary between what is 
achieved (i.e. state) and what is achievable/yet to be achieved (i.e. action). Seen from 
another perspective, Gramsci's broad vision might be said to provide a means of 
defusing an inter-related polemic, in offering, on paper at least, a level upon which to 
reconcile the aims of the 'pragmatist reformers' and the 'radical reformers'1 4 6; the 
locating of the vision in the conflict areas of a broad and vaguely-defined zivile 
Gesellschaft (set off - simplistically - against a politische Gesellschaft in a reductive 
bipolar schema) provides a broad basis upon which the 'radical reformers' - such as 
the Junge Genosslnnen whose rejection of capitalism and commitment to 
fundamental change is not, however, predicated upon a backward-looking socialism 
such as is enframed in the model of class conflict - might be brought into the picture; 
their reluctant acceptance of the here and now has consistently been coupled with a 
refusal to give primacy to what they perceive as the egregious structures of the 
established political fora which are to be bypassed if the PDS is not to be 'sucked in ' 
and 'neutralised' in the way that - as they perceive it - the Greens were. (In other 
words, an Optimierung des Bestehenden is to be achieved by by-passing the 
established political structures). For the pfagmatist reformers (Gysi, Bisky et al.) it 
might be said to simply provide, in calling for practical solutions to the problems 
symptomatic of the prevailing polity, a basis for 'getting on with i t ' , for realistic 
action in, and acceptance of, the here and now, and offers the prospect of a Hegelian 
synergy once the 'right solutions' have been found; in other words, this is a position 
of optimisation through involvement, be it in the established fora, be it in the 
interests of a vaguely drawn civil society. It seems reasonable, to see in Neubert's 
efforts as much a tactical attempt to keep the 'old guard' 1 4 7, on board as any real 
1 4 6 We must stress again the (very necessary) reductiveness of our model. The inner-party situation is 
a good deal more complex than is suggested by reductive categories enframed in easily manageable 
polarised models such as 'orthodox Marxists' vs. 'modernist reformers' or 'modernist reformers' vs. 
'radical reformers'; the 'reality' is a complex amalgam of a whole plethora of different psychological 
motivations, not easily identifiable or extricable, which cannot be reproduced empirically by any 
language system. 
1 4 7"die bei der Stange gehalten werden miissen, damit die Partei nicht zugrunde gent"; Good: "Uber 
die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 266 
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incitement - as Moreau vociferously suggests - to subversive activity 1 4 8. In other 
words Neubert, in invoking Gramsci, is attempting what Gramsci before him spent 
much of his life attempting: to reconcile fundamentally different political visions, to 
bridge the gap between commitment to fundamental change starting from the basis of 
bourgeois society whose achievements are acknowledged and a 'revolutionary' 
transformation of that society based on violent overthrow.1 4 9 Put a more cynical way, 
the attempt is to sell to the old guard a 'new' acceptance of the existing polity by 
locating that acceptance within an 'old' tradition, a 'communist' tradition which is 
drawn broadly, where 'revisionism' and 'reformism' might be allowed to co-exist 
happily; at the same time the 'radical fundamentalists' are offered a vision whose 
essential dynamic is located in 'the people' and not - as this faction sees it - in the 
corruptive machinery of the status quo. As such, the attempt is, as Moreau rightly 
observes, "(den) Zusammenhang von Reform und Reovlution zu klaren ... Zu der fur 
das Uberleben (surely the important point - MD!) der PDS notwendigen 
Anpassungsstrategie (in making itself a viable party in a united Germany - MD) 
lieferte Gramsci Methodolgie und eschatologische Vision" 1 5 0 , (my italics) 
Let us now proceed to a brief survey of the language of the Gramscian vision, before 
examining the question of its broad re-emergence in the discourse of the PDS. 
It would be hard to find a more graphic catalogue of language with an inherently 
positive semantic component of unity, uniformity and harmony than we encounter in 
the Gramscian vision as desceibed by Neubert; it calls for: 
"Gleichberechttgung", 12) the party's "Fuhrungsfunktion in einem Bundnis", 
"Zustimmung", (p. 12) a "Suche nach einem Konsens gleichberechtigter Partner", 
(p. 12) a "Biindniskonstellation"; (p. 12) the exercise of power "muB sich auf einen 
zu bildenden historischen Block der Mehrheit des Volkes stiitzen" (p. 12) the party 
"muB sich mit alien Sektionen dieser Klasse verbinden" (p. 13) and be an 
"organischer Teil" (p. 13), "organisierende und fuhrende Kraft der Klasse" (p. 13). 
1 4 8 W e touched, in chapter 2, upon how, in the cold-war world of Moreau, the PDS's single-issue 
Arbeits- and Interessengemeinschaften are reduced to a recreation of twenties Soviets and are 
perceived as forming the basis for a Biindnispolitik (Moreau.- PDS. Anatomie ... op. cit., p. 154) with 
the single-minded aim of crushing the capitalist consensus: "Das Ziel der PDS besteht darin, auf alien 
Gebieten der zivilen Gesellschaft die Konfliktzonen auszumachen und in jedem Spannungsfeld oder 
jeder Kluft eine spezifische Botschaft zu vermitteln. Kernpunkt ist der Widerstand gegen den sozialen 
Konsens, wo immer er moglich ist." (Moreau, ibid., p. 156).(We might well argue that the PDS's IG's 
and AG's are just as much an attempt to invoke the Green model of the 80s as the party attempts - as it 
has consistently done - to strike the 'Bewegung' keynote. This will be dealt with in chapter 4) 
l 4 9 cf.: "Sein (Gramsci's - MD) Bemuhen, die herannahende Spaltung der sozialistischen Partei in 
Reformisten und Revolutionare zu verhindern hatte keinen Erfolg." (Neubert: Von Sozialismus und 
Demokratie ... op. cit., p. 6); "Gramsci ubernahm in dieser Zeit auch die Fiihrung der Partei, nachdem 
er sich mit seinen Auffassungen gegen die sektiererischen Positionen Bordigas durchgesetzt hatte." 
ibid., p. 7 
l 5 0Moreau: PDS. Anatomie ... op. cit., p. 147 
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The party's essential role is one of bringing about "sozialen und politischen 
Integration", (p. 14) (all italics mine) 
Crucially, Neubert argues: 
Sein (Gramsci's - MD) Integralismus bedeutete nicht, die nichtproletarischen 
Krafte fur die Durchsetzung der spezifischen Klasseninteressen des 
Proletariats zu gewinnen; deren Interessen denen des Proletariats einfach 
unterzuordnen, sondern er verlangte von der kommunistischen Partei, sich 
zum Fiirsprecher aller Interessen (! MD), das heiBt aller Bundnispartner zu 
machen. (p. 14; my italics) 
The proletariat, argues, Gramsci, must understand the wishes of the peasantry, "muB 
diese Klassenforderungen seinem revolutionaren Ubergangsprogramm einverleiben"; 
if the party champions only the proletariat it will be unable to carry out its 
"gesamtgesellschaftliche, nationale Funktion". (p. 14; my italics) 
Ultimately Gramsci (and Neubert) are on a classical and (elusive?) quest for an 
"Einheit zwischen Theorie und Praxis, zwischen den intellektuellen Schichten und 
den Volksmassen, zwischen Regierten und Regierenden". (p. 15; my italics) 
The vision operates at a very high degree of abstraction. The group(ing)s it 
champions are extremely broad (Block, Bundnis, Klasse, aller Interessen, aller 
Bundnispartner especially "die auf Sozialismus orientierten Krafte" (p. 4), 
unverifiable, empirically unquantifiable and ultimately mythical. (We might well 
question, for example, if there is a uniform peasant class with uniform interests). 
Natural antagonisms are simply circumvented and obscured through the invocation 
of an inherently unifying language where the lowest common denominator is simply 
that - unity; how and by whom this unity is to be achieved is left a at a very high 
degree of generality, with very little explicit causality. How is this 'causal 
circumvention' achieved? In other words, what conspires to make the unachievable 
look achievable? For one thing, recourse is had to a large number of means which 
background and obscure problematic questions of agency. To that end, we encounter 
a very high level of nominalisation: "die Durchsetzung der spezifischen 
Klasseninteressen" (p. 14); "nach der Ubernahme der Macht". (p. 12) (all italics 
mine) Nominalisation, in being outside indications of tense, conspires to blur the 
distinction between what is and what is desirable. A large number of relational 
constructions'51 show no causal transaction from actor/agent to affected; cf.: "Ihre 
[that of intellectuals - MD] Funktion besteht darin, Konsens zu erreichen"(p. 15); 
see "Transitivity in Language" in chapter 4 below. 
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"daB der demokratische Zentralismus 'eine organische Einheit zwischen Theorie und 
Praxis, zwischen den Intellektuellen und den Volksmassen' ... erfordert" (p. 15); 
"wahrend die grundlegende Aufgabe eine nationale war, d.h. das Erkennen des 
Terrains und die Feststellung der Elemente von Schutzengraben und Befestigungen 
erforderte ". (p. 10) (all italics mine) Recourse is had to an inherent causality152; 
observe in the following how things fall into place 'naturally', through the invocation 
of reflexives requiring only one inherent participant: "Auf diese Weise darf sich 
Machtausiibung (observe the nominalisation! - MD) einer Klasse nicht auf die 
Herrschaft einer kleinen, auserwahlten, machtbewuBten Elite griinden, sondern muB 
sich auf einen zu bildenden (by whom?! - MD) 'historischen Block' der Mehrheit des 
Volks stutzen". (p. 12) (all italics mine) Observe how inanimates occupy the 'actor' 
position ("Machtubung darf sich ..."; "die so verstandene Bundniskonstellation 
bildet ... einen 'historischen Block'"), (my italics) 
Georgia Green offers a graphic description of the polysemous nature of nominalised 
forms; they can cover a broad semantic spectrum taking in, inter alia: 
* the fact that something has been done, or is a certain way 
* the extent to which something has been done, or is a certain way 
* whether or not something happens 
* the act of doing something 
* the products of some action 
* the way something was done' 5 3 
There is clearly ideological potential to be had from choosing a form which blurs the 
distinction between state and action/process, between what is achieved and what has 
yet to be achieved, between what can and what may never be achieved. Gramsci's 
notion of a "democratic centralism", for example, calls for a "standige Anpassung der 
Organisation an die reale Bewegung" (my italics) where the boundaries are blurred 
between a complex (mythical and unrealisable?) process (requiring agentsY) and (a 
readily achievable or already achieved) state. Put simply the nominal conspires to 
make something complex and barely tangible appear concrete and realisable. The 
example just cited is embedded in an environment which, for sheer abstraction and 
complete suspension of agency, is second to none: 
Der 'organische Charakter des Zentralismus' kann nur in Gestalt des 
demokratischen Zentralismus existieren, der sozusagen ein 'Zentralismus in 
, 5 2 see ibid. 
, 5 3 Green, Georgia M.: Pragmatics and Natural Language Understanding. Hillsdale, New Jersey: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 1990, p. 50. 
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Bewegung ist', was eine standige Anpassung der Organisation an die reale 
Bewegung bedeutet. Die miisse verbunden sein mit der Akkumulation immer 
neuer Erfahrungen. Der Zentralismus sei 'organisch' weil er die Bewegung, 
d.h. die historischen Veranderungen, berucksichtigt, 'was bedeutet, auf 
organische Weise die historische Realitat zu erfassen'. (p. 15) 
We shall have much more to say about causal abstraction in our survey of transitivity 
in language in chapter 4. 
Gramsci's 'democratic centralism' is based upon "Ubereinstimmungen" and 
"Gemeinsamkeiten" (p. 16) and, says Neubert, should have taken into account the 
"soziale, politische, weltanschauliche, kulturelle Vielfalt in der Gesellschaft". (p. 16) 
The overlap with current PDS ideology is unmistakable here. Neubert, like Gramsci 
seeks to deal with the contradictions inherent in any rational schema, the refusal of 
the world to subordinate itself to neat categories, by making virtue from necessity, by 
making this his credo, the centrepiece of his vision: his socialism is based upon the 
championing and acceptance of heterogeneity and plurality, of the Widerspriiche in 
society; in other words, harmony and uniformity (motivated by the language we 
identified above) are to be gained on a level of generality which embraces otherwise 
problematic plurality and heterogeneity and offers harmony through the acceptance 
of disharmony. Here is Neubert's means of bridging the gap between Weg and Ziel: 
Eine wesentliche Erfahrung aus dem Scheitern des bisher praktizierten 
Sozialismusmodells besteht darin, daB die Formen, Wege, Methoden, hierfiir 
sehr vielfaltig sind. (p. 19) 
- not an unuseful notion for a PDS struggling to hold together groups with 
fundamentally different ideas as to how to put socialism into place and what form it 
should take; the fundamental (and irreconcilable?) diversity of approach is 
encapsulated in the sheer breadth of PDS conceptions of the term Opposition, whose 
semantic specification, as we shall see in chapters 4 and 5, has yet to be pinned down 
by the PDS with any degree of uniform, inner-party acceptance: is it an opposition to 
'capitalism' based upon the old class warfare model, is it an opposition (though not 
motivated by a commitment to the supremacy of the proletariat) predicated upon a 
refusal to become involved in the governmental institutions of the prevailing order, 
or is it opposition which can be understood in fairly standard establishment terms, i.e. 
as the antonym of a governmental role, where the party's prime aim is to increase its 
influence in the existing order by striving for power within the framework of the 
established structures? An overall 'PDS discourse' - one key discursive component 
of which is a 'unifying discourse' which attempts to locate a level of abstraction 
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capable of circumventing problematic discursive disparity - represents a complex 
tapestry of this and numerous other competing and contradictory discourses. 
Socialism then, says Neubert, is about embracing the problems, the "Widerspruche" 
irfcsociety, and evening these out where they occur: 
Bei der Neuformulierung des Inhalts des demokratischen Sozialismus, den 
wir anstreben, lassen wir uns ebenso wie Gramsci davon leiten, daB 
Soziaiismus nicht die Verwirklichung eines abstrakten, vorgefaBten 
Gesellschaftsmodells sein kann, sondern das Ergebnis der Losung realer 
Widerspruche und Probleme der bestehenden Gesellschaft, in deren 
historischer und wandelbarer Konkretheit, im Sinne von Fortschritt, 
Gerechtigkeit, Humanismus, Demokratie. (p. 19) 
Observe, here, how "Losung" clearly straddles the problematic boundary between 
complex process and achieved state. Observe, too, the component of nominal 
presuppositionality: the fact that the nominal stands outside of indiqations of time 
(i.e. as something problematic yet to be achieved) allows the existence of a solution 
to be taken for granted. The Gramscian Widerspruche are drawn broadly. Their 
lowest common denominator is that - whatever they are - they will be evened out by 
a (mythical) socialist movement; there is a natural presumption that the groups 
concerned would necessarily wish this nebulous and vague socialist movement to 
make itself "Fiirsprecher" for its interests. The synergist dimension which has been 
so prevalent a feature of PDS discourse is clearly in evidence in the Gramscian 
vision: there is a natural textual presupposition that the aggregate of all individually 
resolved conflicts would naturally form a harmonious overall picture, thereby 
circumventing the problematic notion of what happens when the resolution of one 
conflict is predicated upon the creation of another. The suggestion is that a uniform, 
harmonious movement will magically fall into place as the 'filtering out' and 
crystallisation of all individual socialist conceptions and aims: 
keine politische Bewegung kann sich angesichts der komplizierten 
Wirkungsbedingungen, der vielfaltigen Erfahrungen, der unterschiedlichen 
Formen, Ziele und Methoden der Aktion dauerhaft und erfolgreich behaupten, 
wenn sie nicht kritisch und schopferisch alle geschichtlichen Erkenntnisse, 
Erfahrungen, Impulse usw. immer wieder aufs neue verarbeitet. (Neubert; 
p. 3) 
Similarly, Gramsci's democratic centralism is based upon the "Akkumulation immer 
neuer Erfahrungen". (p. 15) 
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As with Bortfeldt's monograph we observe the dialectical approach as Neubert 
struggles to achieve a Spagat between political realism 1 5 4 and the need to sweeten the 
bitter pill he is offering the party's old guard. While Neubert offers an expressis 
verbis recognition that in adapting the Gramscian world-view to meet the demands of 
a modern environment "man nicht in den Fehler verfallen (darf), Antworten auf alle 
aktuellen Probleme finden zu wollen", the reductive and abstract notion of a uniform 
goal {demokratischer Sozialismus) predicated upon a (realist) diversity of approach 
hints quite precisely at a concomitant attempt to proffer an all-embracing schema 
which would represent a panacea for all societal ills. 
It is hardly surprising that Neubert's dialectical attempt to proffer an ideological 
'super-model' which might override problematic inner-party factionalism and tie 
together the legitimacy strands we identified in chapter 1 should yield some 
contradiction. It is telling that in a work which - pragmatically - champions plurality 
and a move away from a determinist, dogmatic and uniform world-view on the one 
hand' 5 5, on the other hints at the primacy to be accorded a Leninist party avant-
gardism as Neubert pre-empts the objections of aghast party conservatives; Neubert 
seems at pains to locate Gramsci's conception of the party role in the Leninist 
tradition familiar to the SED's old guard: 
Ohne Zweifel befiirwortete er (Gramsci - MD) die fuhrende Rolle der 
kommunistischen Partei als unverzichtbare Voraussetzung fur die 
sozialistische Umwalzung. Hier stand er ganz in der Leninschen Tradition. 
(p. 13; my italics) 
Observe, too, how Neubert, like Bortfeldt, struggles with the SED legacy: on the 
one hand a pragmatic and realistic Neubert catalogues the reprehensible features left 
by the SED in its wake as part of the kommunistische (not, of course, sozialistischel 
- MD) Bewegung ("Diffamierungen, Parteiausschlussen, ja sogar ... physische(r) 
Vernichtung"; p. 4) and points to the fact that: 
Fiihrung wurde von den regierenden kommunistischen Parteien im 
wesentlichen kraft Macht und politischer Uberlegenheit ausgeiibt (p. 12); 
on the other exoneration is offered through a transfer of blame onto the Fuhrung in 
the familiar manner: 
1 5 4"Seit Marz 1990 war sich die PDS der Notwendigkeit bewuBt, sich innerhalb von kiirzester Zeit zu 
einer 'gesamtdeutschen' Partei entwickeln zu miissen". Moreau: PDS. Anatomie... op. cit., p. 147 
, 5 5 " E s war zu einer verhangnisvollen Praxis geworden, daB viele Parteien in der kommunistischen 
und Arbeiterbewegung, darunter auch die SED, lange Zeit lediglich die Traditionslinie von Marx, 
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Da die Stabilitat der Gesellschaft im "realen Sozialismus" (leaving, a "pure" 
Sozialismus intact - MD; inverted commas in original) allein auf der Macht 
im engeren Sinne des Wortes, das heiBt auf der Staatsgewalt beruhte, die 
wiederum ein Instrument der Parteifiihrung (nicht die Partei schlechthin 
war) ... (p. 16; my italics) 
Observe how Neubert, too, simplistically foregrounds an extra-system dynamic as 
grounds for the failure of communism (a "standigen sozial-okonomsichen Riickstand 
gegeniiber den kapitalistischen Landern" (p. 9)). 
Given the very nature of Gramsci's vision - the move away from fixed world-views, 
the championing of plurality and the move away from dogma - Neubert is on the one 
hand keen to stress a la Gramsci the fluidity of the model, that it is not the answer to 
all the PDS's problems, (p.19) thereby pre-empting the charge of falling into the 
typical 'socialist' trap of seeking to articulate a monist vision whilst simultaneously 
taking on board the problematic factionalisation which PDS ideologues have 
consistently sought to play down. On the other it would appear that Neubert cannot 
resist the allure of the vision's unifying categories and simultaneously offers it quite 
precisely as a means of locating a level on which vaguely defined socialist actors can 
participate in an equally vague socialist schema. Here, the Gramscian schema whose 
relevance - Neubert elsewhere states - is not to be overestimated is now of 
"auBerordentlichen Bedeutung ... fur ein modernes Geschichts- und 
Politikverstandnis" (p. 4) and nothing short of a: 
notwendiger Schliissel (sic!) zum Verstandnis der modernen 
Gesellschaften ... ihrer Strukturen und Funktionen ... (p. 19) 
Gramscis Erbe ist fiir alle demokratischen und progressiven, vor allem fur die 
auf Sozialismus orientierten Krafte (whoever the members of this catch-all 
group may be - MD) auch heute hilfreich, um nach neue/i gangbaren Wegen 
heraus aus den okonomsichen, sozialen und Menschheitsproblemen ... zu 
suchen. (p. 19; my italics) 
Into this schema fits Gramsci's "positives und zugleich kritisches Verhaltnis zur 
Oktoberrevolution". (p. 4) 
Whilst Moreau's assertion that a year after the publication of Neubert's work the PDS 
"ihren Wandel zu einer Gesellschaft im Gramscischen Sinne vollendet (hatte)" 
represents a convenient and sensationalist oversimplification which Moreau has 
Engels, Lenin und zunachst auch Stalin anerkannten ... mit dem absoluten Anspruch auf 
Unfehlbarkeit und Wahrheit." Neubert: Von Sozialismus und Demokratie ... op. cit., p. 3 
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regularly fed his readers, it would indeed appear that the influence of Gramscian 
ideology - as presented by Neubert - upon (in particular the 'unificatory' strand of) 
PDS discourse has indeed been not insignificant1 5 6. Good has identified a breadth in 
the PDS's 'unificatory' discourse which is strongly reminiscent of the vague and 
abstract categories we encounter in Gramsci: 
Die augenscheinlichste Eigenschaft der Ausdriicke, die die orthodoxe Sprache 
ersetzen, ist ihre Vagheit und "Breite" in der Bedeutung. Dies ist vielleicht 
gar nicht mal so iiberraschend im Licht des neuen Pragmatismus, der zum 
Status eines Leitmotivs erhoben wurde. 1 5 7 
The broad categories Good identifies are indeed ones which we encounter regularly 
in PDS discourse: it champions sozial Schwache, sozial Ausgegrenztel5S and 
Betroffene against a vaguely drawn 'establishment' cast as die Herrschenden or the 
herrschende Klasse (which, as we remember, formed the negatively charged 
antithesis of Hegemonie in Gramsci's polarised conceptual schema); thus, Good 
argues: 
Die Variabilitat und Vagheit der Terminologie ermoglicht es, damit alles 
mogliche zu meinen . . . 1 5 9 
The greater the extension and the more minimal the intension, the greater the scope 
for by-passing problematic societal antagonisms and diversity. 
Whilst these categories are by no means exclusive to a Gramscian vision (wide 
concepts such as Betroffene and Herrschende, for example, have, as we shall see 
below, been central to the discourse of the Greens, thus allowing room for the 
argument that the PDS has sought in its invocation of these lexemes to usurp 
something of the former party's Bewegung mantle), the "abstrakte(s) Konzept von 
ungleichen Machtverhaltnissen zwischen Gesellschaftsgruppen"160 at the heart of the 
PDS's new political sociology in particular draws very heavily, Good rightly 
observes, on Gramscian theory. Observe how, in the following a PDS-inclusive 
1 5 6Moreau does provide a very useful survey of the wide inner-PDS attention accorded to Gramsci, 
including the sponsoring of an international Gramsci colloquium in Berlin in 1991; see, in particular, 
Moreau: PDS. Anatomie ... op. cit., pp. 147, 154 
1 5 7Good: "Uberdie 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 277 
1 5 8"Der Osten Deutschlands hat in Bonn keine tatsachliche Lobby oder gar Vertretung, ebenso wie 
die sozial Schwachen in Bonn kein Gehor finden"; Lothar Bisky, cited from: Mitteilung Nr. 1: 
Beitrage und Dokumente vom 1. Ostdeutschen Bundeskongrefl der Verbande am 2. Oktober 1993 in 
Berlin, Kino 'International'. Berlin 1993 
1 5 9Good: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 278 
, 6 0 ibid., p. 277 
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"unser" (facilitating the suggestion of the Party of Democratic Socialism's non-party 
status!) - i.e. civil society? - is pitted against the political and bureaucratic 'powers 
that be': 
Die Parteien und Biirokratien entscheiden zu oft unser Schicksal. Der einzige 
Weg, der dann Betroffenen bleibt, ist der Gerichtsweg. Das ist eine Waffe der 
Schwachen, aber oft auch eine schwache Waffe . . . 1 6 1 (my italics) 
The broad categories form the basis of a polarised model which, in setting broadly 
'progressive' against broadly 'reactionary' forces, might be said, as Good points out, 
to recreate a class-style model adaptable to the new political setting. This 
"Klassenkampf ersetzendes Vokabular"1 6 2 brings together unquantifiable, 
unspecifiable and unidentifiable opposites: unten versus oben, arm versus reich, 
Schwache versus Starke: 
Die Formulierung von Oben und Unten laBt ... auf eine doppelpolige Teilung 
der Gesellschaft in zwei groBe, neue historisch relevante Gruppen schlieBen, 
eine "progressive" und eine "reaktionare"163 
Witness the following telling extract from a Taz interview with Lothar Bisky: 
Taz: Ist der Klassenkampf noch eine Kategorie, um die gesellschaftliche 
Realitat in Deutschland zu erklaren? 
Bisky: Der Klassenkampf in seiner alten theoretischen Fassung, den 
akzeptiere ich nicht. Aber es gibt arm und reich, es gibt Differenzen.m (my 
italics) 
The invocation of broad (often erroneously deemed 'unideological') categories 
widely perceived as relevant in the competing 'capitalist' discourses of a united 
Germany can in turn be tapped in the (strategic?) attempt to overcome the abiding 
problem faced by the PDS: 
Die PDS wird zwar vor allem als Ostpartei wahrgenommen, wollte aber nie 
nur eine Ostpartei sein. Ihr erklartes Ziel ist und bleibt die Westausdehnung, 
die mit einem antiwestlichen Nationalismus nun schon gar nicht erreichbar 
waren ... 
'"'Gysi: Ingolsladter Manifest... op. cit., p. 8 
,62Good:"Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 277 
, 6 3 ibid., p. 277 
164» 1995 m u ( j e s z u r Entscheidung kommen." op. cit. 
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Die PDS (ordnet) nach ihrem Selbstverstandnis als linke und sozialistische 
Partei in ihrer politischen Programmatik Ost-West Gegensatze in eine 
umfassende Konfliktstruktur - in Konflikte zwischen oben und unten, arm 
und reich, zwischen Kapital und Arbeit, Nord und Slid usw. (ein). 1 6 5 
The PDS's very limited successes in Western Germany offer evidence of their large 
inability to describe a relevant Konfliktlinie a la Neugebauer and Stoss. (see below) 
On this level of abstraction, then, the PDS can offer 'something for everyone'; the 
unifying dimension is simply any cause for complaint with the here and now. It is on 
this level, too, that the PDS offers Solidaritdt ("ein zentraler Begriff in der neuen 
"Begrifflichkeit" der PDS" 1 6 6) to anyone and everyone vaguely betroffen. The lexeme 
is strongly reminiscent of the Gramsican notion of the party making itself 
"Fursprecher aller Interessen". (Note, in Solidaritat, too, the inherently unifying 
semantic.) In the tactical attempt to conflate past and present, Solidaritdt (like 
Revolution ) - as a key term in communist orthodoxy - forms as ideological bridge 
with the past and is equally given a "neuer Anstrich" 1 6 7 inasmuch as: 
Gleichzeitig wird die eng verwandte Bedeutung von "Sympathie"168 
ausgenutzt, wenn der Begriff auf die heutige Situation bezogen wird: "Die 
PDS tritt ein fur Solidaritdt mit alien in Not Lebenden".'69 
This extends to the PDS's problematic 'traditionalists': 
es stimmt schon, daB Menschen in der PDS ein solidarisches Zusammenleben 
erfahren - allerdings bei heftigstem Streit iiber Biographien, iiber Geschichte, 
iiber Politik (observe again: unity in disunity - on a verbal level at least -
MD). Was man aber in der Partei nicht erlebt ist, daB das Leben vor allem von 
Alteren so heruntergespielt und kriminalisiert wird wie sonst in der 
Gesellschaft.170 (my italics) 
, 6 5 Koch: "Die PDS im VereinigungsprozeB." op. cit., p. 192 
, 6 6 Good: "Ober die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 279 
1 6 7ibid., p. 279 
l 6 8 c f . Duden. Deutsches Universal Worlerbuch A-Z. Mannheim, Wien etc.: Duden Verlag 1989: 
Sympathie: auf Grund gewisser Ubereinstimmung, Affinitat positive gefuhlsmaBige Einstellung zu 
jdm., einer Sache 
1 6 9Good: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 279 
l 7 0Lothar Bisky, in: "Die Erneuerung wird aus dem Osten kommen op. cit., p. 315 (see footnote 85) 
205 
The presupposition underlying the PDS's broadly drawn discourse is similar to the 
textual presupposition171, i.e. the "nicht hinterfragte ideologische Pramisse"172, of 
Neubert's work: that all those 'affected' would indeed wish to be championed by the 
PDS: 
Solidaritdt verbindet die Armen, die Unterdruckten, Ostdeutsche, die 
Unterpriviligierten, Frauen und jede andere Gruppe, von der die PDS 
annimmt, dafi sie mil dem Programm der neuen Partei sympathisieren.173 (my 
italics) 
Key ideologemes in this discourse of lowest common denominators are quasi-
mythical, overarching, catch-all "traditionelle Werte der DDR" 1 7 4 such as Frieden 
and Antifaschismus (which finds its practical embodiment in the work of the AG 
Rechtsextremismus/ Antifaschismus175) whose sentiments it would be hard for any 
rational thinking person to challenge: 
Mogen andere Gemeinsamkeiten fehlen, der Begriff Antifaschismus schafft 
gleichsam einen alles iiberspannenden, vereinenden Faktor, den ein 
Kommentator sehr passend als "Metaideologie" beschrieben hat. 1 7 6 (italics in 
original) 
Widely instrumentalised in the discourse of the SED, the term's function was 
primarily to mobilise support for the regime, inasmuch as it was a key symbol in the 
GDR's self-assessment as the embodiment of a break with the National Socialist past: 
SED und DDR waren nach dem Vorbild ihrer kommunistischen 
Fuhrungsgruppen geschichtsnotorisch antifaschistisch - was immer dies auch 
im einzelnen bedeutete - daran war nicht zu zweifeln, durfte auch nicht 
gezweifelt werden.1 7 7 (my italics) 
Its function was more connotative than denotative: 
1 7 1 The term is Burkhardt's; see Burkhardt: "Vergangenheitsiiberwaltigung." op. cit., p. 137 
172Burkhardt, ibid. 
1 7 3Good: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 279 
174Moreau/Neu: Die PDS zwischen Linksextremismus... op. cit., p. 34 
1 7 5ibid., pp. 51-2 
1 7 6Good: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 270 
1 7 7Schulz, Wilfried: "Die PDS und der SED/DDR-Antifaschismus. Historischer Klarungsbedarf oder 
nur Nostalgie und neue Feindbilder?" In: Deutschland Archiv. 4/94, p. 408 
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(Antifaschismus - MD) wurde allmahlich weniger zur Bezeichnung 
bestimmter politischer MaBnahmen, sondem eher als Fahnenbegriff 
gebraucht, der vereinen und mobilisieren sollte. 1 7 8 (italics in original) 
Gerner has shown how the term continues to perform a similar function for the PDS; 
describing the vandalisation of the monument in Treptow (East Berlin) to Soviet 
soldiers who fell in the fight against the Third Reich, he writes: 
X Am 3. Januar (1990 - MD) kam es vor diesem Ehrenmal zu einer 
Demonstration, an der nach ADN-Angaben etwa 200,000 Menschen 
teilnahmen. Initiiert wurde dieser Aufmarsch von der SED-PDS. Einer der 
Hauptredner, Gregor Gysi, forderte "eine gemeinsame Front gegen 
Neonazismus, Neofaschismus, RassenhaB und Auslanderfeindlichkeit". Die 
Intention war eindeutig: Die SED-PDS versuchte die verlorengegangene 
politische Initiative mit der verbindenden Klammer des Antifaschismus 
wiederzuerlangen und konnte in selbem Atemzug die Notwendigkeit einer 
intakten Sicherheitsbehorde einklagen. Die SED spielte aus diesem Kalkiil 
heraus die angeblich von "rechts" drohende Gefahr hoch. 1 7 9 (my emphases) 
Good has identified the use of the term as a basis on which to unify world-views 
which are potentially fundamentally at odds with one another: on the one hand 
liberal and Christian values, for example, on the other a marxist-leninist schema 
which essentially precludes them: 
Ein linkes Zusammengehen, das bedeuten wurde, christliche oder liberate 
Antifaschistinnen und Antifaschisten sowie Linke aus der 
sozialdemokratischen, griinen oder feministischen Tradition auszuschlieBen 
ist nur eine andere Form von linker Ausgrenzung und von Sektendenken.180 
(my italics) 
At the same time, the ideologeme Antifaschismus is a key motivating symbol and 
'ideologische Briicke' in the PDS's hybrid, unificatory discourse which seeks to 
marry a pragmatist recognition of the requirements of the present with a political 
world-view in keeping with the categories of GDR-style marxist-leninist orthodoxy; 
in the narrower frame of reference of the latter, Antifaschismus is all but 
synonymous with Antikapitalismus. Schlosser has shown that the wide 
instrumentalisation of Antifaschismus by Soviets and Germans in the Soviet zone of 
7 8Good: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 270 
7 9Gerner, op. cit., p. 35 
8 0Gregor Gysi, cited in Good: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." ibid. 
\ 
207 
occupation "ist Kennzeichen einer keineswegs zufalligen, sondern durchaus 
bewuBten ideologischen Deutung der Gegenwart und Zukunft" 1 8 1. Inasmuch, 
Schlosser observes, as National Socialism was in the orthodox theory of Marxism-
Leninism subsumed under the overarching category of Faschismus (a highly 
contentious issue - as Schlosser points out - among politologists and historians) and 
Faschismus was deemed to be an inherent feature of Spatkapitalismus, any: 
antifaschistisch deklarierte Politik muGte darum im Munde von 
Kommunisten von Anbeginn an zugleich eine antikapitalistische und 
antiimperialistische Zielrichtung haben.182 
Into this schema of broad, unifying categories fits, too, the notion of Gerechtigkeit: 
Falkner: Herr Bisky ... konnen Sie uns erklaren, was das ... ist, die PDS? 
Bisky: Das kann ich ziemlich kurz sagen: In meinen Augen ist das eine Partei, 
die mehr soziale Gerechligkeit wil l - und deswegen im Parteienspektrum auch 
links anzusiedeln ist. 1 8 3 (my italics) 
The notion is enframed in the PDS-led Gerechtigkeitskomiteesm of mid-1992, which 
we touched upon in chapter 1, where again the lowest common denominator is a call 
for "justice" wherever there is any instance of disaffection with the here and now; 
crucially, too, the notion of Gerechtigkeit, as a broad, positively charged concept 
transcending any capitalist/socialist or East/West ideological divide, could be used 
by the PDS in the attempt to locate a discourse with which to make capital out of the 
German-German divide while at the same time gain a foothold in a united Germany 
(notwithstanding the fact that the Gerechtigkeitskomitees were, of course, designed 
largely to articulate the interests of dissatisfied East Germans)185. 
Deren Struktur schien sich fur die Etablierung eines breiten 
Organisationsbiindnisses wie auch einer gesamtdeutschen 
Sympathisantenszene zu eignen.186 
, 8 1Schlosser, op. cit., p. 31 
1 8 2ibid. 
, 8 3Lothar Bisky, in: "Die Erneuerung wird aus dem Osten kommen." op. cit., p. 313 (see footnote 85) 
, 8 4 F o r a good account of their genesis and general domination by the PDS, see: Moreau/Neu: Die 
PDS zwischen Linksextremismus ... op. cit., pp. 42-4 
, 8 5see footnotes 262, 263, chapter 1) 
l86Neugebauer, Gero: "Hat die PDS bundesweit im Parteiensystem eine Chance?" In: Brie et al. 
(eds.): Die PDS. Empirische Befunde... op. cit., p. 43 
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Diestel und Gysi betonten die "Uberparteilichkeit und Unabhangigkeit der 
Gerechtigkeitskomitees und hatten mil der Wahl des Namens erreicht, daji 
viele Burger spontan Sympathie fur das Projekt etnpfunden (wer ist schon 
gegen Gerechtigkeit?).]S1 (my emphases) 
DEALING WITH SPRACHLOSIGKEIT: ESTABLISHING "OTHERNESS" 
An 'offensive' tactic of seeking discursively to strip the established parties of any 
individuality has been one way in which the PDS has sought to deal with its abiding 
difficulty in being 'other', i.e. in proffering a discourse which presents any profound 
and viable alternative to what is already on offer in the political arena: 
Presenting itself as the "real" opposition in a situation where there is already 
an established opposition already indicates one task facing the PDS. 1 8 8 
The attempt has had two main dimensions: firstly, the other parties are, discursively 
lumped together and presented as a monolithic mass. Making virtue from necessity, 
the PDS has made capital from its very position as a newcomer on the political scene 
in presenting itself as the alternative to a faceless, sluggish and uniform 
establishment. In this the PDS, Good has shown, has had wide recourse to the 
concept of the Etablierten.m In other words, the established parties are lumped 
together on the basis of the lowest common denominator of their having existed prior 
to the unification process: 
Die etablierten Parteien halten an ihrem alten Dogma fest: Sozialistinnen und 
Sozialisten haben in Staat und Parlamenten nichts zu suchen.190 
... Die PDS, so Gysi, habe immer gesagt, daB Bonn mit der Einheit auch eine 
wirkliche linke Partei ins gesamtdeutsche Parlament bekommen werde.1 9 1 
(my italics) 
Observe, in this last example, the expressis verbis invocation of 'difference' (via the 
presupposition trigger 1 9 2 "wirkliche"), which we will discuss in more detail below. 
,87Moreau/Neu: Die PDS zwischen Linksextremismus... op. cit., p. 43. 
, 8 8 Good: PDS - Partei der Diskursiven Strategien"1. op. cit. 
, 8 9 Good: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 268 
l90Parteivorstand der PDS: "10 Thesen ..." op. cit., p. 19 
mNeues Deutschland. 3 December 1990; cited in: Marten-Finnis, op. cit., p. 144 
, 9 2 T h e term is Simpson's, op. cit., pp. 125-6; as a part of the linguistic canon, a presupposition is 
understood to refer to "propositions whose truth is taken for granted in the utterance of a linguistic 
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We will see later, too, how the 'established parties' are indeed differentiated for quite 
different discursive purposes, i.e. when the prospect of the PDS's incorporation into 
political alliances becomes a very tangible one in the wake of the Sachsen-Anhalt 
regional elections of June 1994 and the PDS casts around for 'allies' with whom to 
form strategic alliances (see chapter 4). Good has show how part and parcel of the 
PDS's 'alle in einen Topf message has been to capitalise upon a widely 
acknowledged Rechtsruck in German politics by discursively linking the established 
parties as common catalysts in the process and, indeed, linking these with the 
extreme right wing parties so "that they form one category".193 (Of course, this is no 
different from what the right has sought to do in consistently presenting the PDS as 
the alter ego of the extreme right on the basis of a highly reductive totalitarianism 
model - see chapter 4). The abiding image is that the shift to the right has left a slot 
on the left of the political spectrum which the PDS has made its mission to f i l l as a 
Korrektiv.194 Interestingly, the PDS' status as a Korrektiv here is quite firmly 
predicated upon the GDR biography which the PDS has elsewhere - for the 
immediate discursive purpose of establishing its political 'freshness' - sought to play 
down in its 'gelauterte Sozialisten' mode (we remember: "Kind der Wende"). Its 
mission, it argues, is to introduce the (mythical?) antifascist legacy of the GDR 
where: 
Das geeinte Deutschland lauft Gefahr rechtslastig zu werden und zum Abbau 
von demokratischen und sozialen Rechten zu tendieren, das hangt unter 
anderem auch damit zusammen, daB das Korrektiv "DDR" nicht mehr 
existiert.1 9 5 
A key notion in the PDS's 'synergist' discourse is that the party is in a position to 
create a qualitatively better society by virtue of its having experience of two systems, 
having learned - the hard way - from the mistakes made under the GDR system; at 
expression, propositions without which the utterance cannot be evaluated". Cited from Green, op. cit., 
p. 71. A frequently cited example is "John regrets killing X" which contains the presupposed 
proposition that John has (indeed) killed X. 
, 9 3 Good: PDS - Partei der Diskursiven Strategienl op. cit., Good (ibid.) cites the following 
examples: "auslandische Propaganda der Regierungsparteien und der extremen Rechten (Gysi)"; "die 
extreme Rechte und die Regierungsparteien" (Gysi). 
l 94Disaffected ex-Green member Verena Krieger would agree with the PDS that there has been a 
move to the right in German politics since the heyday of the Greens and that there is little room for 
any alternatives in the established political forum as it stands; she disagrees, however, that the PDS 
has the potential to fill the void on the left of the spectrum: "Die PDS hat eine nur theoretische 
Chance diese Liicke (on the far left of the spectrum - MD) zu fiillen, weil sie iiber die dafiir 
erforderlichen kulturellen und politischen Voraussetzungen nicht nur wegen ihrer SED-Vergangenheit 
nicht verfiigt und nicht verfiigen kann". Krieger, op. cit., p. 158 
, 9 5 G y s i : "Was will die PDS in Deutschland?" op. cit., p. 20 
This notion, of course, that the existence of the GDR helped 'balance out' all the egregious excesses 
of capitalism is not, of course, exclusive to the PDS; see, for example, Gaus, Townson, op. cit. 
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the same time that system's better features are to be taken on board and fused with 
the better elements of bourgeois democracy to yield a "neues Deutschland196, besser 
als DDR und BRD" 1 9 7 ; the message is presented by an ostalgic PDS in a slightly 
modified form to an East German audience which is told of the superiority of its 
collective biography by virtue of its having spanned two social systems198. 
The 'neo-Marxist' notion that the political establishment as it stands works within 
very narrow parameters and offers little in the way of political alternatives per se 
requires the complicity of the established lef t 1 9 9 ; the right, the PDS has consistently 
claimed, is: 
in vielen entscheidenden Fragen leider assistiert durch die SPD, und 
einfluBreiche Teile der Unternehmer.200 
Elsewhere the PDS" deals with its difficulty to successfully-articulate the ways in 
which it might be 'other' by invoking difference on an expressis verbis level - i.e. it 
literally states its difference, which extends to the invocation of the category itself. 
Key expressions, here, are "bei allem Unterschied" and "bei aller Konkurrenz" which 
are frequently and (self-consciously?) invoked where the PDS articulates a position 
1 9 6 We might well ask if there is not a concomitant sub-textual attempt here to promote 'ostalgia' in 
the invocation of a noun phrase whose surface form is identical to a potent symbol of the GDR: the 
SED's press organ Neues Deutschland. 
1 9 7Modrow, Hans: "Wir wollen ein Deutschland, besser als DDR und BRD." op. cit. 
1 9 8"was uns am meisten stort ist die Tatsache, daB die Erfahrungen der Menschen aus den neuen 
Bundeslandern so gering geschatzt werden, dabei haben wir ja schon zwei Gesellschaftsordnungen 
erlebt, wir wissen schon was alles nicht funktioniert und deshalb schauen wir in die Zukunft. 
Ubrigens, auch negative Erfahrungen sind ja ausgesprochen lehrreich." Gregor Gysi: extract from 
speech given on 20 October 1995 at an electoral rally held on Alexanderplatz preceding the elections 
to the Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus. Taped by the author. 
1 9 9 The SPD is accused of working within a framework such as is outlined by contemporary British 
Marxist, Chris Harman {How Marxism Works. London: Bookmarks 1986) in relation to the labour 
party in Great Britain: "every attempt to introduce socialism through parliament has ended up in 
failure ... there have been three majority labour governments in Britain since the war ... yet we are no 
nearer socialism than in 1945." (p. 50) Socialist measures, Harman argues, are always blocked by the 
economic elite in society, for example through the transfer of money abroad to create a balance of 
payments of crisis and the subsequent launching of a press campaign to blame all this on the 
government. Harman quotes Harold Wilson: «We had now reached the situation where a newly 
elected government was being told by international speculators that the policy on which we had 
fought the election could not be implemented. The Queen's first minister was being asked to bring 
down the curtain on parliamentary democracy by accepting the doctrine that an election in Britain was 
a farce, that the British people could not make a choice between policies» (p. 51). So, Harman 
concludes, "In practice the particular 'constitution' we have in Britain means that those who control 
the state machine would be able to thwart the will of an elected left-wing government far short of 
physically overthrowing it. If such a government were elected, it would be faced with massive 
economic sabotage by the employing class. If the government attempted to deal with such sabotage 
using 'constitutional means' - by passing laws - it would find its hands tied behind its back ... 
parliamentary 'democracy' contains in-built mechanisms for preventing any revolutionary movement 
finding expression through it." (p. 53) 
2 0 0 G y s i , Gregor: "Zur politischen Situation und zum Programm der PDS." In: DISPUT. no. 3-4.1993, 
p. 17 
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which might be seen to overlap with that of one of the established parties or feels 
uncomfortable w»ith the boundary between rapprochement and Anbiederung: 
Die PDS weiB (note the factive 2 0 1 presupposition trigger here! -MD), daG sich 
ein gesellschaftlicher Umbruch schon jetzt auf eine Vielzahl 
ubereinstimmender Vorschlage stiitzen kann. Deshalb ist sie bei aller 
Konkurrenz zur SPD und Biindnis 90/Die Griinen bereit, mit Ihnen 
gemeinsam fur Reformen ... zu wirken. 2 0 2 (my italics) 
Talking about being different is, of course, not the same as being different; the 
(insistent!) assertion that: 
Was wir allerdings sichern miissen - und das ist uns auch gelungen (how? 
note, again, the unverifiability! MD) - ist ein anderes Profil als das der SPD. 
Wir sindlmd bleiben eine Partetlinks von der SPD:203 (my italics) 
Fiir die Zukunft der PDS als eine Partei links von der SPD . . . 2 0 4 (my italics) 
is no more than an illocutionary act of slating that the party lies to the left of the 
SPD. The point might seem blatantly obvious, but the fact that simple - and often 
unverifiable2 0 5 - illocutionary declarative acts206 of this type overlap with and can be 
2 0 1Factive verbs are "a collection of verbs, like regret, realise and discover (and know - MD) which 
presuppose their grammatical complements thereby representing them as 'facts'". (Simpson, op. cit., 
p. 124.) An excellent survey of factive presuppositionality is provided by Green, op. cit., p. 71 ff. 
202Parteivorstand der PDS, "lOThesen ..." In: PID. no. 48.1994, p. 24 
2 0 3Lothar Bisky, in: "Die Erneuerung wird aus dem Osten kommen." op. cit., p. 320 (see footnote 85) 
2 o 4Gregor Gysi, in: "Es geht um Macht und nicht urn Moral." In: Lift. Stuttgart. 5/94 (interview) 
2 0 5 T h e programme of the SED (op. cit.) offers a very graphic catalogue of abstract assertions whose 
unverifiability (i.e. our inability to in any way pin down where fulfilment of the proposition contained 
in the assertion starts and ends!) makes them extremely hard to challenge (especially in terms of any 
truth/lie schema). Schaffner/Porsch (op. cit., p. 46) call them "over-generalisations (which) appeared 
necessarily true, in the sense that they could not be disproved". The following represent but a small 
selection of examples: "Das Leistungsprinzip ist Grundprinzip der Verteilung im Sozialismus, es wird 
konsequent durchgesetzt" (p. 32); "Die Sozialistische Einheitspartei tritt fiir den Schutz der 
natiirlichen Umwelt und ihre Gestaltung im Interesse der standigen Verbesserung der Arbeits- und 
Lebensbcdingungen der Werktatigen und einer effektiven Volkswirtschaft ein." (p. 35) "Die 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands betrachtet die Erhohung der Leistungsfahigkeit und 
Effektivitat des Bauwesens auf dem Weg der konsequenten Industrialisierung als eine Aufgabe von 
hohem gesellschaftlichen Rang." (p. 39) "Die Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands fordert die 
Bereitschaft der Werktatigen, sich fur die Losung der staatlichen und gesellschaftlichen Aufgaben 
einzusetzen und Verantwortung zu iibernehmen." (p. 57) We re-iterate, of course, that while the 
discourse of the SED offers a particularly graphic illustration of unverifiable assertions (reliant as the 
party was upon them, given the stark disparity between party theory and political practice), they are 
standard to political discourse in the service of any ideology. Witness, for example: "Labour has 
returned to its values and is now seeking the clearest and most effective ways of putting them into 
practice. This is a historic shift, liberating us from the terrible tyranny of confusing means and 
ends ... The election will present a clear choice - between more of the same under the Tories, and a 
new direction from Labour." Blair, Tony: New Britain - My Vision of a Young Country. London: 




- and often are - confused with the achievement (materialisation or realisation) of the 
stated proposition (i.e. are accepted unproblematically not only as illocutionary acts 
offering a statement of being or achieving but also as the actual realisation of what is 
proposed in the illocutionary statement) shows their ideological potential. By way of 
an example, observe how the original illocutionary act of formally declaring a 
breach with StaatssozialismuslStalinismus such as was enframed in the resolution 
passed at the party's extraordinary conference of 8/9 December 1989 is 
unproblematically re-cast as the realisation of that breach in the following 
historiographic account of the PDS, where the highly complex question of where a 
breach starts and ends (i.e. what constitutes it) is simply circumvented: 
Die Abgesandten von iiber 2 Millionen SED-Mitgliedern vollziehen einen 
radikalen Bruch mit dem Stalinismus und bekennen sich zu den Prinzipien 
eines demokratischen Sozialismus (in December 1989 - M D ) . 2 0 7 (my italics) 
which is in turn accepted and reproduced by Koch as follows: 
... so hielt die PDS in ihrer Entstehungsphase zwar weiter an der 
Eigenstaatlichkeit der DDR fest, brack aber mit der staatssozialistischen 
Konzeption.2m 
and - unproblematically - presents what started out as more of a statement of what is 
as what actually is - and what is ultimately, too, unverifiable. (Alone the existence of 
the KPF, some of whose members have by no means been unequivocal in accepting 
a commitment to a multi-party system!209, is enough to call into question the 
absoluteness of Koch's assertion!). Likewise, the PDS has - formally - passed a 
document entitled "BeschluB zur konsequenten, offenen und offentlichen 
Auseinandersetzung der PDS mit der Problematik 'Staatssicherheit'"210 which allows 
Bisky to state "Wir haben einen BeschluB ... nach dem Leute ihre politische 
Biographie offenbaren mussen, und dazu zahlen Kontakte zum MfS" 2 1 1 Again, 
however, there is no perfect overlap between the statement of what is resolved and 
what actually is; it not hard to see how the above could all too easily be recast as, 
2 0 6see Green, op. cit., p. 66 ff. 
2 0 7Otfrid et al. (eds.): Von den Anfdngen ... op. cit., p. 11 
2 0 8 Koch, op. cit., p. 187 
2 0 9 See, for example, footnote 148, chapter 1 above. 
21u"BeschluB zur konsequenten, offenen und offentlichen Auseinandersetzung der PDS mit der 
Problematik «StaatSSicherheit»." In: 2. Parteitag. 2. Tagung. 21-23 June 1991. Dokumente. 
Berlin: Parteivorstand der PDS 1991, p. 167 
2l1"Koalitionsbereit?" op. cit. 
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say, "Die PDS-Mitglieder offenbaren ihre Stasi-Kontake" which clearly blurs the 
boundary between what is and what is resolved. I f we look more closely at the 
document concerned we see there is much to relativise the initial impression given 
that all members have to - and do - reveal their Stasi-contacts: 
1. Mitglieder der PDS, die als offizielle oder inoffizielle Mitarbeiter fur das 
ehemalige Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit gearbeitet haben sind keine 
Mitglieder "zweiter Klasse" ... 
2. Eine allgemeine Pflicht zur Offenlegung einer friiheren Tdtigkeit fiir das 
MfS gibt es fur die Mitglieder innerhalb der PDS nicht... - Nur fur 
Genosslnnen, die sich anschicken, fur die Partei in exponierter Stellung 
offentlich zu wirken, ist die personliche Biographie in dieser Frage keine 
reine Privatsache mehr . . . 2 1 2 (my italics) 
Observe, however, how Bisky's words above were in fact chosen carefully: the 
indeterminate Leute allows a reading whereby not all members were meant. With 
regard to the question of revealing Stasi contacts Falkner and Huber have very shown 
graphically the extent of the disparity between what is enacted in terms of a formal 
illocutionary resolution and what actually is over and above the mere statement 
thereof.213 
Another way in which the PDS has dealt with the problem of being 'other' has been 
quite simply to displace the problems of defining a vision of its own (and of unifying 
theory and practice) by referring to solutions found outside the immediate textual 
context; in other words, in a kind of 'inter-textual self-referentiality' the PDS can -
and frequently does - make reference to thorough-going definitions made and 
solutions found elsewhere in its discourse, thus making it hard for political 
opponents to offer any immediate challenge to them. In the following, the category 
of solutions is invoked, but there is no attempt in the immediate textual context to 
elucidate what these are: 
Die PDS ist eine pluralistische Partei, die an keine Weltanschauung 
gebunden ist. Sie hat nicht nur eine Theorie, sondern schopft aus den 
Theorien der Moderne - natiirlich aber auch aus klassischen Texten. Das 
fiihrte und fiihrt auch zu unendlichen Debatten, zu nachtelangen, 
2 l 2"BeschluB zur ... Problematik «S(aatssicherheit»." op. cit., p. 168 
2 1 3 See Falkner/Huber, op. cit., pp. 177-81. The later shed very revealing light upon the party's 
discomfort and lack of resolve in the question of revealing Sfaw'-involvement, including Andre Brie's 
conscious violation of the Offenbarungsbeschlufl and Gregor Gysi's knowledge thereof, and the view 
of the "Orthodoxen" (Falkner/Huber's terminology - see p. 180) that the Offenbarungsbeschluji 
represented a «Lust an der eigenen Demontage». (p. 180; cited by Falkner/Huber) 
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nervenzereibenden Auseinandersetzungen - iiber den Stalinismus, iiber die 
Stasi und viele andere Dinge -, aber auch zu vorwartsgewandten Ldsungen.2H 
(my italics) (Observe, here, incidentally, the intrusion of the inherently 
positive vorwdrts, a central ideologeme of official GDR discourse - cf. SED 
slogans such as Vorwarts zu neuen Erfolgen; Vorwarts zur Erfiillung des 
neuen 5-Jahr-Planes; the magazine Vorwarts - as a motivating factor in the 
acceptance of 'solutions' which many in the party's old guard have 
sceptically regarded as more retro- than pro-gressive!) 
Where accused, then, of presenting a "Warenhauskatalog" (Langguth) of different 
ideologies and of failing to offer anything more than an abstract vision far removed 
from reality, the PDS can - and has - frequently countered the charge with the 
assertion that the elements of its vision have been set out elsewhere - in particular in 
its programme - and that it is merely the case that its political opponents have failed 
to take the trouble to look closely enough at its political messages (this recognition in 
itself, of course, not without some justification!). (This doubtless taps in, too, to the 
PDS's instrumentalisation of the German-German psycho-social divide, hinting as it 
does, at an indifference towards the PDS which the party has consistently coupled 
with what it perceives as the general indifference of the West towards the collective 
East German biography). If we look at the 'unifying discourse' of its second 
programme, however, we do, of course, find a 'vision', a 'definition', but one whose 
level of abstraction (high level of superordinacy, causal inexplicitness etc.) might 
well be challenged in terms of its viability. 
We must stress, however, that there we are not attempting here to equate abstraction 
with simplicity; Neubert's study furnishes a graphic example of the sheer complexity 
of a vision located on a very high level of abstract theorisation. Numerous detailed, 
serious and in-depth studies in a whole range of thematic areas have, on an isolated 
textual level, emanated from the enormously diverse range of intellectual and 
intellectual streams which make up the PDS; we do, of course, find in PDS discourse 
in-depth studies which seek to grasp the essence of, and offer a sound definition of -
say- democracy which go beyond well beyond the symbolic (connotative) 
minimalism referred to above; Gysi sets out his understanding of "direkte 
Demokratie"215 (part and parcel of which has been the PDS's frequent call for 
referenda on a whole range of issues), for example, in his Ingolstadter Manifest, an 
2 , 4 Lothar Bisky, in: "Die Erneuerung wird aus dem Osten kommen." op. cit., p. 313 (see footnote 85) 
2,5"Angesichts des Irrsinns von gegenwartiger Politik macht der Vorwurf, das Volk sei zu dumm. 
sich selbst direkt zu regieren, erst recht keinen Sinn." Gysi: Ingolsladter Manifest ... op. cit.; p. 8. 
Observe, here, how Gysi makes rhetorical capital from the invocation of the charge of arrogance 
towards the ordinary populace frequently levelled against proponents of an avant-gardist leading role 
(such as that adopted by the PDS's political predecessor). 
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understanding which, in offering a complex array of (unrealisable?) suggestions, can 
clearly be said to be more concrete than the largely connotatiye democracy offered 
above. In an nutshell, this (Gramsci-inspired?) conceptualisation of democracy calls 
for a "dritte Stimme", for "nichtstaatliche Organisationen"216 (observe the breadth!) 
which will be granted funds from the state budget on a pro rata basis in accordance 
with the level of popular backing secured. It calls, too, for a second parliamentary 
chamber: 
Neben dem Bundestag der Parteien sollte es eine Bundeskammer der sozialen 
Bewegungen geben in die hinein Interessenverbande gewahlt werden ... Sie 
sollten das Recht auf die Vorbereitung und das Einbringen eigener Gesetze, 
auf die Diskussion von Gesetzten des Bundestages und deren zeitweilige 
Zuriickweisung haben, die tief in das Leben von Betroffenen eingreifen.2 1 7 
(my italics) (Observe, again, the broad groupings, the nominalisation and 
causally inexplicit relationals.) 
Gysi offers a vision which can be presented as offering concrete suggestions (to 
counter the frequently levelled charge that the PDS has little to offer in the way of 
concrete proposals), yes, but yet again we observe a high degree of causal 
inexplicitness even though the proposals themselves do not sound unreasonable when 
divorced from a complex background of causal considerations; the problem for the 
PDS has been one of incorporating (often very reasonable sounding) isolated, 
localised, proposals; into an overall, uniform and viable schema which would allow 
these proposals to work beyond the parameters of a narrow and causally inexplicit 
(i.e. highly abstract!) context, i.e. represent a basis for their realisation in practice; of 
Gysi's "direkte Demokratie" Falkner and Huber rightly observe that: 
Das ganze liest sich einfacher, als es zu machen ware ... Wie aber diese drei-
Kammer-System funktionieren soli, zu dem nach PDS-Vorstellungen fur eine 
Ubergangszeit noch eine ostdeutsche als vierte Kammer hinzutreten wurde, 
ist vollig unklar. Zum anderen bleibt unbeantwortet, wie verhindert werden 
kann, daB die zwangslaufig eintretende Verkomplizierung politischer 
Entscheidungsprozesse nicht in eine vollige Paralyse und in 
Entscheidungsblockaden miindet. Zudem ist nicht vorstellbar, wie sich diese 
Ziele mit dem angestrebten Abbau der Biirokratie und der politischen 
Apparate vereinbaren lassen.218 
2 , 6 G y s i : Ingolstadter Manifest ... op. cit., p. 7 
2 I 7 ibid., p. 8 
2 ,8FaIkner/Huber, op. cit., p. 194 
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While Gysi can rightly say, then, to a noisome journalist who challenges the PDS on 
its discursive vagueness that the PDS has offered a detailed conceptualisation of 
democracy as presented in the Ingolstddler Manifest, this must be set against the 
observation that the denotative core of democracy as it is presented in this textual 
context is in itself causally vague (though we cannot pin down the level of that 
abstraction on our sliding scale) and difficult to relate to any practical schema within 
whose context it might be fulfilled. This speaks for so much in the PDS's vision; 
well disposed as they generally are to the PDS, Falkner and Huber observe that: 
Regierungsverantwortung auf Landes- oder gar Bundesebene zu ubernehmen, 
sei die PDS noch nicht (! - observe the relativisation here: this wi l l be a 
crucial element in our discussion in the next chapter - MD) reif, wird vor 
allem der Bundesvorsitzende Lothar Bisky zu betonen nicht miide. Eine 
Analyse des konzeptionellen Riistzeugesder- Partei gibt ihm Rechl. Vision 
und Realitat stehen zu oft in einem nicht iiberbriickbaren Widerspruch,219 
2 ,9Falkner/Huber (op. cit., chapter 8) offer a very graphic catalogue of the difficulties the PDS has 
had4n unifying theory and practice in a whole range of key areas, of the ways in which "die PDS 
verstrickt sich in hausgemachte Widerspriiche und erweckt den Eindruck, manches sei einfach nicht 
zu Ende gedacht". (p. 193) Some of the policy areas they touch upon are as follows (all page numbers 
in brackets refer to Falkner/Huber): 
German nationality and nationalism (see esp. pp. 187-91): the candidacy on the PDS's offene Listen of 
Bismarck's great-grandson, Graf von Einsiedel, in his own words an avowed «Deutschnationalen» 
(Falkner/Huber, p. 188) (and doubtless, inter alia, a useful symbol for the PDS in its attempt to 
transcend the problem of relying on the German-German divide while at the same time wishing to be 
relevant in a united Germany) yielded a major inner-party polemic as Einsiedel had "das West-Linke 
Gebot des nationalen Seibsthasses und das ostdeutsche Dogma von der Einheit allein als 
"Ko(h)lonialisierung der DDR gleichermaBen gebrochen - und die im Umgang mit ihrer nationalen 
Identitat vollig iiberforderte deutschen Linke in die Schiitzengraben getrieben" (p. 188). The 
"/?e/b/7nflugel (note the categorisation - MD!; my italics) an der Parteispitze - Gysi, Bisky, Brie -" had 
"offenbar mittlerweile gespiirt, daB der mehr oder wenige anti-deutsche Ansatz politisch hemmt." 
(pp. 188-9). Falkner/Huber observe that the PDS's programme makes no mention of the question of 
nationality (one way, of course, of backgrounding a problematic but fundamental component of a 
societal vision, but questionable with regard to its long-term viability -MD). The PDS, Falkner/Huber 
argue, has yet to articulate a clear position on the question of Germany nationality/nationalism. 
The Asylum Question (see esp. pp. 192-3) 
Falkner/Huber observe that part and parcel of the PDS's attempt to be 'other' is a not infrequent 
visceral and unconsidered practice of automatically articulating the opposite extreme of governmental 
policy, of which its position on political asylum offers a graphic example: "Ohne Zweifel brachte die 
von der GroBen Asyl-Koalition aus Union, Freidemokraten und SPD bewerkstelligte 
Grundgesetzanderung einen dramatischen Abbau im Bereich der Menschen- und Burgerrechte. Die 
stramme Forderung der PDS nach generell offenen Grenzen, wie sie die PDS dagegenhalt, ist jedoch 
ebenfalls keine realisierbare Alternative." (p. 192) 
Crime - (see esp. pp. 194-5): The PDS calls for a reduction in the number of police and surveillance 
and monitoring systems, puts tackling economic and environmental crimes at the top of its agenda 
and calls for the legalisation of drugs as a solution to drugs-related crimes; "deswegen aber die 
wachsende Alltags- und organisierte Kriminalitat nicht zu bedenken, ist nichts weiter, als in das 
andere Extrem zu verfallen". (p. 195) 
The question of (direct) democracy - discussed above 
The economy: (see esp. pp. 200-6) Falkner/Huber point to the abiding and absolutely fundamental 
programmatic differences residing in the party over the crucial question of ownership; "Neugebauer 
faBt den wirtschaftspolitischen Ansatz der PDS so zusammen: «Die PDS will eine starke Rolle des 
Staates iiber eine interventionistische Politik», wobei sie iiber ihre Demokratisierungsvorstellungen 
auf eine «Vergesellschaftung der Entscheidungsstrukturen» und damit am Ende auf eine faktische 
Verstaatlichung des Privatkapitals zielt. «Das liegt in der Logik der PDS-Forderungen»" (p. 205). The 
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konkrete Vorschlage sind miteinander nicht vereinbar und zu wenig auf ihre 
Handhabbarkeit uberpruft. Und vor allem krankt die PDS an zwei 
Grundubeln nicht nur linker Politik: 
- an der notorischen Abneigung aller Parteipolitik, klar und uneitel zu sagen, 
welche Probleme in der komplizierten, komplexen Welt von heule derzeit 
einfach nicht losbar sind, 
- und an einem Zuviel an "Dagegen" und an einem Zuwenig an konstruktivem 
"Dafilr", wie fast alle Linken.220 (my emphases) 
On the other hand, where a more pragmatic PDS has sought to offer proposals which 
seem reasonable and workable with the framework of the existing polity, this has 
entailed the difficulty that they are widely perceived as either unoriginal or tactical. 
While PDS documents have struggled, then, to make sense of the 'socialist' legacy 
and define the way forward, it is hard to get beyond the high level of discreteness 
and find a viable and uniform vision which operates beyond the - necessarily -
abstract vision we find enframed in highly superordinate language. Of course, in any 
party there are differences in approach and opinion which party ideologues will seek 
to smooth over linguistically with formulations allowing awkward facts to be 
PDS's only way of dealing with the irreconcileability has been, they point out, an expressis verbis 
programmatic recognition thereof, i.e. of the '"unterschiedliche Auffassungen ... hinsichtlich der 
Frage, ob reale Vergesellschaftung der Verfiigung iiber das Eigentum erreichbar ist oder der 
Umwandlung in Gemeineigentum, insbesondere in gesamtgesellschaftliches Eigentum die 
bestimmende Rolle zukommen muB"'. (pp. 205-6; citation from PDS programme 1993) (Observe the 
lexical choice here: what amounts to a discrepancy so wide as to underpin the existence of two 
broadly distinct ideological systems is cast in the attenuative mould of "unterschiedliche 
Auffassungen" - MD.) "Dieser Streit wird dennoch heftig gefiihrt", Falkner/Huber observe, "schon 
deswegen, weil die Anhanger der reinen Lehre die totale Enteignung des Privatkapitals wollen und 
sich nicht mit einer faktischen Verstaatlichung von Entscheidungsstrukturen abfinden werden". 
(p. 206) Crucially, they argue: "Der heftige Disserts in der Eigentumsfrage weist zudem darauf (tin, 
dafi die Probleme der PDS weniger in nostalgischer und/oder ideologisch bestitnmter Ruckschau auf 
den Realsozialismus als in dent Unvermogen liegen, einen komplexen Zugang zu den strategischen 
Zukunftsfragen zu bekommen." (p. 207; my emphases). It is doubtful whether the PDS's programmatic 
championing of a "Vielfalt der Eigentumsformen" (yet again a 'pick and mix' synergy) represents 
anything more than an 'on-paper' solution to the question of the economic way forward. (MD) 
Foreign Policy 
The essential feature of PDS foreign policy is anti-militarism: a ban on nuclear weapons and weapons 
systems, the abolition of military service, NATO/the WEU and German forces abroad, and drastic 
defence cuts. The money so saved could in turn, the PDS argues, be used to pay for greater 
development aid and a scheme whereby the (rich) North would pay the (poor) South compensation 
payments for environmental damage caused. (Observe, again, the polarised schema - MD.) While, as 
Falkner/Huber argue, these sentiments are in themselves very laudable and it is "edel und 
perspektivisch richtig" (p. 197) for a party to promote anti-militarism in its own country, what, for 
example, if this is not accepted in other countries? This is not touched upon by the PDS in its 
programme. So, conclude Falkner/Huber: "Ein PDS-AuBenminister freilich hatte mit diesen 
Grundsatzen nur eine hochst liickenhafte Orientierung fiir seine Politik zur Hand. Denn auch hier 
fehlen praktikable Aussagen gerade zu den Problemen, die die Welt von heute so schwierig machen." 
(pp. 196-7) 
220Falkner/Huber, ibid., p. 206 
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"denied, suppressed or re-interpreted"221; one way of perceiving a party's vision is to 
see it as the - never in any way empirically quantifiable - aggregate of inner-party 
world-views. In the PDS's case the inner-party differences are, however, so 
fundamental as to make it questionable whether, when stripped of the veneer of 
discursive abstraction, these could be overcome to any enduring degree without 
fundamental incisions into the party physiognomy. As we shall see in chapter 5, the 
removal of the KPF's Sahra Wagenknecht from the party executive in 1995 offers 
evidence that the process is underway. 
SOCIALISM - A R E L E V A N T BASIS FOR A NEW S O C I E T Y ? 
Like Wolf above, leading PDS ideologue Michael Brie similarly offers a socialism 
based more upon viscerality than any formal(ised) content: 
Das Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts ist durch eine seit dreihundert Jahren nicht 
gekannte Alternativlosigkeit gekennzeichnet ... 
... Die geistige Alternativlosigkeit kontrastiert aber mit dem verbreiteten 
Gefiihl, daB neue Probleme entstanden sind, fur die es keine Formen einer 
dauerhaften Bearbeitung gibt bzw., alte Probleme - wie die soziale 
Integration, die Gewahrleistung von Vollbeschaftigung und eines Minimums 
sozialer Gleichheit - nicht mehr auf bisherige Weise reguliert werden konnen. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund scheint das Wort Sozialismus als der 
Alternativbegriff schlechthin zum Status quo der fortgeschrittenen 
Industriegesellschaften wieder eine bestimmte Karriere zu machen. Durch 
den Zusammenbruch des Staatssozialismus (observe, again the rescuing of a 
"pure" socialism - MD) hat dieses Wort seine institutionelle Konkretion als 
Herrschaft einer einzelnen Partei und als Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft 
verloren und wird ganz offensichtlich von breiten Schichten der Bevolkerung 
wieder mit positiven Erwartungen gefiillt; (note again legitimisation through 
the invocation of an unquantifiable reference group ["breite Schichten"] of the 
type described by Murray Edelman; many East Germans see socialism as a 
good idea but, as we shall see below, it is doubtful whether they see it as a 
valid basis for a social system - MD). Anders lassen sich die Ergebnisse von 
soziologischen Befragungen nicht erklaren, nach denen zwischen fiinfzig und 
sechzig Prozent der Ostdeutschen den Sozialismus fur eine gute, aber bisher 
schlecht verwirklichte Idee halten ... Fast durchgangig tun dies die PDS-
Trew: "Theory and Ideology at Work." op. cit., p. 97 
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Wahler. Es besteht offensichtlich ein verbreitetes, wenngleich sehr vages 
Gefuhl, (observe, here again, the dialectical approach as Brie pre-empts the 
very real and contradictory counter-proposition!) daB es an grundlegenden 
Alternativen zu den gegenwartigen gesellschaftlichen Strukturen und 
Tendenzen mangelt.222 (my italics) 
Numerous statistical studies have revealed that Brie is indeed not wrong to identify a 
widely positive general response among (in particular East) Germans to the notion of 
socialism. The PDS's 'socialist' cause - by which we mean here the quest for 
harmony and uniformity (if not in practice then at least on the level of language) is 
doubtless boosted by regularly occurring politological observations to the effect that 
"sozialistische Einstellungen" are a prime "Bestimmungsfaktor der PDS-Wahl"2 2 3, in 
which little distinction is drawn between sign and denotation. In other words, a 
hugely reductive observation such as "rund 90% der PDS-Wahler (gegenuber 60% 
der ubrigen Befragten) (halten) den (! - MD; my italics) Sozialismus fur eine gute, 
wenn auch bisher schlecht verwirklichte Idee"2 2 4 presents socialism (a determinate 
"den Sozialismus") as though it were not fluid, as though it were fixed and 
immutable, as though it were something - a concrete vision, say - which 90% of 
those who vote for the PDS uniformly share (and indeed 60% [!!] of the East German 
electorate outside of the PDS). What emerges from Falter and Klein's study, of 
course, is that their (perforce) reductive conception of socialism merely beings 
together a fairly random collection of 'principles' or 'convictions' 2 2 5 (all of which 
were concurred with by 65% of PDS voters) which can in some way be connected 
with the potent socialism category but will in no way carry equal weight in the 
minds of all the individuals polled, nor will they be held with a uniform degree of 
intensity, nor will they be tied together in identical chains of causal 
interrelationships. As such, the acute problem of 'reading' these individuals' mind is 
2 2 2 Brie , Michael: "Das politische Projekt PDS op. cit., pp. 18-9 
2 2 3Falter; Jiirgen/Markus Klein, "Die Wahler der PDS bei der Bundestagswahl 1994." In: Aus Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte. B 51-52.1994, p. 31 
2 2 4 ibid. 
2 2 5 ibid., pp. 30-1; those polled were asked to deny or affirm the following: 
- the US represents an imperialist threat 
- the GDR had more positive than negative sides 
- the economy should be nationalised 
- socialism is a good idea 
- the workers are exploited 
- the third world is exploited 
Observe, here, how it is quite possible for to hold one or all of these views without considering 
oneself 'socialist'! 
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a psycholinguistic one, of the type described above. No language can empirically 
enframe the complex web of motivations which make up the human psyche. Many 
will indeed share some or all of these convictions without necessarily regarding 
themselves as "socialist". Observe, too, how a model like this telescopes 
perspectives: 'socialist' features beatable in a distinct tradition of GDR-style 
communism are thrown together with features more readily ascribable to a wider, 
'traditional' socialism; what this makes clear, too, is the enormous temporal 
telescoping which takes place behind one signifier). It is not hard to see how, by way 
of the conflationary potential in language to which we drew attention above, a 
schema such as Falter and Klein's can - through increasing de-contextualisation - be 
ever more reduced and ultimately reproduced as follows: 
The PDS is the Party of Democratic <Socialism> 
90% of PDS voters support <socialism> (reduction of "think socialism is a 
good idea") 
60% of other voters support <socialism> (reduction of "thinks socialism is a 
good idea") 
> PDS enjoys a broad base of uniform <socialist> support 
- thus allowing Brie to make the above assertion that "zwischen funfzig und sechzig 
Prozent der Ostdeutschen (halten) den (observe the common ground between Falter 
and Klein here in presenting Socialism as though it were a fixed and concrete target -
MD, my emphases) Sozialismus fur eine gute, aber bisher schlecht verwirklichte 
Idee...Fast durchgangig tun dies die PDS-Wahler," whereas commitment is in fact 
primarily to a potent sign on the connotative level, rather than to any broad and 
formalised denotative socialism as system. In other words, the 'socialist' features are 
not uniformly linked in any formalised manner as part of a uniform system or way of 
seeing the world which might be broad enough to form the basis upon which the PDS 
could locate an entire systemic 'vision'. The point might seem an obvious one, but it 
is frequently overlooked in reductive politiological and other! observations and 
studies which fail to problematise and draw attention to the (often very high) level of 
'manageable' abstraction. Like all our attempts to make sense of the complex 
processes which form the world around us world they are fraught with reduction. As 
we have said, as soon as we categorise we - necessarily - simplify. Opinion polls of 
the type cited above offer particulary graphic examples of this 'manageable 
reductiveness'. The above rating are based upon a fixed group of interviewees 
designed to represent society in microcosm but - in being merely representative - can 
never recreate that totality 100%. What is not problematised either, is the fact^that not 
infrequently we respond in opinion polls in the way WF=tMi?te==»i^^^m to (for 
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reasons of political correctness, for example) rather than according to how we 
'really' feel. As an indicator of the caution with which we should approach opinion 
poll findings, it is worth observing that the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. in 
Mannheim records the followings statistics: "AuGerdem halten immerhin 80% der 
PDS-Wahler viel oder gar sehr viel von der Idee des Sozialismus, in der Gesamtheit 
der ostdeutschen Wahler sind es nicht mehr als 29%" 2 2 6, displaying a considerable 
disparity with the statistics recorded above! 
Al l our arguments here are presented with this strong reservation in mind as to the 
reductiveness of all attempts to frame human motivation in language. Certainly, the 
statistical evidence suggests that socialism as a positively charged symbol still enjoys 
an affirmative response from a significant number of - in particular East - Germans. 
For PDS members and voters it forms - on a symbolic level - an integral part of the 
edifice for their politische Heimat:; as Raschke puts it: 1 
Als Symbol fur Egalisierungs- und Solidarisierungspolitik hat Sozialismus 
keineswegs ausgespielt. Gerade in der defensiven Funktion als Schutzmacht 
des Milieus und der kleinen Leute, sicherlich auch als kognitives MuB fur die 
postsozialistische Intelligenz.2 2 7 
Raschke observes, too, that this symbolic socialism is vast in its extension and 
minimal in intension, that its sustainability is predicated quite precisely upon its 
breadth: 
Wenn man ubereinkommt, Sozialismus nicht, oder jedenfalls nicht sehr hart 
zu operationalisieren kann er so alt werden wie das Christentum. Das ware 
auch sehr schnell am Ende, wenn man die Bergpredigt zur verbindlichen 
Richtschnur von Alltagsverhalten machte228 (my italics) 
But while the general population may feel the potency of, and respond positively to, 
socialism on a largely connotative level, may respond positively to certain ideas, 
convictions or features generally subsumed under the socialism category, it does not 
appear to be enough - as we shall see - to motivate most into voting for the PDS as 
bearers of the "socialist" standard. Doubtless, they feel - whether rationally or 
2 2 6cited in: Neugebauer/Stoss, op. cit., p. 232 
2 2 7Raschke, op. cit., p. 796 
2 2 8 ibid. 
cf., for example: "(Der Sozialismus - MD) wird aber als Idee ebenso unsterblich sein wie das 
Christentum, dessen Vision - gleichermaBen unerreicht - in den Jahrhunderten tausendfach von sich 
Christen nennenden Menschen beschmutzt wurde. Die Kirche, die dem Christentum verpflichtet ist, 
hat sich nicht aufgelost, weder nach Hexenverbrennungen noch nach groBtem Versagen wie wahrend 
des Nationalsozialismus." Cited from: Gysi: "Was will die PDS in Deutschland?" op. cit., p. 9 
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viscerally - the truth of what Raschke has said of the general response to socialism in 
the West: 
Die Offentlichkeit wartet kaum auf eine Neudefinition des Sozialismus ... Ein 
wie auch immer modifizierter Sozialismus als System (nicht nur als 
Wertesymbol), der in Deutschland vom Boden der alten DDR ausgeht, wird 
selbst bei den aufrichtigsten und idealistischsten Vertretern an seinen 
Voraussetzungen scheitern. Sozialismus als System wird in Deutschland auf 
Jahrzehnte mit dem Bankrott eines Wirtschaftssystems, mit okologischem 
Raubbau, mit der Krake Staatsbiirokratie und einem perfektionierten 
Repressionssystem verbunden bleiben. Mogen andere den Sozialismus neu 
erfinden, doch noch die Verbindung von Sozialismus mit Markt und 
Demokratie entdecken, in Deutschland hat er seine Chance gehabt.229 (my 
italics) 
Brie's assertion, then, that PDS voters and sympathisers and indeed large sections of 
the populace in general respond positively to socialism is thus not unfounded; the 
question, though, is at what level of abstraction and whether this can translate into a 
uniformly accepted basis upon which to locate a new systemic vision. Quite apart 
from the fact that it is highly questionable whether the party's Kommunistische 
Plattform would accept, as we witnessed above, Brie's commitment to a socialism 
predicated upon partypluralism, Brie's conceptualisation of socialism "entbehrt ... 
einer klaren Konfliktposition 2 3 0, die Existenzgrundlage der Partei sein konnte". 
2 2 9Raschke, op. cit., p. 796 
230Neugebauer/St6ss, op. cit., p. 264; the latter argue that any party system mirrors the 
"Konfliktstruktur" (p. 263) of a particular society; see, in particular their introduction (pp. 11-33) and 
pp. 263-75. The existence of a party is inextricably linked, they argue, with this structure: "Die 
Existenzgrundlage von Parteien bilden mithin Konflikte iiber Werte und/oder politische Sachfragen, 
die in alien Gesellschaften vorhanden sind. Parteien iibersetzen gesellschaftliche Konflikte in Politik. 
(p. 19) A party "muB ihre Existenzberechtigung auf dem Wahlermarkt unter Beweis stellen 
(konnen)". (pp. 19-20) The question is, of course, which line of conflict the PDS represents. 
Neugebauer/Stoss argue that Brie's attempt to cast the PDS as a Weltanschauungspartei ("long 
standing doctrinal party"; p. 24) taking on board a (traditionally socio-economically grounded) 
socialism/capitalism cleavage ("Michael Brie vertritt eine klare These: Die PDS sei ein Ausdruck des 
Ost-West Gegensatzes und des Gegensatzes zwischen Sozialismus und Kapitalismus." p. 22) is an 
anachronism and something of an irrelevance in a post-industrial society in which socio-economic 
issues - unlike in the nineteenth century in the case of the SPD and the CDU - "immer weniger 
parteibildend (wirken)". (p. 266) Brie is adhering, they argue, to a "Freezing-These" (p. 22) still 
widely expounded in the sixties but ignoring the fact that "In der Parteienforschung neigt man 
vielmehr zu der Ansicht, daB sich die Konfliktstruktur der westlichen Parteiensysteme in den 
siebziger und achtziger Jahre fundamental gewandelt hat", (p. 22) Neugebauer and Stoss proffer a 
very detailed account (see esp. pp. 263-75) of the complex interplay of what they perceive as the four 
main dynamics - Libertarismus, Auloritarismus, Marktfreiheit, soziale Gerechtigkeit (themselves of 
course perforce reductive! - MD) informing this conflict structure, (p. 270) Their model is in turn 
based up on a model devised by Kitschelt whose theories, they point out, presuppose that "die 
klassische Konfliktline westlicher Industriegesellschaften (socialist vs. capitalist politics) durch die ... 
Konfliktlinie libertarian vs. authoritarian politics erganzt bzw. uberlagert wird. Libertare Politik 
meint hier z.B. Okologie. Feminismus, Abriistung. Dezentralisierung, Pluralisierung. 
Selbstbestimmung und Spontaneitat. (p. 267-8; italics in original) (Neugebauer/Stoss cite Kitschelt's 
understanding of the term libertarian: "My use of the concept 'libertarian' is rooted in the European 
linguistic convention that associates the term with anarchist and syndicalist theories of direct 
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Parties, Neugebauer and Stoss argue, are mortal organisations with a cycle of 
existence (birth, life and death). A party with a relevant Weltanschauung and flexible 
enough to take on board the changes arising in society and adapt to these, can expect 
to secure its existence in the long term; such a party can be compared with an 
Interessenpartei which, as a representative of transient, largely socio-economically 
grounded interest, have an existence which is only "mittelfristig gesichert". Brie's is 
an attempt to harness the PDS's existence to a Weltanschauung based upon a 
socialism-capitalism cleavage. And while Neugebauer and Stoss's observation that 
"Brie fiillt den Begriff Sozialismus nicht inhaltlich" is - like Topitsch's Leerformel 
metaphor - perhaps misleading/unhelpful inasmuch as even a vastly extended term 
has some intension (socialism's "content" here, though difficult to grasp tangibly, is, 
at the very least, that it is a foil for the system obtaining: still a content, though one at 
a high degree of generality), they percipiently recgnise that: 
er (Brie) faBt ihn (den Begriff Sozialismus) abstrakt als Alternative zum 
Status quo. Das kann vieles bedeuten ... die Alternative zum Status quo (mufi) 
democracy, sympathetic to the self-organisation of autonomous individuals and voluntary associations 
in collective decision-making processes." (p. 268)) "Autoritare Politik bedeutet nach Kitschelt u.a. 
Hierarchie, Paternalismus, Gemeinschaft, wirtschaftliche GroBe und vor allem Fremdenfeindlichkeit. 
Diese neue Konfliktlinie sei eine Begleiterscheinung des sozialen Wandels und erzeuge in 
Wechselwirkung mit der klassischen Konfliktline, daB sich die Hauptachse der Parteienkonkurrenz 
verschiebt." (pp. 268-9) Thus, Neugebauer/Stoss conclude, "Das Kitschelt-Modell kombiniert also die 
klassische, eher okonomisch-sozial gepragte Konfliktlinie mit der zwischen libertaren und autoritaren 
Wertorientierungen". (p. 269) Neugebauer/Stoss argue convincingly that (traditional) 
socialist/capitalist conceptions are encapsulated in modern industrial society in the tension between 
the need for maximum modernisation/profit/ rationalisation (i.e. market freedom [also: liberalism]) on 
the one hand and the need to bear in mind social considerations on the other ("soziale Gerechtigkeit"; 
p. 270); "Die Extrempositionen (Marktwirtschaft vs. Planwirtschaft) werden in den heutigen 
Demokratien kaum noch vertreten. Der Konigsweg liegt irgendwo zwischen beiden Polen." (p. 269) 
In a nutshell, then, the main area of party conflict according to Neugebauer/Stoss's model runs along 
two axes, the first having libertarian ism and authoritarianism as its polls, the second social justice and 
market freedom: 
Ahnlich wie Kitschelt gehen wir davon aus, daB sich die Parteienkonkurrenz hauptsachlich 
zwischen einer eher sozial und libertar orientierten und einer eher neoliberal und autoritar 
orientierten Politik (bzw. Modernisierungskonzeption) vollzieht. Entlang dieser Hauptachse 
der Parteienkonkurrenz gruppieren sich die Wertorientierungen der Wahlerschaft. Am sozial-
libertaren Pol sind die Biindnisgrunen angesiedelt, am neoliberal-autoritaren Pol die 
Republikaner. Die ubrigen Parteien liegen dazwischen, die SPD naher am sozial-libertaren 
Pol, die C D U / C S U naher am neoliberal-autoritaren Pol. (p. 271) 
Crucially, however, Neugebauer/Stoss do draw attention to the fluidity and reductiveness of their 
model (an inevitable by-product of any attempt to frame and categorise linguistically the complex 
interplay of values and motives pervading the human mind [MD]; for an excellent account of this 
'inadequacy' of language, see: Fowler, Roger: "Linguistic Criticism." op. cit.); the two value pairs are 
neither rigid nor mutually exclusive but rather inter-related in a highly complex manner: 
Wir gehen ... nicht davon aus, daB ein Mensch entweder libertar oder autoritar eingestellt ist, 
entweder fur soziale Gerechtigkeit oder fur Marktfreiheit eintritt. Vielmehr diirften wir es ja 
mit sehr differenzierten Positionen zu tun haben. Beispielsweise kann eine Person in Sachen 
Umweltschutz sehr libertar denken, bei der inneren Sicherheit aber autoritaren Losungen den 
Vorzug geben. Und sie mag sich gleichermaBen fur soziale Gerechtigkeit und fiir 
Marktfreiheit aussprechen. Das Achsenkreuz bildet daher ein Ensemble von vier Vektoren, 
wobei jeder Mensch auf jedem Vektor mit seinem persdnlichen Durchschnittswert vertreten 
ist. Dies entspricht der bekannten Komplexitdt von Denkmustern und Wertorientierungen in 
fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaften, die sich der Zuordnung zu geschlossenen 
Weltanschauungen weithin entziehen. (pp. 271-2; my emphases) 
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erst noch formuliert werden. Fest steht lediglich, daji sie die Bezeichnung 
Sozialismus tragen soil... Die Konfliktlinie, die die PDS im Parteiensystem 
reprasentieren mochte, besteht noch gar nicht (oder nur latent). Sie muB erst 
geschaffen, also zunachst konzeptualisiert und dann der Bevolkerung bewuBt 
gemacht werden. Die PDS steht also, was ihre zukunftsgestaltenden 
Konzeptionen angeht, mit leeren Taschen da.2 3 1 (my italics) 
For Neugebauer and Stoss a bipolar, 'socialist/capitalist' schema of conceptualising 
the world - especially where the poles are based upon traditional socio-economic 
considerations - are misnomers in complex, post-modern economies. For them this 
traditional line of conflict, increasingly superseded, has at best been transmuted into 
a non-systemic polarity ranging between "Soziale Gerechtigkeit" at the one extreme 
and "Marktfreiheit" at the other (though, they stress, it is a simplification to see these 
as in any way mutually exclusive): 
Wir gehen davon aus, daB die okonomisch-soziale Konfliktlinie 
(Sozialismus-Kapitalismus), die die Parteienkonkurrenz lange Zeit 
maBgeblich bestimmt hat, zwar nach wie vor Bestandteil der Konfliktstruktur 
der deutschen Gesellschaft ist, aber auf die Alternative "Soziale Gerechtigkeit 
- Marktfreiheit" verkiirzt und zunehmend urn eine neue Konfliktlinie erganzt 
wird: um den Gegensatz von libertaren und autoritaren Werten. 2 3 2 
Indeed, can it even be said that the PDS's voter base fits neatly into a (traditional) 
capitalist-socialist schema in which it votes 'socialist' on account of its socio-
economic situation? In other words, can the PDS's 'socialism' be said to incorporate 
a unifying component of socio-economic motivation? The findings of Falter and 
Klein reveal convincingly that the PDS is anything but the natural choice of 'the 
workers' or the economically 'downtrodden'. In their detailed study of the 20% of 
the East German electorate who voted PDS in 1994, Falter and Klein show that the 
PDS faired best among Angestellte and Beamte in densely populated areas with 
strong service industry sectors (every fourth Angestellte and every third Beamte 
voting for the PDS): 
man kann mit einiger Berechtigung vermuten, daB es sich bei diesen 
Berufsgruppen, die ja in der Hauptsache dem offentlichen Dienst angehdren 
um die Privilegientrager des alten Systems handelt.233 
2 3 1 ibid., pp. 264-5 
2 3 2 i b i d . , p. 274 
2 3 3 Fal ter /Kle in , op. cit., p. 26 
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Crucially and significantly in terms of any capitalist-socialist schema which might be 
predicated upon socio-economic status: 
Bei Arbeitern, Selbstandigen und Rentnern, sowie bei Landbewohnern 
dagegen war die Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus im Osten mit 
lediglich 15 Prozent bis 17 Prozent der abgegebenen Stimmen weit weniger 
erfolgreich als beim Durchschnitt aller Wahler ... 
Als Fazit der sozialgeographischen Analyse konnen wir festhalten, daB 
sowohl in den alten als auch in den neuen Bundeslandern die PDS 
Wahlergebnisse in den urbanen Dienstleistungszentren 1994 sehr viel hoher 
ausgefallen sind als in anders strukturierten Gebieten und daB sie sich in den 
klassischen Arbeitergebieten Ostdeutschlands nach wie vor sehr schwer tat. 2 3 4 
Falter and Klein identify, too, a direct correlation between the level of education and 
the likelihood of a vote for the PDS: "Je hoher die formale Bildung, desto 
wahrscheinlicher eine Wahl der PDS". 2 3 5 Perhaps most crucial of all, the PDS -
despite, as we witnessed in the preceding chapter, the 'economic scaremongering' 
which is a not infrequent feature of its discourse - is not the party given any 
particular preference by those with a low income: 
Weit unterdurchschnittliche Erfolge erzielte die PDS auch bei Personen mit 
sehr niedrigem Haushaltseinkommen, wahrend Personen mit einem 
monatlichen Haushaltsnettoeinkommen von mehr als 3500 DM 
iiberdurchschnittlich haufig die Absicht auBerten, PDS zu wahlen. 2 3 6 
So, conclude Falter and Klein, it would be erroneous to see the PDS's voters as a 
group of poor and underprivileged 'Einheitsverlierer': the PDS was voted for largely 
by individuals earning reasonable to good salaries, holding down steady jobs or 
receiving reasonable pensions237. True, the evidence suggests that the PDS has had 
2 3 4 i b i d . , pp. 26, 24 
2 3 5 i b i d . , p. 28 
2 3 6 i b i d . , p. 28 
2 3 7 Wittich's statistics show 63% of the PDS's voters in 1994 as having a net monthly income in excess 
of D M 2,500 (cf. 72% in the case of C D U and SDP respectively); see: Wittich, op. cit., p. 78 
Wittich (ibid., pp. 69-70) observes a not dissimilar situation in the case of the PDS's membership: "Es 
ist bei weitem keine Mehrheit, die in sozialer Hinsicht zu den Verlierern der Einheit zu rechnen ist" 
(p. 69) but offers the relativisation, however, that "Aber immerhin etwa ein Viertel der Mitgliedschaft 
gehort zu den unteren Einkommensgruppen: Dazu zahlen vor allem Arbeitslose, Vorruhestandler und 
ein Teil der Berufstatigen in unteren Qualifikationsgruppen" (p. 69); on the other hand, he observes, 
"rund 30% der PDS-Mitglieder (haben) ein monatliches Nettoeinkommen zwischen 2,500 DM 
und 3,500 D M und gehoren damit fur Ostdeutschland in die Gruppe der relativ gut situierten. 
Weitere 20% verfiigen uber monatliche Nettoeinkommen von iiber 3,500 D M und sind damit in die 
oberen Einkommensgruppen in Osten zu rechnen". (pp. 69-70) 
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slightly above average success in mobilising certain groups on (as would seem 
likely) primarily socio-economic grounds, in particular the unemployed238, but in 
terms of the overall picture, this success seems of limited significance. Wittich 
provides a graphic picture of how the PDS, in fact, "ihren Wiedereinzug in den 
Bundestag den Angehorigen vieler sozialer Gruppen zu verdanken hat".2 3 9 
Falter and Klein's picture of the PDS is echoed by Neugebauer and Stoss as follows: 
Die PDS reprasentiert ein abgegrenztes und mittlerweile wohl stabiles Milieu, 
das sich mental nicht in die Ordnung der Bundesrepublik integrieren lassen 
wil l . Dieses Milieu besteht nicht (italics in original - MD) aus 
Einheitsverlierern im materiellen Sinn, nicht aus relativ oder sogar absolut 
deprivierten Personen, die durch die Einheit benachteiligt oder schlechter 
gestellt worden sind und daher (noch) nicht integriert werden konnten. 
Folglich geht es diesem Milieu auch nicht um die Vertretung von kruden 
Ostinteressen. Zwar ist der Anteil der Arbeitslosen und der Bezieher niedriger 
Einkommen an den PDS-Anhangern etwas grbBer als bei den anderen 
Parteien. Zumeist sind sie aber okonomisch-sozial voll integriert und weithin 
auch gut situiert.240 (my italics) 
Andre Brie, by the end of 1996 still frustrated with a PDS for his liking still far too 
unpragmatic, still 'pussyfooting' around its problematic history in pandering to the 
reservatio mentalis of the Ost-Milieu which forms its voter base, reveals of the PDS 
voters who meet in the pub at his Mecklenburg retreat that: 
Es sind Einheitsgewinnler, die sich da treffen. Aber sie reden davon, daB 
friiher alles besser war. 2 4 1 (my italics) 
Where, then can we begin to look for a unifying 'motivating factor' among PDS 
members and voters for supporting the PDS? For Neugebauer and Stoss et al. unity js 
only to be found on a very high level of generality: that of a broad "Abwehrhaltung", 
a reservatio mentalis vis-a-vis the new system, incorporating a complex interplay of 
psychological motives. (We remember Koch's observations above - see footnotes 55 
and 56). An abstract 'disaffection' (prompted by a veritable plethora of differing 
reasons and considerations) with the Federal Republic can hardly be said to form the 
nucleus for developing a systemic vision; herein lies the essential (and 
- 3 8 see: Falter/Klein, op. cit., p. 26; Neugebauer/Stoss, op. cit., p. 232 
2 3 9 see : Wittich, op. cit., p. 79 
2 4 0Neugebauer/St6ss, op. cit., p. 285 
2 4 1 Andre Brie, cited in: Hartung, Klaus: "Der artige Rebell." In: Die Zeit. no. 33. 1996 
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irreconcilable?) tension facing party ideologues, who must deal with the task of 
articulating the essence of a future-orientated, systemic 'democratic socialism' 
incorporating a relevant liqe of conflict in society (such as would sustain the PDS as 
an electable party) and marrying this 'vision' with the essentially anachronistic 
position of its voters who have given the party its mandate as 'democratic socialists' 
and for whom democratic socialism is anything but a formalised, homogenous and 
clearly defined Weltanschauung: 
Strategisch befindet siclTdie Partei in einer schwierigen Lage. Das betrifft 
zundchst die Diskrepanz zwischen ihrem Anspruch als 
Weltanschauungspartei-und der Mentalitdt hrer Anhdnger. Ihrem offiziellen 
programmatischen Selbstverstandnis nach ist die PDS eine sozialistische 
Partei, die mit dem Staatssozialismus gebrochen hat. Sie will ... durch 
demokratische Reformen eine okologische, solidarische, emanzipatorische, 
gerechte, freie und zivile Gesellschaft schaffen ... Ihre Anhanger (im Osten) 
eint dagegen keineswegs der demokratische Sozialismus als Konzept zur 
Gestaltung moderner Industriegesellschaften, sondern zuallererst die 
Zugehorigkeit zu einem regional (und sozial) klar abgegrenzten Milieu, die 
Teilnostalgie bezuglich der DDR, die Wahrung von Interessen der DDR-
Eliten in der neuen Gesellschaftsordnung und schlieBlich die antiwestliche 
und modernisierungsfeindliche Grundhaltung".242 (my italics) 
And while the unificatory discourse of the PDS has sought to overcome this 
discrepancy with a rather clumsy expressis verbis representation of the pandering to 
the interests of its Ostmilieu as an integral part of its democratic-socialist "vision" for 
a united Germany: 
Sie (Die PDS - MD) ist die Partei, die ostdeutsche Interessen als integralen 
Bestandteil einer alternativen Reformpolitik fur ganz Deutschland begreift. 2 4 3 
Neugebauer and Stoss argue that: 
In Wirklichkeit handelt es sich dabei um eine Ausrede, urn die Flucht vor der 
- tendenziell unausweichlichen - Entscheidung zwischen einer modernen, 
reformsozialistischen Perspektive und den traditionellen Orientierungen und 
2 4 2Neugebauer/St6ss, op. cit., p. 304 
2 4 3Parteivorstand der PDS: "lOThesen ..." op. cit., p. 19 
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bornierten Interessen eines besonderen Milieus in Ostdeutschland, dem die 
PDS allerdings ihre parlamentarische Reprasentanz verdankt.244 
How has the PDS been able to survive in the short term? Neugebauer and Stoss argue 
that it has sustained its existence by capitalising on an "Ost-West-Konflikt"245. It is 
the only party which lives from that conflict. The problem for the PDS, they argue, is 
that this line of conflict, which the other parties incorporate as Nebenkonflikte, is 
simply that: a secondary conflict which is potentially transitory. We must, however, 
be very clear on the nature of this 'Konflikt': the compelling evidence they and 
numerous other commentators246 offer (which we touched upon above) is that the 
PDS is not the party which represents East German socio-economic interests, despite 
its attempts to make itself the Anwalt of, and have itself identified with, 
Einheitsverlierer in a socio-economic sense. In other words the PDS is not the party 
representing what Neugebauer and Stoss call 'krude Ostinteressen\ (see footnote 
240) The PDS is not the party which the "Schwache" or the "Betroffene" in any 
socio-economic sense have voted for any more than for any other party. If it can be 
deemed an interest party, then it is so for a specific milieu, the nature and 
characteristics of which we have discussed above. The evidence presented here is 
that the PDS functions as an interest party on a more prominent socio-psychological 
level 2 4 7 , as the party which provides its members with a Seelenmassage. Put another 
way, the findings discussed above make patently clear the complex, conflationary 
and reductive nature of statements, frequently encountered in the German press, such 
as "the PDS is the party of Ost-Interessen" and the enormous problem of in any way 
grasping or determining empirically what being a party representing East-German 
interests "really" means. We can only invoke categories - in themselves reductive and 
simplistic - such as socio-economic, krude Ostinteressen, reservatio mentalis which 
again fail to address the fact that these categories are themselves very difficult to 
specify semantically and can be understood from different perspectives; what is even 
more problematic is that a given individual might have voted for the PDS out of a 
complex amalgam of - often not rationally explicable - motives ascribable to more 
than one category. On a broad level we can say that the term fails to problematise the 
distinction between interests which are largely socio-economically grounded and 
interests which are socio-psychological (where the PDS is a vehicle for personal 
2 4 4Neugebauer/St6ss, op. cit., p. 305 
2 4 5 i b i d . , p. 302 
2 4 6 s u c h as Falter/Klein, Wittich 
2 4 7 W e must guard, for example, as Neugebauer/Stoss point out, against equating the PDS with an 
interest party such as the Block der Heimatvertriebenen who represented a distinct set of primarily 
socio-economic demands which, when largely met, rendered the latter obsolete, (see 
Neugebauer/Stoss, pp. 238-9) 
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vindication, for providing a psychological prop for those who, while they may not be 
any worse off in pecuniary terms, suffer, say, on an emotional level from the loss of 
their societal status). These categories are not, however, mutually exclusive, nor are 
they in any way fixed or pre-defined. The reductive notion Ost-Interessen is 
suggestive of a (mythical) uniformity of East German interests pitted against West 
German interests; to say (as is frequently done in the media) that the PDS is the party 
of Ost-Interessen implies a much wider voter-base for the PDS than it has in reality, 
that the PDS is the representative of all and any East German aspiration(s), is the 
party upon which all East German hopes and aspirations in the new system are 
pinned, irrespective of their nature; Neugebauer and Stoss's statistics reveal that of 
25,000 East Germans (again a necessarily reductive picture!) asked what they 
deemed the three most acute current problems to be, only 15% (! -MD) named 
problems which the two sociologists felt could be in some way linked to an East-
West disparity (yet another reduction, of course: the perspective bears their 
subjective interpretation!); and indeed, only 11% of this sub-group declared 
themselves to be PDS voters. Thus some 90% of those who mentioned problems in 
connection (as far and Neugebauer and Stoss were concerned) with an East-West 
disparity took their vote elsewhere. Neugebauer and Stoss conclude that: 
Es gibt keine Partei, die massiv von Wahlern bevorzugt wird, die sich 
besonders fur Ost-Interessen einsetzen.248 
Similarly, we must be very cautious in using the term Protestpartei to characterise 
the PDS. Within a wider, general frame of reference, the PDS is doubtless the party 
through which a specific milieu registers its mental protest against the new polity on 
the level of an esoteric reservatio mentalis; from within the narrower context of the 
term's received definition within the discipline of party and electoral research, 
however, it is highly doubtful whether the PDS could be labelled so: Neugebauer and 
Stoss point out that while "der Begriff 'Protest' ... in der Wahlforschung nicht klar 
definiert (ist)", a general feature of any attempts to furnish a formalised definition has 
been the recognition - in this academic discipline - that what characterises protest 
parties is a high level of voter mobility, these voters having as their general aim: 
den etablierten Parteien einen Denkzettel (zu - MD) verpassen ... Protestwahl 
meinte den Wechsel von einer etablierten Partei zu einer Randpartei, 
wechselndes Wahlverhalten also"2 4 9 
2 4 8 i b i d . , p. 262 
2 4 9 i b i d . , p. 247 
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in other words, their electoral behaviour is very much bound up with short term 
frustrations.250 The extensive studies on electoral behaviour/loyalties and voter 
mobility which Neugebauer and Stoss have carried out 2 5 1 (the necessary 
"Komplexitatsreduktion" of which they themselves stress)252 reveal, however, that: 
Zwei Drittel der PDS-Anhanger im Osten sind ... Wiederwahler, was -
jedenfalls im Osten - keineswegs von geringen Parteibindungen und groBer 
Wahlerfluktuation zeugt. Die PDS unterscheidet sich diesbeziiglich kaum von 
der SPD und der FDP in den neuen Landern.2 5 3 • 
The PDS is compared with the Republikaner who, with 60% fluctuation, represent a 
typical protest party (within terms of the academic discipline concerned). - MD). (The 
PDS in the West, on the other hand, is characterised by a high level of voter 
fluctuation but because of the "minoritaren Bedeutung der West-Anhanger am PDS-
Elektorat verbietet es sich allerdings, der Partei in toto das Label Protestpartei 
anzuheften".254) Clearly, then, the signifier Protestpartei fails to show the importance 
of this wider, contextual background for the purposes of assessing its denotative core; 
it could thus easily - in failing to show any mixing of frames of reference - provide a 
conflationary level on which to (simplistically) lump the PDS together with - say -
the Republikaner, the ideological potential of this for certain political actors of, for 
example, the CDU/CSU (who have by no means always invoked and handled terms 
like Protestpartei with the rigour we might expect of scholarly, as opposed to 
politically motivated], debate255 and who - as we shall see below - have consistently 
relied heavily on the invocation of a reductive 'extreme left = extreme right' schema) 
is, of course, not inconsiderable! 
2 5 0Neugebauer/Stoss observe that the term has been used with particular frequency in respect of the 
Republikaner "und sollte verdeutlichen, daB nicht alle REP-Wahler notwendigerweise iiberzeugte 
Rechtsextremisten sind". ibid., p. 246 
2 5 , s e e ibid., pp. 244-53 
2 5 2 i b i d . , pp. 242-3 
2 5 3 i b i d . , p. 246 
2 5 4 i b i d . , p. 247-8 
2 5 5 T h e CDU's Gerd Langguth ("PDS - Partei mit Doppelgesicht." op. cit.) for example, offers an 
understanding of a 'protest vote' for the PDS which is very much in keeping with the 'extreme left 
(PDS) = extreme right ( R E P U B L I K A N E R ) ' schema which the right has consistently invoked; 
Neugebauer/Stoss's findings show Langguth's reductive attempt, as in the following, to link the PDS 
with Protest (which is in turn linked with "keine ideologische Bindung" [Langguth, ibid., p. 20]) to be 
in need of considerable relativisation: "Uber ihre Stammwahler hinaus konnte die PDS in 
Ostdeutschland inzwischen auch ein nicht unbetrachtliches Protestpotential von unzufriedenen 
Wahlern, die keine ideologische Bindung haben ansprechen. Indem sie den Ost-West-Gegensatz 
schiirte, gelang es der PDS bei den letzten Wahlen, solche Protestwahler in groBerem Umfang 
zusatzlich zu gewinnen." (p. 20) 
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What is crucial here, too, then, is that the PDS has a largely static reservoir of voters. 
Neugebauer and Stoss's statistics are backed up by the findings of the Dortmunder 
FORSA Institut 2 5 6 which reveal that 4 out of 5 of those who voted PDS in 1990 did 
so again in 1994; all in all 57% of the PDS's 1994 vote came from those who voted 
PDS in 1990; by the autumn of 1994 70% of PDS voters saw themselves as 
"langerfristige Anhanger ihrer Partei".257 Falter and Klein conclude that: 
Diese Werte deuten auf die Existenz einer PDS-Stammklientel hin, was fur 
eine nominell so junge, allerdings in einer langen, fast achtzigjahrigen 
Tradition stehende Partei ungewohnlich ist. 2 5 8 
While the PDS has had some limited successes in stealing 'protest' voters from other 
parties (some 80% of the "Parteiwechsler" who transferred to the PDS in 1994 came 
from the two large Volksparteien, SPD and CDU 2 5 9 , the overall picture seems to be 
that the PDS has, on the whole, found it difficult to harness votes from outside of a 
fairly static voter reservoir. 
Where, then, has the complex interplay of the PDS's 'discourse of causal 
circumvention' and its 'unificatory discourse' (the two being by no means mutually 
exclusive!) been most successful? Neugebauer and Stoss reveal that we may locate 
the answer in the PDS's having mobilised to a maximum a restricted pool of voters. 
The sudden surges in support for the PDS in the run-up to both the Europawahl and 
the Bundestagswahl can be seen to be almost exclusively based upon their ability to 
mobilise a set of vacillating voters who had in very large part voted PDS before 2 6 0: 
Die Erfolge der PDS bei der Europa- und der Bundestagswahl beruhten nicht, 
wie etwa bei der CDU/CSU, auf langerfristigen Mobilisierungsleistungen 
sondern auf temporaren Spitzenleistungen in StreBsituationen. Dies erzielte 
sie in West und Ost gleichermaBen ... bei den Wiederwahlen, nicht aber bei 
den Wechselwahlern. Es gelang ihr mithin, die treuen Anhanger zum 
Urnengang zu veranlassen.261 
2 5 6 c i ted in Falter/Klein, op. cit., p. 24 
2 5 7 i h i d . 
2 5 8 i b i d . , p. 24 
2 5 9Neugebauer/St6ss, p. 247 
2 6 0 " I n der41.Woche verbuchte die PDS im Osten 3.7% Wiederwahler, 2.9% Wechselwahler. In 
der 42. Woche stiegen die Wiederwahler auf 10%, die Wechsler sanken dagegen auf 1.5%. Der 
Zuwachs anlaBlich der Bundestagswahl verdankte sich mithin ausschlieBlich dem Anstieg der 
Wiederwahler." ibid., p. 252 
2 6 1 ibid., p. 249 
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Here we arrive at the crucial point: 
Die Wahlergebnisse beruhen also im Prinzip nicht darauf, daB es ihr gelingt, 
zusatzliche Wahlerschichten (z.B. Protestwahler) zu gewinnen, sondern 
darauf, daB sie ihre Kernbelegschaft nahezu geschlossen an die Urnen bringt. 
Daraus schlieBen wir, daB die PDS - vergleichbare Rahmenbedingungen wie 
1994 vorausgesetzt - bei ihren engeren Anhangern an die Grenze ihrer 
Mobilisierungsfahigkeit gestoBen ist. Bessere Resultate als bei der 
Bundestagswahl 1994 kann sie nur erreichen, wenn sie im 
Wechselwahlersektor erfolgreicher ist ... (was) auch nicht sehr 
wahrscheinlich ist ... 
Fazit: Die PDS verdankt ihre Wahlerfolge in erster Linie ihren 
Daueranhangern und nicht, jedenfalls nicht in nennenswertem Umfang, 
verdrossenen oder protestierenden Wechslern ... Bezuglich ihrer sozialen 
Basis ist die PDS eine regionale Milieupartei (der politischen Klasse oder 
auch der "Dienstklasse" der DDR). Ihre Expansionsmoglichkeiten als 
regionale Milieupartei sind daher auBerordentlich begrenzt... .SchlieBlich war 
die Partei immer auf optimale externe Bedingungen angewiesen, urn 
wenigstens ihr eigenes Milieu (das perspektivisch nicht wachst, sondern 
schrumpft) umfassend zu mobilisieren. Bessere Wahlergebnisse sind nur 
moglich, wenn sich die PDS vollig neue Wahlerschichten aus den Lagern 
konkurrierender Parteien erschlieBt.262 
Last but not least, the PDS has certainly been successful, too, in generating 
considerable acceptance and sympathy on the part of the voting public in East (and to 
a lesser extent)West Germany. Infas statistics (cited by Neugebauer and Stoss) based 
on a survey of 2,500 voters in October 1994 reveal that: 
Auch die Halfte der Ost-Bevolkerung sah in der PDS die Nachfolgepartei der 
SED ... nur knapp 20% (and only 30% in the West! -MD) beurteilten sie als 
undemokratisch oder verfassungsfeindlich ... die Halfte der Berfragten 
"Ossis" bescheinigte der PDS, daB sie eine Partei mit seriosen politischen 
Zielen sei. Ein Drittel der Ostdeutschen billigte der PDS sogar die Ubernahme 
von Regierungsverantwortung zu. Die PDS wurde mithin von den 80% der 
Ostdeutschen, die sie bei der vergangenen Bundestagswahl nicht gewahlt 
haben, weder rundweg abgelehnt noch gar ausgegrenzt wird. Wenn ihr 42% 
(and 28% of West Germans -MD) bescheinigten, dafi sie sich urn die kleinen 
2 6 2 i b i d . , pp. 251-2 
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Leute und die Wendeverlierer kiimmert, dann zeugt das von erheblicher 
Sympathie der Bevolkerung fur die PDS.263, (my italics) 
CONCLUSION 
It seems fair to say, then, that the PDS has been successful in presenting itself as, and 
creating the myth of its being, the representative of a nebulous Edelmanian East 
German reference group of Einheitsverlierer and critics of the Wende. The problem 
with vague, reductive terms/categories like Einheitsverlierer and Ostinteressen is that 
they fail to distinguish between complex levels (in themselves reductive) of 
motivation - socio-economic, socio-psychological etc. From a socio-economic (i.e. 
material) point of view, for one, it seems very clear that those who have most reason 
not to be content with their lot have taken their vote elsewhere. The PDS might be 
widely recognised as being the receptacle for the problems and frustrations (socio-
economic or otherwise) born of the Wende, but this recognition, while gaining the 
PDS considerable sympathy, seems not to have generally been enough to mobilise 
individuals outside of a restricted voter reservoir - which, as Neugebauer and Stoss' 
findings reveal very strongly, has already been tapped to capacity - into voting for the 
PDS. 
The future looks somewhat bleak, therefore, for the PDS if, as the evidence suggests, 
it is largely reliant on a vague and diffuse socio-psychological divide for its 
continued existence: 
Wenn die PDS sich nicht andert, bleibt ihr der Zugang zu neuen 
Wahlerschichten versperrt. Sie wird mit dem Abebben des Ost-West-
Konflikts und dem Abschmelzen ihres Milieus kontinuierlich an Bedeutung 
verlieren.2 6 4 
The PDS must broadly embody a Konfliktposition tenable in the polity of the Federal 
Republic. The dominant positions (in terms of Neugebauer and Stoss's model 
described above; see footnote 230) are already occupied by the established parties. 
The evidence so far suggests that the PDS's ideological centre265 has been hard 
2 6 3 i b i d . , p. 232-3 
2 6 4 i b i d . , p. 306 
2 6 5 W e draw attention, again, to the reductiveness of this notion: naturally Gysi and Bisky have not 
always seen eye to eye on every issue, but we include them under one category here on the grounds 
that their attempts to make the PDS diskursfdhig and politikfdhig have enjoyed a broad level of 
uniformity. As Raschke (op. cit.) has put it: "Es war die Gruppe um Gysi und Bisky, die meinte, die 
Partei langerfristig nur dadurch stabilisieren zu konnen, daB die Westausdehnung und der Ubergang 
zu einem demokratischen Sozialismus gelange." (p. 795) 
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( 
pushed - other than on, as we have seen, a very high level of abstraction - to 
articulate any coherent, uniform 'vision' which takes in the disparate and 
contradictory discourses of the PDS's sub-groups and which might at one and the 
same time offer anything over and above the left-wing positions already occupied by 
the SPD and the Greens, positions which the PDS has been frequently accused of 
usurping2 6 6 and which, i f the PDS fails to articulate the ways in which it can offer 
anything outside of these positions, may well render it a (dispensable) appendage of 
the SPD and the Greens. Articulating difference on a mere expressis verbis level 
seems inadequate as a long-term prospect. Even if Gysi, Bisky, Brie et al. do manage 
to shrug off the regressive, apathetic and anti-Western stance of a significant number 
of voters, and the tenacious communist orthodoxy of its party hard-liners: 
Inhaltlich ist nicht erkennbar, daB und wie die PDS im Westen etwas zu 
bieten hatte ... Der Ubergang von stalinistischen zu linkssozialistischen oder 
sozialdemokratischen Positionen ist fur sich genommen auch kein sehr 
aufregender Vorgang ( . . . ) 2 6 7 
The PDS might have been able to use, and profit from, those features in language 
highlighted above which - in securing a high level of discursive abstraction and 
thereby putting at a remove complex and noisome questions of causality - for the 
time being allow it to background the highly problematic heterogeneity of both its 
membership and its voters, to blur the boundaries between Weg and Ziel, and to 
suggest that it is a bearer of a uniform vision (demokralischer Sozialismus) which has 
the broad backing of society (this having been particularly useful in presenting a 
united from in the pre-election - 1994 - period); the vision seems inadequate, 
however, where it exists more on the connotative level of sign/symbol, where it is not 
underpinned by a denotative core which sees it embodying a relevant conflict 
position (even if language is not in a position to adequately 'grasp' its complexity) in 
society, where behind the scenes the party is still 'all at sea' ideologically2 6 8. After 
all, i f the best that the unifying discourse of the PDS can hope to achieve is to 
mobilise to a maximum - on the unsolid 'unifying' basis of an attitude of defiance - a 
restricted pool of voters which, rather than growing, seems more likely to dwindle 
with the gradual breakdown, over the years, of psycho-social barriers as memories of 
2 6 6 T h e following observation is typical: "Bei politischen Fordcrungen der PDS handelte es sich 
zumeist um eine radikalisierte Version aus dem Katalog der SPD oder der Griinen." Cited from Lang, 
op. cit., p. 370 
2 6 7 Raschke , op. cit., p. 795 
2 6 8 I t is precisely this disarray which, by all accounts, is increasingly frustrating leading PDS 
ideologues such as the Brie bothers who, more and more, are growing tired of taking on the gruelling 
task of attempting to locate and steer - through the medium of a broad, de-antagonising language - an 
inner-party middle ground and are increasingly questioning whether their future lies with the PDS 
(see, for example, Hartung: "Der artige Rebell." op. cit.) 
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the GDR fade, then it is not inappropriate to moot, at least, the question of the PDS's 
long-term political relevance. 
Of the PDS's socialism we can say the following: 
1. As used by the PDS in its unifying discourse it is vast in its extension, with 
minimal intension; 
2. The sign is not representative of any defined, homogenous ideological system or 
world-view - though it doubtless embodies and incorporates a random set of features 
which are commonly associated with the socialist signifiant - despite offering the 
suggestion that it is so; the understanding of it among the party membership is vast 
and contradictory, though as a highly superordinate term whose semantic 
specification is difficult it obscures this; for PDS voters it seems emblematic not of 
an adherence to any formalised system, but of a vague reservatio mentalis vis-a-vis 
the new system; it is a comforter responded to largely on a symbolic level. 
3. Any 'systemic' socialism has yet to be defined by the PDS - it can 'hide' this fact 
behind a potent sign like socialism, but to survive in the long term it will have to 
surmount the enormous task of articulating a raison d'etre other than a vision which, 
below the surface form (be it socialism or democratic socialism or whatever) in 
which it is enframed amounts to little more than a visceral negation of the here and 
now and a random collection of (not necessarily insincerely held) views neatly 
packaged as socialist in order to suggest uniformity. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
A NON-GOVERNING OPPOSITION? 
THE PDS IN THE WAKE OF SACHSEN-ANHALT 
A L L E S SCHON GEWESEN? D E A L I N G WITH POWER: T H E NEW 
REALO/FUNDI DEBATE? 
Suddenly, at the end of June 1994, the Landtagswahl in Sachsen-Anhalt afforded the 
PDS the prospect of a real opportunity to get its foot in the political door.1 The 
possibility of the PDS 'propping up' a minority regional government became a major 
talking point across the German media spectrum; the "medialer Dammbruch"2, 
whether positive or negative, cannot but have been advantageous to a party 
previously written off by many as a political irrelevance.3 
Hitherto the PDS had, in a sense, made virtue from necessity by largely abjuring - as 
a strictly oppositional party whose essential role was as a Korrektiv, as a political 
watch-dog - any governmental role in the established political arena4; this is captured 
'Briefly the background to this, as described by Neugebauer and Stoss (op. cit., p. 211 ff.), is as 
follows: the C D U , while emerging as the strongest party, gained 5% fewer votes than in the previous 
elections and lost its coalition partner, the FDP, which failed to surmount the 5% hurdle. The CDU's 
lead over the SPD was only some 4,000 votes, the SPD having gained 8% with respect to 1990. 
Seeing itself as the real victor, the SPD, with 34% of the vote, chose to form a minority government 
(Minderheitsregierung) - headed by Reinhard Hoppner - with the Greens, who had just managed to 
clear the 5% mark. The PDS's showing, too, was impressive: with 20% of the vote it emerged as the 
third strongest party. "Das Kabinett des SPD-Spitzenkandidaten Reinhard Hoppner sah sich von 
Anfang an dem Verdacht ausgesetzt, von der Gunst der PDS abhangig zu sein, die zuvor (strategisch 
geschickt) eine Tolerierung der Minderheitsregierung angekiindigt hatte. Dies war die Geburtsstunde 
der 'Rote Socken-Kampagne' (= the CDU/CSU- led anti-PDS, anti-left tirade - MD)." 
(Neugebauer/Stoss, ibid.) 
2Falkner/Huber, op. cit., p. 211 
3"Bessere Publicity hatten sich die Wahlkampfplaner urn den PDS-Strategen Andre Brie kaum 
wiinschen konnen. Einen Tag nach der denkwiirdigen Wahl in Sachsen-Anhalt, die das demokratische 
System der Bundesrepublik - je nach Standpunkt - um eine interessante Facette politischer 
Mehrheitsbildung bereicherte oder den Anfang vom Ende eines iiberkommenen demokratischen 
Konsenses markierte, war es mit der 'Medienblockade' (so die Klage jedes PDS-Politikers) vorbei. Die 
demokratischen Sozialisten waren plotzlich in aller Munde ..." ibid. 
4 After all, there simply had been no question of PDS governmental involvement at Land level: by the 
end of 1991 the PDS was in a desperate situation, plagued by party in-fighting, factionalisation and 
renewed calls for the party to disband; its popularity with the electorate had waned considerably after 
a hopeful start, caught up as the latter was in the euphoria of unification. The PDS's anti-unification, 
anti-West-German messages were not popular with an - as yet - optimistic electorate. By 1992, 
however, the desolate economic situation and the gradual realisation among large sections of the East 
German population that the Kohl government would be unable to deliver upon its electoral promises 
were key factors in prompting a gradual mood-swing among East Germans tired of their widely 
perceived status as Deutsche zweiter Klasse; a PDS which had always purported to champion East 
German interests in the face of what it presented as the West-German steam-roller could not but gain, 
Neugebauer and Stoss maintain, in prestige and popularity from the gradual rise in East German 
'ostalgia', self-confidence, and defiance. 
For an excellent account of the PDS's gradual rejuvenation, see Neugebauer/Stoss, op. cit., pp. 43-62 
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in its - by now notorious - slogan, (with the PDS in its characteristic 'modesty' 
mode) in which it declares that 
Alle wollen regieren, wir nicht 
In wishing to get beyond the surface form of this last utterance - de-contextualised as 
it is - and analyse it pragmatically, we are faced with the complex problem of the 
discrepancy - which we shall encounter time and again - between (what we might 
call) 'conviction' on the one hand, i.e. 'genuine' commitment to what is 'literally' 
expressed in the surface form of an utterance, and 'strategy', where commitment is 
less to the proposition contained in the surface form, but rather to the perlocutionary 
effect of that utterance against a complex of background considerations and 
assumptions. 
If we bear in mind the temporal and situational context in which the slogan was 
uttered - one in which the PDS was only gradually beginning to find its feet and had 
little or no chance of getting involved in government (not, at least, at a level higher 
than that of local government) - there are ample grounds for arguing that the PDS (or, 
at least, certain ideologues within the PDS responsible for key statements of policy) 
felt that there was nothing to lose by articulating a position of non-involvement, 
banking, on the contrary, on the perlocutionary effect of the utterance, whose 
modesty and pathos might serve to elicit sympathy and possibly support for the 
fledgling party. I f we take this view, then, an expressis verbis commitment to non-
involvement in government might be said to be at the heart of a strategy aimed at 
bolstering support for the PDS; this will leave the party in an obvious quandary when 
that support has reached such proportions as to allow the party to assume - should it 
wish to do so - a governmental or quasi-governmental5 role. 
(As an aside, it is precisely this temporal dimension which would help to explain the 
overall difference in modality between the party's first and second programmes of 
1990 and 1993 respectively; the former, unlike the latter offers a (surprising) 
conciliatory recognition that "Der Kapitalismus ist wirtschaftlich effizient (! - MD), 
und er hat die Weltzivilisation bereichert"6 as the PDS struggles to find its feet in the 
new order, still at the height of support from the majority of enthusiastic East 
German citizens. By 1993 the tide had turned and a much more self-assured PDS 
could offer a much more outspoken and unmitigated recognition that "Die 
5 B y quasi-governmental is meant a role such as one of helping to prop up and thus exert influence 
upon a Minderheitsregierung and thus being what Jens Reich (op. cit.) has called (with reference to 
the role of the PDS) a "Zunglein an der Waage": "die PDS (ist) im Begriff, in der gesamten 
Bundesrepublik, wenn es um wichtige Entscheidungen geht, zum Zunglein an der Waage zu werden". 
^"Programm der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus." 1990. op. cit., p. 88 
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Hauptursachen fur die globalen Probleme sind die kapitalistische Produktions-, 
Verteilungs- und Konsumtionsweise in den Herrschaftszentren der Weltwirtschaft 
sowie die Herrschaft des Patriarchats".7) 
At the same time, a message of non-involvement was undoubtedly designed, too, to 
bolster the party's 'otherness' as it struggled, as we witnessed in the preceding 
chapter, to articulate a political vision offering any real alternative to what was 
already on offer in the establishment. As such, a message of strict non-involvement 
in government doubtless appealed to the party's radical reformers (in such groups, for 
example, as the Junge Genosslnnen9) keen to see the PDS avoid being - as they 
perceived it - swallowed up by the disempowering and equalising machinery of 
government. 
On one level, then, such an utterance can readily be seen as tactical: it makes virtue 
from necessity and it panders to the party's - important - radical-reformist wing. On 
this same level we must ask ourselves whether some party ideologues did not, in fact, 
choose to champion it not because they 'really' wished to abjure any notion of 
gaining power in the established polity, but rather because they saw it as a possible 
means of strengthening the party image, both internally and externally, thus quite 
precisely increasing the party's chances of gaining support and - later - exerting 
influence/exercising power within the contemporary arena. As we shall see below, 
this (cynical?) viewpoint is in part borne out by the fact that, after a gradual process 
of political revival which began in 1992 and when afforded the opportunity of 
'coming in from the cold' and 'taking part'9 in the wake of Sachsen-Anhalt, we see 
the PDS only too eager to make political overtures to the other parties and articulate 
messages of rapprochement, the language of which we wil l examine below.1 0 
Iprogramm der Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus. 1993. op. cit., p. 6 
8 L a n g perceives the position of the Junge Genosslnnen as follows: "... die A G 'Junge Genosslnnen' 
der PDS [ist] das Bindeglied der Partei zu 'Autonomen' und linksalternativer Jugendkultur. Die A G ist 
zwar fur die parlamentarische Prasenz der PDS, fordert aber die strikte (inhaltliche) Abgrenzung zu 
anderen Parteien dort. Daneben solle sich die PDS der Interessen einer 'von unten' ausgehenden 
breiten oppositionellen Bewegung in der Gesellschaft annehmen, ohne als 'Avantgarde' aufzutreten." 
Lang, op. cit., p. 371 (italics in original) 
9 A s Der Spiegel puts it in its characteristically emotive style: "Die PDS schmeiBt sich liberal! rann, 
wo sie die Chance vermutet, sich als Mehrheitsbeschaffer wichtig zu machen." See: "Regieren mil der 
PDS." op. cit., p. 26 
'"Compare, too, how Gysi hints at the fact that the long term aim is governmental involvement in the 
following extract from an interview with the cultural magazine Lift (Stuttgart): "Fur die Zeit nach '94 
kann ich mir nicht vorstellen, daB wir uns an einer Regierung beteiligen, auch auf Landesebene nicht. 
Das mag 1998 gattz anders aussehen. Ich finde es auch okay, daB eine ehemalige Staatspartei, wie 
wir sie waren, sich als Oppositionspartei profiliert." Gysi, cited from: "Es geht urn Macht und nicht 
um Moral." op. cit., p. 23 (interview) 
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But what happens when commitment to the surface proposition - "we do not want to 
govern" - is indeed 'genuine', when it is indeed taken at face value?" In chapter 5 we 
will examine the varying degrees of commitment among the PDS's members and 
voters to this surface proposition, and the fierce ideological debate prompted by what 
has been seen by a significant number of party members and sympathisers as a 
betrayal by an increasingly opportunistic and pragmatically (some have said social-
democratically ) orientated PDS of the party cause. In other words, the problem for 
PDS ideologues wishing to see the PDS becoming involved in governmental 
alliances at Land- level and beyond has been to deal with those in the party who have 
taken to heart the ' l i teral ' 1 2 propostion entailed by the slogan: that the PDS will not 
become involved in the established governmental apparatus. (We shall see in the next 
chapter how the PDS has sought to deal with this by attempting to offer its own 
peculiar PDS-specific re-definition of Opposition in widening the category to include 
a governmental role!). 
The problem faced by the PDS in coming to terms with the question of its own 
increasing influence and of how this might translate into the assumption of 'power' is 
not dissimilar to that faced by the Greens13 in the Realo/Fundi polemic of the 
eighties. Certain obvious surface parallels can be drawn between the PDS and the 
Greens. PDS discourse leans heavily on the 'anti-establishment' rhetoric we observed 
in the discourse of the Greens. We observed above how the PDS has consistently 
styled itself a Bewegung like the Greens before it: 
Die Partei betont, sowohl eine Partei als auch eine Bewegung ... zu sein. Der 
Gedanke der Bewegung schafft eine Verbindung mit der Geschichte der 
Arbeiter«bewegung», hat aber gleichzeitig eine Uminterpretation im Sinne 
eines notwendigen taktischen Pragmatismus erfahren.14 (my italics; other 
markings in original. Observe how this author too recognises the potential 
residing in the conflationability of verbal forms [Bewegung]) 
"cf. Michail Nelken's "Anderungsantrag I V . 1 .4 .95 zum Initiativantrag Bisky, Gysi, Modrow zu 
den fiinf wichtigsten Diskussionspunkten der gegenwdrtigen Debatte in der PDS." In: 4. Parteitag der 
PDS. 1. Tagung, Berlin, 27. bis 29. Januar 1995. Arbeitsmaterial fur Delegierte. Berlin 1995 
(Nelken's motion for amendment was submitted for scrutiny at the PDS's January 1995 Parteitag, 
with a view to replacing point two of Bisky et al.'s "5 Punkte"; for more details, see chapter 5 below.) 
1 2 W e use the term here with the reservations expressed in the introduction as to the notion of meaning 
in the "zero context". 
1 •'Despite the parallels between the PDS and the Greens to which attention is drawn here in respect of 
the issue of handling political influence and power, there is no attempt, it must be emphasised, to 
equate the two. One obvious and fundamental difference is that the Greens arose from a complex 
'evolutionary' background while the PDS, as the legal successor to the S E D (and thus bearing - unlike 
the Greens - the 'Altlast' of a politically compromised tradition!) was much more of a 'conceived' 
political vehicle. 
l 4 Good: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. c i t , p. 268 
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Witness: 
ich mag auch nicht mehr Parteien, zumal ich aus einer solchen komme, die 
schon wieder alles und fur alle Zeiten weiB. 1 5 
(Observe here again, incidentally, how the PDS invokes its own discredited past to 
justify its current stance.) 
Closely linked to this is the notion of the Etablierten, against which the Bewegung 
sets itself off. Like the Greens, the PDS has used the term widely in its discourse in 
suggesting that the establishment is an amorphous mass against which it is its 
mission to work. As with the Greens, too, the PDS is composed of a complex and 
often uncomfortable amalgam of diverse Strdmungen. Structurally, the PDS's 
Arbeitsgemeinschaften*6 are - superficially at least - strongly reminiscent of the 
Greens' manifold single-issue BI's ("Bundesinitiativen"). As with the Greens, the 
PDS's has strong support from among intellectuals. Both the PDS and the Greens 
have incorporated remnants of the "K-groups". Both have championed 
Basisdemokralie, ecology, feminism, and anti-militarism. What former Green-party 
spokesperson Verena Krieger has said of the Greens might equally be said of the 
PDS: 
Einen regelrechten Kult haben die Griinen um ihre basisdemokratischen 
Prinzipien veranstaltet. Der Anspruch "anders" Politik zu machen schwebte 
stets liber allem . . . 1 7 (my italics) 
PDS discourse invokes, as we observed above, broad, vaguely defined and uneasily 
identified groupings (Betroffene, Herrschende etc.) of the type central to Green 
ideology, where the lowest common denominator for their co-existence is a 
conceptual framework which pits the aggregate of all forms of discontent with the 
status quo against a vaguely defined 'establishment'. Observe, again, how Krieger's 
terminology might well have issued from the pen of - say - Andre Brie: 
Dies war eine Reaktion auf die ernuchternden Erfahrungen mit den 
herrschenden biirgerlichen Politikstrukturen, deren Abschottung gegeniiber 
Betroffeneninteressen.18 (my italics) 
, 5 Gregor Gysi, cited in: Volmert: "Wahlkampf-Rhetorik ..." op. cit., p. 249 
l 6 F o r a full list, see Moreau/Neu: Die PDS zwischen Linksextremismus ... op. cit., p. 23 
1 7 Krieger, op. cit., p. 13 
1 8 ib id . 
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The Greens, like the PDS in 1990, caused outrage when they entered the Bundestag 
in 198^. Green party unity, like PDS unity, was easier to maintain when the party 
was an embattled minority, out of power and with no choice but to 'take it to the 
streets'. The Greens in a sense became victims of their own success: their increasing 
popularity and support forced them to deal with their status as an, and the essential 
oxymoron of, (as Petra Kelly put it) the 'anti-party party' 1 9. The Realo/Fundi split 
was predicated upon fundamental differences as to what the party should do with its 
new found popularity and influence.20 The Realos, whose commitment to Green 
politics was perceived by more radical party members to be of a more 
'careerist'/opportunist bent, came to favour a gradual - and what they saw as realistic 
- process of (revisionistically) changing the system from within by occupying 
positions of power. The Fundis refused to become absorbed into the machinery of 
government, arguing that they were in fact the ones who were being realistic, for to 
bring about real ehange-required-a-steadfast refusal^they-maintained - to-be-tempted 
by the mere trappings of power. By late 1984 the poles had been formed when 
Fundis Bahro and Trampert presented their famous Antrag for submission to the 
Green's Federal Conference. Large passages of Point 3, "Biindnisse und 
Regierbarkeit", are striking in their similarity to the kind of arguments we are 
currently seeing from radical fundamentalists in the PDS (keen to see the PDS avoid 
being sucked into the - in their view - corruptive machinery of government). 
Witness, for example: 
Gerade die konsequente Alternative zu alien anderen Parteien hat zu unseren 
beachtlichen Wahlerfolgen gefiihrt. Gemeinsam mit den oppositionellen 
Basisinitiativen sind wir zu einer ernstzunehmenden Herausforderung fur das 
etablierte politische System geworden ... Der gesellschaftspolitische Druck 
der Grunen zwingt also die anderen Parteien zu Reformen ... Die 
Bundnisvereinbarungen (mit der SPD - MD) bewiesen, daB wir die SPD nicht 
andern, sondern sie sich unserer Stimmen fur ihre Politik bedient ... Dahinter 
1 9see: Radice, Giles: The New Germans. London: Michael Joseph 1995, p. 112 
2 0 Krieger offers a graphic account of what she perceives as the prevailing system's mechanism of self-
perpetuation - i.e. its power to 'suck in' and 'normalise' opponents who question the sanctity of its 
structures; the Greens, she argues, lost their radical edge by falling prey to the vanity which comes of 
bearing the mere trappings of authority and power: "Unglaubliche Bliiten trieb grime Doppelmoral 
erst so richtig nach dem Einzug in die Parlamente. Schnell zeigte sich das wirklich Gesicht all der 
'neuen Menschen', die die Grunen hervorzubringen geglaubt hatten. Es ist unfaBbar, welche 
Veranderungen ein Mandat mit sich bringen kann. Bescheidene, unauffallige Menschen fangen an, 
nach Offentlichkeit, Anerkennung und Macht zu gieren. Zugleich werden sie zu peinlichen Gestalten, 
denn die Diskrepanz zwischen der sich selbst zugeschriebenen Wichtigkeit und der schnoden Realitat 
ihrer Kompetenzen, ihres Einflusses und ihrer Unersetzbarkeit ist gewaltig ... Diese Eitelkeit ist nicht 
einfach nur ein unerfreulicher, aber unvermeidlicher Zug Politik machender Menschen. Sie wird 
strukturell erzeugt. Mir ist kaum ein Ort in der bundesrepublikanischen Gesellschaft bekannt, wo die 
Diskrepanz zwischen dem ideologischen Stellenwert einzelner und ihren realen EinfluBmoglichkeiten 
so riesig ist wie im Bundestag. Krieger, op. cit., p. 18 
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(strategic alliances with other parties - MD) steckt offensichtlich auch eine 
vollig idealistische Vorstellungen von den wirklichen Krafteverhaltnissen im 
Land, die eine zunehmende Parlaments- oder Staatsfixiertheit unserer Politik 
begrundet. Die wirkliche Entwicklung wird immer noch von Industrie, 
Banken und NATO-Militar-Atomlobby bestimmt. Das verlangt auch von uns 
groGere Anstrengungen, soziale Bewegungen zu starken, die dieses-
Krafteverhaltnis im Fundament der Gesellschaft verandern wollen. Wir 
ziehen den SchluB, daB es unser Auftrag ist, den Weg der grundsatzlichen 
Fundamentalopposition, zu dem wir mit unserer Griindung angetreten waren, 
fortzusetzen und auszubauen . . . 2 1 
As we will see in the next chapter, the PDS's more pragmatically-orientated 
ideological leadership is currently parrying charges of opportunism and 'selling out' 
which are strongly reminiscent of similar charges levelled at the Realos in the 
eighties. 
Like the Greens, then, the PDS is dealing with the essential paradox of wishing to 
exert its influence as a party (Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus) where: 
... es liegt auch im Wesen ihrer Eigenschaft als politische Partei, daB sie (the 
PDS - MD) bestrebt ist, unmittelbar oder doch wenigstens mittelbar 
(Sachsen-Anhalt) auf die Bildung und Politik von Regierungen EinfluB zu 
nehmen.22 
while at the same time articulating messages abjuring any power as a party in the 
established arena; too little success in that arena and the party becomes an 
irrelevance; too much success and factions will inevitably clamour for coalitions. On 
the one hand, Andre Brie points out: 
In der Wahlstrategie des PDS-Bundesvorstandes zu den Wahlen 1994 wird 
betont, "daB die PDS um den Einzug in die Landesparlamente, den 
Bundestag und das Europaische Parlament kampfen und einen Wahlkampf 
nach auBen, um Wahlerstimmen, fuhren wi l l " . (Presse- und 
Informationsdienst der PDS 14/1993)23 
2 l B a h r o , Rudolf/Rainer Trampert: '"Wir lehnen Regierungsbeteiligung ab': Antrag der 
Bundesvorstandsmitglieder Bahro und Trampert zum bevorstehenden Bundesparteitag der Grunen." 
In: Die Tageszeitung. 27 November 1984 
2 2Neugebauer/St6ss, op. cit., p. 26 
2-*Andre Brie, in Preface to: Patzolt, Harald: Das Wahlkampf-Regelbiichlein. Berlin: Wahlbiiro der 
PDS 1994, p. 5 
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on the other, it must ask itself "warum die PDS gewahlt werden soil" 2 4 i f all the 
elements of advertising, commercial or political, are "but means to an end, the end 
being power and control".2 5 
The PDS continues to agonise over this problem to date. We now turn to the ways in 
which pro-involvement26 ideologues sought to resolve it and play it down in the 
period preceding the Federal elections of October 1994. 
TO GOVERN OR NOT TO GOVERN - <VERANTWORTUNG> AS THE 
SPRINGBOARD? 
In the run-up to the 1994 elections one of the PDS's prime slogans, displayed on a 
whole series of election posters, was that: 
Veranderung beginnt mit Opposition.27 
On a superficial reading - with the emphasis being on Opposition - the latter seems 
very much in keeping with the proposition offered earlier (where the PDS set itself 
off against a governmental role): the PDS does not want to govern, its role is purely 
oppositional. 
In an acutely perceptive article, ex Green-Fundi Thomas Ebermann observes, 
however, that: 
Am gleichen Tag, an dem "Spiegel"28 erschien, war im "Neuen 
Deutschland"29 schon verkundet worden, daB die alte PDS-Parole ("Alle 
2 4 ib id . 
^Townson, op. cit., p. 204 
The following comments from Lower Saxony's Ministerprasident, Gerhard Schroder, are barely a 
revelation: "Wer politisch arbeitet, muB ein solides Verhaltnis zur Macht haben ... Man muB sie 
wollen, sei es in Hannover wie auch in Bonn, wenn es denn so weit kommt ... Ein Politiker muB nach 
ihr drangen, muB damit etwas bewirken wollen." See: "Mit Kopfchen und Charisma." In: Stern. 
no. 30.1997, p. 19 (interview with Gerhard Schroder) 
2 6 see footnote 37 below 
2 7 c f . , too, "Wir sagen Danke unseren tollen Kandidatinnen und Kandidaten zur Europawahl und zu 
den Kommunalwahlen, unseren Genossinnen und Genossen, Sympathisantinnen und Sympathisanten 
fur ihr Engagement im Wahlkampf, unseren Wahlerinnen und Wahlern. Wir bleiben dabei: 
Veranderung beginnt mit Opposition." Cited from: PID. no. 24. 1994, p. 16 (bold in original) 
2 8 T h e reference is to Der Spiegel, no. 27. 1994 in which the prospect of the PDS playing a key role in 
influential power configurations is deemed a distinct possibility, extending even as far as "Eine linke 
Mehrheit jenseits der Union ... auch bei der Bundeswahl". See: "Regieren mit der PDS?" op.cit., 
p. 24 ff. 
2 9 I s Ebermann right to equate Neues Deutschland (hereafter: ND) with the PDS? Despite the attempts 
of both the PDS and ND's editorial board to assert their independence from one another, Marten-
Finnis (op. cit.; see esp. pp. 136-8) has uncovered fairly convincing evidence that the latter is in fact a 
Sprachrohr for the former; briefly, her arguments as follows (all quotations are from her work): 
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wollen regieren - wir nicht) obsolet und die jungere ("Veranderung beginnt 
mit Opposition") nun wortgetreu ("beginnt"!) zu interpretieren sei: "Beharren 
auf Opposition, so erfolgreich es in diesem Wahljahr ist, wird auf lange Sicht 
nicht ausreichen, urn zu uberzeugen ... Die Zeit des ausschlieBlichen 
Grundrechtsfundamentalismus und Protestes ist vorbei, schrieb Andre Brie 
dieser Tage. Die PDS, nunmehr in der Rolle des vollwertigen politischen 
Akteurs, musse Opposition und regieren lernen. ("Neues Deutschland", 4 July 
1994)30 
And indeed, the question of PDS involvement in strategic (governmental) alliances -
whether in the form of a Tolerierung/Duldung (see footnote 1) or a coalition - only a 
year before unthinkable31 suddenly became a major talking point both inside and 
outside the party. In particular the SPD became embroiled in a long and complex 
inner-party polemic as how to deal with the PDS, with East German SPD politicians 
(of which Ministerprasidenten Stolpe [Brandenburg] and Hoppner [Sachsen-Anhalt] 
were at the forefront) and sympathisers generally arguing for a more indulgent 
approach to the PDS than their counterparts in the West3 2 (although Schroder33 and 
While Reinhard Gotze, an ND editorial secretary declares in an interview with Marten-Finnis that ND 
"stehe wohl dieser Partei nahe, sei aber nicht ihr Organ" (p. 136), Marten-Finnis observes that since 
July 1990 the newspaper has been run as a GmbH with the PDS as one of its two main shareholders (! 
- M D ) and that "bei der Lektiire des ND fallt auf, daB sein politischer Teil der Partei des 
demokratischen Sozialismus in nicht geringem MaBe als Mittel zur Selbstdarstellung dient". (p. 137) 
Gotze owns in the interview that 75% of ND readers have been recruited from the ranks of PDS 
members and sympathisers. ND, Marten-Finnis argues, has consistently argued a pro-PDS line and 
failed to adopt an independent stance: "Urn den Leser zu uberzeugen, daB die politischen Wurzeln der 
PDS fur das ND nicht mehr gelten, hatte es in der innenpolitischen Berichterstattung einer 
kritischeren Distanz zur PDS bedurft." (p. 141) A s a case in point she identifies ND's failure to 
question the PDS's motives in the party's notorious Finanzskandal of autumn 1990 (where the party 
sought to transfer abroad ex-SED funds which were in danger of being expropriated - MD). Much in 
this partisan journalism, she argues, has to do with the socialisation of its journalistic staff: all of 
the 120 ND journalists who remained (by November 1992) after its initial body of 520 was honed 
down in the wake of the Wende had been working with ND beforehand. There was no new 
recruitment. In other words, the newspaper's journalistic staff (mostly between the ages of 30 and 45) 
had emerged largely from a G D R journalistic tradition which could not but have left "ihre Spuren in 
den Kopfen der Textautoren ..." (p. 141) 
3 0 Ebermann, Thomas: "Von Sachen und Sachsen." In: Konkret. 8/94, p. 12 (The Neues Deutschland 
article referred to by Ebermann is entitled "Abschied von der Notwehr-Haltung.") Compare also 
Andre Brie's assertion that: "Die PDS muB, weil die Wahler es so wollen, Opponieren und Regieren 
lernen." See: Neues Deutschland. 23/24 July 1994. 
3 1 "Wenn wir zu so einem Thema 'Opponieren - Tolerieren - Koalieren' vor einem Jahr zur Diskussion 
eingeladen worden waren, wir hatten uns sicherlich an den Kopf gefaBt." Heinz Vietze, in: 
"Opposition oder Was? - Die PDS nach Sachsen-Anhalt - eine Podiumdiskussion." In: DISPUT. 
no. 14. 1994, p. 3. (The podium discussion in question is prefaced with the following observation: 
"Zu einer Podiumdiskussion hatten der PDS-Landesvorstand Berlin und die Redaktion von 'Disput' 
eingeladen. Das Thema hatte, salopp formuliert, lauten konnen - 'Sachsen-Anhalt - was lehrt uns das?' 
- aber offiziell hieB es dann 'Opponieren -Tolerieren - Koalieren?'.") 
3 2 See , for example, Schmidt, Golo: "Zwei Seelen in der Brust der Sozialdemokratie - Ost-Politiker 
gegen scharfe Abgrenzung von der PDS/Parteichef Scharping setzt sich durch." In: Berliner 
Zeitung. 6 December 1994. 
The comments of Udo Knapp (Ubergangsdezernent (SPD) fur Soziales, Familie, Jugend und 
Gesundheit in Anklam, [Landkreis Ostvorpommern]) are not unrepresentative of prevailing attitudes 
among the eastern SPD to the question of involvement with the PDS: "Die PDS vertritt Positionen, die 
bei Jusos, vielen Gewerkschaften und vielen Griinen selbstverstandlich und fur die iibrige 
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Lafontaine have been consistent exceptions). Heavily critical of the SPD executive's 
resolution (initiated by Party Chairman Rudolf Scharping) of December 1994 to the 
effect that "es diirfe Koalitionen und gemeinsame Biindnisstrategien mit der PDS 
nicht geben"34, Hoppner doubtless expressed a widely held resentment in the East of 
what was seen as Western 'interference', in declaring the question of regulating 
relations with the PDS to be a matter for the exclusive concern of the East German 
SPD-Landesverbande: 
... nachdem uns der Westen den Staat, die Wirtschaft und alles sonst 
ubergestiilpt hat: LaBt uns das mit der PDS doch wenigstens allein machen.35 
As a potent symbol, then, of the psycho-social divide between East and West, the 
inner-SPD polemic could not but have been beneficial to a PDS relying heavily in its 
discourse upon the invocation of a perceived Western 'juggernaut' and a concomitant 
reservatio mentalis among East Germans vis-a-vis West Germany. 
The Neues Deutschland article cited by Ebermann (see footnote 30) is entitled, 
tellingly, "Abschied von der Notwehr-Haltung" which hints that there are indeed 
forces at work in the PDS for whom the question of non-involvement in government 
is more about strategy (i.e. initial self-defence and survival) than about conviction. 
There is something metalinguistic about the author's recognition that political capital 
has been made from the instrumentalisation of Opposition; the implication is that 
where a real opportunity for grasping at power presents itself, the PDS wil l wish to 
become involved. 
Gesellschaft in jeder Hinsicht unakzeptabel sind. Was diese Positionen zu ihrer Realitatstaufe 
brauchen, ist nichts als die klare Luft des Wirkenmiissens in demokratisch kontrollierten 
Institutionen ... Wenn die SPD hier in den neuen Landern mit der PDS eine lockere Zusammenarbeit 
eingeht, dann gefahrdet das nicht den erfolgreichen ProzeB der Wiedervereinigung, im Gegenteil, es 
treibt die Integration des Ostens in die neue Republik voran." Knapp, Udo: "Partner PDS: Wenn die 
SPD mit der PDS eine lockere Zusammenarbeit eingeht, treibt sie die Integration des Ostens in die 
neue Republik voran." In: Die Tageszeitung. 5 July 1994. 
3 3 Schroder (Ministerprdsident of Lower Saxony) has consistently argued for a strategy of divesting 
the PDS of its mystique by actively incorporating it into positions of responsibility in which it will be 
forced to recognise, as he sees it, the impracticability of its demands. This position is neatly summed 
up by the PDS's Harald Wolf: "nachdem die Strategic der Ausgrenzung offensichtlich gescheitert 
ist, ... ist (jetzt) die Strategic der Einbindung angesagt, des Einbeziehens in - wie es immer so schon 
heiBt - 'Verantwortung' unter dem Stichwort der 'Entzauberung' der PDS". Cited from: "Opposition 
oder Was? ... eine Podiumdiskussion." op. cit., p. 4 (my italics; observe, here, the metalinguistic 
recognition of the centrality of the lexeme Verantwortung in the debate surrounding the PDS's 
incorporation into positions of responsibility; we will deal with it in detail below.) 
3 4 see: "In der SPD weiter Meinungsunterschiede iiber die PDS." In: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung. 7 December 1994 
3 5 H6ppner, cited in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. ibid. (Hoppner's remarks were originally made 
to the Leipziger Volkszeitung some days beforehand.) 
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Brie and other more pragmatically-orientated PDS leaders and ideologues pushing 
for PDS involvement in government face a complex of thorny and potentially 
contradictory tasks: 
1) of selling involvement in governmental or quasi-governmental alliances both to 
their own party and (to a lesser extent?) their supporters36, as well as to the political 
establishment as a whole, after having made Opposition (which, in the frame of 
reference of established politics would largely preclude the holding of positions of 
power - see below) the centrepiece of the PDS's political ideology: in so doing they 
must simultaneously counter the charge (from both within the party and without) of 
political opportunism. The problem is recognised by Petra Sitte3 7 but demands much 
more than the mere expressis verbis denial she offers: 
Wir haben unser Angebot (of tolerating a minority government in Sachsen-
Anhalt -MD) vor der Regierungsbildung unterbreitet, urn auch politische 
Garantien fur unsere Wahlaussagen zu erhalten. Das war schwierig genug, 
weil das leicht so erscheinen kann, als ob man seine Oppositionshaltung 
aufgibt.38 (my italics) 
2) of bridging the (linguistic?) gap created between the PDS and the other parties (as 
we saw in chapter 3), and of articulating messages of rapprochement towards them; 
of legitimising the PDS's credentials before the 'establishment' as a new player in 
governmental alliances 
The attempt to surmount these tasks has yielded, we will now attempt to show, an 
elaborate discursive strategy of 'marrying' the two lexemes - Opposition and 
Regieren - through the medium of <Verantwortung>. 
3 6 According to Bisky: "Die Wahlerschaft (der PDS - M D ) will mehrheitlich, daB wir mitregieren. Das 
ist ein Auftrag ... Mehrheitlich will die Partei in der Opposition bleiben." (Note the unverifiability of 
the propostion - MD.) Cited from: "Koalitionsbereit?" op. cit. (Observe here, incidentally, how in this 
frame of reference regieren is presented as the logical antonym of Opposition; this will be of 
significance in the ensuing discussion.) 
3 7 Petra Sitte, chairwoman of the PDS's parliamentary party in Sachsen-Anhalt, is a key figure in the 
very active, pragmatically-orientated reform group around Gysi, Bisky and Brie which, in the words 
of Michael Brie ("Das politische Projekt PDS ..." op. cit., p. 9) "dominiert eine eher passive, den 
Traditionen monolithischer Einheit verpflichtete Mitgliedschaft und kann sich dabei auf Teile einer 
jungeren und pragmatischen Funktionselite der Alt-Partei stutzen. Zu solchen Kraften zahlen in der 
PDS Christine Ostrowski, Vorsitzende der Stadtorganisation Dresden, oder Petra Sitte ... bzw. der ... 
Landesvorsitzende (von Sachsen-Anhalt - MD) Roland Claus (whom we shall encounter below -
MD)". Because theirs is a position which gives, as we shall see below, centrality to increasing the 
PDS's influence through involvement in positions of influence in the established arena (especially on 
the level of the 'Sac/i/rage') we shall call this group the "pro-involvement PDS", whilst mindful of 
the convenient oversimplification involved. 
3 8 see: "Geheimdiplomatie mit der SPD lehnen wir ab." In: Neues Deutschland. 5 July 1994, p. 5 
(Interview with Petra Sitte). 
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In the narrower frame of reference of the established political fora, Veranlwortung is 
broadly accepted as being synonymous with governmental involvement; it is implied, 
for example, in the following: 
Mit ihrer Formel von der Entzauberung der PDS meint Bundnis 90/Griine 
nichts anderes als eine neue Art von Wandel durch Annaherung. Die PDS soil 
in Verantwortung genommen werden, zeigen, was sie wirklich leisten kann.3 9 
Compare, too: 
Meine Auffassung ist, die PDS sollte Verantwortung ubernehmen und sie 
sollte sich auf den verschiedenen Ebenen darauf vorbereiten. Aus der Hiifte 
heraus wird das alleine nicht machbar sein.4 0 
and: 
Wahrend Scharping schon jetzt erklart, auf Politik, die in irgendeiner Weise 
auf Duldung der PDS angewiesen sein konnte, zu verzichten, denken 
Strategen wie SPD-Schroder ... daniber nach, wie sich die PDS in 
(Regierungs-) Verantwortung zwingen lieBe, um sie zu "entzaubern".41 (my 
emphases) (Observe the deontic modality here: part and parcel of the pro-
involvement PDS's attempt to counter charges of opportunism and retain its 
'otherness' has been to signal that any co-operation is at best grudging; in 
this, modality, as we wil l show below, is vital.) 
Witness also the polarities in: 
Wahlen dienen der Legitimation demokratischer Eliten. ... Hier haben die 
Regierungsparteien einen Vorteil, ihren Amtsbonus. Alle Erfolge der 
vorherigen Legislaturperiode verbuchen sie als ihr Verdienst; Ungelostes oder 
MiBlungenes wird jedoch weitgehend verschwiegen, dafur aber um so 
deutlicher von der Opposition benannt und kritisiert . . . 4 2 (my italics) 
In this frame of reference, this Verantwortung, then, (which we shall call 
Veranlwortung() is generally linked with the conceptual domains of Regieren, 
3 9"Abschied von der Notwehr-Hallung." In: Neues Deutschland. 4 July 1994 
4 0 Harald Buttle, in: "Opposition oder Was? ... eine Podiumdiskussion." op. cit., p. 6 
4 1 W o l f , Udo: "Regierungspartei im Wartestand?" In: West-Zone: 2. West-Berliner Wahlkampfzeitung 
der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS). Berlin: Landevorstand der PDS. 
September/October 1994, p. 1. 
4 2 Geier , Ruth: "Die Welt der schonen Bilder; Wahlwerbung in Ostdeutschland - Wahlwerbung fur 
Ostdeutsche?" In: Reiher/Lazer: Von Buschzulage... op. cit., p. 229 
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Macht, although the term functions as something of a euphemism for (i.e. is more 
attenuative than) the latter two, inasmuch as it incorporates a 'moral' dimension from 
its use (as responsibility) in a wider frame of reference, where it is linked with such 
conceptual domains as care, sensibleness, conscientiousness etc. This 'wider' use we 
will call Verantwortung 2. 
In the narrower frame of reference, Verantwortung t - as a synonym for Regieren - is 
generally coupled with Opposition as its antonym, where Opposition is taken 
(logically) to mean non-involvement in government; in other words, within the 
context of establishment political-speak Verantwortung ^ and Opposition will 
generally be seen by political actors and observers to be mutually exclusive. 
A conceptual model in which government (Regieren/Verantwortung^ and 
Opposition are mutually exclusive is a major problem for the PDS pro-involvement 
camp wishing, in a sense, to marry the two. What we find, then, is PDS ideologues 
favouring governmental involvement at pains to show that they are indeed not 
mutually exclusive, but in fact can co-exist happily; more and more we find 
Opposition and Verantwortung juxtaposed, with the wider Verantwortung2 - in being 
identical in ist verbal form to its subset {Verantwortung : regieren) - allowing a 
reading which links Opposition and regieren: 
Witness the carefully crafted title of a - crucially revealing - article by Andre Brie: 
Mit neuer Veranlwortung Opposition sein (my italics), 
in which Brie goes on to observe that the juxtaposition of the two lexemes is by no 
means incidental: 
Durch die Wahlerinnen und Wahler sind wir am 12. Juni und am 26. Juni 
(Sachsen-Anhalt -MD!) in eine Situation gewahlt worden, auf die wir nicht 
vorbereitet waren - weder inhaltlich noch hinsichtlich der Diskussion 
innerhalb der PDS. Aber wir sollten zu dieser Diskussion kommen. Politisch-
inhaltlich heiflt es meiner Meinung nach, die PDS wird mit neuer 
Verantwortung Opposition sein. Von ihr wird als Opposition mehr als 
Kontrolle und Alternative erwartet. Sie wird in der Lage sein, aus der 
Opposition heraus Politik zu beeinflussen, zu bewegen, zu verandern und 
durchzusetzen was in den letzten vier Jahren nur in geringem MaBe der Fall 
war. 4 3 (my italics) 
4 3 B r i e , Andre: "Mit neuer Verantwortung Opposition sein." In: DISPUT. no. 15-16. 1994, p. 1 
249 
(observe, too, how the reluctance to relinquish Opposition is captured in the carefully 
chosen formulation "aus der Opposition heraus" which links the 'old' and 'new' 
stances by allowing a suggestion that Opposition forms the very basis for a move to 
governmental involvement; the construction links the two ideas {Opposition and 
political power) linguistically and makes their co-existence look a comfortable one; 
closer scrutiny reveals, however, the potential illogicality of relinquishing a non-
governmental role on the very basis of a non-governmental role (!), an illogicality 
which, unsurprisingly, remains unaddressed). Witness, too, 
Mit der Starkung der PDS in den ostdeutschen Landtagen, hieB es in einem 
maBgeblich von Andre Brie verfaBten Vorstands-Papier, "wachst die 
Verantwortung der PDS, ihre Oppositionsrolle mit einem 
Gestaltungsanspruch zu verbinden".*4 (italics in original; other emphases 
mine) 
What we find then, is Brie et al, mixing and confusing frames of reference. Theirs is 
an attempt to break beyond the (narrower) political frame of reference in which 
Verantwortung wil l not allow Opposition, and to invoke a wider, more general 
Verantwortung - greater in its extension - alongside which their self-styled 
Opposition (in this frame of reference no longer the antonym of regieren) can exist 
more comfortably. Here the proposition is something like 
Wir haben uns als Opposition (d.h. als auBerparlamentarische/bzw. nicht-
regierende Kraft) als sehr verantwortlich gezeigt. 
The crucial, point, however, is that the signs <Opposilion> and <Verantwortung> 
have been linked; on the basis of the conflation which the identical signifiants for 
Verantwortung, and Verantwortung2 wi l l allow, an Opposition-Verantworlung2 
relationship might in turn, in looking and sounding identical to an Opposition-
Verantwortung{ (regierenl) relationship, be harnessed to facilitate the articulation of 
a move from Opposition into Verantwortung as government (Verantwortung}: 
regieren) and to counter the suggestion that there is something illogical or 
'opportunistic' about being oppositional and yet governing. 
Put simply, the argument is that in fact there is nothing new or illogical about the 
PDS showing Verantwortung (where that Verantwortung is Verantwortungl (i.e. 
regierenl)) because in its oppositional role it is showing - and has shown all along -
Verantwortung (primarily Verantwortung2) in conscientiously carrying out its 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary work. The construct turns on the 
4 4 L a n g , op. cit., p. 370 
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confiationability of two quite distinct denotational references behind a surface form 
<Verantwortung> which is variously extendable. It is of little surprise that 
<Verantwortung> is preferred by Brie et al. to 'narrower' terms such as Macht and 
regieren which cannot be 'moulded' in the same way. (Unsurprisingly, we generally 
see Oppostion coupled with such terms in PDS discourse at this time only within the 
framework of explicit arguments against any involvement on the part of the PDS in 
the perceived "corruptive" machinery of government). Of course, the 'theory' (the 
attempt to resolve the essential contradiction) is one thing, and the practice another; 
as we shall see below, by no means everyone in the party or its supporter-base wil l 
accept the validity of this conflation! 
What we find at this time, then, is the frequent and telling juxtaposition of 
<Opposition> and <Verantwortung> in the discourse of PDS 'pro-involvement' 
-ideologues and politicians such as Claus4?:. _ 
Die PDS-Wahlergebnisse vom 26. Juni 1994 in Sachsen-Anhalt sprechen fur 
sich. Der Zuwachs nach den Kommunal- und Europawahlen vom 12. Juni 
1994 ist erneute Zustimmung zu Oppositionsverantwortung der PDS. Er ist 
eine Absage an die Unwahlbarkeitskampagne von CDU und SPD gegen die 
PDS. 4 6 (my italics) 
Leading PDS ideologue and 'moderate', Wofgang Gehrke47, is keen to convince his 
colleagues in the course of the PDS Podiumdiskussion on the nature of PDS-
Opposition in the wake of the Sachsen-Anhalt developments that: 
ich finde es auBerordentlich wichtig, daB eine verantwortliche linke 
Opposition ihren Beitrag dazu leistet, daB diese Mehrheiten (i.e. "Mehrheiten 
jenseits der CDU" - MD; we wil l comment below upon this polarised world 
4 5 see footnote 37 
4 6"Presseerklarung des PDS-Landesvorsitzenden Sachsen-Anhalt, Roland Claus, und des Landes-
Pressesprechers, Thomas Drzisga, vom 27. Juni 1994." In: PID. no. 26.1994, p. 1 
4 7 Lang's interpretation of Gehrke's position is that it represents the opposite extreme to that of the 
Junge Genosslnnen in the "Opponieren, Tolerieren, Koalieren" debate: "Er (Gehrcke - M D ) verficht 
ein stark auf die parlamentarische Ebene ausgerichtetes, rein strategisch motiviertes Konzept. Ziel sei 
es, eine Mehrheit links von der Union zustande zu bekommen, wozu die PDS ihren Beitrag leisten 
miisse. Unabhangig davon und parallel dazu solle die PDS "iiber bestimmte Themen" 
auBerparlamentarische Bewegungen inszenieren, denn die vorhandenen seien zu schwach fur die 
PDS, um als ihr parlamentarischer Arm fungieren zu konnen. Gehrkes Idee einer prinzipiellen 
Biindnisorientierung stieB vor allem in den PDS-Fraktionen der Landtage in Sachsen-Anhalt und 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern auf Zuspruch. SchlieBlich ist gerade in diesen beiden Landern die "Macht' 
der PDS wegen ihrer relativen Starke gegeniiber den anderen Parteien spiirbar - die Versuchung sich 
fur die strategische Option eines 'Reformbundnisses' zu entscheiden, somit am groBten." Lang, 
op. cit., p. 371 (italics in original) 
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of a generic Linke pitted against the right and upon the invocation of Brandt's 
famous dictum) dann in der Praxis auch stattfinden konnen.48 (my italics) 
His words are echoed by his colleague Thomas Drzisga: 
man kann die Rolle der Opposition nicht auf das Geleise drangen, nur 
Widerstand zu leisten, sondern hier ist auch die Verantwortung zur 
Gestaltung gleichermaBen drin. Und interessanterweise finden wir im 
Wahlerverhalten zwei Stromungen: Die eine will ausgesprochen Opposition 
haben, aber die PDS hat auch viele Stimmen von denen gekriegt, die den 
Wunsch haben, PDS-Leute zumindest im kommunalen Bereich in die 
Verantwortung zu bringen49. (Observe, here, the move from a wider 
Verantwortung2 to a narrower Verantwortung,; my italics.) 
It is doubtless no coincidence that the two lexemes are juxtaposed in a PDS electoral 
pamphlet which is headed 
Die PDS tragt auch als Opposition Verantwortung.50 (my italics) 
and, in which again, whilst the authors are keen to hold on to the PDS's 'extra-system 
oppositionality', we encounter the ambiguites, identified by Ebermann, residing in 
beginnt: 
Gesellschaftliche Verantwortung beginnt nicht mit Regierung sondern mit der 
Kontrolle der Regierenden.51 (my italics) 
The attempt to step outside of the narrower (political) frame of reference in which 
Opposition and Verantwortung are antonyms does not, however, go unchallenged by 
many of the party faithful, for whom PDS discourse on the question of governmental 
involvement is simply inconsistent and contradictory. For the following Neues 
Deutschland reader the polarities are clear: 
Opposition oder Koalition! 
Sachsen-Anhalt braucht keine Minderheitsregierung! Schon gar nicht eine 
handlungsfahige "rot-grime Allianz" und erst recht keine Tolerierung durch 
4 8"Opposition oder Was? ... eine Podiumdiskussion." op. cit., p. 2 
4 9 i b i d . 
5 0 P D S Electoral pamphlet on the candidature of Bismarck's great grandson, Heinrich Graf von 
Einsiedel, 1994 
5 1 i b i d . 
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die PDS. Entweder Radikalopposition der PDS oder eine Koalition mit der 
SPD - d.h. Regierungsverantwortung . . . 5 2 (my emphases; bold in original) 
Radical reformer and Gallionsfigur of the party's Junge Genosslnnen, Angela 
Marquardt, will have none of it and, interestingly, turns the argumentation of Brie et 
al on its head by deploying the same linguistic conflation for quite the reverse: as an 
argument for non- involvement (!) in government. She argues that the PDS has 
exercised Verantwortung (Verantwortung2 - MD) all along in its extra-parliamentary 
role and questions why the pro-involvement camp are now hell-bent upon achieving 
something which the PDS has always had anyway: 
Wenn ich jetzt h6re, wir miissen in Verantwortung (, - MD) gehen, wir 
wollen jetzt endlich Verantwortung iibernehmen, wir mussen unseren 
Wahlerinnen und Wahlern gerecht werden, dann frage ich: Wo war diese 
PDS seit vier Jahren? Was hat sie seit vier Jahren gemacht? Hat sie keine 
Verantwortung ( 2 -MD) gehabt? War sie nicht in den Parlamenten? War sie 
nicht aujierhalb der Parlamente auch in Veranlwortung ( 2 - MD). Fur mich 
isl Verantwortung ( 2 -MD) auch aujierhalb der Parlamente sozusagen 
irgendeiner Opposition gerecht zu werden.53 (my italics) 
And though there has been little love lost between Angela Marquardt and Sahra 
Wagenknecht, the spokesperson for the party's hard-line, orthodox Marxist 
Kommunistische Plattform, in this respect they share common ground: 
Viele unserer Basisgruppen und Kreisvorstande wollen sich nicht in das 
politische System der BRD einpassen, sondern es vielmehr perspektivisch 
abschaffen.54 
Die Oppositionsrolle ist daher keine bloB taktische Frage oder gar eine, die 
davon abhinge, daB die anderen politischen Krafte sich bisher eben noch nicht 
bereit finden, Koalitionen mit uns einzugehen. Es ist vielmehr eine Frage die 
den Gesamtcharakter unserer Partei aufs engste beruhrt.55 
5 2"Opposition oder Koalition!" In: NeuesDeutschland. 2/3 July 1994 ('Leserbrief) 
^"Opposition oder Was? ... eine Podiumdiskussion." op. cit., p. 6 
5 4 S a h r a Wagenknecht, in: Reinke, Klaus: "Ist die PDS cool?" In: Tempo. (Hamburg) 8/94, p. 55 
5 5Wagenknecht: "Anforderungen an die PDS." op. cit., p. 3 
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One party activist in an article entitled "Regierungspartei im Wartestand?" offers an 
(at this time rare) unequivocal expressis verbis commitment to an oppositional role 
which precludes involvement in government: 
Dennoch bleiben wir dabei: Wir werden auch kunftig die Oppositionsrolle 
annehmen, weil Opposition, parlamentarisch und auBerparlamentarisch, 
nichts Defensives und nichts Verliererhaftes haben muB ... Auch wenn wir 
nicht selbst auf die Regierungsbank wollen, ist es uns nichl egal, wer 
regiert . . . 5 6 (my italics) 
This assertion is set against the notion that the PDS is a "Regierungspartei im 
Wartestand". He champions the 'traditional' PDS concept of oppositionality, seeing 
the thrust of the PDS's political mission as being located in its extra-parliamentary 
role in civil society. In this conception of opposition, any parliamentary presence on 
the part of the PDS serves as (no more than) a link between a broad and vague body 
of affected individuals outside of parliament whose interests are to be the prime focus 
of the PDS's political activity, and who are pitted against an equally vague body of 
Herrschende: 
Vielmehr steigen die Durchsetzungschancen fur Gesellschaftsveranderung 
mit entschlossener Oppositionspolitik, sofern sie Mobilisierung und 
Selbstorganisation auBerhalb des Parlamentes befordert, in die Parlamente 
tragt und damit den Druck auf die Regierung erhoht ... Wirkliche 
Veranderungen und Reformprojekte hin zu einer offenen, sozial gerechten 
Gesellschaft miissen in der Gesellschaft und gegen die Herrschenden 
durchgesetzt werden.57 
This is a highly reduced, abstract world which again turns upon the broad, bipolar 
conceptual opposites (Herrschende vs others) which we have identified as a central 
feature of PDS discourse; the problematic lack of homogeneity and identity (i.e. the 
mythicality?) of the groups encompassed by the movement for change is smoothed 
over by recourse to a high level of (reductive) nominal isation in which inanimates 
become actors and in which there are no animate agents. An inherent causality58 is 
5 6 Wolf , : "Regierungspartei im Wartestand?" op. cit., p. 1 
5 7 ib id . 
5 8 W e remember: "Satze mit nur einem inharenten Teilnehmer - wie sterben oder sich ergeben - sind 
interessant, weil das "Wirklichkeitsmodell1, das sie zum Ausdruck bringen, eine Version von 
Kausalitat ausdruckt, die ... 'eine implizite oder inharente Kausalitat ist, spontan und selbst 
verursacht'" Good: Presse und soziale Wirklichkeit. op. cit., p. 22 
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implied through the use of the non-transactive59 "steigen" with only one inherent 
participant. 
How does Wolf attempt to handle the ambivalence (be this 'inner-personal' or 
between different PDS factions), i.e. the problematic situation that on one level the 
party has - through the notion of Opposition - struck an 'extra-system' keynote in 
stressing its unwillingness to become involved in the corruptive machinery of 
government, while simultaneously asserting and relishing6 0 its potential influence as 
a lever61 in strategic political configurations which, in the view of many political 
commentators, might allow it to become at the very least de facto players in 
governmental alliances?62 Firstly, by a (rather weak) expressis verbis re-assertion of 
the PDS's commitment to a non-governmental role and, secondly, through the 
invocation of an abstract picture which allows the (secondary) quest for 
parliamentary influence (which would stop short of actual governmental 
involvement) and a primary role located in civil society to co-exist happily and 
unproblematically on paper. Given the evidence outlined above (for example, that 
leading PDS ideologues are toying with the imposition of a definite time-limit upon 
Wolf's "kunftig die Oppositionsrolle annehmen" [cf. Gysi, footnote 10]), we are left 
wondering whether this is not more of a personal attempt to reconcile for himself 
fundamental and problematic contradictions than any statement of uniform PDS 
policy. (It makes abundantly clear the pitfalls of drawing generalised conclusions on 
the basis of individual texts, whose prima facie propositions can look quite different 
5 9 A transactive clause is one in which a causal process word can combine with two "inherent 
participants" (to use Halliday's terminology; [see Good: Presse und soziale Wirklichkeit. op. cit., 
p. 21]), a syntactic agent and an affected participant; this will be given full treatment below. 
6 0"Seit den Wahlen in Sachsen-Anhalt und der Bildung einer rot-grunen Minderheitsregierung in 
Magdeburg ist die PDS in aller Munde ... die PDS (ist) nun nicht mehr ganzlich unwichtig fur die 
Frage ... Wer soil regieren?" Wolf, Udo: "Regierungspartei im Wartestand?" op. cit., p. 1 
6 1 c f . Gysi, on the PDS's role in tolerating a minority government: "Wir miissen den 
Ministerprasidenten mitwahlen, und wir miissen, sicherlich nach zahen Verhandlungen, den Haushalt 
bestatigen, damit die Regierung regieren kann. Das ist aber auch schon alles (! - MD) ... die 
Regierung [ware] in der Zwickmuhle, weil sie sich uberlegen muB, ob sie den KompromiB nach 
rechts oder links sucht, und das ist eine Zwickmuhle, die ich einer solchen SPD-Regierung auch 
wiinsche." See: Reinke: "Ist die PDS cool?" op. cit., p. 55. 
Observe how Gysi is keen here to present the 'reality' of PDS involvement with the SPD not as a 
problem for the PDS but as a problem for the SPD; his portrayal of the situation contrasts sharply 
with that of his PDS colleague, Heinz Vietze, (parlamentarischer Geschdftsfiihrer der PDS-Fraktion 
von Brandenburg): "ich finde ganz einfach, erst muB der Inhalt klar sein und danach kann ich mich 
entscheiden, ob ich hier etwas toleriere, mit jemandem kooperiere oder wie ich in dieser Weise 
vorgehe. Ich hatte nach der Sache in Sachsen-Anhalt ein kurzes Telefongesprach mit Gregor Gysi 
und habe ihm gesagt, daB war das Letzte, was er machen konnte, also die Zustimmung zu einem 
Haushalt in Sachsen-Anhalt sozusagen vorab anzukiindigen. Ich kann uberhaupt nichts tolerieren, 
wenn ich nicht weiB, was Inhalt dessen ist, was eine sozialdemokratisch gefuhrte Regierung vorhat ... 
Man macht es sich zu einfach mit der Vorstellung, daB wir mit der Tolerierung der SPD oder der 
Wahl der SPD eine Wende haben." See: "Opposition oder Was? ... eine Podiumdiskussion." op. cit., 
p. 3 
6 2 G o l o Schmidt doubtless expresses the view of many observers in remarking that "In Sachsen-Anhalt 
sitzt sie (die PDS - MD) beim Ministerprasidenten Hoppner de facto mit am Regierungstisch." See: 
Schmidt, Golo:"Der Sprengstoff heiBt 'Pluralismus'." In: Das Parlament. no. 3-4. 1994 
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when set against a wider contextual background). The PDS's essential vehicle 
towards exerting influence after Sachsen-Anhalt is the SPD. If they are to co-operate 
on the basis of the lowest common denominator of a generic Linke (a point with 
which we will deal in more detail below), this now calls for a problematic 
relativisation of the very SPD which the PDS has consistently - as we saw in 
chapter 3 - lumped together rhetorically with the CDU as part of an egregious and 
immutable 'establishment'; this might entail charges of opportunism and Wolf seems 
keen to deflect these by re-asserting that the SPD is seen, at most, as the 'best of a 
bad lot'; to deal with the problematic question of how and why co-operating with the 
SPD can be better than with the CDU, especially when, as Wolf himself points out, 
"wir wissen, daB Scharping nur ein anderes Wort fur Kohl ist" (! MD) Wolf, in 
relativising, yet again has recourse to a highly abstract, causally vague body of 
language with inanimate actors (Spielraum ) and non-transactives with one inherent 
participant {sich erweitert): 
Obwohl wir wissen, daB ... die SPD ebenso wie die CDU fur die 
Abschaffung des Asylrechts gestimmt hat, sie der Rechtsentwicklung in der 
Gesellschaft nicht entgegentritt, sondern ihr entweder hinterherlauft oder sie 
gar befordert, ziehen wir eine SPD-gefuhrte Regierung einer CDU-gefiihrten 
vor. Nicht weil wir glauben, daB sich damit etwas wesentlich zum Besseren 
andert, sondern weil sich damit der Spielraum fiir linke Politik erweitert.63 
(my italics) 
The ensuing justification for this assertion is: 
Eine SPD- oder gar rot-grime Regierung ist dem Druck anderer 
Interessengruppen und Bewegungen in der Gesellschaft ausgesetzt als die . 
CDU-Administration.64 
Observe how the above is enframed in a construction which straddles the boundary 
between a relational65 - "it is of the nature of this model (the relational - MD) that it 
allows only a limited realisation of transparent causal processes"66 - and a passive (of 
state) indicating no agency: the process noun Druck and its adjunct, anderer 
6 3Wolf: "Regierungspartei im Wartestand?" op. cit., p. 1 
6 4ibid. 
65Relational processes express "processes of being. Quite often, they signal that a relationship exists 
between two participants but without suggesting that one participant affects the other in any way. 
Relational processes may be (a) intensive, expressing an 'X is a' relationship; (b) possessive, 
expressing an 'X has a' relationship; or (c) circumstantial, expressing an 'X is at/on a' relationship." 
Simpson, op. cit., p. 91 (italics in original). 
66Kxess/Hodge: Language as Ideology, op. cit., p. 28 
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Gruppen, are not - despite possibly appearing as such - the strict grammatical agents 
of the construct: if we represent the construction as X is exposed to Z (by Y), then Y 
has been left unidentified. In other words, the question of the medium by which the 
government is to be exposed to the pressure of these groups (i.e. how?/by whom?/in 
what way?) is left unaddressed. At the same time the construction yet again 
incorporates the vague and broad groupings (Interessengruppen, Bewegungen) whose 
identity it is difficult to specify and which, as we have stated, have been a 
characteristic feature of PDS discourse thus far. 
Wolf leaves his 'justification' at this level of generality; important causal questions 
as to identity and medium are left unaddressed; we cannot say that his justification is 
'wrong' or 'untrue' but we can question the level of abstraction. Yet again, however, 
acceptance of the abstraction will be a matter of subjective opinion: his arguments 
will doubtless be accepted by some at this level of generality although, as we shall 
see below, the significant body of inner-party criticism of what was perceived as the 
leadership's growing "Anpasserei"67 expressed during the heated debates surrounding 
the 4th party conference offers evidence that by no means all party members and 
voters are comfortable with it. 
EXCURSUS - TRANSITIVITY IN LANGUAGE 
The final page (4) of the West-Zone text (see footnote 41) into which Wolf's 
"Regierungspartei im Wartestand? " text is incorporated contains a short biography 
of Gregor Gysi followed by a personal declaration from the latter that: 
"Wir machen nur zwei Wahlversprechen, die wir auf jeden Fall halten 
werden: 1. Wenn es die Mehrheitsverhaltnisse hergeben, wird die Abwahl 
von Kohl auf keinen Fall an uns scheitern und 2. wir bleiben Opposition."68 
(inverted commas in original) 
The "transitivity configuration"69 of both these promises is highly elucidating; before 
proceeding to a detailed examination thereof, we shall make a few brief remarks 
upon transitivity7 0 in language. This system, Good points out: 
6 7 cf. "Was soil diese ewige Anpasserei? ... Wirkt nicht derjenige unglaubwiirdig, der mit 
vollgefressenem Bauch vom Hunger spricht?" Schreier, Bernd (PDS member of Saxony 
Landtag, 1990-4): "Heiligt Erfolg die Mittel?" In: Junge Welt. 9 January 1995 
6 8 Gysi , in: West-Zone: 2. West-Berliner Wahlkampfzeitung der Partei des Demokratischen 
Sozialismus (PDS). op. cit., p. 4 
69Simpson, op. cit., p. 109 
™A very readable introduction is provided by Simpson, op. cit., pp. 86-118 
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bezieht sich auf die Weise, in der in einer beliebigen Sprache Ereignisse oder 
Zustande der Wirklichkeit eine sprachliche Struktur bekommen71 
and as such it performs what Halliday has called the "ideational function" of 
language.72 
As Simpson puts it: 
It (the system of transitivity) shows how speakers encode in language their 
mental picture of reality and how they account for their experience of the 
world around them ... the transitivity model provides one means of 
investigation how a reader's or listener's perception is pushed in a particular 
direction or how the linguistic structure of a text effectively encodes a 
particular "world-view".7 3 
The structural way in which ideas are related is thus not incidental, but rather: 
Ideology involves a systematically organised representation of reality.7 4 
The critical linguist studying the structural ways in which ideas are enframed in 
language will "seek to interpret, rather than simply describe the linguistic structure 
of texts".75 (italics in original). At the heart of this system is the notion that language 
enframes systematically connected "categories of process and participant"76 and that 
there are maximally explicit ways of representing the same 'reality'; put another way, 
this 'reality' can be represented with varying degrees of generality or abstraction 
"while retained within some - to re-invoke Simpson's phraseology - notional 
parameter of 'truth'".7 7 I f we are concerned "with clearly establishing causes and 
7 1 Good: Presse und soziale Wirklichkeit. op. cit., p. 21 
72"Language serves for the expression of 'content': that is the speaker's experience of the real world, 
including the inner world of his own consciousness. We may call this the ideational function ... In 
serving this function, language also gives structure to experience, and heljis to determine our ways of 
looking at things, so that it requires some intellectual effort to see them in any other way than which 
our language suggests to us"; Halliday, Michael: "Language Structure and Language Function." In: 
Lyons, J (ed.): New Horizons in Linguistics. Harmondsworth: Penguin 1970, p. 143 
73Simpson, op. cit., pp. 88, 104 
7 4Kress /Hodge, Language as Ideology, op. cit. p. 15 
75Simpson, op. cit., p. 105 
7 6Trew: '"What the Papers Say' ..." op. cit., p. 123 
77Simpson, op. cit., p. 106 
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causal relations, then the transactive is the best model for the job". 7 8 The transactive 
clause is one where: 
transactive process words can combine with two linguistic items (2 inherent 
participants in Halliday's terminology - MD), syntactic agent and affected 
participant (and a sentence with a transactive verb represents a causal process 
in which one thing - or group of things - affects another).79 
An example would be X did Y. This can in turn be reconstituted - through 
passivisation, - as Y was done by X, with a resulting shift of focus from actor/agent 
to affected; what began as an actual active process now looks more like a finished 
process - a state - through the introduction of the verb "to be". Through the insertion 
of "by" the causal connection between agent and process is weakened. The agent can 
at this juncture be dropped (with all the ideological implication this may entail!) with 
some ease to yield Y was done. 
The non-transactive models links one entity to a process. "As there is only the one 
entity it is difficult to know whether it is actor or affected"80. An example would be 
"X does" (as in, say, "prices rise."). While the transactive and the non-transactive are 
about action, are, as Kress and Hodge put it, "actional"81, we touched above on a 
further model, the relational (e.g. "X is/has Y"), which links participants in a clause 
without necessarily suggesting that one is in any way affected by the other (see 
footnote 65). 
PROMISE 1: A TRANSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Let us now return to a detailed examination of the transitivity configuration of Gysi's 
"Die Abwahl von Kohl wird an uns nicht scheitern". The construction is not a 
'natural choice': there is something stilted about the PDS appearing as indirect 
participants in the process. In fact, we wil l argue, the configuration is entirely in 
keeping with the duality of the (pro-involvement) PDS's position: on the one hand it 
wishes - i f the increasing number of statements from leading party figures to the 
effect that long-term governmental involvement is not to be ruled out is anything to 
78Kress/Hodge: Language as Ideology, op. cit., p. 19; "In understanding any process, causality is of 
crucial importance. If the causal steps are clearly indicated - those who started an action are specified, 
the effects are shown, and those affected are mentioned - then our judgements can be made on 
reasonably secure grounds (unless we have been told outright lies, but no linguistic analysis can guard 
against that anyway)." ibid., p. 18 
7 9Trew: "Theory and Ideology at Work." op. cit., p. 110 
80Kress/Hodge: Language as Ideology, op. cit., p. 8 
8 , ibid. 
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go by - to increase its influence in 'the system' through the assumption of roles of 
'responsibility'; on the other hand, however, it has (to be seen, at least) to hold on to 
the dimension of 'extra-system oppositionality'. This is, for the PDS, an example of 
what Trew, we remember, would call an "awkward fact": 
in the case of political and social ideologies, the challenge posed by 
anomalies has a particular urgency ... the gap between reality and theory is so 
great that there is a continual stream of "awkward facts" which opponents 
will exploit i f they are not successfully denied, suppressed or reinterpreted".82 
How does the PDS seek to deal with the 'awkward fact' of justifying a 'a one foot in, 
one foot out' position? The essential reluctance - for the time being? - to present 
itself as becoming actively involved in establishment politics is mirrored in a 
syntactic construction clearly crafted to express the essential passivity of the PDS's 
role (but, crucially, its involvement nevertheless). In other words the structural way 
in which the idea is mediated is designed to redress the problematic ideational 
import. The construction suggests that the PDS's involvement in established politics 
is not active, but indirect; working backwards, we might posit that the most explicit -
of course, notional^ - articulation of a position of 'joining in ' in removing Kohl 
might have been something like: 
Auch wir werden Kohl abwahlen, 
which has gone through (at least) the following transformational stages: 
(through passivisation) > Kohl wird auch von uns abgewahlt (link between process 
and actor attenuated through introduction of preposition; active involvement is 
played down; the PDS as agents are now in what Trew calls "a less focal position"84) 
(through nominalisation and inversion) > Die Abwahl von Kohl erfolgt auch durch 
uns (an inanimate process has now become a participant in the process; the 
nominalisation paves the way for relexicalisation of the 'active' abwahlen) 
(through relexicalisation) > Die Abwahl von Kohl wird an uns nicht scheitern (the 
negative puts active involvement at an even greater remove and the resultant 
construction is of a quasi-relational nature) 
8 2Trew: "Theory and Ideology at Work." op. cit., p. 97 
^"Es ist in jeder Wissenschaft erlaubt, Hypothesen aufzustellen. In diesem Fall wurden Hypothesen 
in der Annahme bestehen, daB es bestimmte sprachliche Formulierungen in der "Wirklichkeit' gibt, die 
beziiglich Kausalitat, Agens, Zeit, Ort usw. maximal explizit sind - oder vielleicht einfach weniger 
mehrdeutig als andere Formulierungen." Good: Presse und soziale Wirklichkeit. op. cit., p. 24. 
8 4Trew: "Theory and Ideology at Work." op. cit., p. 98 
260 
The essential passivity of the resultant configuration also taps in, of course, to the 
'modesty mode' which has been so consistent a feature of the PDS's attempt at self-
legitimisation. 
It might of course be argued here that we are falling into the trap here of what 
Simpson has called "interpretative positivism", in other words of invoking "linguistic 
description as a way of confirming the decisions ... already taken about a text's 
meaning"85. We can counter such a criticism in two ways: firstly, on the basis of the 
wide evidence outlined in this chapter to the effect that the PDS is indeed grappling 
with the fundamental contradictions of its position; secondly, even though we would 
reasonably expect not to find the construction again on account of its 'stilted' quality, 
its consistent re-invocation offers compelling evidence that it has been consciously 
crafted: we encounter it widely (sometimes with minimal variations), a point picked 
up in the article from Neues Deutschland cited above (and offering evidence, 
incidentally, of PDS ideologues' success in generating recognition [and acceptance?] 
of the formulation!): 
So vollzieht sich allmahlich eine Umwertung der Werte. Gysi und Bisky 
sagen schon seit einiger Zeit, daB an der PDS die Abwahl Kohls nicht 
scheitern werde.86 
Compare also: 
An uns wird die Bildung einer Regierung aus SPD und Biindnis 90/die 
Griinen nicht scheitern.87 
And: 
Wesentlich ist Bisky aber die Botschaft, "an der PDS wird rot-grim in Berlin 
nicht scheitern".88 
It is this fact of its wide instrumentalisation which points to its ideological function 
in helping - a pro-involvement PDS would hope - to smooth over the fundamental 
contradictions of a 'one foot in, one foot out' position. 
In a very real sense this 'one foot in, one foot out' position is mirrored in the PDS's 
offene Listen strategy89 which, too, can be seen as part and parcel of the attempt to 
85Simpson, op. cit., p. I l l 
86"Abschied von der Notwehr-Haltung." op. cit. 
8 7Gregor Gysi, cited in: Volmert: "Wahlkampf-Rhetorik ..." op. cit., p. 248 
8 8 Leo, Erich: "Wieder klar zur Opposition." \w.Junge Welt. 9 January 1995 
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marry otherness with 'Anpassung'. These lists included Stephan Heym, the writer 
once ostracised by the GDR regime (whose candidature on the PDS's lists was a great 
symbolic coup for the PDS, as 'tangible' evidence of its having exorcised the ghost 
of the past and thus of its ongoing Erneuerung) and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, 
Bismarck's colourful great-grandson.90 On the one hand the PDS is keen, in 
oppositionality mode, to strike the anti-establishment Bewegung keynote by calling 
for a departure from traditional party structures. Citing from the party's self-history, 
Von den Anfangen, Neugebauer and Stoss - for whom the offene Listen are primarily 
a matter of "Strategic"91 - reveal that: 
Lothar Bisky erklarte bei der Kandidatenvorstellung: 
"die PDS wolle mit ihrer offenen Listen ein Biindnis linker, demokratischer 
Krafte anstreben. Man sei an selbstandig denkenden und handelnden 
Personlichkeiten interessiert, wolle starre Parteigrenzen offnen und so auch 
Parteilosen die Moglichkeit geben, im Deutschen Bundestag zu wirken." 9 2 
(my italics) 
(Observe yet again how the candidates in question, a wide array of colourful and very 
different personalities, are unified on the level of the lowest common denominator of 
links and demokratisch, however these epithets are to be understood). On the other 
hand, there is a definite oxymoron in the notion of 'partyless' candidates standing on 
the lists of a party of democratic socialism, especially where, as in the case of Heym, 
the candidate in question is instrumental in securing the party's return to the 
Bundestag9*; it is hard to see how a candidate operating "parteilos fur die PDS" - to 
use the frequently encountered collocation94 - could fail to be indentified as being a 
candidate for that party itself. As such, the candidature of the members of the offenen 
8 9"Die PDS bemiihte sich auch im Superwahljahr 1994 ihr nahestehende Personen zur Mitarbeit zu 
gewinnen. Bereits Mitte 1993 hatte ein Parteitag beschlossen, wiederum mit 'offenen Listen' auf 
denen auch Nicht-Mitglieder kandidieren sollten, bei den bevorstehenden Wahlen anzutreten. Auf 
einer Pressekonferenz am 6. Februar 1994 im Berliner Karl-Liebknecht-Haus der PDS erklarten sich 
prominente Personen aus Ost und West dazu bereit." Neugebauer/Stoss, op. cit., p. 222. 
9 0 For a full list of open-list candidates for the 1994 Federal elections, see Neugebauer/Stoss, ibid., 
p. 223 
9 ,ibid., p. 224 
9 2ibid., p. 223 
9 3Heym was one of four Direktmandate won by the PDS/LL in East Berlin in the 1994 Federal 
elections; under the German Constitution, a party may be returned to the Federal Parliament despite 
failing to meet the mandatory 5% of the vote if it wins the mandate in a minimum of three electoral 
districts. 
94Witness, for example, "beantragt der Bezirk Mitte auf Initiative von Karin Baumert {parteilos fur 
PDS) ..." (my italics). Cited from: Burkhardt: "Palast versus SchloB oder: Wem gehoren die 
Symbole." op. cit., p. 162 
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Listen, while symbolically different, can simultaneously be seen - functionally - in 
conventional terms. Trew has said that: 
Words alone cannot capture all that is put over with words, pictures layout 
and type all together95 
and the following cover for a PDS electoral pamphlet (issued not by Stephan Heym 
but by the Wahlburo der PDS9 6,1994) on Stephan Heym, bearing the PDS's familiar 
logo, clearly shows the level of identity between Heym and the PDS9 7: 
9 5Trew: "'What the Papers Say' ..." op. cit., p. 120. 
96Die andere Stimme: Stephan Heym. op. cit. 
9 7Ruth Geier identifies something of a similar situation in showing how the SPD appended the 
photographs and signatures of popular East German SPD politicians Regine Hildebrandt, Manfred 
Stolpe and Reinhard Hoppner to an electoral advertisement aimed at encouraging potential SPD 
voters in Saxony to vote for Rudolf Scharping. The semiotic effect was to put Scharping "in zwei 
Bezugslinien ... zum einen in die allgemeine SPD-Tradition, zum anderen in eine Linie, die das 
Ostdeutsche betont. Das unter Ostdeutschen nach wie vor positive Image dieser Politiker soli auf 
Scharping transformiert werden". Geier: "Die Welt der schonen Bilder ..." op. cit., p. 239 
Die andere Stimme: 
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there is nothing in this crucial first impression to overtly suggest that - formally -
there is any distinction between the parteiloser Heym 9 8 and any other (member) 
candidate for the PDS. 
Modality, too, is central to this abiding ambivalence, ^n the following, what can be 
read as an attempt (by a pro-involvement ideologue) to motivate the PDS and its 
sympathisers to recognise the necessity of participation in the machinery of power is 
simultaneously 'mitigated' (to counter charges of betrayal and opportunism?) by 
being enframed in a deontic modality which suggests that it is all but forced upon the 
PDS, that if the PDS is 'getting its hands dirty' it does so only under duress, against 
its wil l and as a martyr to some abstract cause; observe, too, how the relational "Wir 
werden mit ..." allowi a nominalised, lexical choice {Umarmung) which - in deleting 
agency - (conveniently?) blurs the boundary between active and passive action (is the 
PDS embracing or being embraced here?): 
Wir werden mit der Umarmung leben mtissen. Vielleicht fst "die Umarmung 
fur eine Partei, die sozialistisch ist und bleiben wil l , die sich nicht der 
schleichenden Korrumpierung von Parlamenten oder . auch von 
Regierungsverantwortung unterwerfen will sogar die gefahrlichere und 
wahrscheinlich langst noch nicht bestandene Herausforderung.99 (my italics) 
Notice, too, the (calculated?) causal unclarity of the relational "Korrumpierung von 
Regierungsverantwortung", which allows a dual reading; is Brie arguing against the 
institution of government itself (which necessarily promotes corruption, i.e. which 
forms the very basis of corruption) or is he not, indeed, merely arguing against PDS 
involvement in any corruption which might emanate from the (otherwise sound?) 
institution. Put simply, what looks, prima facie, like an argument against 
involvement in government per se can, on closer scrutiny, stand up to a reading in 
which merely the abuses of a role in government is challenged, not involvement in 
the institution itself. 
In a very real sense, too, the whole construct of Tolerierung (Duldung) of a 
Minderheitsregierung is per se not unuseful to a pro-involvement PDS seeking to 
9 8 The comply oxymoron encapsulated in the PDS's position - whether motivated primarily on 
strategic grounds or born out of genuine ideological commitment to 'looser' electoral structures -
certainly paid off for the PDS: "Bei der Bundestagswahl am 16. Oktober 1994 scheiterte sie zwar mit 
einem Gesamtergebnis von 4.4% der Zweitstimmen knapp an der Sperrklausel. In vier Berliner 
Wahlkreisen eroberte sie freilich das Direktmandat und konnte so mit insgesamt 30 Abgeordneten in 
den deutschen Bundestag einziehen. Von den vier Direktmandaten wurden zwei von Nicht-
Parteimitgliedern gewonnen (Heym und Miiller), in den beiden anderen obsiegten der Motor der 
Reformaktion Gysi und die eher traditionalistisch orientierte Christa Luft. Ohne die parteilosen 
'Vorzeigekandidaten' hatte die PDS wohl auf eine Prasenz im Bundesparlament verzichten miissen." 
Neugebauer/Stoss, op. cit., p. 224 
"Brie, Andre: "Mit neuer Verantwortung Opposition sein." op. cit., p. 3 
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marry that involvement with the retention of 'otherness'; on the one it might be said 
to provide a crucial medium for introducing the PDS as a factor into the complex 
equation of power relationships, while on the other it has a strong semantic 
component of mere grudging acceptance100 which, again, might bolster the 
(politically less compromising?) suggestion that the PDS stands apart from the 
establishment and is merely helping to 'make the best of a bad job' in furnishing the 
SPD and the Greens with the support necessary to bring about the right's removal 
from government. 
PROMISE 2: (' Wir bleiben Opposition') 
From the point of view of textual cohesion it seems more than likely that a casual 
observer unfamiliar with the ongoing extra-textual polemic within the PDS as to the 
nature of its oppositional role will (simplistically) understand Gysi's commitment to 
Opposition as a commitment to a non-governmental role {Opposition,). After all, the 
textual function strongly promotes this impression, given that Gysi's utterance (on 
page 4) comes after the expressis verbis commitment by Wolf to a non-governing 
political role foregrounded on page 1. But while the respective commitments of Gysi 
and Wolf to Opposition might look the same, there is, of course, a world of 
difference. Gysi's ambivalent utterance - a (causally inexplicit) relational; we 
remember, "Ich bin Opposition") - is as abstract as the PDS's position is nebulous. 
The nominalised form suspends tense and can stand more comfortably on its own 
that a verbal form such as "Wir opponieren weiterhin" which seems more truncated 
and more readily draws problematic questions such as "against whom?", "in what 
way?", "for how long?". Kress and Hodge have shown how nominalised forms can 
be harnessed to shroud complex questions of causality. They operate in something of 
a 'linguistic limbo' inasmuch as they are "not marked for tense"101; their enormous 
ideological potential lies in the fact that they are thus "outside indications of time or 
modality" 1 0 2: the boundaries between present and future, between what is and what 
should be are thus blurred, and the merely 'hypothetical' nature of what is in fact a 
complex - and perhaps ultimately unachievable - process can thus be neatly side-
stepped. A verbal form, by contrast, would be subject to "classificatory acts"103, i.e. it 
xmTolerieren is defined in the Duden. Deulsches Universal Worterbuch A-Z (op. cit.) as: "... 
(bildungsspr.) dulden, zulassen, gelten lassen (obwohl es nicht den eigenen Vorstellungen o. a. 
entspricht): jmdn. t.; der Staat toleriert diese Aktivitaten." (italics in original; other emphases mine) 
1 0 1 Kress/Hodge: Language as Ideology, op. cit., p. 27 
1 0 2ibid. 
1 0 3ibid. 
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would have to indicate "when, how likely" 1 0 4 , a noisome task if complex causal 
questions are best left backgrounded. Nominalisation plays a key part in processes 
where "a series of complex actions are collapsed into surface forms which make them 
seem extremely simple"'0 5; in other words in collapsing processes into easily-
manageable single units, it is a key feature in any move to veil causality through 
abstraction: 
Reducing the complexity of an argument and limiting the terms which it can 
contain is a drastic intervention. Showing less means someone else seeing 
less. And seeing less means thinking less.106 
The relational construction allows the ideologeme Opposition to stand comfortably 
on its own without qualification, meaning that the sheer breadth of the term 1 0 7 offers 
(at. least)Jhe potential foMhe different 'camps' to understand it in different ways 
according to their own predilections'08, i.e. in (vastly simplified!) terms of The innef-
PDS polemic as either fundamental, 'radical' opposition to the very basis of the 
system on the one hand or as a (Gramscian) 'revisionist' opposition on the other; 
inner-party discord can thus, on this level, remain shelved and backgrounded in the 
vital run-up to the elections in which the PDS, like any party(l), is keen to present a 
united front ' 0 9 : 
l 0 4 ibid. 
, 0 5ibid., p. 24 
, 0 6 ibid., p. 22 
l 0 7 cf . Reich (op. cit.): "Allenfalls laBt die heterogene Zusammensetzung gewisse Milieus zu, die unter 
dem gemeinsamen Dach von Opposition und Osttrotz locker zusammengehQren." (my italics) 
, 0 8 "Die Verwendung von Leerformeln in politischen Texten, von Ideologemen und affirmativen 
Nennungen laBt zwet Hauptfunktionen erkennen: Die politischen Anhanger sollen fiihlen, daB einer 
der ihren spricht oder schreibt. Die Gegner sollen fiihlen, daB sie die Grundmeinung des Sprechenden 
teilen, daB einer der ihren spricht oder schreibt." Eroms, Hans-Werner: "Zur Analyse politischer 
Sprache." In: Linguistik und Didaktik. Sonderdruck aus Heft 17. 5. Jg. 1974, p. 5. 
, 0 9 I n a highly revealing and acutely perceptive semiotic study Rudolf Woderich ("Ex oriente Lux? -
Zur symbolischen Politik der PDS im Superwahljahr." In: Brie et al. (eds.): Die PDS - Empirische 
Befunde... op. cit., pp. 146-61) argues strongly that the PDS has sought to convey the impression of 
being a united, homogenous party through the bold uniformity of its electoral design (be it of posters, 
flysheets, leaflets, pamphlets, stickers, badges or advertisements, all "konsequent in das visuelle 
Gesamtkonzept eingebunden" (p. 151; all subsequent page numbers in brackets refer to Woderich's 
study). The discourse of symbolism, Worderich rightly argues, is an integral part in the complex web 
of competing discourses which underlie the construction of reality; symbols "reprasentieren einen 
eigenstandigen Diskurs bei der ErschlieBung und Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit." (p. 148) He argues 
that to be successful in setting itself apart from the other parties as a "'moderne linke 
Oppositionspartei'" (p. 148), the PDS had, in its design, to do much more than rely on the "mehr oder 
minder deutliche Wiedererkennbarkeit von Signaturen, worauf sich die Wahlsymbolik der etablierten 
Parteien letztlich reduzierte" (p. 149) and on the "gangige Topoi der Waren- und Produktwerbung, an 
'Waschmittelparolen' ... die Bilderarrangements fiir das traute Heim im Grunen ..." (p. 149). At the 
same time the design had to be careful to avoid being overtly reminiscent of a communist past with its 
"staatssozialistische Einheitssemantik im Rahmen politischer Inszenierungen ..." (p. 149). In 
dispensing with the elements of modern product advertising, "auf harmonisierende Arrangements und 
schone Bilder" (p. 149) the PDS showed sensitivity to the affinity of a significant number of East 
Germans for certain 'purist' conventions, he argues, with "Keine ... Durchmischung der Spharen, 
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Seitens der Vorstande und Wahlburos muB im Wahlkampf Geschlossenheit 
und Zuversicht ausgestrahlt werden, ohne damit Selbstzufriedenheit zu 
erzeugen oder gar das Gefuhl, das Wahlkampfziel der PDS sei ohne 
auBergewohnliche Anstrengungen sehr vieler Mitglieder erreichbar.110 
However, the media-pervasiveness of the contemporary political world makes the 
task of playing down inner-party discord an ever more problematic undertaking. 
Elsewhere Gysi has - where challenged on its refusal to deal with 'problem' factions 
- made virtue from necessity and rhetorical capital from its ambivalence through a 
very public assertion that the desire to present a united front is what characterises the 
other parties not, in fact, the PDS; 
[...] bei den Griinen, wenn ein Streit ausbricht, [sagt] Joschka Fischer: "Kein 
Streit vor der Wahl!" Das ist namlich die unterschiedliche 
Demokratieentwicklung. Sowas konnen wir uns in der PDS gar nich (sic) 
mehr leisten [ . . . ] ' 1 1 (square brackets in original) 
keine schwebende Leichtigkeit und Ironie ... Nicht zuletzt dieses lebensweltliche Credo der 
puristischen Trennung und Unverwechselbarkeit der Spharen, der unbezweifelbaren Eindeutigkeit, 
eben auf politische Themen und Problemfelder bei der Begegnung mit PDS-Wahisymbolen zu 
treffen, hat wohl in Ostdeutschland einen Nerv beriihrt und den Erwartungen interessierter Wahler 
entsprochen." (p. 149). The features of the "elaborierte Strategic der 'corporate identity'" (p. 159) 
Worderich identifies are a uniform, strict and resolute graphic, logocentric design (punctuated with an 
'affirmatory' colon; on this point see: Geier: Die Welt der schdnen Bilder. op. cit.; pp. 240-1 - MD) 
underpinned by stark, dominant black and white contrasts and a very restricted use of other (softer) 
colours; the visual 'ensemble' is complemented by the addition of the PDS's logo (white on a red 
background or vice versa) which picks up, but plays down, the red which dominated the design of the 
orthodox communist line of tradition; by contrast with that tradition, Woderich points out, the PDS's 
design contains little or nothing in the way of sketched elements or martialist and titanic symbolism 
and is completely lacking in shading and blending of its dominant colours (black, white, and, to a 
lesser degree, red). The logocentricity of the design, he argues, is innovative in terms of both 
prevailing political design and the party's own history. The PDS's election posters in many cases 
achieve an expressive urgency through the largeness of the captions' letters, designed to be effective 
both from close up and from afar; the 'sense' of the caption in large letters is only to be determined by 
approaching the poster and reading the (smaller) lower caption. Woderich traces the roots of this 
design to the communicative graphic culture which emerged in the GDR, particularly from the 70s 
onwards, with its emphasis - given the power structure obtaining - upon a cognitive credo of 
(primarily) "'philosphierender' Bildideen" (p. 153) and a concomitant 'neglect' of written forms. As 
such, he argues, the logocentricity of PDS electoral design can be seen as a reaction to that 'neglect'. 
Crucially, he points out, the key members of the PDS's ideological "Machtzentrum" (Bisky [as Rector 
of the Potsdam Hochschule fur Film und Fernsehen], Brie [as a former cabaret artist] and Gysi) are 
products of precisely this communicative generation. Despite his enthusiasm for the originality of the 
PDS's design, for a "visuelle[s] Erscheinungsbild einer symbolischen Politik, die den Imperativen der 
Warenwerbung nicht folgt, aber dennoch eine moderne Anmutungsqualitat zu Wege bringt" (p. 152), 
Woderich concludes - crucially - that: 
Die Partei ist natiirlich nicht identisch mit dem, was sie in ihrem prdgnanten und kreativen 
Wahl-Design zu sein scheint: Homogen und monolilhisch, selbstbewuBt und jederzeit 
kritisch, ausgestattet mit allseits zielklaren Konzepten und Methoden. ... Gerade 
der 4. Parteitag im Januar 1995 hat gezeigt, wie diinn die Decke des Konsenses ist, welche 
Konflikte darunter auch weiterhin schwelen, die jederzeit neu aufbrechen und die 
Handlungsfahigkeit der Partei jah begrenzen, aber auch erweitern konnen. (p. 160; my 
italics) 
1 1 0Andre Brie, in: Patzolt: Das Wahlkampf-Regelbiichlein. op. cit., p. 5 
1 1'cited in: Volmert: "Wahlkampf-Rhetorik ..." op. cit., p. 259 
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(This is consistent, of course, with the PDS's presentation of its problematic 
factionalism as a healthy pluralism). 
A "POPULIST" OPPOSITION? 
(Joschka) Fischer: ... Sag mal, 
stimmt es eigentlich, daB du in Bremen 
mil dem Privalflugzeug warsl? 
Gysi: ... Du spekulierst auf einen 
billigen populistischen Effekl. 
Fischer: Na gul, das habe ich von der 
P D S g e l e r n l . 1 1 2 
Staying with the subject of political inconsistency, Gysi's promise-making is all the 
more interesting when set against the PDS's 1994 summer election slogan in Leipzig 
that: 
Wir versprechen nichts 
which is clearly designed to "tap the rhetorical potential that politics is about 
truth" 1 1 3. In its 'modesty' it is similar to the assertion "Alle wollen regieren, wir 
nicht" and bolsters the 'Burgernahe'-Yjetimotiv in PDS discourse. In exploring the 
interrelationship between politics, language and morality, Colin Good has 
demonstrated that there is something of a tacit agreement in established politics that 
the failure to keep promises or political inconsistency are part and parcel of its 
workings. What is important is the maintenance of the facade, the semblance of 
truth-telling, otherwise politics would 
cease to be a viable activity ... Although by no means everyone believes 
them, politicians invest a good deal of time in maintaining the appearance of 
not telling lies. This mythical value is central to the political cultures of 
Germany and England, and I would have thought of most polities. We can 
find evidence for the status this mythical idea enjoys, for instance, in the way 
that it is mobilised and instrumentalised in the language game of politics, by 
all sides. Particularly at election time parties tend to define themselves in 
relation to this fundamental value. 1 1 4 
There are grounds for the argument, however, that we can respond to the PDS's "wir 
versprechen nichts" in another way which perceives it as part of a whole 'tradition' 
1 1 2Cited from: Kohler/Harnisch: Gregor Gysi: Freche Spriiche. op. cit., p. 107 
1 1 3Good, Colin: "Politics, Language and Morality." In: Smith, Christopher (ed.): Essays in Memory of 
Michael Parkinson and Jane Daky'ns. (Norwich Papers, no. 4) Norwich: University of East Anglia 
School of Modern Languages and European Studies 1996, p. 368 
n 4 ib id. , p. 368 
268 
of PDS electoral advertising"5 in which it has sought to usurp, "parody" and take ad 
absurdam certain established features - "topoi"" 6 - of electoral advertising.117 On 
1 1 5 The ensuing discussion will proceed on the basis that electoral language (which, like Gruner, 
op. cit., pp. 23-37) we understand broadly as "samtliche wahlkampfsprachlichen Texte aus 
Regionalplakatierungen, aus Werbebroschiiren, aus Zeitungsanzeigen der Parteien ... [und] alle 
weiteren wahlkampfspezifischen Ausfiihrungen wahlkampfender Politiker in Reden und Interviews" 
which are "zweifelsfrei schriftlich belegt"; p. 23) encapsulates, in a 'concentrated' form, the essential 
features of cross-textual political legitimization, i.e. the ways in which political actors use the medium 
of language to legitimise themselves and their parties in their fundamental attempt to martial support. 
As such, Gruner argues: "Wahlkampfsprache ist die rhetorische Spitze der politischen Sprache 
iiberhaupt. Ein polarisierender, ein konkurrenzbedachter und profilhektischer Extremausschnitt 
politischer Sprache an sich ... Wahlkampfsprache ist als Ausschnitt besonders kampferischer 
Selbstdarstellung Teil der ganz ublichen Selbstdarstellung der politisch Verantwortlichen in Talk-
Show, Magazin-Interview, Pressekonferenz usw." (ibid., p. 24) 
1 , 6Woderich, op. cit., p. 147 
1 1 7 A detailed and graphic account of these "topoi" is provided by Gruner ("Inszenierte 
Polarisierung ..." op. cit.; all page numbers in brackets below refer to Gruner's work). In a diachronic 
comparison of electoral language between 1957 and 1987, he observes a striking continuum: an 
essentially conservative Zeitgeist, a «psychischen Immobilismus» (p. 26; Gruner citing Mitscherlich) 
underpinned, he argues, by an "erneuerungstrage[s] AlltagsbewuBtsein" (p. 25) and a "sozial-
qualitativer Experimentierunwilligkeit" (p. 25) in "den verschiedenen Denk- und Handlungsfeldern 
des Politischen und Privaten" (p. 25); this is crystallised in "ProlongierungssIogans"(p. 26) such as 
«Weiter so, Deutschland» and «Keine Experimenter (CDU) (p. 26), and «Sicherheit fiir alle» (SPD) 
(p. 26), which are "AusfluB einer Weltanschauung die Zustande in ihrer historisch begrundeten 
oder zufalligen Konkretheit als vorwiegend unproblematisch, 'natiirlich' und richtig erachtet". (p. 27) 
"Beide Slogans (i.e. those of the CDU - MD) konnen als herausragende Manifestation des 
herrschenden politischen Klimas gelten." (p. 26.) (This, Toman-Banke has concluded, is where 
electoral slogans are "besser als ihr Ruf", i.e. in enframing a particular Zeitgeist; see: Toman-Banke: 
"Die Wahlslogans von 1949 bis 1994." op. cit., pp. 47-55; here p. 55 - MD). At the heart of this 
"Konservatitve Hegemonie" (p. 25), is a polarised conceptual structure which pits change (which is 
linked with conceptual domains such as risk and irresponsibility) against continuity (linked with 
concepts such as security and reliability); further development is presented as an unproblematic, 
logical, linear process linking the immediate past, the present and the future. This interpretation of 
reality is bolstered by a set of stock, highly superordinate, intentionally minimal but connotatively 
positive key-words such as "'Zukunft', 'Aufschwung', 'Soziale Marktwirtschaft', "Wohlstand"' (p. 27) 
which withstand a diachronic time-test and which the CDU has been very successful in 'usurping' 
and associating with its own party acronym. The SPD, in turn, has consistently battled to 'reclaim' 
them for itself, (largely unsuccessfully? - MD) and indeed has faced "Teilenteignungen" (p. 28) of its 
traditional lexical base by the CDU (e.g. «Sozial immer - sozialistisch niemals», p. 28; my 
underlining). Gruner identifies a highly reductive, black and white polarised world with "nicht-
rationalen, monologischen, aufklarungs- und integrationsfeindlichen Muster(n), die in gnadenlos 
unreflektiertem Entweder-Oder (e.g. «Freiheit oder Sozialismus» - MD) die Suggestion einer 
'einfachen' Wahl aufbauen" (p. 29), a world where synthetic contrasts, personalisation and tactics of 
discrediting political opponents stand in place of very little actual political alternative, where 'left' 
and 'right' are practically synonymous (except perhaps, Gruner argues, where enframing the more 
marginal positions occupied by the "REPUBLIKANER" and the Greens). What is crucial here, 
Gruner argues, is to recognise that the reduction is not - as is often perceived to be the case - a 
departure from making political statements, but is rather fundamentally political in marshalling 
support for a prevailing ideology: "alle Strategien der Entsachlichung substanzieller Gegensatze 
(witness the discursive attempts of the PDS - MD!), der fehlenden Problematisierung brisanter 
Weichenstellungen und elementarer Zukunftsentscheidungen, der Verschleierung gesellschaftlicher 
Strukturen, der Verlagerung politischer Alternativen auf Personen, fetischisierte Begriffe oder die 
Ebene des Politik-Surrogats sind eminent politisch (p. 30; italics in original). The relegation of the 
competition for votes to the level of a contest of self-portrayal is, he argues, a logical consequence of 
the market strategy at the heart of the prevailing order; Gruner sees little qualitative difference 
between the Marlboro cigarette slogan «Der Geschmack von Freiheit and Abenteuer» (pp. 30-1) and 
the SPD's 1989 Euro-election slogan, «Auch die Fliisse wurden SPD Wahlen» (p. 31); on this level 
what counts are not the policies themselves but their image: "Fiir Verkauf und Absatz der Ware ist 
nicht der Qualitdtsnachweis des Produktes vonnoten, sondern der Aufbau eines unwiderstehlichen 
Produktcharismas" (p. 31; italics in original). Hence the parties' increasing reliance upon the services 
of advertising agencies. On this level, too, party slogans, in particular, are devoid of any substantive 
content: what counts is their optical presence, their capacity for communicating "nur noch Nettes" 
(p. 32), such as the CDU's 1986 Landtagswahlkampf slogan, «Sommer, Sonne, Bayern» (p. 32), to 
the voting public. So, Gruner observes, "Parteien sichern nicht allein den Frieden, nein, sie 
verkorpern ihn sogar; die jeweils gegnerischen Parteien weisen den Weg ins 'Chaos', liefern 'ein 
Rezeptbuch, wie man ein bliihendes Land ruinieren kann' ...; andere ... 'garantieren' ein 'Leben in 
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such a reading, the PDS slogan kill$, in a sense, two birds with one stone: it taps the 
rhetorical potential described by Good above, yes, but at the same time it can be read 
as an ironic and conscious mimicry, the absurd logical culmination of the way 
politicians, in particular at election times, ritually make (hollow?) meta-promises 
such as "keine falschen Versprechungen, sondern tatsachliches Handeln fur die 
"^Tvlenschen"118. As such, the slogan might be said to encapsulate the PDS's sensitivity 
to the fact that whilst "naturlich alle Wahlkampfwerbung mit Versprechen 
arbeitet"119, politicians are keen to make rhetorical capital from distancing 
themselves from the concept of promise-making on an expressis verbis level (in an 
attempt, of course, to bolster their image of political integrity). Geier presents us 
with the following examples in 1994: 
"Wir versprechen keine Wunder, aber wir halten Wort" (SPD) 
"Wir verspreche^i gar nichts, aber das halten wir!" (SPD) 
"Sie kann nicht alles versprechen, aber alles versuchen" (PDS) 
"Mit erfullbaren Wahlversprechen die Heimat gestalten" (CDU) 1 2 0 
In other words, the PDS's "Wir versprechen nichts" can potentially make rhetorical 
capital on two levels: in the way described by Good above in the case of the less 
politically sensitive, on the level of a recognition of the parodic intentions in the case 
of those who are more so. This seems all the more significant in the case of a party 
which, as numerous commentators have consistently pointed out, is marked by a 
very high level of political awareness.121 
If such an interpretation is thought, in this instance, to be tenuous, there can be little 
doubt of the parodic intentions of the design of the PDS's large, quasi-dadaistic "ja, 
ja, nein, nein" poster for the Europawahl 1994. The large, staggered 
"deklamatorische Kurzformeln" 1 2 2 - whose significance is only to be decoded by a 
PT 
Frieden und Freiheit', erschaffen und bewahren den "Wohlstand fur alle' und sorgen fur ein 'Alter 
ohne Sorgen'." (p. 33) Crucially, language in this mode is - of course - not exclusive to electiogp f^ 
"Wahlkampfsprache ist nicht Ausnahme, sondern Krone der Ausformung der sog. battle of dueflinto 
sound-bites'." (p. 35; italics in original) \ 
l l 8 T h i s assertion stems from an SPD electoral advertisement cited by Geier, op. cit., p. 238 
1 , 9 Geier, op. cit., p. 240 
, 2 0see Geier, op. cit., p. 240 
, 2 1 T h e tenor of the following assertion from Michael Brie ("Das politische Projekt PDS ..." op. cit., 
p. 9) has been echoed by many: "Die Mitglieder und Wahler der PDS unterscheiden sich von denen 
anderer Parteien u.a. durch ein signifikant hoheres Interesse an Politik sowie ein starkes Engagement 
in den Vereinen Ostdeutschlands." 
1 2 2Woderich, op. cit., p. 151 
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scrutiny of the much smaller sub-caption ("fur aktive Beschaftigungspolitik"; "gegen 
Sozialabbau") - doubtless represent an ironic attempt to pick up the prevailing 
tendency (and react to the wide criticism of) a "Neigung zur formelhaften, extremen 
Reduktion der Botschaften und Appelle" 1 2 3 in electoral advertising and its tendency 
to function primarily on the symbolic, connotative level; as such they are 
emblematic of what many perceive as its empty banality and extreme simplification. 
The poster thus works on a number of different levels: its ironic wittiness is 
appealing to those sensitive to its parodic intentions, yet still engaging and alluring, 
however, even to those who are not aware of them 1 2 4 and whose repsonse - upon 
being drawn into a closer scrutiny of the sub-text - is informed primarily by a 
reaction to the propositions offered in the sub-caption. 
Indeed, the PDS has parodied the 'Waschmittel' quality of electoral advertising by 
'usurping' and adapting the prominent slogan ("Aus Erfahrung gut") of AEG, a 
major washing-machine manufacturer; Geier identifies and cites the following rich 
mix of irony, biblical allusion, pun ("Fall"), and parody in a PDS electoral 
advertisement: 
Hochmut kommt vor dem Fall. Wir kennen den Hochmut der Macht - und 
haben sie fallen sehen [.. .] Hochmut kommt vor dem Fall - ein Fall fur eine 
starke linke Opposition. PDS. Aus Erfahrung klug 1 2 5 (Doubtless, too, there is 
an allusion to the popular detective series, "Ein Fall fur Zwei".) 
It is precisely this rich mix which has been at the centre of PDS bold, fresh and 
wi t ty 1 2 6 electoral advertising (and indeed of PDS party advertising in general); in her 
study of 1994 electoral advertising texts, Geier concludes that: 
Auf den ersten Blick zeichnen sich Werbetexte der PDS zum einen durch 
Argumentation, zum anderen durch Witz und Esprit aus.127 
The complex multi-dimensionality of the PDS's electoral advertising has led 
Woderich to conclude that: 
1 2 3ibid. 
, 2 4 There will be few, one would imagine, who will recognise the slogan's allusion to the 
Matthew 5:37: "Eure Rede soil sein: Ja, ja, nein, nein; was dariiber hinausgeht, ist vom Bosen." Cited 
from: Tillmann, Fritz (Translator): Die Heilige Schrift des neuen Testaments. Leipzig: St. Benno-
Verlag GmbH 1952, p. 13 
l 2 5 Geier, op. cit. p. 243 
I 2 6 " [ n r Wahlkampf (the PDS's -MD) ist witzig, was man von dem der anderen Parteien nicht sagen 
kann." Augstein, Rudolf: "Vom 'Mitgestalten'." In: Der Spiegel, no. 27. 1994, p. 26 
, 2 7Geier, op. cit., p. 242 
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der Populismus-Vorwurf insoweit verfehlt ist, als ein derartiges Konzept sich 
zweifelsfrei an den denkenden, politisch aufgeschlossenen Interessenten 
wandte, nicht um den Beifall des groBen Elektorats buhlte, vielmehr das 
/cognitive, rationale Moment politischer WelterschlieBung favorisierte.128 
We can agree with Woderich that, unquestionably the features we have identified 
wil l have appeal to an 'intellectual' target readership. Geier rightly observes that 
"Vorwiegend Intellektuelle und junge Menschen wahlen PDS". 1 2 9 I f the function of 
election advertising seems to be primarily one of mobilising existing supporters to 
vote for their party rather than in fact influencing electoral choice 1 3 0 - which, as 
Toman-Banke concludes certainly seems to be so in the particular case of electoral 
slogans131 - then this is crucial to a PDS which is dependent upon (and has been very 
successful in) mobilising to a maximum a restricted voter base (cf. the studies of 
Neugebauer and Stoss discussed in chapter 3). I f Woderich's observation is 
suggestive of the fact that the 'cognitive' dimension of the features we have outlined 
alone constitute grounds for the invalidity of the wide application of the populist 
epithet to PDS discourse in general, then this is much more problematic; problematic 
for 3 essential reasons: 1) because of the difficulty of semantic specification of the 
highly superordinate populist epithet itself; the problem is a good deal more complex 
than Gysi's attempt to brush off accusations of populism through the invocation of, 
as Good identifies, a rhetorical "popular ist nicht populisitisch" device1 3 2; 2) because, 
as we have argued, the advertising (slogans in particular) functions on different 
levels, not necessarily requiring intellectual/cognitive recognition of any intended 
parody 3) because electoral advertising - though it displays all the features we 
encounter in politicians' use of language across the whole spectrum of political texts 
- is but one discursive element in the whole complex body of a party's discourse, and 
is in itself multi-faceted with many different text types appealing to different target 
audiences. Januschek has drawn attention to the nebulous nature of the populist 
epithet: 
1 2 8 Woderich, op. cit., p. 151 
, 2 9 G e i e r , op. cit., p. 242 
Wittich's statistics show that: "Wahrend die C D U und die SPD in Ostdeutschland in den Gruppen mit 
relativ niedrigen Bildungsabschliissen hohe Akzeptanz finden, hat die PDS ihre starksten Bastionen 
bei den Hohergebildeten. Vor allem bei Hochschulabsolventen ist sie deutlich iiberreprasentiert." 
Wittich, op. cit., pp. 76-7 
1 3 0 c f . Geier (op. cit., p. 244): "Es zeigt sich aber auch, daB die Art der Werbung nicht 
ausschlaggebend fur den Wahlerfolg ist. Die Macht des Wortes ist also auch im Wahlkampf 
beschrankt. Ihre Grenzen sollte sie aber ausschreiten. Dies konnte sie tun, indem sie den Rezipienten 
mit seinen Erwartungen und Problemen ernst nimmt." 
1 3 1 "Allerdings ist es fraglich, in welchem MaBe der Wahlslogan die tatsachliche Wahlentscheidung 
beeinfluBt. Vielmehr kommen ihm Funktionen zu, die generell zu einer politischen Mobilisierung der 
Wahler beitragen sollen." Toman-Banke: "Die Wahlslogans von 1949 bis 1994." op. cit., p. 47. 
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Was ist Populismus? ... Niemand bezeichnet sich selbst so - also handelt es 
sich offenbar urn einen abwertenden Begriff . . . m Wer dem Volk nach dem 
Munde redet, urn Wahlerstimmen zu erschleichen, und dabei seine Prinzipien 
der Irrationalitat des "Mannes" auf der StraBe opfert, wird gem als Populist 
beschimpft. Aber einer solchen Beschimpfung liegt ein unscharfer Begriff 
von Populismus zugrunde, denn es ist fur alle Politiker unabdingbar 
notwendig, sich auch durch Zugestandnisse an ihnen eher fernstehende 
Wahler und Wahlerinnen Stimmen zu erkampfen - und so gesehen waren alle 
demokratischen Politiker Populisten.XM 
This 'popular' definition is picked up by a leading dictionary of political key-words: 
Mit Populismus charakterisiert man Einstellungen, Denk- und 
Handlungsweisen, vorwiegend von Politikern und Personlichkeiten des 
offentlichen Lebens, die an der Meinung und dem Geschmack einer breiten 
Masse orientiert sind.' 3 5 (bold in original) 
Doubtless, on this level, the PDS can indeed be said to offer a catalogue of 'populist' 
demands. A vociferous proponent of this notion is Gerd Langguth, 
Geschaftsfuhrender Vositzende of the CDU-affiliated Kontad-AdenauerStiftung who 
argues (not without some substantive justification) that the PDS: 
einen Linkspopulismus (prasentiert), der in wohlkalkulierter Weise den 
Bedingungsrahmen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Handelns und die Frage 
der Realisierbarkeit politischer Forderungen ausblendet. 
Die von der PDS vorgetragenen Forderungskataloge umfassen MaBnahmen 
wie die sofortige Schaffung von Arbeitsplatzen, die Instandsetzung von 
Wohnhausern, das Einfrieren von Mieten, den Erhalt aller Kindergarten und 
1 3 2 G o o d : PDS - Partei der Diskursiven Strategien? op. cit. 
1 M F r a n z Januschek (see: "Haiders Sprache." In: Tributsch, G.(ed.): Schlagwort Haider - ein 
politisches Lexikon seiner Ausspriiche von 1986 bis heute. Wien: Falter Verlag 1994, p. 296) et al. 
have drawn attention to the term's frequent invocation to describe leading figures of the extreme right, 
such as Haider and Le Pen. Doubtless, the C D U , sensitive to this trend, has sought, in consistently 
invoking the term to describe the political agenda of the PDS, to reinforce a simplistic, reductive and 
propagandist rhetorical schema of a (putative) extreme left equalling an extreme right. This issue is 
given full treatment by Volmert in "Die 'Altparteien' ..." (op. cit.): "Ausgangspunkt des Kampfes 
gegen linke Parteien und Bewegungen ist fast immer die Gleichsetzung von 'Rechts' und 'Links' (-
Extremismus). Mit eincr Geste grolkr moralischer Entriistung eroffnet Bayerns Regierungschef 
Stoiber (wieder einmal) die offentliche Aburteilung der «Extremisten von links wie von rechts»: 
«Nach einem Hitler, nach einem Ulbricht kann ich nur sagen: Republikaner und PDS sind eine 
Schande fur Deutschland» (Warns [= Welt am Sonntag - MD] 3 July 1994)". (Volmert: "Die 
'Altparteien' ..." op. cit., p. 171) 
l 3 4 Januschek, Franz: "Haiders Sprache." op. cit., p. 296 
1 3 5 StrauB, Gerhard/Ulrike HaB/Gisela Harras et al.: Brisante Worter von Agitation bis Zeitgeist. 
Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter 1989, p. 686 
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Sportanlagen, die Eroffnung von Jugendzentren und sofortige 
InfrastrukturmaBnahmen. Da die Gemeinden angesichts ihrer schwierigen 
Finanzlage solche Projekte haufig nicht finanzieren konnen, kann sich die 
PDS als Verteidigerin der Interessen der "kleinen Leute" ausgeben, deren 
Konzepte durch die "herrschende" Klasse durchkreuzt wiirden . . . 1 3 6 
Unsurprisingly, his words are echoed by CDU-sponsored Moreau: 
Um das Wesen der PDS zu verstehen ist einer kurze Darstellung des Begriffs 
Populismus unausweichlich. Unter Linkspopulismus wird die Strategic der 
PDS verstanden, diffuse und unterschwellig vorhandene sozialen Angste und 
Note politisch zu instrumentalisieren. Die PDS sieht sich diesem Konzept 
zufolge sozusagen als "Partei des sozialen Gewissens". Dem PDS-Populismus 
liegt nicht nur - dies zeigt eine Analyse der Programme der Partei - ein 
wohlkalkulierter Verzicht auf eine realistische Bestandsaufnahme der 
Handlungsspielraume von Politik zugrunde.137 
While we can doubtless agree with Moreau and Langguth that a lack of causal clarity 
(how are these demands to be realised?) has been an abiding feature of PDS 
discourse, it is hard to see how, on this level, the PDS's behaviour represents 
anything more than - at worst - a particularly graphic illustration of the way in which 
all politicians ritually behave. If populism is about playing upon social fears to 
martial support or about making 'cheap' promises and/or pressing complex multi-
causal problems into simplified, black and white, either/or conceptual structures, then 
it is hard to see how, for example, how a Theo Waigel who offers the eletorate a 
choice between jobs or a vote for the PDS 1 3 8 is behaving in a qualitatively different 
way to a PDS which offers the electorate a choice between jobs or a vote for the 
right. Kohl might have packaged his promise of "bluhende Landschaften" in a readily 
defeasible metaphor139, but he, too, gave 'the people' precisely what they wanted to 
hear. 
Januschek provides a more refined and rigorous definition of populism, offering 
something of a composite model incorporating prevailing theories as to its essential 
nature. He argues that at the heart of populism lies the exploitation of irrational 
l 3 6 Langguth, op. cit., p. 24 
l 3 7 Moreau/Neu: Die PDS zwischen Linksextremismus... op. cit., p. 13 
, 3 8 ( a s a "Gefahr fur die Arbeitsplatze und Kapitalmarkte"; see: Volmert: "Die 'Altparteien' ..." 
op. cit., p. 173) 
, 3 9 G o o d : Language, Politics and Ideology, op. cit. 
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Ressentiments, feelings of deep dissatisfaction with the prevailing political situation, 
underpinned by a feeling of being excluded by the 'powers that be' 1 4 0; populism 
gibt vor, das allgemeine Interesse "des Volkes" gegen die partikularen 
Interessen herrschender Gruppen zu vertreten ... 
and offers: 
eine einfache Losung der komplexen Probleme moderner Gesellschaften als 
moglich ... Gerade weil der Populismus aber kein Interesse an der 
Beseitigung der eigentlichen Ursachen gesellschaftlicher Ohnmacht und 
Unterpriviligierung hat, greift er gern auf populare Vorurteile gegeniiber 
Gruppen zuriick, die den Unterpriviligierten als Ursache ihrer Misere 
und/oder als Bedrohung ihres immerhin erreichten Lebensstandards 
erscheinen. Denn dies sind in der Regel die noch Schwacheren - Tiirken, 
Asylsuchende, Fliichtlinge, Dunkelhautige -, denen gegenuber man sich selbst 
wenigstens noch als etwas Besseres empfinden kann.1 4' 
One PDS poster proclaims the word "wir" in bold letters'42; yet again we can see it as 
a complex multi-dimensional construct, one dimension of which is a parody of the 
way in which political slogans and key-words function on the symbolic, connotative 
level. Clearly, however, it is designed to function, on another - doubtless more 
prominent - level, in exactly the way in which, from another perspective it can be 
seen to parody; de-contextualised as it is, it straddles the boundary between being a 
wir which is exclusive of, and a wir which is inclusive1 4 3 of East Germans in general, 
with whom the party has consistently sought to couple its fate; in other words, not 
only does it boost the impression of party unity and resoluteness, it also - crucially -
conveys a feeling of solidarity to unsettled and disorientated members of an East 
German electorate. It picks up (and plays upon?) its feelings of defiance and its 
insecurities and sends it comforting signals - clearly much more than a cognitive 
function. We can only, of course, guess that this might be intention on the basis of 
the evidence discussed in chapter 1; connotative impression is - like metaphor -
1 4 0 Januschek, op. cit., p. 296 
l 4 l i b i d . , pp. 296-7 
l 4 2 T h e latter is accompanied by two much smaller captions, one at the top left reading "Gegen 
Massenarbeitslosigkeit und Sozialabbau. Fur bezahlbare Mieten. Fur die Gleichstellung der Frau", the 
other, underneath, being the familiar "Veranderung beginnt mit Opposition". 
l 4 3 F o r an excellent account of the pragmatic implications of the extendibility of pronominal forms, 
see: Wilson: Politically Speaking, op. cit.; esp. pp. 45-92: "When one looks at language use, the 
pronouns of English do not form neat categorical divisions; 'we' can be used to designate a range of 
individuals moving out from the speaker him/herself to the speaker plus hearer and the whole of 
humanity." Wilson, p. 76 
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defeasible and can easily be denied. Is this dimension, then, populist in terms of 
Januschek's model? After all, there is room for the argument, on the one hand, that in 
p i l i n g upon insecurities it bolsters (as does another well-known PDS slogan, "Den 
Kopf hoch nicht die Hande"), a reservatio mentalis vis-a-vis a unified Germany, and 
is thus anti-integrative. On the other hand, how irrational are the fears it picks up on? 
The 'juggernaut' dimension of unification we touched upon in the previous chapters 
leaves at least some room for the argument that the PDS has filled a very definite 
vacuum when it comes to the articulation of certain very justifiable - and anything 
but irrational - East German concerns. Can the instrumentalisation of these fears 
really be equated with the starkly irrational fears, predicated upon visceral hatred and 
distrust of foreigners, gays etc., ritually stirred up by the extreme right? Furthermore, 
sociologist Thomas Koch - like Neugebauer and Stoss - argues that the PDS has 
played a structurally important role in picking up and articulating the dissatisfaction 
of a large segment of the East German population; despite the fact that on a 
subjective level certain party factions might express their out-and-out hostility 
towards a united Germany (for a complex amalgam or reasons involving both 
conviction and strategy), the objective function of the PDS's continued (and often 
highly successful) campaigns on behalf of East Germans has been to promote the 
course of social integration in the Federal Republic in forcing the political 
establishment to re-address the sanctity of existing social, institutional and political 
structures: 
Als politischer Akteur folgt die PDS einer dreifachen Handlungslogik: wenn 
schon Vereinigung, dann a) auf gleichberechtigter Basis und b) unter 
Anerkennung von historisch gewachsener Differenz. Eine solche Vereinigung 
schlieBt c) auch Wandel im Westen ein. Diese mehr oder weniger deutlich 
von der PDS verfolgten Intentionen verweisen die Partei auf die 
demokratischen Institutionen der Bundesrepublik, auf gesetztes Recht, 
darunter nicht zuletzt auf den Einigungsvertrag. Indem die PDS die 
Institutionen, die demokratischen Verfahren und Freiheiten der 
Bundesrepublik - Wahlen, Parlamente, Gerichte, Demonstrations-, 
Versammlungs-, Meinungsfreiheit usw. in Anspruch nimmt wirkt sie 
objektiv als integrierende Kraft. Die demokratische Artikulation von Ost-West 
Konflikten ist zudem eine der wichtigsten Formen und Voraussetzungen ihrer 
Beachlung innerhalb der Institutionenordnung der Bundesrepublik. Sie leitet 
die Energien, die sich aus der Ost-West-Konfliktlinie ergeben in die politisch-
rechtliche Ordnung der Bundesrepublik.144 (my italics) 
l 4 4 K o c h , op. cit., p. 190 
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In other words, while the PDS's electoral discourse clearly functions on a (much 
more than only cognitive) level which might be said to pick up and give voice to 
East German fears and resentment, we must set this against the observation that there 
is also room for the argument that the perlocutionary effect of the defiant anti-
establishment/anti West-German strand of PDS rhetoric has been a stabilising factor 
in the German-German integration process. And while we have identified in PDS 
discourse the consistent invocation of broad and nebulous conceptual pairs 
(Oben/Unten, Herrschende/Betroffene etc. ) which in a sense pick up the 
Januschekian criterion of purporting "das allgemeine Interesse des 'Volkes' gegen die 
partikularen Interessen herrschender Gruppen zu vertreten", it is hard to see how the 
PDS fulfils the criterion of predicating its popularity on prejudices towards weaker 
groups who are made scapegoats for the problems obtaining. Indeed, the PDS's 
commitment - on a formal level, at least145 - is to championing the interests of 
society's general scapegoats (witness its consistent calls for "offene Grenzen" and its 
championing of gay rights). 1 4 6 What is more, if, as Koch suggests, the conflict 
between asylum-seekers and Germans is currently perceived to be the most 
pronounced of all conflicts in the subjective perception of East Germans, then the 
(formal programmatic) position of the PDS on this issue, at least, can be said to do 
anything but pander to popular opinion: 
Vor allem die objektiv nicht gerechtfertigte Wahrnehmung von Konflikten 
zwischen Ayslbewerbern und Deutschen auf Rang 1 zeugt von einer gewissen 
Ohnmacht der "demokratischen Sozialisten". Die von der PDS-Gruppe im 
Bundestag verfochtene Position in der Asyldebatte (Nein zum 
AsylkompromiB und fur das Konzept der offenen Grenzen) ist in der Partei 
selbst umstritten.147 
If, then, we are to apply the term "populist" to the PDS it is hard to see how this can 
be done on any level other than one on which the term is understood widely as "von 
Opportunismus gepragte, volksnahe, oft demagogische Politik mit dem Ziel, durch 
l 4 5 T h e 'reality' of a party's programmatic commitment is never clear cut: "[Es] finden sich in der 
Partei (PDS -MD) Aktivisten einer Dritte-Welt-Gruppe, die fur Menschenrechte und 
VQIkerverstandigung eintritt, ebenso wieder wie verdrossene Rentner, die im Park gegen die vielen 
Auslander in den offentlichen Verkehrsmitteln wettern und Polizeischutz verlangen." Reich, op. cit. 
I 4 6 c f . "wir wollen: * offene Grenzen fur Menschen in Not, daB die rechtliche Stellung von 
Fliichtlingen verbessert wird. In der Gesetzgebung miissen politische, ethnische, religiose und 
sexistische Verfolgung sowie Verfolgung aufgrund einer HIV-Infektion/AIDS-Erkrankung als Grund 
fur Asylgewahrung anerkannt werden. Kriegs- und Biirgerkriegsfliichtlinge sollen ein Bleiberecht 
erhalten; ... * daB Staat und Gesellschaft jegliche juristische und gesellschaftliche Diskriminierung 
von Menschen auf Grund ihrer sexuellen Identitat beenden und Bedingungen fur die voile und 
gleichberechtigte Akzeptanz lesbischer Frauen, schwuler Manner und Transsexueller sowie ihrer 
Lebensformen in der Gesellschaft geschaffen werden." Cited from: Konkrete Oppostion:... 
Wahlprogramm der PDS. 1994. op. cit., p. 22 
1 4 7 K o c h , op. cit., p. 192 
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Dramatisierung der politischen Lage die Gunst der Massen (in Hinblick auf die 
Wahlen) zu gewinnen"148; a level, on other words, whose features characterise the 
discourse of all political parties, where populism is about 'cheap' and often emotive 
monocausal reduction, polarisation and - ultimately - obfuscation. After all, "political 
ways of talking about the world - necessarily - involve a radical simplification of the 
complexity of human motivation and social interaction"149 PDS discourse - wide and 
diverse as it is - does, of course - necessarily take in these elements and as such we 
must guard against equally reductive assertions that the PDS's 'intellectual' discourse 
aims solely to motivate a rational response. The 'rational' strand of PDS discourse is 
only a part of the overall discursive picture. Geier identifies the following PDS 
advertisement which makes this entirely clear: 
Wir sind wieder zur Wahl gerufen. 
Was brauchen wir jetzt? 
Sichere Arbeitsplatze, denn nur durch qualifizierte Arbeit kann das Land 
entwickelt werden. 
Gesicherten, also bezahlbaren Wohnraum, denn Heimat fangt im Zuhaus an. 
[...] Sicherheit fur Alte und Schwache, denn keiner ist ewig jung und 
stark [.. .] 
Haben wir noch eine Wahl? Ja: Liste 3 PDS 1 5 0 
This, Geier observes, is a typical of PDS self-advertising: "Mangel (werden) benannt, 
aber keine Losungsvorschlage gegeben ... Die Argumentation im Text begriindet 
lediglich warum was notig ist (and implies, of course, that the PDS is the panacea to 
all ills! - MD), aber nicht, was die PDS dafiir konkret unternehmen w i l l . " 1 5 1 The text 
on another PDS poster reads "Wohnen ist Menschenrecht", which is sub-captioned 
"Es fehlen uber 2.5 Millionen Wohnungen. Obdachlosigkeit nimmt drastisch zu. Wir 
wollen das Recht auf Wohnen und auf eine eigene bezahlbare Wohnung als 
^8Duden. Deutsches Universal Worterbuch A-Z. op. cit. 
1 4 9 G o o d , "Politics, Language and Morality." op. cit., p. 367 
, 5 0 C i t e d by Geier, op. cit., p. 243 
, 5 1 i b i d . 
Good ("Politics, Language and Morality." op. cit.) has offered some graphic illustrations of how 
politicians across the board make all sorts of emotive and causally unsound promises; they can then 
later "leave the language of morality quite intact" (p. 369) in various ways, in particular through 
statements of good intention, i.e. by arguing that they meant well, but were forced to back-track upon 
these good intentions through factors which, they argue, were beyond their control, through force of 
circumstance: we will comment below on the intrusion of the notion of the 'Sachzwang' into the 
discourse of the PDS. 
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einklagbares Menschenrecht im Grundgesetz. Wir wollen Mietspreisbindung und 
Forderung des sozialen Wohnungsbaus. Veranderung beginnt mit Opposition."1 5 2 
(my italics) How this is to be achieved without addressing the fundamentals of the 
economic system and the problematic notion that a high level of state subsidy of the 
type which obtained in the GDR - went hand glove with a high level of state 
profligacy and debt is left unstated; observe, again, how the high level of abstraction 
underpinned by nominalisation and (causally inexplicit) relationals. 
On the other hand, Volmert offers us a very graphic linguistic illustration of the fact 
that politically-motivated emotive and causally unsound reduction is in no way 
exclusive to the PDS. In examining the emotive rhetorical strategies 
("Agitationsmittel"153) used by the right in the post Sachsen-Anhalt 
"Schlammschlacht"154 against the PDS (and SPD) - in reaction, of course, to the 
PDS's huge electoral successes - Volmert paints a graphic picture of the rhetorical 
devices used; emotive metaphors of war, crime and sex abound. Volmert draws 
attention in particular to the invocation of the term Machtergreifung (and a whole 
range of related metaphors) to describe the role of both the SPD and the PDS in the 
Duldung ITolerieren scenario. We touched upon Machtergreifung in chapter 1: the 
latter term has consistently been used to describe Hitler's accession to power 1 5 5 and is 
doubtless mobilised to link both SPD and PDS with National Socialism and support 
the CDU's recurring polarised model of an extreme left (of which the PDS is 
presented as the living embodiment) equalling, via the notion of totalitarianism, an 
extreme right; into this schema fits Kohl's now notorious dismissal of the PDS as a 
party of "rotlackierte Faschisten". Volmert cites GeiBler: 
Nach Stasi-Folter, Mauer und Stacheldraht ... locken jetzt die alten SED-
Kommunisten mit flotten Protestspruchen 
and observes that: 
, 5 2 Reproduced as a postcard and sold in a booklet entitled: Plakate der PDS; Ein Grufl von links - wo 
das Herz schlagt. Berlin: Wahlburo der PDS 1994 
, 5 3 Volmert: "Die 'Altparteien' ..." op. cit., p. 170 
, 5 4 i b i d . , p. 163 
1 5 5 Ironically, the term has, of course, been instrumentalised by the very right which now invokes it to 
obscure the complex causality behind Hitler's accession to power; we remember Townson's 
observation that: "Machtergreifung has overtones of an illegitimate seizure of power, a putsch or a 
coup; it suggests the imposition of a minority will, circumventing the legitimate procedures of the 
state for the transfer of power ... we need to remind ourselves that Hitler did not stand alone, that he 
was at least tolerated, if not actively supported, across a broad band of the political spectrum: as 
Schieder put it, the conservative and liberal parties were prepared to enter into a coalition with a 
partner that could counter the Socialists and the Communists." Townson, op. cit., p. 173 
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So bringt der CDU-Generalsekretar den ... Wahlerfolg auf handliche 
Formeln fur seine BILD-Leser. 1 5 6 
Through a string of emotive nominals the complex SED past and its problematic 
relationship with the present is pressed into a reductive, simplified conceptual model 
which backgrounds complex causality. Volmert shows how in this mythical bipolar 
world marked by the return of cold war rhetoric the political actors of the right make 
frequent reference to a (notional) "Gemeinsamkeit der Demokraten'V'Solidaritat der 
Demokraten" pitted against a 'subversive' PDS courting, and being courted by, the 
SPD; The moralistic outbursts of the right are underpinned, Volmert shows us, by the 
presupposition that their democratic credentials are fixed and immutable; all these 
rhetorical means lead Volmert to conclude that: 
Die Vorstellungskomplexe mobilisieren ... tiefliegende schon vergessen 
geglaubte Einstellungenund Obsessionen^die-Symptome eines konservativen 
Weltbildes aus Vorvatertagen sind. 
Die abstruse Mischung aus borniertem Wahrheitsanspruch und infantilen 
Vorstellungen der Politik ... kann aber nur Lesern zugemutet werden, in 
deren Kopfen liebgewonnene politische Klischees fest verankert sind ... und 
die wenig Bedarf an rational-argumentativer Auseinandesetzung mit einem 
politischen Gegner haben.157 
Effecting a highly revealing pragmatic analysis of the right's consistently invoked 
"unsere Demokratie" /"unser demokratisches Gemeinwesen" formula, Volmert points 
to its potential divisiveness and psychological harmfulness: the "unser" is GDR-
exclusive, an "implizite, den meisten (westlichen) Politikern und Leitartiklern 
offenbar nicht bewuBte Grenzziehung", is a "besitanzeigendes Fiirwort fur etwas ... 
das sie (inhabitants of the new states -MD) als politische Subjekte ausschlieBt"158 in 
being strongly suggestive of a blanket dismissiveness towards the collective forty-
year biography of the GDR. But then again, Volmert concludes: 
den Strategiekommissionen waren die wahltaktischen Vorteile dieser 
Kampagne offensichtlich wichtiger als der mogliche politische und 
, 5 6 Volmert , "Die 'Altparteien' ..." op. cit., p. 169 
, 5 7 i b i d . , pp. 164, 171 
, 5 8 i b i d . , p. 178 
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psychologische Schaden, den sie damit (nicht nur in den neuen Landern) 
anrichteten.159 
Indeed, in this process, the PDS is in essence incidental. The real target, numerous 
commentators have pointed out, is the SPD, who are the butt of a political 
defamation strategy - on the part of the right - of associating that party with the PDS 
(we remember the remarks of Von Weizsacker discussed in chapter 1). Thomas Koch 
argues that it is in fact the CDU's policy of Ausgrenzungi60 which "verkorpert ... 
, 5 9 i b i d . , p. 179 
l 6 0 K o c h , op. cit., identifies three essential approaches towards integrating the two halves of Germany; 
the right's strategy has generally, he argues, been one of integration through marginalisation and 
exclusion, in a tradition of thought which owes much to the work of Carl Schmitt for whom 
"Politik ... darin (besteht), den Feind zu definieren, Grenzen zwischen den Dazugehorigen und den 
jeweils anderen zu Ziehen und so die Nation zusammenzuschmieden." (p. 182; all subsequent page 
numbers refer to Koch's study.) It is a position based on a presupposed sanctity and immutability of 
existing structures. (There is little room here for the PDS along the (Hegelian) line of continuum 
which, as Gruner argues, [see above] is at the centre of the psychischer Immobilismus which 
characterises the contemporary Zeitgeist - MD.) This world-view requires a Feindbild of the type, 
Koch argues, consistently invoked by Moreau: "Daher empfiehlt er (Moreau - MD) den Demokraten, 
ihren 'antitotalitaren Konsens' zu erneuern, mithin einer Strategic der Ausgrenzung zu betreiben. Auf 
diese Position griff die C D U / C S U im Bundestagswahlkampf 1994 zuriick, als sie mit einer 
Neuauflage antikommunistischer Feindbilder das eigene Lager mobilisierte und das gegnerische 
spaltete." (p. 182) Koch argues that the onslaught to which the PDS has been subjected on all sides 
has hindered the inner-party Kldrungsprozefl in forcing the party to defiantly close ranks in parrying 
the attack from without. 
Koch identifies a second approach to integration, such as is espoused by Noelle-Neumann; in this 
view, too, «die Demokratie, die wir in der Bundesrepublik haben» (Noelle-Neumann, cited by Koch, 
p. 196; observe here the 'exclusive we' identified by Volmert - MD) is taken as, a priori, «die beste 
Staatsform» (Noelle-Neumann; ibid.). Here integration is to be achieved not through ostracisation but 
through a gradual process of educating East Germans to accept the supremacy of established (West 
German) values. In this view, what is necessary are "geistige(n) Anstrengungen im Sinne langfristig 
angelegter Aufklarungs- und Uberzeugungsarbeit". (Koch, p. 181). But, argues Koch, the situation 
demands much more than a mere expectation of East Germans that they effect a simple osmosis with 
the existing system (and acknowledge it unquestioningly as the best of all state forms): not 
commitment on the part of East Germans to abstract values and ideals such as 'freedom' ("erwartet 
wird zum Beispiel, daB Freiheit der Vorrang vor Gleichheit gegeben wird"; p. 183) and 'democracy' 
will promote integration, he argues, but rather an equality of interests and institutions: «die gleichen 
Teilhabechancen, die Vermischung von Interesseniagen, die zunehmende kommunikative 
Vernetzung, die Geltung der gleichen Institutionen» (Lepsius, cited by Koch, p. 184). Koch thus 
favours a third approach to integration which is predicated upon a recognition of the necessity for 
structural change, given that "das importierte Institutionensystem in Ostdeutschland «an 
Leistungsdefiziten leidet und daB es fiir die Probleme der Transitionsgesellschaft in Osten 
Deutschlands nicht anschluBfahig ist»." (Koch citing GlaeBner, p. 197) "Die ubernommene Rechts-
und Institutionenordnung erwies sich gegenuber DDR-Spezifika in Sozialstrukturen und 
Verhaltenspragungen als «blind». Sie verlangt den Ostdeutschen Einordnung ab, oft gar 
Unterordnung und zwar dort, «wo die Westdeutschen aufgrund der in diesem System erworbenen 
Rechte die besseren Karten hatten»." (Koch citing Misselwitz, p. 189) "SchlieBlich gingen die 
Schliisselpositionen in fast alien Bereichen Ostdeutschlands an Manager, Beamte, Wissenschaftler 
usw. aus den alten Bundeslandern liber." (p. 189). He argues that the task of effecting a collective 
integration of East Germans with an established biography transcends traditional sociological 
concepts of the notion - i.e. of integrating a society by inculcating individuals in emerging generations 
(or immigrants) with its values. It is a task which will not be surmounted without a fundamental 
reappraisal of the status quo. And though, prima facie, it would be easy to see the PDS as the party of 
anti-integration (given that it was essentially opposed to unification, only setting out its plan for a 
longer process towards unification after it became clear that the latter had become an inevitability) 
and that "worauf im einzelnen auch immer die Abwehr beruht, die PDS kann als politischer Akteur 
zur Bundesrepublik, so wie sie ist, kein affirmatives Verhaltnis ausbilden" (p. 186), there is another 
side to the coin: though the "Mitglieder und Wahler der PDS gehorten zum groBen Teil jenem Drittel 
der ostdeutschen Bevolkerung an, das 1989/90 die Eigenstaatlichkeit der D D R erhalten wollte" 
(p. 188), there were also very rational, practical economic considerations underlying this stance (not 
only a mere defiant refusal to relinquish a G D R identity); in addition, the PDS primarily represents 
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'altes Denken', verbleibt im Banne 'alter Politik' und verscharft Ost-West-
Gegensatze"161; he points, too, to the discrepancy which we have consistently 
highlighted between the propositions contained in the surface form of an utterance 
(here, in the case of the CDU/CSU, something like "We are the party of unity") and 
the perlocutionary effect of these forms: 
Subjektiv gemeinter Sinn politischen Handelns und dessen objektive 
Funktion miissen nicht ubereinstimmen ... die Wahlkampfstrategie jener 
Partei, die sich selbst als "Partei der Einheit" sieht, der CDU, (verscharfte) 
Ost-West Gegensatze. 
... Eine Partei der alten und neuen Spaltung, wie die PDS in Anspielung auf 
ihre Herkunft aus der SED und ihr dezidiertes Engagement fur Ostinteressen 
zuweilen bezeichnet wird, avanciert in mancher Hinsicht zu einer Partei der 
Binnenintegration, wahrend sich auf der anderen Seite politische Akteure 
(CDU/CSU/FDP and some in SPD -MD), fur die nach eigenem 
Selbstverstandnis das Gewinnen der inneren Einheit hochste Prioritat hat, von 
einem tiefen MiGtrauen gegeniiber der ostdeutschen Gesellschaft, als deren 
konzentrierter Ausdruck ihnen die PDS erscheint, leiten lassen und so 
ihrerseits die innere Einheit erschweren.162 
As with the invocation of demokratischlantidemokralisch, which we discussed in 
chapter 1, we must be extremely sensitive as to just who, in fact, is using the term 
populist i.e. whether the interest lies more in political gain that any genuine attempt 
to enlighten. Observe how in Langguth's argument the Populismus argument forms a 
natural textual springboard for the 'subversion' argument, which is invoked -
unsurprisingly - in the very next paragraph. The conceptual link is as follows: 
and articulates the interests of that part of the East German population which to a large extent formed 
the «politisch bewuBter (sic) DDR-Biirger» (Koch citing Lepsius, p. 188), a group of people to a large 
extent ostracised in the post-unification development process. As a highly educated, politically aware 
and articulate mouthpiece for these interests and as a general «Indikator des Protestes und der 
Opposition gegen eine verfehlte Einigungspolitik» (Koch citing Falkner/Huber, p. 193), the PDS has 
been a motor for structural change in providing a proper channel for disaffection and in forcing the 
other parties to re-address the sanctity of existing structures: "inzwischen haben die anderen Parteien 
ihre Anstrengungen, nicht zuletzt wegen der jiingsten PDS-Erfolge verstarkt. Insbesondere zu 
Landesvatern avancierte Personlichkeiten wie Stolpe und Biedenkopf bieten der PDS eine ernsthafte 
und wirksame Konkurrenz bei der Definition und Vertretung ostdeutscher Interessen." (p. 191) No 
party, argues Koch, has been more active in invoking the Grundgesetz than the PDS and in raising 
G D R citizens' awareness of all the democratic possibilities available to them in a united Germany; as 
such the PDS, "leistet ... objektiv einen zweifachen Beitrag zur demokratischen ... Ordnung (der 
Bundesrepublik -MD). Sie stellt zum einen Formen und Strukturen infrage, die Auseinandersetzungen 
urn eine gerechtere Verteilung von Lasten oder urn Anerkennung von Leistungen, Anspriichen im 
Rahmen des bestehenden nur in begrenztem MaBe moglich machen. Zum anderen bringt sie 
Eigentiimlichkeiten, Erfahrungen und Probleme einer postkommunistischen Gesellschaft in die 
Institutionenordnung ein, so daB sie nicht langer ignoriert werden konnen." (p. 198) 
1 6 1 ibid. p. 183 
, 6 2 i b i d . , pp. 182-3,199 
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PDS makes demands which the system can't provide 
> PDS must be subversive 
For Langguth and Moreau the sanctity of the existing is presupposed: only the PDS's 
critique may be challenged, not the defects inherent in the existing democratic order. 
So it is that Langguth proceeds to trot out, as the right has ritually done, the PDS's 
programmatic assertion that it incorporates, among others, those who fundamentally 
reject the conditions obtaining in society and who "der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft 
Widerstand entgegensetzen wollen" (see footnote 201 below) as evidence of the fact 
that 
die PDS (stellt sich) klar gegen die parlamentarische Demokratie obwohl sie 
deren Institutionen nutzt (! - MD). Politische Reformen, die sie in den 
demokratischen politischen Institutionen fordert, interessieren die PDS nicht 
wirklich. (! - MD) Diese sind fur sie vielmehr Bestandteil einer Politik der 
kleinen Schritte, die auf sehr viel weitergehende, letztlich revolutionare 
Veranderungen zielt. 1 6 3 (my italics) 
There is no attempt to invoke (as we will below) the pertinent i f highly problematic 
questions of where changing a system begins and ends and of why a system might 
not be changed if the support of the majority can be marshalled using means which in 
practice do not entail an infringement of individual civil and human rights. 
Unsurprisingly, Langguth proceeds to invoke the right's standard conceptual schema 
of "extreme right = extreme left", whose features we discussed above. The PDS are: 
Feinde der Demokratie 
Direkte oder indirekte Aktionsbiindnisse mit der PDS schwachen zudem die 
Gemeinsamkeit der Demokraten, die sich in der gemeinsamen Ablehnung der 
rechtsradikalen Republikaner bewahrt hat. Feinde der Demokratie gibt es 
bekanntlich rechtsaufien wie linksaufien.*64 (observe how the strong 
implicature here stops short of an actual expressis verbis equation of PDS and 
CDU; is Langguth, one wonders, wary of finding himself embroiled in a civil 
libel suit?) 
Volmert would challenge the position of Langguth, Moreau et al. as an: 
l 6 3 Langguth, op. cit., p. 25 
, 6 4 i b i d . , p. 25 
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autorativ-patriarchalische Verstandnis von Staat und Gesellschaft. das jede 
kritische Initiative, jede nichtkonforme auBerparlamentarische Aktivitat als 
Bedrohung wahrnimmt.1 6 5 
Neugebauer and Stoss have shown that newcomers in the political arena who 
challenge the status quo are ritually branded extremist: 
gerade kleinere oder nicht-etablierte Parteien in der Bundesprepublik 
(werden) zumeist als storend und unerwunscht empfunden ... jedenfalls wenn 
sie grundsatzliche Alternativen zu den etablierten Parteien einbringen. Alle 
Kleinparteien sahen sich nach Roemhold in der Bundesrepublik einer Politik 
der "Minorisierung" ausgesetzt, die sich immer auch des 
Extremismusarguments bedient(e). Davon konnen die Griinen ein Lied 
singen, und darauf diirfte auch ein Gutteil der Kritik an der PDS beruhen.166 
And while we might well ask whether the PDS has as yet been able to offer anything 
substantially 'alternative' such as might realistically be put into practice, certainly 
the articulation alone of any surface proposition which calls into question the 
inviolability of the prevailing order has been enough to incense the CDU/CSU which 
sees itself as that system's backbone and custodian. 
It is hard to find a more graphic illustrative catalogue of the linguistic features 
informing Grunert's recognition of a "Verengung multikausaler Wahrheit auf die 
Ebene monokausaler Interpretation" and that "Die Option emanzipatorisch-
aufklarerischer Instrumentierung der Sprache fallt der eingefahrenen Praxis des 
Gegenteils zum Opfer" 1 6 7 than we encounter in the right's 1 6 8 election tirade against 
the PDS. If, as Januschek argues, populism is about the way it "mit Irrationalitat 
umgeht" (we remember Waigel's 'threat' to East Germans that a vote for the PDS 
represents a "Gefahr fur die Arbeitsplatze und Kapitalmarkte", doubtless picking up 
on West Germans' insecurity at the burgeoning unification bill) there is ample room 
for mooting the question, at least, who is more populist - the PDS or the CDU? 
1 6 5 Volmert: "Die 'Altparteien' ..." op. cit., p. 178 
1 6 6Neugebauer/St6ss, op. cit., p. 23 
, 6 7 G r u n e r , op. cit., pp. 29, 33 
1 6 8 W e realise, and stress, of course that the use of the broad term right to facilitate our argument is in 
itself a convenient oversimplification; there have of course been many in the C D U and C S U who 
have questioned the sanity of the prevailing anti-PDS ideology; on this point see Volmert: "Die 
'Altparteien' ..." op. cit., p. 179. 
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The right's attempt to win broad acceptance of its presupposition that populist and 
antidemokratisch are terms which characterise 'them but not us' is reminiscent of a 
comparable situation described by Chomsky in respect of the ideologeme terrorism: 
In the same years in which Libya killed fourteen, maybe 20 people, mostly 
Libyans, the government of El Salvador slaughtered about 50,000 people. 
Now that's not just terrorism, because it was done by us. We instituted the 
government as much as the Russians instituted the government in 
Afghanistan ... The U.S. Air Force participated directly in co-ordinating 
bombing strikes - thq terror was not ordinary killing. Libyan terror is bad 
enough; they kill people. But our terrorists first mutilate, torture, rape ... 
That's not called terrorism ... Libya is a very, very minor terrorist state - but 
we see it the other way round. "Terrorism" is used for them, not us. In the 
case of El Salvador it's plainly being done by a major state against its own 
citizens - in fact a state that we established, a client state of the United States. 
Therefore it can't be terrorism, by definition ... This is true in case after 
case.169 1 
Where the PDS offers simple solutions to complex problems to win support, this is, 
in the eyes of the right, populism. Where the 'democratic' right does so it - as 
Chomsky would put it - can't be populism, by definition. Clearly, if the right can win 
wide acceptance of this ideological thought pattern, i f it can win over crucial key-
words such as Demokratie for its exclusive preserve, it will have won the battle to 
maintain its own hegemony. 
Words and symbols have no hard and fast "Abbildfunktion", Grunert has pointed out, 
they are subject to occupation170. The PDS has consistently furnished graphic 
examples of the strategy of 'undermining' and trivialising through usurpation, in 
actively invoking key terms and symbols - such as Rote, Rote Socken - of the right's 
anti-PDS tirade and in using them in self-description. Carsten Schatz (of the PDS's 
AG Lesben- und Schwulenpolitik) drew a parallel here with the way there has been 
an attempt in the gay movement to de-negativise the term "queer" by its use in self-
description.171 One PDS election slogan reads, for example: 
, 6 9 C h o m s k y , Noam: Chronicles of Dissent. Vancouver: New Star Books 1992, p. 39 (interviewed by 
David Barsamian) 
1 7 0 Gruner , op. cit., p. 34 
1 7 1 Interview with the writer, November 1995 
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Wenn die Roten weiterhin an allem Schuld sein sollen, dann muB man sie 
auch wahlen. 1 7 2 
The background to the CDU's "Rote Socken" symbolism is described in some detail 
by Woderich: 
Den ersten Stein hatte die CDU geworfen mit ihrem Slogan "Auf in die 
Zukunft ... aber nicht auf roten Socken". Der entsprechende Plakatentwurf 
zeigt ein Paar rote Striimpfe, zum Trocknen auf die Leine gehangt ... 
Natiirlich frohlockte man im Liebknecht-Haus, der Zentrale der PDS, iiber 
den Einfall der CDU, hatte er doch der eigenen Partei unverhofft Schlagzeilen 
eingetragen ... Folgerichtig avancierte die FuBbekleidung zu einem 
Markenzeichen der PDS im Selbstbehauptungskampf.173 
Indeed, pairs of red socks were soon to be found on sale at the PDS's documentation 
centre at its Rosa-Luxemburg-Platz headquarters. A PDS election newspaper 
(entitled simply "94:" [inverted commas mine] - notice again the 'authoritative' 
colon) shows, on the front page, a picture of Bisky seated on a flight of steps with his 
socks clearly visible. The accompanying caption reads "Das Gerede von den 'roten 
Socken' erweist sich bei naherer Betrachtung als offensichtliche Hochstapelei ... 
Festgestellt werden konnte hingegen, was der Ober-PDSler Bisky am Knochel tragt: 
profane Ringelsocken, wie weiland Elvis Presley, Fats Domino und die Soul Sisters. 
Unser Reporter Eric Richard lieferte den optischen Beweis". 
The widely publicised Rote Socken farce not only raised public awareness of the 
PDS, it could be woven as a potent symbol of banality into that strand of PDS 
rhetoric in which is has attempted to offer itself as the serious political alternative to 
what it sees as the emptiness and triteness of the goings-on in the political arena 
(which, like its attempts to present itself as an extra-system opposition) it has linked 
closely with the politically worn key-words Partei- and PolitikverdrossenheitxlA. As 
Woderich puts it: 
[Es] sollte jedoch nicht vergessen werden, daB die von der CDU in den 
Wahlkampf eingefiihrte Signatur nichts anderes war als eine zur Hochstform 
aufgeblasene Banalitat, die vor allem anderen Essentielles offenbarte iiber das 
7 2 cited by Woderich, op. cit., p. 151 
7 3 ib id . , p. 156; see esp. pp. 156-8 
7 4 see Good: "Ober die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 268 
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derzeitige geistige Niveau in den politischen Arenen. Eine Strumpf-
Infantilitat triumphierte, die kaum noch zu iiberbieten scheint.'75 
"COMING IN" - ON T H E L E V E L O F LANGUAGE A T L E A S T 
We have witnessed time and again above how the PDS has sought to deal with its 
complex plethora of internal contradictions by introducing to its discourse a high 
level of abstraction underpinned by 'vague' categories, broad in their extension, 
which by-pass and leave unaddressed important causal questions. 'Harmony', if not 
achieved in practice, is sought in language. In the wake of Sachsen-Anhalt We see the 
PDS particularly keen to invoke the wide category of Linke whjch serves as a 
potential lowest common denominator on the basis of which it can bring itself into 
the fold and suggest its common ground with the established German left. Gysi is 
keen to stress that: < 
Gerade als Linke stehen wir vor der Frage: Motze ich am Rande der 
Gesellschaft herum, in dem Wissen naturlich gar nichts zu bewegen, oder will 
ich die Gesellschaft wirklich verandern? Dann muB ich in sie hinein, und 
wenn ich in sie hineingehe dann besteht immer die Gefahr der Anpassung.176 
(Notice here how, in the attempt to overcome the "Problem der politischen 
Abgrenzung bei gleichzeitig zu vermittelnder Nahe"1 7 7 the very language of extra-
system oppositionality ("bewegen") is invoked as a motivating factor in what might 
potentially be construed as a forfeiture of precisely that oppositionality). 
Doubtless the PDS's "Ein GruB von Links, wo das Herz schlagt"178 (my italics), a 
modified version of the SPD's 1953 electoral slogan, "Wahle links, wo das Herz 
schlagt! Wahle Sozialdemokraten"179, represents an attempt to locate common 
ground with the SPD. Ebermann acutely observes that: 
Fur die Zwecke der PDS miissen Griine und Sozialdemokraten als Linke 
erscheinen, deren Bekampfung eine sektiererische Torheit ware' 8 0 
7 5 Woderich, op. cit., p. 157 
7 6 Gregor Gysi, in: Reinke: "Ist die PDS cool?" op. cit., p. 55 
7 7 Good: "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 268 
7 8 see footnote 152 
7 9 S e e Toman-Banke, op. cit., p. 49 
8 0 Ebermann: "Von Sachen und Sachsen." op. cit., p. 13 
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and cites the fol lowing telling observation of Andre Brie, which he (Ebermann) 
perceives as "Liigereien iiber die Wahlerwunsche in GroBdeutschland": 
Es gibt in Ostdeutschland, etwas schwacher iibrigens audi in den alten 
Bundeslandern, ein betrachtliches und stabiles linksoppositionelles Potential 
(mit positiver Bewertung der Idee Sozialismus, sozial gepragten 
Wertorientierungen, linksorientierten politischen Einschatzungen und 
Forderungen). In OstdeutscWand gehoren dazu mehr als 50%, in 
wist4eutschland etwa 30% der Wahkrinnen und Wahler (Wahlauswertung 
von Andre Br ie ) . 1 8 1 
(We would equally take issue here with Ebermann, &f course, with respect to the 
form in which he packages his criticism: it is on the level of the extent of abstraction 
involved in Brie's presentation of 'reality' that he might be challenged and not in 
terms of a reductive truth/lie schema which fails to take account of the" problematic 
circumstance that t r ie 's account may well be retained within a notional parameter of 
'truth'.) Ebermann hits the nail on the head in recognising that the terms Linke is part 
and parcel of an "Abstraktion von der realen Politik der Parteien"; while it is a level 
of abstraction upon which the PDS can present itsplf as having common ground with 
the established left, its sheer breadth means that complex causal questions as to their 
very real differences are simply put at a remove 1 8 2 ; in other words what is complex 
and contradictory is made to look harmonious and unproblematic - not unimportant 
to a pro-involvement PDS wishing to legitimise its credentials as a player in the new 
political environment and circumvent its problematic ostracisation by the other 
parties. 
Observe, too, how, as a legitimising tactic, the same idea emerges in Wolfgang 
Gehrcke's invocation of W i l l y Brandt's famous 1982 dictum on the possibility - then 
with the Greens - of achieving a majority "diesseits der Union": 
Ich glaube, daB ... nach den Landtagswahlen in Sachsen-Anhalt, daB 
Mehrheiten, wie es mal W i l l y Brandt formuliert hat, diesseits oder jenseits -
das ist mir recht egal - der Union vorhanden sind. Nicht nur Mehrheiten, die 
l 8 1 ibid. 
l 8 2Ironically, of course, it is precisely the same breadth of the term links which the right has utilised to 
lump the SPD and PDS together for its own political purposes: "Die Chefin des Instituts fur 
Demoskopie in Allensbach, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ging damals noch einen Schritt weiter ... Die 
SPD, so die CDU-nahe Autorin, strebe ein Linksbundnis an und weigere sich, ahnlich geschlossen 
gegen die PDS zu stehen, wie die CDU/CSU gegenuber den Republikanern." Neugebauer/Stoss, 
op. cit., p. 220 
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von den Wahlerinnen und Wahlern geschaffen werden, sondern auch 
Mehrheiten, die sichparlamentarisch realisieren konnen.^ (my italics) 
Using features inherent in language to 'play down' problems requires, however, that 
target audiences w i l l either accept or else fai l to recognise the abstraction. In the next 
chapter, we w i l l , as we have said, attempt to show that by no means all PDS 
members and voters, let alone the political establishment are insensitive to it either, 
just as the Fundis refused to accept what they saw as the Realos' gradual abstraction 
and rapprochement a decade before: 
Es besteht vielmehr die Gefahr, daB die Griinen mit einer Politik "Getneinsam 
gegen rechts" die geringfiigigen Angebote der SPD, die an ihrem Grundzug 
nichts andern, hochjubeln und so zur Pflege eines in 16 Jahren arg ladierten 
Images beitragen. 1 8 4 (my italics) 
T H E ' S A C H Z W A N G ' 
Ebermann shows how, as part of its 'anti-antagonism', the pro-involvement PDS has 
wide recourse at this time to the notion of the SachzwanglSachfrage (political force 
of circumstance): the idea that the need to f ind practical solutions to immediate 
practical problems can entail the imposition of necessary constraints upon 'higher' 
policy considerations or a departure f rom a promised course of action) -, a notion 
which is closely linked to a wide acceptance in the political establishment that 
politics at local level functions differently f rom politics at a higher level, inasmuch as 
it gives primacy to solving immediate local, smaller-scale problems and generally 
leaves the problems of formulating overall policy, of dealing with inter-party 
antagonisms to the higher levels. 1 8 5 As one PDS pro-involvement politician puts it: 
Denn auf der kommunalen Ebene hat es zwischen Abgeordneten der PDS 
Zusammenarbeit sowohl mit Abgeordneten der SPD als auch mit denen der 
C D U und der von Wahlergemeinschaften gegeben, weil es auf der 
1 8 3Gehrcke, in: "Opposition oder Was? ... eine Podiumdiskussion." op. cit., p. 2; interestingly, 
Gehrcke's picture displays a rare convergence with that of Der Spiegel (no. 27. 1994, op.cit., p. 25): 
"Der Niedergang der FDP und der Aufstieg der PDS (after Sachsen-Anhalt - MD) haben Willy 
Brandts Vision von 1982, es konne eine Mehrheit 'diesseits der Union' geben, real werden lassen -
wenigstens rechnerisch und ganz anders, als Brandt es sich damals dachte." 
,84Trampert/Bahro, op. cit. 
I 8 5 cf. , for example: "Nach Angaben Scharpings wird mit dem BeschluB jede Form von Koalitionen 
zwischen SPD im Bundestag und in den Landtagen ausgeschlossen. Es werde auch keine 
gemeinsamen parlamentarischen Initiativen geben. Auf kommunaler Ebene sei die Situation 
allerdings durch die Kommunalverfassung anders. Hier gebe es Zwange, denen man nicht ausweichen 
konne." Cited from: "SPD schlieBt jede Form von Koalition mit der PDS aus." In: Die 
Tageszeitung. 6 December 1994 
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kommunalen Ebene oft sehr vorrangig um die Losung von Sachfragen 
gegangen ist und politisches Parteigerangel in den Hintergrund gedrangt 
wurde. Ich sehe das auch so, wie es hier gesagt worden ist, man kann die 
Rolle der Opposition nicht auf das Geleise abdrangen, nur Widerstand zu 
leisten . . . 1 8 6 (my italics) 
Another leading member of the pro-involvement camp, Brandenburg's 
Landesvorsitzende, Helmut Markov, is keen to stress the degree of common ground 
occupied by the parties when it comes to finding practical solutions: the PDS he 
argues has introduced motions at communal and Land-level, "die ebenfalls von FDP 
oder CDU stammen konnten" 1 8 7 . Witness also: 
Al le Sachfragen konnen Gegenstand von Verhandlungen sein, starre Grenzen 
zwischen Koalition und Opposition gehdren wohl ohnehin zum alten Denken 
(! - M D ) ' 8 8 (my italics) 
and 
... die SPD (sollte) endlich den SchluG ziehen, daG soziale und demokratische 
Politik fur Sachsen-Anhalt nicht an der PDS vorbei zu machen ist ... Wir 
brauchen in Sachsen-Anhalt ein faires Ringen der politischen Parteien um die 
besten Losungen fur schwierige Probleme.*89 
In the wake of Sachsen-Anhalt a pro-involvement PDS seems at pains to play down 
the inter-party differences it was keen to play up by tapping this generally 
acknowledged feature of local politics to suggest a broad, inter-party harmony and 
legitimise its credentials as a fellow player in the game of established party politics 
(not only, as we shall show below, at local level, but potentially at a higher level too); 
witness the fol lowing telling way in which it categorises the world of local politics: 
In den Kreistagen, Stadt- und Gemeinderaten, wo die PDS starke Fraktionen 
stellen wird, sind wir bereit, auch in den Rathausern und Landratsamtern in 
Koalitionen mitzuwirken. Schliejilich ist alle Kommunalpolitik gestaltende 
Opposition. Der wirkliche ( ! -MD) Unterschied verlauft zwischen unten und 
open, nicht zwischen verschiedenen Vertreterinnen in einem Gemeinderat. 
l86Scheringer, in: "Opposition oder Was? ... eine Podiumdiskussion." op. cit., p. 2 
, 8 7Helmut Markov, cited in: Falkner/Huben/lH/sc/iwH/igf'DS ... op. cit., p. 206 
,88"Presscerklarung des PDS-Landesvorsitzenden Sachsen-Anhalt ..." In: PID. no. 26. 1994, op. cit., 
p. 3 
,89"'Protestwahl ist notig in diesem Land!' - Presseerklarung von Roland Claus, Landesvorsitzender, 
und Thomas Drzisga, Pressesprecher der PDS Sachsen-Anhalt, vom 13.6.1994." In: PID. 
no. 24. 1994, p. 5 
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Die anderen Parteien sollten deshalb auf die Volksvertreterlnnen in der PDS 
zugehen . . . 1 9 0 (my emphases) 
Again an "Abstraktion von der realen Politik der Parteien" is achieved through the 
invocation of a sweeping, oben-vs.-unlen model, very much in keeping with the 
broad conceptual pairs we identified in chapter 3, in which the antagonisms of the 
political world are re-cast in a polarised model, in which they exist not between the 
parties (!) but between the Gemeinde (as a metaphor for the ordinary citizen? - M D ) 
and the overweening polity against which it is pitted. Notice how the central 
ideologeme of PDS discourse - Opposition - is retained, through re-definition, as a 
motivating factor in the 'new' stance, as the pro-involvement faction attempts yet 
again to overcome the contradiction between its 'extra-system' stance on the one 
hand and its overtures to that system on the other, and to deflect the charge (from 
inside the party and f rom without) that it is forfeiting its oppositional role. For this 
discursive purpose Opposition is presented as all but synonymous with inter-party 
harmony at a lower level; harmony not only between the PDS and other parties on 
the left, but indeed between the PDS and the CDU too; the important point for the 
pro-involvement camp is to hold on to - at the very least - the potent sign (albeit with 
modified denotation), in bolstering up the suggestion that the PDS has not abandoned 
its 'anti-establishment' stance. (What is not dealt wi th , however, is the internal 
contradiction of this line of argumentation: i f this is an argument for moving into 
strategic alliances, what happens when the PDS becomes involved at a higher level 
and - in becoming part of that nebulous, mythical and unverifiable 'ofoe/i' - is pitted, 
so to speak against itseip). This construct earns f rom Ebermann the ironic 
observation that: 
Da also der "Deutsche Stadtetag" (d.h. unten) Widerspruche zur 
Bundesregierung (d.h. oben) hat, wurde es die Opposition nur schwachen 
wenn im Stadtrat Streit ausbrache.1 9' 
And while there is room for agreeing with the pro-involvement PDS that there is 
indeed a 'structural' difference between the workings of politics at a local level and a 
higher level, we might well question the level of abstraction: whether local politics is 
such as to allow such a blanket circumvention of inter-party antagonisms, and 
whether it can be seen - so unproblematically - independently of the complex 
dialectical interrelationship with party workings at higher levels. The crucial point, 
however, is that pro-government voices, while all the while predicating their picture 
1 9 0ibid. 
l 9 lEbermann, op. cit., p. 12 
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of a competent, constructive and co-operative PDS upon the difference between 
politics at a local level and politics higher up, have consistently used the connotative 
elements of this picture - harmony, co-operation, constructiveness - as a microcosmic 
model for suggesting that the same as has been achieved at this level can indeed be 
achieved at the next level up; Claus is in no doubt that: 
Das Ergebnis vom 12. Juni 1994 ist ein Signal fur die Landtagswahl192 
and the fol lowing observation f rom the party's press spokesman, Hanno Harnisch, 
when questioned about the PDS's offer of tolerating a minority government, 
represents a mental leap f rom communal politics to Landtag politics which we 
typically see in pro-involvement discourse at this time: 
In 2,500 Gemeinden ist die PDS vertreten und mir ist kein Fall bekannt, in 
dem es mchf schon eine gemeinsame Abstimmung gegeben. hatte. Woruber 
sich die anderen Parteien aufregen (and the question of a Tolerierung by, or 
coalition with, the PDS relates here to the Bundesebenel - M D ) , ist doch 
sowieso schon lange Tatsache.m 
For Ebermann, and doubtless for the Fundi movement of which he was a product, the 
problem with a picture in which a political party champions immediate practical 
problems on the basis of 'force of circumstance' is that it thus fails to address the 
very ideological roots of the system which causes these problems - the 'symptoms' -
to arise in the first place; he identifies Petra Sitte's 1 9 4 attempt to deflect charges of 
opportunism through the rhetorical fusion of realism and sacrifice/martyrdom (to 
suggest a necessary but mere 'grudging involvement', of the type we identified 
above): 
Wir wollten der SPD realistische Positionen antragen, damit sie nicht wieder 
das Argument in die Hand bekommt, die PDS gehe mit volligen Illusionen in 
die Gesprache und w i l l von vornherein, daB sie scheitern. Unter den 
gegebenen tagespolitischen Anforderungen hdtten wir auch unseren 
grundsatzlichen, visionaren Ansatz zuriickgestellO95 (my italics) 
Hence his ironic observation that: 
1 9 2 Claus, in: '"Protestwahl ist notig in diesem Land!' ..." op. cit., p. 5 
1 9 3Hanno Harnisch (JPDS-Pressespreclter), in: Reinke: "Ist die PDS cool?" op. cit., p. 56 
l 9 4 see footnote 37 
1 9 5Petra Sitte, in: "Geheimdiplomatie ..." op. cit. (cited, in part, in: Ebermann: "Von Sachen und 
Sachsen." op. cit., p. 13) 
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Die Sachfrage, fern von Ideologic, unbeeinfluBt von der Weltanschauung, 
nicht tangiert von Kri t ik oder Zustimmung zur marktwirtschaftlichen 
Grundordnung, das Spezialgebiet des in jeder Ordnung funktionierenden 
Experten, des Meisters der "intelligenten Losung" - sie wird aucf /von der 
PDS beherrscht, bescheinigen selbst parteipolitische Gegner ... Furs erste ist 
es schlieBlich visionar genug, nicht ausgegrenzt zu sein. 1 9 6 
Grunert has argued that political parties often present themselves "im 
multifaktoriellen Geflecht sog. Sachzwange" as "ohnmachtigen 
'Entscheidungstragern' ohne Entscheidungspotenz und -kompetenz". On this level, he 
argues: 
Sprache wird ... zum Medium der Derealisierung herrschender 
gesellschaftlicher Machtverhaltnisse und Ordnungsfaktoren, wie sie etwa 
Industrie und Handel bereithalten. 1 9 7 
In other words, the instrumentalisation of the notion presupposes the structural 
immutability of, and inherent causality residing in the system, i.e. things inevitably 
happen which are necessarily outside the control of, and cannot be changed by, those 
who govern, thereby providing them with a 'get-out clause' when events do not turn 
out as planned or promised. It is precisely this presupposition which is rejected by 
the PDS's anti-involvement camp, for whom the involvement in solving Sachfragen 
is seen as complicity in perpetuating 'the system': 
Es hort sich, finde ich, unheimlich gut an, wenn man sagt: Die PDS toleriert 
oder stimmt einem Haushalt so einer sozialdemokratisch gefiihrten Regierung 
nicht zu, die PDS hat einen Preis. Und ich finde, in dieser Formulierung, die 
PDS hat einen Preis, da steckt ein furchterlich wahrer Kern drin, namlich in 
der Marktwirtschaft wird iiber einen Preis auf dem Markt gehandelt. Und 
dieses Handeln iiber den Preis der PDS findet statt in Tolerierungs- oder 
Koalitionsverhandlungen. Und der Mechanismus derartiger Verhandlungen 
besteht darin, daB versucht wird, Paketlosungen anzustreben und am SchluB 
wird ein Vertrag geschlossen. Und in diesem Vertrag werden dann ein paar 
Elemente von Reformpolitik drin sein, eine Unmenge von Priifauftragen und 
eine ganze Reihe von Schweinereien, Kroten und sonst noch was, die 
96Ebermann: "Von Sachen und Sachsen." op. cit., p. 12 
9 7Gruner, op. cit., p. 33 
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zusammenhangen mit den Sachzwangen, die existieren, dafi die Bundespolitik 
nichts anderes erlaube etc. e/c. 1 9 8 (my italics) 
For Ebermann, too, this is opportunism, given that on one level the PDS has insisted 
that the whole point of its oppositionality was to bypass the established system and 
root its politics in civil society as the very basis for change; after all : 
Im allgemeinen wird sie (the PDS - M D ) als eine Partei angesehen, die fur 
eine Uberholung oder eine vollige Ablehnung des traditionellen 
Parteiensystems steht. 1 9 9 
For others, PDS messages of rapprochement represent a sensible pragmatism and 
evidence of its growing moderateness and increasing democratisation. The fol lowing 
observation f rom Bisky is revealing of the stage reached by the 'anti-antagonism' by 
January 1995, where the parties and the prevailing situation are two neatly separable 
poles,: 
Wir sind eine Oppositionspartei. Wir definieren uns nicht in erster Linie als 
Opposition zu anderen Parteien (! - M D ) , sondern als konstruktive 
Opposition gegenuber den herrschenden Verhdltnissen. Einen 
Regierungsbeteiligung fur ewig auszuschlieften halte ich fiir nicht richtig. Das 
macht den Sinn einer Partei uberfliissig. Eine Partei, die auf ewig sagt, sie 
w i l l nur Opposition sein, wird es schwer haben, glaubhaft zu machen, daB sie 
die Vision einer verbesserten Gesellschaft hat. 2 0 0 (my italics) 
which offers the unmistakable recognition that a governmental role in the established 
arena can serve as a basis for 'changing society'. 
On the whole, the picture emerging of the PDS at the time of the highly complex, 
inner-party Tolerierung debate is enough to cast considerable doubt upon Moreau's 
simplistic portrait of the PDS waiting in the wings to undermine and thwart the 
system. There is considerable room for the very real - i f problematic - possibility that 
(for leading lights in the PDS's ideological centre at least) the articulation of 
oppositionality - the very superordinacy of the term Opposition and its minimal 
contextualisation allowing it to be variously understood and interpreted as 
'revisionism' or 'fundamentalist reformism' (though the two do not, of course, 
enframe neatly separable poles) - was not so much aimed at ultimately subverting the 
l 9 8Harald Wolf, in: "Opposition oder Was? ... eine Podiumdiskussion." op. cit., p. 4 
'"Good, "Uber die 'Neuen Linken' ..." op. cit., p. 267 
2 0 0Lothar Bisky, in: "1995 muB es zur Entscheidung kommen." op. cit. (interview) 
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system, as making virtue f rom necessity: the vague - and variously interpretable -
notion of otherness connoted by the term was harnessed in the attempt to set the PDS 
apart from the other parties as the fledgling party struggled to establish itself; the 
notion of the PDS being an Opposition was a lowest common denominator for 
holding the party together, a level on which "interne Differenzen durch den 
Begriff ... verkleistert werden" 2 0 1 , a catch-all term which allowed the party to at least 
background i f not reconcile the fundamental inner-party differences as to what form 
the party's relationship to the new system should take. As one astute observer put it: 
Nach wie vor ist in dieser Partei vieles moglich, teils aus originarer 
Unfertigkeit, teils aber auch aus kalkulierter Unklarheit . 2 0 2 
It can be strongly argued that for the pragmatic reformers around Gysi, Bisky and 
Brie who seemingly have the upper hand in the par ty 2 0 3 oppositional messages which 
hinted at, inter alia, a rejection of the democratic framework of the Federal Republic 
(i.e. bore 'subversive trappings') were allowed to go unqualified or unchecked in the 
attempt to - paradoxically perhaps - gain electoral support and strengthen the party 
within the system, by allowing the wideness of the term to appeal to as broad a target 
audience as possible. Hence the vacillation and contradiction which is a central 
feature of PDS discourse. As soon as the opportunity for 'coming i n ' presented itself, 
the party's ideological leadership - supported (passively, i f not actively) by the 
'pragmatic' majority we identified in chapter 3 - began, as we have seen in this 
chapter, to make overtures to the establishment; from its position of strength 
fol lowing the 1994 Bundestagswahlen the pro-involvement PDS could begin to 
tackle the issue of divesting itself (see chapter 5) of elements (such as the party's 
orthodox Kommunistische Plaltform) whose understanding of Opposition was not 
coupled with a realistic acceptance of the contemporary political arena as a basis for 
change, and who might actually threaten the successful course of the PDS's ultimate 
integration into establishment politics. 
It is against this contextual background that we must assess the PDS continuing 
vacillation on the question of its political role in the new system - 'revisionism' or 
out-and-out rejection; we remember: 
2 0 , Ludger Volmer(of Biindnis 90/die Griinen), cited in: Volmert: "Wahlkampf-Rhetorik ..." op. cit., 
p. 245 
2 0 2Speicher, Stephan: "Klein, aber scheckig." In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 20 February 1995 
2 0 3 see chapter 5; we use the term pragmatic here - somewhat differently than at the beginning of 
chapter - to include all those forces in the PDS whose aim is essentially one of making the PDS a 
viable political force within the parameters of the present system. 
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In der PDS haben sowohl Menschen einen Platz, die der kapitalistischen 
Gesellschaft Widerstand entgegensetzen wollen, als auch jene die ihren 
Widerstand damit verbinden, die gegebenen Verhaltnisse positiv zu verandern 
und schrittweise zu verhindern. 2 0 4 (my italics) 
The right, as we saw above, have been eager to seize upon the notion of the PDS 
offering "Widerstand" to the system as evidence of its underlying subversiveness. 
Again, however, we encounter the problematic disparity between 'real' commitment 
to the surface proposition contained in an utterance and commitment which - when 
seen against a broader situational background - may well be prompted more by 
strategic concerns. In practice, there is ample evidence - as we have seen above - to 
suggest that those in control of the PDS are seeking to make the PDS an accepted 
force within the conventional political arena; the problem they are now encountering 
is one of dealing with the problematic sign - Opposition - which has been at the 
centre of the PDS's political credo, and of trying to mould its (strategic?) 'anti-
establishment' component to a role which is geared to involvement in precisely that 
establishment! 
One of the SPD's more perceptive theoreticians, Erhard Eppler, picks up on precisely 
this desire for acceptance. His explanation for the psychological motivation behind 
the genesis of the PDS is utterly convincing: 
Urspriinglich war die PDS vor allem entstanden, weil verwirrte und 
gedemiitigte Kommunisten sich in der neuen, demokratischen Gesellschaft 
ihrer Haut wehren wollten. Sie wollten sich nicht einfach ins politische Nichts 
verfliichtigen und suchten eine politische Heimat, wohl auch so etwas wie 
Schutz, vor allem fur die SED-Mitglieder, denen das Wort Sozialismus mehr 
bedeutet hatte als ein Kniippel gegen alle Kr i t ike r . 2 0 5 
Here, then, in the PDS, was a place where disorientated and disaffected former 
communists would be accepted in the new system. How, then, Eppler would ask 
could the PDS be programmatically committed to subverting the establishment when 
in fact a programme as such was very much subordinate to the PDS's symbolic 
importance to its members: 
204p, 
ogramm der Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus. 1993. op. cit., p. 34 
2 0 5Eppler, op. cit., p. 31 
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Das Programm der Partei war weniger wichtig. Viele hatten aus alter 
Anhanglichkeit und Disziplin auch dann zur Stange und zur Fahne gehalten, 
wenn ein ganz anderes Programm beschlossen worden ware. 2 0 6 
It is not at all inconceivable that this desire for acceptance - to maintain at least some 
semblance of authority given the forfeiture of the status enjoyed by the PDS's 
political predecessor - should translate into a desire for acceptance in the new system 
through acceptance into political alliances in which the PDS can exert its influence. 
In any case, argues Eppler: 
Eine Gefahr fur den Staat des Grundgesetzes ist die PDS nicht. Sogar wenn 
sie in Bonn die absolute Mehrheit bekame - nicht eben wahrscheinlich -, 
wiirde jeder Versuch, das gescheiterte System wiederherzustellen, die PDS in 
ihre Bestandteile zerbersten lassen ... Nicht zielbewuBte Totalitaristen sind 
hier beisammen, sondern ein buntes Gemisch aus Leuten, die auf sehr 
unterschiedliche Weise mit dem endgiiltigen Scheitern des Marxismus-
Leninismus fertig werden wollen. Dabei mag es Biographien geben, die 
Achtung benotigen. 2 0 7 
Eppler, perhaps unwittingly, touches upon another crucial point here: 
Wer so lange Opposition kriminalisiert hat (the SED, as precursor to the PQS 
- M D ) , soli sie erst einmal lernen. 2 0® (my italics) 
There are doubtless grounds for the argument that in championing Opposition the 
PDS is - ironically - attempting, inter alia, to harvest the very positive connotative 
resonance it w i l l have for a significant number of East Germans, for whom 
Opposition meant resistance to the darker side of the SED regime; in other words the 
lexeme's positive connotative value stems quite precisely f rom its criminalisation by 
the PDS's political predecessor! This in turn allows some obfuscation of the 
respective territories occupied by the SED (PDS) and the Biirgerbewegungen, a 
situation similar to that which we have already witnessed in the PDS's 'usurpation' 
of the notion of the dritter Weg. As such, Eppler argues, the PDS "der Not 
gehorchend" (Eppler) champions, in its oppositionality, values which it has yet, he 
maintains, to learn: 
2 0 6 ibid. 
2 0 7 ibid. 
2 0 8ibid., p. 32 
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Erstaunlicher war, daB man (the PDS - M D ) nun, der Not gehorchend, das 
eigene Feindbild zum Programm erhob. Denn wer 1989 in der DDR darauf 
bestand, daB Grundrechte, Menschenrechte, Burgerrechte wichtiger seien als 
Eigentumsformen, wer die These verfocht, daB politische Macht sich nur auf 
freie Zustimmung von Menschen, nicht auf das Wahrheitsmonopol des 
Marxismus-Leninismus stutzen diirfe, muBte das Verbrechen des 
Sozialdemokratismus hinter Gittern biiBen. 2 0 9 
Not yet having learned these values, however, is, of course, not the same as 
opposing them outright. 
And indeed a PDS in the modesty mode we have identified has frequently - and 
pathetically - expressed messages which suggest its desire to undergo the arduous 
process of learning - via a cathartic process - to become a governmental player in the 
'democratic' establishment, enframed in such messages as: 
Ich halte es f u r gut, daB wir die harten Banke der Opposition noch ein paar 
Jahre driicken, um Erfahrungen zu sammeln, uvA kompetenter zu werden. 2 1 0 
Doubtless the rhetorical potential of the modesty and pathos in Brie's recurring 
"regieren lernen" formulation above is part and parcel of the attempt to legitimise the 
PDS as a party wi l l ing to work constructively with , and 'within the rules' of, the 
establishment; for legitimising purposes elsewhere the party presents a very different 
perspective of itself: where it is 'unencumbered' by the immediate discursive task of 
having to legitimise its involvement in government (i.e. as a player in a political 
game in which it w i l l only be accepted i f it signals its willingness to acknowledge 
and learn f rom the mistakes of the past), it's 'democratic' credentials are taken as a 
given. This is enframed in recurring presuppositionally loaded constructions such as 
"mit anderen demokratischen Parteien'V'mit anderen demokratischen Kraften" 
which, via the presupposition trigger "andere" carries the presupposed proposition 
(and assumption) that the PDS is a democratic party, is at least as democratic as the 
other parties 2": 
2 0 9 ibid., p. 31 
2 , 0 Lothar Bisky, in: "1995 muB es zur Entscheidung kommen." op. cit. 
2 1'cf. , too: "In diesem Sinne ist die PDS antikapitalistisch - nicht mit dem Ziel der Beseitigung des 
Privateigentums, sondern mit dem Ziel, gemeinsam mit anderen linken, demokratischen, 
sozialistischen Kraften (observe the breadth of the nominal category - MD) die Vorherrschafl der 
Kapitalinteressen in der Geselischaft zu iiberwinden." Cited from: Wer ist das, die PDS1 op. cit., 
p. 22 (my emphases; bold in original) 
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Die Partei strebt Ubereinstimmung und gemeinsames Handeln mit anderen 
Parteien und demokratischen Bewegungen an. 2 1 2 
We can make sense of the differing signals i f we bear in mind the legitimacy strands 
discussed in chapters 1 and 2. 
2,2"Programm der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus." 1990. op. cit., p. 90 
Gysi's very public message in a television debate is: "Was sich in der PDS durchsetzt ... das sind ganz 
klar demokratische Strukturen nach innen, demokratische Forderungen nach auBen, und ein Politikstil 
und ein Politikinhalt, der das deutlich unterstreicht." Gregor Gysi, cited in: Volmert: "Wahlkampf-
Rhetorik ..." op. cit., p. 258 
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C H A P T E R S 
C O N C L U S I O N : PDS O P P O S T I Q N B Y 1995 ° 
I D E O L O G I C A L D E B A T E S S U R R O U N D I N G 
T H E F O U R T H PAR IEII AG 
Wer eine Gesellschaft wirkl ich verandern w i l l , weil er zu den herrschenden 
Verhaltnissen in Opposition steht, muB sich in die Gesellschaft 
hineinbegeben. Fur die PDS bedeutet dies, an alien fortschrittlichen 
auBerparlamentarischen Bewegungen teilzunehmen und zugleich um breite 
parlamentarische Moglichkeiten zu ringen. Die Frage, ob eine 
Parlamentsfraktion der PDS sich innerhalb des Parlaments in eine 
Oppositionsrolle, in eine Situation der Tolerierung einer Regierung oder in 
eine Koalitionsrolle begibt, beriihrt nicht das prinzipielle 
Oppositionsverstandnis der PDS ... Selbst dann also, wenn die PDS sich auf 
irgendeiner Ebene in eine Regierungspolitik begeben sollte, weil sie davon 
ausgeht, in einer solchen Konstellation das zu dem gegebenen Zeitpunkt 
hochste MaB an Veranderung durchsetzen zu konnen, wiirde dies bei richtiger 
Politik (!? - M D ) ihren Oppositionscharakter in bezug auf die herrschenden 
Verhaltnisse nicht beeintrachtigen (my emphases)1 
OPPOSITION - A COMPOSITE MODEL 
The above is extracted f rom the "5 Punkte" - drafted with the avowed aim of 
achieving an inner-PDS "Minimalkonsens" 2 - presented by Bisky, Gysi and Modrow 
at the 4th PDS Parteitag and f rom which we have already cited heavily above. 3 Here 
then, is the level of 'integration' reached by 1995 upon the pro-/anti-involvement 
polemic discussed above. In this PDS-specific (more accurately, pro-involvement-
PDS -specific) model - which M . Brie calls a "salomonische Formel 4" - 'radical' and 
'Bisky, L. et al.: "Sozialismus ist Weg ..." op cit., p. 27 
2Bisky, cited in: Lang, op. cit., p. 374 
3The "5 Punkte" were drafted as a 'Mindestforderung' in place of an earlier position paper drafted by 
the Parly-Vorstand, the 10 Thesen, which the leadership had originally wished to offer the Parteitag 
for scrutiny. Many members had been unhappy about their emergence only a few weeks before the 
Parteitag, leaving little or no time for an informed discussion upon them. Despite the short notice, 
numerous motions for amendment of these Thesen had been submitted for discussion at the Parteitag. 
Due to their less than rapturous reception, however, it was decided to defer discussion thereof until a 
later date. 
4Brie, Michael: "Das politische Projekt PDS - eine unmogliche Moglichkeit." In: Brie et al. (eds.): Die 
PDS - Empirische Befunde ... op. cit., p. 33 
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'pragmatic' positions are brought together quite simply by eschewing what (judging 
by the vociferous objections of political observers) is widely received in the political 
arena as a logical conflation in which a wider 'radical' opposition (Opposition^ 
implies a narrower parliamentary opposition (Opposition^). In the "5-Punkte" world-
view any problematic inter-relationship is denied on an (awkward?) expressis verbis 
level: the two roles, the construct has it, can stand separately, and by setting up the 
former as an unchallengeable category to which the second role is subordinated, any 
activity in the latter, so the construct runs, w i l l not affect the former. This paves the 
way for an extensional broadening of the received understanding of Opposition in the 
established arena to include a governmental role (in a way which would generally be 
perceived as odd, counter-intuitive, illogical and contradictory in that arena where 
the category of Opposition has a fairly fixed semantic component of 'non-
government'). (Observe, too, how the key - but uncomfortable! - issue of 
governmental involvement isjplayed down' by being subordinated (as item three) to 
other options in a list.) 
I f there is any bridging of the gap between the two positions it comes in the form of 
the highly vague 'throwaway' notion, of "bei richtiger Politik"; what many would 
regard as the pivotal issue - what the (crucial!) nature of that "richtige Politik" is -
occupies a syntactically subordinate position, allowing a highly uncomfortable 
question not to be dwelled upon (but fail ing, in its nebulousness, to offer a uniformly 
accepted 'bridge', as our citation f rom Nelken's Anderungsantrag below shows). 
Whatever the PDS decides to do in parliament is, then, in the "5 Punkte" world-
view, Opposition. Put unkindly, Opposition might be perceived to be everything and 
nothing. Commentators were not slow to brand this attempt to overcome the 
fundamental "Widerspruch zwischen fundamental-oppositionellem Selbstverstandnis 
und dem Wil len nach groBtmoglicher parlamentarischen Prasenz"5 a tactical one: 
Somit hat die PDS ihre gesellschaftliche oppositionelle Strategic gedanklich 
von ihrer Position in den Parlamenten entkoppelt und dadurch ihre 
strategischen Motive ein Stuck weit verraten. 6 
This commentator is clearly not convinced by a concept of oppositionality 
incorporating what he sees as an awkward juxtaposition of positions and a (mere?) 
expressis verbis denial of what is widely perceived as a logical interrelationship, as 
indeed were many political observers at this time, questioning how governmental 
5Lang, op. cit., p. 373 
6ibid., p. 374 
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involvement in the institutions born of the herrschende Verhdltnisse might be 
married with a position which a priori smacks of a rejection of those very 
herrschende Verhdltnisse. One journalist captured what he and many others perceive 
as the essential oxymoron of the PDS's position with the headline: 
PRINZIPIELL 7 KRITISCH - PDS-Spitzenpolitiker urn Lothar Bisky legen 
zum Parteitag Fiinf-Punkte-Programm vor: 
PDS ist oppositionell, regierl aber auch mit, ist pluralistisch aber 
antistalinistisch. 8 (my italics) (There is room for arguing that the notion of 
"prinzipiell" here describes a Spagat between "as a matter of principle" [i.e. 
"aus festem Prinzip"] and the less absolute "in principle" [i.e. "im Prinzip", 
"on the whole"] - M D . ) 9 
And indeed, as the furious inner-party on this issue and on a whole range of others 
both in the months preceding, and at, the 4th Parteitag showed, many sections of the 
party, too, were unconvinced by the "5 Punkte" oppositionality. The crucially 
revealing 7-page Anderungs- antrag10 of Berlin-delegate Michail Nelken (never 
discussed because a motion to the effect that the Parteitag dispense with considering 
any Antrdge auf Anderungen was carried - leading to angry responses from delegates 
as to the legitimacy of the procedure 1 1), speaks for the view of many, especially, in 
the radical wing around the JG (for whom, too, the conflation referred to above [i.e. 
between Opposition{ and Opposition^ is not a natural one 1 2) and picks up on the 
vagueness of the (for him any many others pivotal!) notion of "richtiger Politik" 
7The reference here is to the statement in Punktl that "Daraus ergibt sich, daB die PDS in 
prinzipieller Opposition zu den herrschenden gesellschaftlichen Verhaltnissen in der Bundesrepublik 
steht". (p. 27) 
8Tolmein, Oliver: "Prinzipiell kritisch." In: Junge Welt. 14 January 1995 
9Compare the entry in the Collins German Dictionary (Glasgow: Harper Collins 1992) under 
prinzipiell: "... (im Prinzip) in principle; (aus Prinzip) on principle. ~ bin ich einverstanden I agree 
in principle; das tue ich ~ nicht I won't do that on principle." 
l 0Nelken, Michail: "Anderungsantrag IV. 1. 4. 95. zum Initiativantrag Bisky, Gysi ..." op. cit. 
"Delegates did, however, subsequently force an amendment upon the issue of the PDS's position in 
respect of Antikommunismus - see below. 
This mode of procedure was deemed by Sabine Hartwig in the interview cited above to be a 
"Sauerei". It re-affirmed many commentators' view of the leadership's increasingly authoritarian, in 
the view of some - dictatorial, style of leadership. We will have more to say on this subject below. 
1 2cf. "Die Diskussion in den letzten Monaten hat uns gezeigt, daB aber auch in der PDS der Wunsch 
besteht, im Konzert der staatstragenden Parteien mitzuspielen und als 'Regierungspartei im 
Wartestand' zu fungieren. Dies deckt sich aber nicht mit dem Anspruch der 'konsequenten' 
Opposition, den die PDS im Wahlkampf iiber die Medien verbreiten lieB, und womit sie ein neues, 
freches Profil gewonnen hat. Die PDS sollte auch nach den Wahlen dazu stehen ..." Cited from: 
"Positionen zur zukiinftigen Politik der PDS. BeschluB der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Junger Genosslnnen 
in und bei der PDS." op. cit. 
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Wir denken, es ist falsch zu behaupten, daB unsere grundsatzliche 
gesellschaftliche Opposition "unabhangig" von unserer praktischen Politik 
sei, resp. umgekehrt. Die Aussage, daB unsere jeweilige Rolle im Parlament 
(Regierung, Tolerieren, oder Opponieren) nicht unser prinzipielles 
Oppositionsverstandnis beriihre, ist ebenso falsch oder irrefiihrend, wie die, 
daB auch eine Regierungsmitwirkung - "bei richtiger Politk" - unseren 
Oppositionscharakter in bezug auf die herrschenden Verhaltnisse nicht 
beeintrachtigen konne. Hier fallen Politik und Theorie, politische Praxis und 
Parteiideologie in klassischer Weise auseinander.13 
It is interesting that where the zweite Tagung of the Third Party Conference in 1993 
offered the central conference slogan "Linke Opposition gegen rechte Experimente" 
(my underlining), thereby picking up arjy'parodying, in the familiar manner (see 
chapter 4), the right's notorious "Keine sozialistischen Experimente" slogan, the 
January 1995 conference - where the crucial question of what kind of opposition the 
PDS should offer was at the forefront of deliberations - foregrounds the slogan "PDS 
'95: solidarisch, alternativ, bundesweit." (my underlining) This offers some evidence 
that, increasingly, the term Opposition is being supplanted by other lexemes which 
invoke the notion of oppositionality, of Green-style 'Andersartigkeit', but which 
bypass the highly problematic Opposition lexeme i t s e l f 4 , a lexeme which was 
hitherto the centrepiece of PDS ideology, yet in the post-election period so focal an 
element in the potentially divisive pro-/anti-involvement-in-government polemic. 
(Certainly, the lexeme alternativ is one we f ind favoured across the very broad range 
of inner-PDS discourses.1 5) 
Weimar-delegate Sabine Hartwig observed how she had left the Parteitag wi th the 
impression that many delegates were highly dissatisfied with the opposilionelles 
13Nelken, Michail: "Anderungsantrag IV. 1. 4. 95. zum Initiativantrag Bisky, Gysi ..." op. cit., p. 4 
14Compare, the PDS programme for the 1995 Berlin elections which is entitled: PDS '95: Ein anderes 
Berlin, eine andere Politik, (my underlining) 
15Witness how Opposition and alternativ inform each other in the discourse of the JG: "So postulierte 
die AG (JG - MD) bei der faktischen Wiedergrundung im Januar 1994, solange unter anderem 
'Autonome' ... auch von PDS-Mitgliedern als 'Chaoten' angesehen und beschimpft werden, sei der 
'Weg zu einer alternativen sozialistischen Partei oder Bewegung mit klarem OppositionsprofW ... 
verstellt'." (cited from Falkner/Huber; op. cit. p. 168) In the discourse of the KPF the lexeme is bound 
up with traditional 'communist' notions of revolutionary change: Falkner and Huber describe in some 
detail the contents of a Grundsatzaussprache between the KPF and the PDS-Bundesvorstand 
on 30 May 1994: "Eingangs hatte Thomas Heckmann eine im Bundeskoordinierungsrat beschlossene 
Stellungnahme der KPF verlesen. Wieder beharrte man auf der 'wissenschaftlichen 
Weltanschauung' ... und orakelte uber eine 'verantwortbare revolutionare Alternative zur 
sozialreformistischen Vorstellung von der Veranderung des kapitalistischen Systems' ..." (ibid., 
pp. 161-2; my italics) 
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Selbstverstdndnis contained in the "5 Punkte"16. The ratification of the "5 Punkte" 
belies the fact that, as Michael Brie, observes: 
Der Parteitag im Januar 1995 hat deutlich gemacht, daB die Grenzen einer 
Politik erreicht sind, bei der die PDS durch ein unkoordiniertes 
Nebeneinander ... (ihrer - MD) Positionen bei nach auBen gesicherter 
Hegemonie der SED-Reformer erfolgreich sein konnte.17 
The wide displeasure among delegates was evident from delegates' rejection of 
Andre Brie, leading party ideologue and close ally of Gysi and Bisky, as proposed 
Bundesgeschaftsfiihrer. 
Brie's study - aptly bearing the oxymofQhic title , !Die PDS - ejne unmogliChe 
Moglichkeit" - gives a graphic account of the sheer level of ambivalence and 
contradiction (hitherto suppressed, he observes, for the purposes of presenting a 
united electoral front) with which the party was fraught by the time of its Parteitag, 
of the: 
extrem heterogenen Anforderungen, die die PDS integrieren miiBte, wenn sie 
ihrem Anspruch gerecht werden sollte, sich weiterhin als polifische Kraft in 
Deutschland zu behaupten. Bis hin zu den Bundestagswahlen 1994 konnte 
dieses Problem im Interesse der Bestandssicherung und des Wahlzieles durch 
eine weithin inkonsistentes Nebeneinander verschiedener Positionen und 
Strategien bei gleichzeitiger Biindelung der Hauptaktivitaten und Dominanz 
der SED-Reformer nach auBen relativ erfolgreich gelost werden.18 
On all sides the leadership was accused of 'selling out' on its 'true' socialist 
principles in order to curry favour with the establishment; what is noticeable here is 
that the denotative nature of that socialism is perceived in a vast array of different 
ways in accordance with personal ideological predilections. For the fundamentalists a 
gradual betrayal of 'true' socialism was evident in the increasing signs of a 
pragmatist 'pro-involvementalism'. For the traditionalists, the betrayal came in the 
form of a rejection of the class model (see below). Some of the areas of discord Brie 
touches upon are: 
'"interview with the writer, op. cit. 
l 7 Brie: "Das politische Projekt PDS ..." op. cit., p. 30 
1 8 ib id . , p. 27 
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' - the East/West question: "Die PDS stent in der Spannung zwischen GroBpartei und 
Kleinpartei oder - anders ausgedruckt - zwischen politische Oligopolist und 
Kleinhandler." 
- "der Gegensatz von prinzipieller Opposition und parlamentarischer Partei ... Sie 
konnte zu einer ernsten ZerreiBprobe werden, da an diesem Punkte zwei 
gegensatzliche Auffassungen - die einer sog. Volks- oder Mehrheitspartei und die 
einer Weltanschauungspartei ... ist erstere pragmatisch mehrheitsorientiert ... und 
geht intern vor allem den Weg des Kompromisses, so ist letztere primar ideologisch 
orientiert... und strebt intern eine weltanschauliche Koharenz an." This is closely 
linked to: 
- "der Gegensatz von Partei und Bewegung" 
- the differences between the pragmatist "Moderne Sozialisten" whose "Spezifik vor 
allem in einer klaren Abgrenzung zum Staatssozialismus als einem prinzipiell 
verfehlten Gesellschaft ... (liegt)" and the traditionalist wing which perceives the 
"Grundstrukturen des friiheren Staatssozialismus als 'eigentlichem Sozialismus'".19 
The months leading up to the Parteitag had revealed the traditionalists' deep 
dissatisfaction with what they perceived as an increasing Bad Godesberg-style move 
away from the (as they saw it) 'true' socialism enshrined in the model of class 
warfare and/or Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Schreier speaks for many in the 
traditionalist camp in observing: 
Vom Kommunisten zum demokratischen Sozialisten zum demokratischen 
Sozialdemokraten... Man hat auch mal Leute Wendehalse genannt ... Das 
Wort Sozialismus scheint nicht mehr hoffahig zu sein ... Wann andert man 
den Parteinamen?20 (my emphases) 
The traditionalist camp had been aghast at 10 Thesen's unequivocal eschewal of the 
Klassenkampfmodell: 
Da es um das Uberleben der Menschheit geht, lassen sich die Probleme der 
Gegenwart nicht mit einem vereinfachten und reduzierten Denken in den 
Kategorien von Klassenkampf oder Sozialpartnerschaft erf assent (my 
italics; observe the synergy - MD) 
l 9 ib id . , pp. 32, 32-3, 34, 28-9 
20Schreier, Bernd: "Heiligt Erfolg die Mittel?" op. cit. 
2 1 Parteivorstand der PDS: "10 Thesen ..." op. cit., p. 21 
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The pain inflicted by this formulation is evident from the fact that it does not re-
emerge in the "Minimalkonsens" of the "5 Punkte". Evidently, Schreier's observation 
that socialism is no longer "hoffahig" is predicated upon an understanding of 
Socialism as embodying a fixed (Klassenkampf/Marx'ist Leninist) denotation; any 
perceived mitigation of that model is thus per se a challenge on the category. Clearly 
Schreier's is an expression not so much of the absence of the category in PDS 
discourse at this time (after all, we encounter Socialism as sign widely) but rather of 
what he and others perceive as the increasing absence of an (in their world-view) 
fixed denotative core; in other words they perceive evidence of a gradual substitution 
of the category's (in their view a priori) orthodox marxist-leninist dimension with an 
increasingly 'social-democratic' dimension a la SPD. The category socialism is 
'hammered home' in the 10 Thesen22, and enjoys pride of place as point 1 (drafted, 
tellingly, by Hans Modrow, "die Integrationsfigur der DDR- und 
Sozialismusnostalgiker")23 - of the "5 Punkte": 
1. Zum sozialistischen Charakter der PDS. Der sozialistische Charakter der 
PDS ist in ihrer Geschichte begriindet, von ihren Mitgliedern gewollt, von 
ihren Wahlerinnen und Wahlern akzeptiert, in ihrem Programm und Statut 
festgeschrieben und in ihrem Namen hervorgehoben. (my underlining; bold in 
original) 
We discussed above the evidence of the use of the socialism sign as a positive 
symbol at the heart of an attempt to create a unifying 'super-discourse', as a lowest 
common denominator which backgrounds the fundamentally different denotative 
conceptions highlighted above. As such, numerous commentators have observed that 
the insistent invocation of an (intensionally minimal) socialism in thelO Thesen and 
"5 Punkte" is at the heart of an attempt to push through the eschewal - as recognised 
by Schreier - of orthodox/traditionalist positions via the medium of (comforting) 
'trappings' - such as the unifying banner of a vague, maximally extended socialism. 
The following commentaries are typical: 
Mit ihrer Berufung auf den "sozialistischen Charakter" der PDS konnen die 
drei Programmatiker nicht iibertunchen, daB sie ihren Frieden mit der BRD zu 
machen bereit sind. 2 4 
2 2"Die PDS ist eine sozialistische Partei ... Sozialismus bleibl fur die PDS ein unverzichtbares 
Ziel ... Sozialismus ist fur uns eine Bewegung gegen die Ausbeutung des Menschen durch den 
Menschen ... Sozialismus ist fur uns ein Wertesystem." ibid. p. 24 (These 10; bold in original) 
2 3 Lang, op. cit., p. 374 
2 4Ripplinger, Stefan: "Den teuren Toten." In: Junge Well. 16 January 1995 
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... in den "Fiinf Standpunkten" (taucht) die Forderung nach "sozialistischer 
Kritik" der Vergangenheit auf. Diesem Zuckerbrot fur die Mitglieder voraus 
ging die Peitsche: Es gibt Grenzen, die durch kein Mitglied der PDS 
iXberschritten werden durfen. Nationalistische, chauvinistische, rassistische, 
antisemitische Auffassungen sind mit der Mitgliedschaft in der PDS 
unvereinbar. Das gilt ebenso fur stalinistische Auffassungen.25 (my 
emphases; italics in original) 
Semantic specification of the notion of "sozialistische Kritik" (which tellingly comes 
close to a formulation favoured by Sahra Wagenknecht!)26 is indeed difficult, 
offering evidence of the strategic invocation of the socialism sign, i.e. of an attempt 
to counter the 'Anbiederung' charge of 'selling out' by qualifying the willingness to 
effect a criticism of the past (for which the political establishment has so clamoured 
and which the party must [be seen at least to] offer it if it is to be accepted as an 
equal, 'democratic' player) with the intensionally vague, but - for the party 
membership - connotatively positive socialist symbol. The evidence clearly suggests, 
however, that while PDS members such as Gysi and Bisky on the one hand and 
Wagenknecht on the other champion a "sozialistische Kritik" of the past, their 
respective understanding of what lies behind the signifier is fundamentally different. 
Clearly, Schreier et al. are unconvinced of the leadership's 'socialist' Spagat . The 
perception of a 'tactical' use of the socialism category as opposed to any 
commitment to the category as embodying a uniform underlying denotation is 
strengthened by some evidence which suggests that Sozialimus, while as yet 
insistently invoked, is simultaneously, as Schreier intimates, losing something of its 
'sacro-saint' quality, which would-indeed beg the question of whether it might not be 
supplanted if and when it is no longer required tactically. Witness, for example, the 
surprising failure to relativise Sozialismus in These 8: 
Die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Scheitern des sozialistischen 
Versuches und der eigenen Geschichte bleibt ein unverzichtbarer Bestandteil 
des politischen Profils der PDS. 
From our experience of PDS historiography as discussed in chapters 1 and 2, we 
might well have expected the sozialistisch to be entered in inverted commas, to 
suggest that what failed was not socialism per se but 'socialism gone wrong'. Might 
the failure to rescue the category here not be proffered as tentative evidence of 
2 5 Lang, op. cit., p. 375 
2 6See: Wagenknecht: "Anforderungen an die PDS." op. cit., p. 5: "Wir miissen den vergangenen 
Sozialismus in seinen verschiedenen Entwicklungsetappen und die Ursachen seines letztlichen 
Unterganges griindlich analysieren ... Die Kritik an der DDR muB eine Kritik nach MaBgabe unserer 
sozialistischen Anspriiche ... sein." 
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Schreier's claims? Likewise, commitment to an ontologically stable socialism looks 
in some doubt in recurring formulations to the effect that the SPD is 'not social-
democratic enough' or Die Griinen 'not green enough', carrying something of an 
implication that the PDS's aim (or, more strictly, that of its pragmatist wing) is to to 
usurp positions which, in its view, were formerly held, but have been abandoned, by 
the established left, or positions which these parties should adopt as social democratic 
or green parties. The following is typical: 
Ich bestreite gar nich (sic), daB wir zu Beispiel bestimmte Felder 
besetzen, die urspriinglich mal Grime waren „ . 2 7 
As such, the implication is that the PDS's mission is to show the established left 'how 
it's done', and thus to be the 'true' social democratic or green party. In that case, if 
'true' social democracy/'greenness' is essencially socialism, then socialism as a sign 
expressing a difference b~etweeh"diffefihg~ideolagies would-indeed-be-something-of-
an irrelevance, and the PDS's "socialist" vision would enframe positions which 
already have a name on the established left. For Michael Brie, the basis for the PDS's 
long-term prospects lies in generating a qualitatively different denotative socialism: 
as we saw in chapter 3, this has yet to be articulated by the PDS. 
T H E 'STALINISMUS-DEBATTE' 
"Allerdings besteht die Schwierigkeit zu 
definieren, was Stalinismus ist" 2 8 
Die Existenz einer "kommunistischen" Plattform in der PDS war bisher ein 
Hindernis fur eine ungeschminkte Bundnispolitik der Linken unter EinschluB 
der SED-Erben. Sie bremste immerhin den linken Drang des linken SPD-
Flugels in diese Richtung, weil sie Schamgrenzen in Erinnerung rief. Und sie 
minderte erheblich die Attraktivitat der PDS in den alten Bundeslandern. 
Bisky, Gysi und Modrow wollen das Hindernis jetzt aus dem Weg raumen. 
Das ist der politische Gehalt ihres VerstoBes, was ihr personliches Interesse 
an klaren Verhaltnissen nicht ausschlieBt und zeigt, daB sie mit 
kommunistischen Dogmatikern nichts am Hut haben.29 
2 7Gregor Gysi, cited in Volmert: "Wahlkampf-Rhetorik ..." op. cit., p. 245 
28Uwe-Jens Heuer, cited from: "Der Klassenkampf ist real." In: Die 
Tageszeitung. 21/22 January 1995 (interview) 
2 9"PDS Light." In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeilung. 14 January 1995 
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Before the 1994 elections the PDS had generally (tactically?) played down its 
fundamental problems with the KPF. We might call this a 'discourse of silence': a 
crucially revealing account of the very real tensions existing 'below the surface' is 
provided by Falkner and Huber; the latter point to a telling 'behind the scenes' 
Grundsalzaussprache between the PDS Vorstand and the KPF, which makes clear, 
yet again, the importance of bolting a 'parteiintern/-extern' context onto our complex 
overall model of PDS discourse. Lothar Bisky's widely cited messages of solidarity 
with the KPF 3 0 , which the right naturally proffered as evidence of the commitment of 
the party as a whole to a 'traditionalist' past (and, in the Moreau-led world-view to 
'subversion') looks quite different when set against the contextual background 
invoked by Falkner/Huber. It points to evidence that party leaders had for some years 
'tolerated' the KPF and its uncomfortable orthodox views, doubtless for the sake of 
party unity, rather than being actively committed to them. After all: 
Zu groG ist offenbar der Respekt vor dieser Partei (the KPF - MD) in der 
Partei, von der niemand genau weiB, wie stark sie in der PDS vertreten ist.3 1 
The vital 'stabilising' function of the Communist category has been identified by 
Falkner and Huber: 
Lothar Herzfeldt, der die Plattform mitbegrundete, wollte 1989 als engagierter 
Reformpolitiker, jenen SED-Mitgliedern den Verbleib in der Partei 
ermoglichen die sich weiter als Kommunisten fiihlen ... Jene Krafte an die 
Reform heranzufiihren hatte unter anderem deswegen groBe Bedeutung, weil 
die Selbsldefinition der SED-Mitglieder als Kommunisten noch bis in die 
Wende hinein zur Pateirdson zahlte, der Begriff einen gewissen inneren Halt 
gab.7,2 (my italics) 
This tension - the need to (be seen at least?) to rid the party of traditionalist 
ideological positions (we can leave open the question of whether this was out of 
'true' conviction or as a way of giving the establishment what it wanted - or a 
complex amalgam of both) while at the same time 'keeping on board' the 
Communists and 'rescuing' the communist category (with its important symbolic 
function) for the benefit of the party members and sympathisers for whom it was so 
much a prop - is at the heart, we wil l argue, of the pragmatic leadership's discursive 
3 0 cf . , for example: "Ich bin froh, daB es die Kommunistische Plattform gibt ... Ich habe iiberhaupt 
keine Lust, mich von der kommunistischen Plattform in der PDS in irgendeiner Weise abzugrenzen." 
Bisky, cited in: Moreau/Neu: "Die PDS zwischen Linksextremismus ..." p. 49 
3,Preusker, Ingo: "Alles nur Theaterdonner." In: Wochenpost. no. 4. 19 January 1995 
32Falkner/Huber, op. cit., p. 153 
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Spagat: in the post-election period. We will argue with Lang 3 3 that those journalists 
who saw the PDS as seeking, at this time, to eject its problematic traditionalists is 
something of a misleading (or misled??) perspective, and that the attempt was, in 
fact, to effect a (tactical?) fusion between on the one hand (being seen to be?) 
challenging traditionalism and quelling its voices, while on the other holding on to its 
proponents themselves and rescuing central symbols of their discourses. In a 
nutshell, we will argue, the attempt was to remove Sahra Wagenknecht - as the 
Kommunistische Plattform's most potent symbol - from the executive, but removing 
her as a Stalinist, not a Communist. 
What we wil l attempt to show is that the leadership's Spagat functions largely on a 
symbolic as opposed to denotative level. The centrepiece for that Spagat is the 
category of Stalinismus, whose invocation to exonerate the party membership by 
creating a category of 'mythical others' we touched upon above. Where we see 
traditionalism taken on by the leadership its is via that category; this allows the 
leadership to play down any condemnation on its part of Communism, while relying 
at the same time upon a tacit conflation - via the person of Sahra Wagenknecht (a 
well-known Stalin admirer34 [resulting in her being widely termed in the press a 
"Stalinist" and/or the very epitome of Stalinism*5] while at the same time the 
mouthpiece for the Kommunistische Plattform) - of Stalinism and Communism; put 
mathematically: 
SW = Stalinist = Communist (Platform) 
Thus SW = Communist 
ergo PDS minus SW (Stalinism) = [i.e. suggests] PDS minus communism (i.e. 
suggests that PDS has divested itself of communist positions, but avoiding the need 
to invoke the category of communism itself) 
(The mathematical formula makes clear, of course, that the hugely simplistic 
symbolic nature of the construct!) 
In other words, by ridding the Vorstund of Sahra Wagenknecht as a Stalinist, the 
PDS can symbolically suggest to the outside world that it has dealt with its 
•"Lang, op. cit., see p. 376 ff . 
3 4 A n excellent account of Sahra Wagenknecht's "offene Stalin-Verherrlichung" (Falkner/Huber, 
op. cit., p. 156) is provided by Falkner/Huber, op. cit.; see pp. 156-9 
3 5 The following is typical: "Ausloser fur das innerparteiliche Rumoren ist ein Buch der ebenso jungen 
wie unverbesserlichen Stalinistin Sahra Wagenknecht ..." (my italics) Stiege, Rudolf: "Statins 
Schatten fallt auf die PDS." In: Morgenpost. 17 January 1995. 
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Communists without, for its part, invoking and issuing what for many of its members 
would be a painful challenge upon this problematic category. 
What emerges is that Bisky, Gysi et al in fact continue to deploy a modified version 
of the discourse of silence: a survey of press articles at this time 3 6 reveals they rarely 
invoke a challenge upon the category of communism at this time, indeed where 
communism is invoked it is to defend it via a polarised model which pits Stalinism 
(as "illiberal socialism") against the nebulous notion a 'pure' Reformcommunism 
(which suggests, however, that Communism, in the eyes of the leadership stands 
uncomfortably on its own!) and suggests that the crimes committed under the 
'communist' regime from the time of Stalin onwards can be seen independently of 
the systemic theory and practice that gave rise to them: 
... daB Reformkommunisten in dieser PDS einen Platz haben miissen ist eine 
ganz andere Frage37 
to which one commentator responds: 
immerhin konnte er sich (Bisky - MD) eine re/ormkommunistische Plattform 
vorstellen. Man sollte taktvoll genug sein, einen Tag nach dem Gedenken an 
Luxemburg und Liebknecht (the reference is to a memorial service attended 
by Bisky -MD) nicht nachzufragen was "reformkommunistisch" bedeutet . . . 3 8 
Likewise, the Communists are rescued through individualisation: 
Die Kommunistische Plattform ist nicht mit einzelnen ihrer Mitglieder zu 
verwechseln. Die Mehrheit der Plattform ist mit den grundsatzlichen 
Positionen der PDS einverstanden.39 
Ich kenne eine Menge Mitglieder der Kommunistischen Plattform auf die ich 
um Gottes willen nicht verzichten mochte.40 
Und die stalinistischen Angriffe auf seine (Bisky's - MD) Person beschaftigen 
ihn noch immer. "Ich wil l nicht langer die Rolle des Integrationsopas spielen" 
sagt er veragert. Wenn sich auf dem Bundesparteitag Ende Januar nicht eine 
3 6Conducted by the writer throughout January 1995 using a wide range of newspapers, in particular: 
FAZ, Junge Welt, Die Zeit, Berliner Zeitung, Die Tageszeitung, Morgenpost (Berlin), Wochenpost. 
37"Integrationskraft ausgereizt?" In: Junge Welt. 14 January 1995 (interview with Lothar Bisky) 
3 8Ripplinger, op. cit. 
3 9 Bisky, in: "1995 muB es zur Entscheidung kommen." op. cit. 
40"Integrationskraft ausgereizt?" op. cit. 
311 
Mehrheit ein fur allemal gegen das stalinistische Sozialismusmodell 
ausspricht, miisse er eine erneute Kandidatur fur den Parteivorsitz 
uberdenken. Im nachsten Augenblick relativiert er aber schon wieder. Nein, 
nein, gegen die kommunistische Plattform insgesamt habe er nichts. Nur 
gegen einzelne."41 
Nowhere is the category of Communism invoked - and thus taken on directly - in the 
10 Thesen. The leadership can rely, in generating a picture of having taken on 
orthodox positions, upon the press to do the 'dirty work' for it, i.e. that of associating 
the 'attack' upon a 'Stalinist'' Sahra Wagenknecht with an attack upon the 
<Kommunist>ische Plattform (and thus with an attack upon traditionalist 
(<Kommunist>ische) positions; in the following the link is made: 
Der PDS-Bundesvorsitzende, Lothar Bisky, stellt die linken Hardliner in 
seiner Partei vor die Alternative: Entweder sie distanzieren sich auf dem 
Parteitag von neostalinistischen Ideen und bekennen sich zur Demokratie, 
oder er kandidiert nicht mehr fur den Parteivorsitz ... Die Thesen (meaning 
5 Punkte - MD) zielen vor allem auf die Anhanger der Kommunistischen 
Plattform und deren fuhrende Vertreterin Sahra Wagenknecht ab . . . 4 2 (my 
underlining) 
In other words, the reductive model is (neo-)Stalinism = Communism (= SW). The 
extract above stems from an article entitled "Bisky zwingt seine Partei zur 
Entscheidung. Entweder Kommunistische Plattform oder er". If we look more closely 
at the packaging of the 'choice' 'actually' or 'originally' given to the party by Bisky, 
we see that it looks quite different: i.e. Bisky or neostalinist ideas and NOT Bisky or 
Kommunistische Plattform. The distinction is a crucial one. Nowhere has Bisky 
himself invoked the KPF and thus the uncomfortable category of Kommunismus. 
Tolmein, perhaps unwittingly, sums it up: 
Klar ist dagegen die sich stillschweigend daraus ergebende scharfe Kritik an 
der Kommunistischen Plattform.4 3 (my italics) 
The following extract from an article in Die Zeit describing a meeting between Bisky 
and journalists in Potsdam some days before the party conference is revealing: 
4,Preusker, op. cit. 
4 2 Lang, Christoph: "Bisky zwingt seine Partei zur Entscheidung. Entweder Kommunistische 
Plattform oder er." In: Morgenpost. 14 January 1995. 
4 3Tolmein: "Prinzipiell kritisch." op. cit. 
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Bisky (schwenkte) mit der Linken eine Broschiire seiner Vorstandskollegin 
Sahra Wagenknecht mit dem Titel "Antisozialistische Strategien im Zeitalter 
der Systemauseinandersetzung" Da sei es ihm kalt den Riicken 
hinuntergelaufen, als er das gelesen habe, das seien "politisch gegnerische 
Auffassungen" Sahra Wagenknecht ist die Wortfuhrerin der 
"Kommunistischen Plattform" ... Eine der Kernthesen dieses Biichleins, ist 
die Behauptung, der Niedergang des Sozialismus habe mit dem XX. Parteitag 
der KPdSU 1956 begonnen, auf dem Nikita Chruschtschow sich mit den 
Verbrechen Stalins auseinandergesetzt hat. Diese poststalinistische Attitude 
der kommunistischen Plattform ... will die PDS-Spitze nicht mehr 
hinnehmen.u (my emphases) 
Bisky invoked Sahra Wagenknecht; the link between Stalinism and communism is 
made by the journalist! Witness, too: 
Sie scheint unerschiitterlich. Sahra Wagenknecht, 25 Jahre jung, Studentin der 
Philosophie und Vorzeigefrau der Altkommunisten in der PDS. Seit Monaten 
schon bemiiht sich der Reformfliigel um den Parteivorsitzenden Lothar Bisky 
und Gregor Gysi, die uberzeugte Kommunistin mit Hang zum Stalinismus aus 
dem Fokus des offentlichen Interesses zu verdrangen.45 (my italics) 
In this pre-conference period the leadership came under fire by many within the party 
and without who, for a plethora of different reasons, saw the use of Stalinismus as a 
tactical one. 'West-Linke' Joachim Bischoff is in little doubt that the invocation of 
Stalinismus is a means for the leadership to take on traditionalist positions without 
actually saying so: 
Wenn die Leute von der Kommunistischen Plattform den Klassenkampf 
negierende Positionen kritisieren, werden sie relativ schnell in die 
Stalinismus-Schublade geschoben.46 
This idea, that the leadership's 'real' desire is to in fact rid the party of ideas 
traditionally bound up with the communist category, but to do so under the 
'scapegoat' category of Stalinism - gains strength from the observations of Falkner 
and Huber; i f we look at the catalogue of features of KPF policy challenged by a 
4 4Nawrocki, Joachim: "Bisky und die Roten." In: Die Zeit. no. 4. 20 January 1995 
4 5Fehrle, Brigitte: "S. Wagenknecht, eine Ketzerin in der PDS." In: Berliner Zeitung. 19 January 1995 
4 6Joachim Bischoff, in: "Ist Sahra Wagenknecht eine Stalinistin?" Junge Welt. 20 January 1995 
(interview with Joachim Bischoff) 
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pragmatist PDS 'behind the scenes' in the Grundsatzaussprache referred to above47, 
we find that there is in fact nothing particularly 'Stalinist' (however we understand 
the term) about, for example, championing, as the KPF does, the avant-garde role of 
the party. The Partei neuen Typus is, after all, a decidedly Leninist construct, as 
Falkner and Huber rightly observe.48 
In many respects the leadership's instrumentalisation of Stalinismus can be said to 
mirror the use of Opposition cited above. A problematic inter-relationship is side-
stepped: how, for example, is Stalinism different from Marxism-Leninism, from 
Communism? What many commentators (both inside and outside the party) note as 
missing at this time is any attempt, on the party of Bisky, Gysi et al., to offer a more 
rigorous definition of the term Stalinism. The "5 Punkte" definition relies upon a 
reductive, polarised construct of the type described above, where features of a system 
are seen as hermetically divorceable from an unsullied system itself: 
Damit verbunden ist die unumkehrbare Absage an ein stalinistisches oder 
poststalinistisches Sozialismusmodell, das heiBt an Sozialismusvorstellungen 
mit diktatorischem, antiemanzipatorischem, antidemokratischem, illiberalem 
und zentralistischem Charakter.49 
It is a construct which came under fire by what we might call the party's 'Stalin in 
jedem' proponents, who for their part invoked a much wider understanding of 
Stalinism as a phenomenon which pervaded every aspect of GDR life, party and 
social structures, as involving - not eschewing - the notion of personal complicity: 
Wie soil es in einer Partei, die sich aus einer stalinistischen/poststalinistischen 
Partei herausgebildet hat, unter ihren Mitgliedern keine stalinistischen 
Auffassungen geben? Sind sie alle mit der Wende von 1989 geloscht? Die 
Quelle dieser Verdrehtheit in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Stalinismus 
liegt in der Mythologisierung des Begriffs "Stalinismus ". Wer Stalinismus 
zur Ungeheuerlichkeit schlechthin macht, mit Verbrechen identifiziert oder 
47FaIkner/Huber, p. 162 ff . The features described are, inter alia, the KPF'S insistence upon a: 
- "wissenschaftlichen Grundlage fur die Uberwindung der Klassengesellschafl" 
- '"revolutionarer Uberwindung des Kapitalismus', indem der herrschenden Klasse die Macht entrissen 
und die Eigentumsverhaltnisse grundlegend umgestaltet werden" 
- marxist-leninist "Klassenkampf" rhetoric 
- the avant-garde role of the party 
-existence of a revolutionary subject 
-glorification of "Realsozialismus" as the attainment of 'true' socialism 
4 8 ib id . , p. 155 
4 9 "5 Punkte" op. cit., p. 27 (Punkt no. 1) 
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auf politische Prozesse, Utiterdriickung, Massen- und Volkermord reduziert, 
der lafit nur noch Raum fur die demonstrative ... Distanzierung.50 (my italics; 
bold in original) 
Soemthing of the same perspective is offered by Karin Dorre in her 
A ustrittserklarung: 
Die Mehrheit der PDS-Mitglieder kommt aus einer reaktionaren Partei, aus 
der SED. Deshalb wird die Auseinandersetzung mit diesem konkreten 
Auswuchs stalinistischer Politik nicht zu Ende sein, sollte Sahra 
Wagenknecht oder die Kommunistische Plattform die PDS verlassen oder per 
Erklarung dem Sozialismus abschworen. Dann stiinde die PDS lediglich vor 
der Offentlichkeit gelautert da ... Denn ein bifichen Wagenknecht silzt in 
jedem Kopf.51 
Dorre perceives, as we have done, a tactical attempt to create the veneer of a 
Vergangenheitsbewdltigung by neatly compressing all past reprehensibility into the 
'throwaway' category of Stalinism; and even though her politics could not be further 
removed from those of Wagenknecht, Dorre sees the KPF as a mere instrument in 
this process: 
In diesem neuen Papier wird die Abkehr von jeglicher Form des Stalinismus 
formuliert. Wieder einmal ... die KPF (soil) jetzt der Brautpreis fur die 
Zusammenarbeit mit der SPD sein. Statt ehrlich und vorbehaltlos einen 
Beitrag zur Aufdeckung der SED Herrschaftsstruktur zu leisten, hoffen Gysi 
und Bisky auf eine Koalition der Vertuscher mit Stolpe und Co. 5 2 
In other words she too perceives an attempt to suggest that by ridding the decision-
making Vorstand of the KPF - widely enframed as the epitome of a vaguely-defined 
and negatively charged Stalinism - the party has purged itself of the "illiberal 
socialism" referred to in the "5 Punkte". 
The evidence suggests that Dorre's view of a tactically motivated articulation of a 
break with Stalinism is not without grounds: there is indeed, as we touched upon 
above, little or no attempt at this time on the part of the pragmatic leadership to 
initiate - or dwell upon - the ultimately problematic question of how Stalinism is to 
5 0Nelken, Michail, "Anderungsantrag IV. 1.4.96. zum Initiativantrag Bisky, Gysi, Modrow zu den 
ftinf wichtigsten Diskussionspunkten der gegenwartigen Debatte in der PDS". In: 4. Parteitag der 
PDS... Arbeitsmaterial fur Delegierte. op. cit. p. 3 
5 , D6rre, op. cit. 
5 2 i b i d . 
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be understood (witness the move to have the "5 Punkte" passed without a discussion 
of motions for amendment; a four-page Anderungsantrag [cited above] on the 
Stalinism issue submitted by Michail Nelken was never discussed). The evidence 
suggests that a problematic debate upon a problematic category would not suit the 
leadership's discursive purposes: 
Was Stalinismus war oder ist, warum die KPF, warum die KPF, oder doch 
zumindest ihre bekannteste Vertreterin, als stalinistisch bezeichnet werden 
konnen, sagen Gysi und seine Mitstreiterinnen und Mitstreiter nicht. Das ist 
auch nicht so wichtig, denn es geht nicht darum, sich mit der Geschichte der 
Sowjetunion und damit der kommunistischen Bewegung im 20. Jahrhundert 
auseinanderzusetzen. Der Begriff Stalinismus funktioniert als Reizwort fur 
das Bose schlechthin, er ist eine Beschworung: Wer damit belegt wird, ist aus 
der Gesellschaft der Demokraten und Demokratinnen ausgeschlossen.53 
For Tolmein, Stalinism is strongly bound up with nationalism and an avoidance of a 
head-on discussion of the category is a means of circumventing, inter alia, the 
problematic 'pro-German' dimension introduced into PDS discourse with the 
candidature of von Einsiedel: 
Die Linien wiirden in diesem Streit wahrscheinlich anders verlaufen, als es 
sich Teile des Partievorstands aus Griinden der eher wahltatksich motivierten 
Parteirason erhoffen - nationalistische Positionen haben gerade in dem eher 
sozialdemokratisch orientierten Fliigel der Partei, wie z.B der Streit um die 
Kandidatur von Graf Einsiedel gezeigt hat, ihren Platz.54 
For Tolmein, the evidence of a 'tactical' use of Stalinismus is compounded by what 
he perceives as a lack of anything particularly 'new' about the positions articulated 
by Wagenkencht at this time. The leadership, he argues, had been familar with much 
the same sentiments from KPF quarters for some years. Commenting on Bisky's in 
the meantime 'notorious' remark about how Sahra Wagenknecht's recent writings 
had made him (Bisky) shudder, Tolmein argues that: 
es (wird) deutlich, daB sich ein aktueller AnlaB fur die Kritik nicht finden 
laBt; er ist allenfalls in den Texten des Jahres 1992 zu suchen. Diese waren 
5 3Dreyer, Klaus: "Gespenster." In: Junge Welt. 23 January 1995 
5 4Tolmein, Oliver: "Verkehrt." In: Junge Welt. 20 January 1995 
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schon beim letzten PDS-Parteitag im Januar 1993 bekannt, als Sahra 
Wagenknecht in den Parteivorstand gewahlt wurde.55 
Tolmein thus identifies a crucial temporal dimension. Indeed, if we look at the 
essential thesis of Sahra Wagenknecht's book 5 6 - that the demise of Socialism begun 
not in 1985 or 1989, but with Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin at the XXth Congress 
of the Soviet Communist Party in 195657 - we can see that the Stalin glorification 
espoused is little different from that of her 1992 writings described by Falkner and 
Huber.58 In a nutshell, Tolmein asks why the PDS should consider delimiting its 
much vaunted pluralism only now, doubtless hinting at the fact that the essential 
'difference' was that the leadership was now stepping up its pro-involvement drive 
following the Sachsen-Anhalt watershed and in the aftermath of the elections in 
which differences had to be played down in order to present a united front. 
Precisely this Pluralismus is invoked in the debate by members of what might be 
called the 'KPF-friendly' camp, who challenge what they recognise as an attempt to 
divest the Vorstand of the KPF as a violation of the PDS's overarching, ideological 
cornerstone. They turn the leadership's argumentation on its head by suggesting that 
if Stalinism is about illiberalism then the leadership is Stalinist in terms of its own 
definition. In the following, Heuer, Sprecher des Parteirates, alludes to the notion of 
'Einheil und ReinheW and to a continuation of SED-style practice in the PDS: 
Den Hauptfeind in den eigenen Reihen auszumachen ist auch eine 
stalinistische Tradition. Wenn man sagt, Stalinismus sei illiberal, dann muB 
ich offen sagen: es gibt illiberale Menschen in der PDS und es gibt illiberales 
Auftreten in der PDS. Es wird gesagt, wer einer bestimmten Ansicht ist, mit 
dem konne man nicht mehr.59 
For Lang, there is no little irony in the invocation of pluralism on behalf of - and 
indeed, he points out, by - the KPF, a faction which elsewhere has consistently been 
on record as questioning the efficacy and desirability of a plurality of world-views: 
Wie ein Treppenwitz mutet es an, daB sich ausgerechnet die 
"Kommunistische Plattform", die heute noch offen einem autoritaren 
5 5 i b id . 
56Wagenknecht, Sahra: Antisozialistische Strategien im Zeitalter der Systemauseinandersetzung. 
Bonn: Pahl-Rugenstein 1995 
5 7Winters, Peter Jochen: "Der PDS-Vorsitzende denkt an Riicktritt." In: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeilung. 14 January 1995 
58Falkner/Huber, esp. pp. 156-9 
5 9cited from: "Der Klassenkampf isl real." op. cit. 
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Staatssozialismus anhangt, ausgegrenzt fiihlte und vehement den 
innerparteilichen Pluralismus einforderte.60 
The 'KPF-friendly' camp, for its part, also proffered a neatly reductive, polarised 
schema of its own, suggesting that a Stalinist is one who espouses the virtues of the 
crimes committed under Stalin's regime as opposed to the virtues of the regime itself. 
Witness the response of 'West-Linke' Bischoff when probed by a journalist as to 
whether journalist whether Sahra Wagenknecht is a Stalinist: 
Nein ich teile diese Position nicht, sie hat auch auf der Vorstandssitzung 
deutlich gesagt, daB sie die unter Stalin begangenen Verbrechen und spater 
die negativen Seiten in keiner Weise schonreden w i l l . 6 1 
This line of argumentation was enframed in the Alternalivvorschlag to the 
'Stalinism' clause proffered by Heuer, who proposed an "UnvereinbarkeitsbeschluB" 
in respect of "Auffassungen, bei denen Verbrechen, die unter dem Regime Stalins 
begangen wurden, gerechtfertigt oder verherrlicht wurden", in respect of which one 
bemused journalist wonders how he can "das Regime Stalins unabhangig von dessen 
Verbrechen betrachten?"62 For Heuer, then, this leaves intact an unsullied 
'traditional' communism, and the class model is perceived as an essential factor in 
party life: 
Der Klassenkampf ist ein Faktor, den es real gibt. Eine Kategorie, die immer 
ein Schliissel war, um viele Dinge zu verstehen, die wirft man nicht einfach 
iiber Bord. 6 3 
By contrast, the leadership is taking on - he feels - that very necessary orthodoxy 'by 
the back door' - by packaging it as, and throwing it away as, Stalinism. Precisely this 
was expressed in Heuer's move at the Parteitag, in conjunction with the KPF, to have 
"qnrikommunistisch" introduced into the list (in These 1) cited above of positions 
incompatible with PDS membership. Initially his motion was carried, although Gysi 
would subsequently manage to persuade delegates to accept an alternative 
formulation, which - in linking the Kommunismus category with a highly 
superordinate, but connotatively and inherently positive key-word (demokratisch) -
amounts to little more than a repackaging of Bisky's "/te/ormkommunisten", and is 
no less difficult to specify semantically: 
6 0 Lang, op. cit., p. 376 
6 1cited from: "Ist Sahra Wagenknecht eine Stalinistin?" op. cit. 
6 2cited from: "Der Klassenkampf ist real." op. cit. 
6 3 i b i d . 
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Als sozialistische Partei kann und darf die PDS nicht antikommunistisch sein. 
Sie ist nicht bereit auf demokratisch-kommunistische Positionen in ihren 
Reihen zu verzichten.64 (my emphases). 
It is hoped that this brief survey of some of the main arguments in the Stalinismus-
Debatte wil l have given a flavour of the sheer level of argumentation generated -
both within the party and without. It is solid evidence that the leadership, whose 
seeming unwillingness to enter into anything more than a very shallow debate upon 
the nature of the substantive core of its 'Stalinism' construct was widely criticised for 
a wealth of differing reasons, was unable to generate anything approaching uniform 
acceptance for its abstract model. Ultimately, the leadership had its way. Sahra 
Wagenknecht was removed from the Vorstand, but it is worth remembering that 
more than 30% of delegates voted in her favour6 5; she failed by a mere one place to 
get on the list of those elected to the Vorstand. Sabine Hartwig 6 6, delegate for 
Weimar, maintained that she had left the conference with the feeling that there was a 
profound sense of dissatisfaction in large sections of the party at Gysi and Bisky's 
having 'pandered' to the establishment by offering the KPF as a 'sacrifice' and at 
their having used forceful means (the threat of resignation from their party posts) to 
push through the "5 Punkte" and make the PDS, in the diction of These 1, 
polilikfdhig. Dorre's observation that: 
Die neue Partei kehrt zur alten Praxis ... Hinter den Kulissen hat Andre Brie 
die Fuhrung der Partei fest in der Hand ... mit ihm hat der damalige 
Parteivorsitzende Gysi sein Schicksal eng verknupft ... Parteivorsitzende 
Bisky fordert Brie jetzt genauso wie Gysi. 6 7 
is one of many picked up on by the right in support of its Moreau-led view of a 
dictatorial PDS leadership (see chapter 2 above). It is worth pointing here, however, 
to the context of Dorre's observation. Her frustration with the party leadership is 
predicated not upon a realisation that it is any less 'democratic' than that of the other 
parties, but rather on the fact that a 'pragmatic' PDS has failed, in her view, to offer 
the 'true* alternative it could have (and as such has itself become guilty of the charge 
it has consistently levelled at the establishment): 
Damit verabschiedet sich die Partei von Nachdenken iiber wirkliche 
Alternativen zum Bestehenden und Vergangenen, uber Utopien, dariiber, wie 
6 4cited in: Lang, op. cit., p. 375 
6 5 Brie , Michael, "Das politische Projekt PDS ..." op. cit., p. 11 
6 6interview with the writer, op. cit. 
6 7D6rre, op. cit. 
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eine wahrhaft alternative Kultur im Unterschied zu parteiublicher Kungelei, 
Machtfixiertheit und parteipolitischer Unterordnung entwickelt werden 
konnte.68 
OVERALL CONCLUSION 
The essential characteristic of an overall 'PDS discourse' could be said to be its 
breadth. Not only do we mean the breadth of the positions we find in that discourse 
(in which, for example, a starkly anti-authoritarian libertarianism (cf. the Junge 
Genosslnneri) co-exists uncomfortably with a hard-line authoritarianism (cf. some of 
the factions inside the KPF), thus yielding a very wide array of different and 
contradictory discourses; the unifying, very public 'super-discourse', too, is 
predicated upon broad, highly superordinate, intensionally minimal terms (of which 
Opposition is a key element), upon broad categories which background natural 
antagonisms and complex causal issues. Where it is a lowest common denominator 
in the attempt to circumvent the problematic intra-party opposition, the notion of 
demokratischer Sozialismus seems to enframe little more than a vaguely - and 
differently perceived - 'unifying' opposition to the new polity, to the here and now. It 
is highly questionable, however, whether that opposition can be neatly and 
unproblematically cast in the mould of subversion widely and persistently proffered 
by Moreau and the right. The process which make up the complex tapestry of life can 
rarely be pressed into absolute models. We have observed that many of the features 
of PDS discourse identified in support of the theory that the party is "antidemocratic" 
and "extremist" (especially its 'tactical' dimension [and here most notably the 
leadership's 'hedging' over its deeply uncomfortable past]) are equally evident in the 
discourse of the 'democrats' of Germany's political establishment. 
The debates at the 4th Parteitag offer clear evidence that by 1995 the PDS is still far 
from having reached a degree of unity beyond a very high level of abstraction; the 
PDS has made virtue from necessity by championing the very plurality which is its 
problem. The 'Stalinism debate' at the 4th Parteitag revealed too that, increasingly, 
this plurality looks in trouble. The sheer breadth of the (unifying) term Opposition, 
obscures, to some extent, the evidence that the party is deeply divided upon the 
fundamental issue of which of the many permutations of opposition to champion 
within a united Germany. 
It is hard, as yet, to find a uniform and viable 'vision' in PDS discourse. The party 
seems far too taken up with brokering compromise, with seeking discursive means to 
6 8 ib id . 
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deal with its problematic factionalism, with presenting different images of itself to 
suit the needs of widely differing target audiences in both East and West. We have 
attempted above to identify some of the discursive formulae which the PDS has 
offered in the attempt to appeal to different target audiences at one and the same 
time. Inter-textually, the evidence is that the party has sought to expedite the task of 
legitimising the party with differing target audiences by a process of 'selective 
filtration', of foregrounding different messages to suit differing immediate aims. This 
filtration can be said to work in two ways: firstly, by giving prominence to particular 
issues and circumventing/backgrounding others relative to the target audience 
concerned: 
Die Politiker von Biindnis 90/Die Griinen, Ludger Volmer und Christiane 
Ziller, stellen ebenfalls eine Zwiespaltigkeit fest: "Die Programmatik der PDS 
ist ein Gemisch aus sozialistischer Rhetorik, sozialdemokratischen 
Ordnungsvorstellungen, linkspopulistischen Forderungen und deutsch-
nationalen Einsprengseln ohne konzeptionelle Verbindung und 
Realisierungsstrategie ... Im Osten will die PDS als Anwaltin der 
Ostinteressen gelten, im Westen dagegen als konsequente Oppositionskraft. 
Beide Anspriiche sind absolut unvereinbar... Die PDS ist der mifilungene 
Versuch, durch Protestphraseologie zwei antagonistisch widerstreitende 
Interesse zum Zwecke der Selbsterhaltung der Organisation unter einem 
Dach zusammenzubringen" (Volmer/Ziller 1994).69 (my italics) 
It comes as little surprise that the West-Zone election magazine targeted towards the 
West Berlin Bezirke discussed in chapter 4 above makes no mention of an East-West 
division, of 'ostalgic' issues, and deals instead with 'pan-German' social issues 
(unemployment etc.) in the way described above. A comparable election newspaper 
catering to an East German electorate in Thiiringen, on the other hand, entitled "94: 
Thiiringen wahlt" features the prominent - and emotive - headline "Ossis zeigt 
Haltung" (my italics) on the front page; the ensuing article cites a Neues Deutschland 
interview with Austrian actor Klaus Lowitsch who is purportedly appalled at West 
German demands upon East Germans.70 Page 5 features an article bearing the 
prominent headline "Sollen etwa Wessis die Wismut sanieren?" (my italics), which 
proceeds to enframe an East -West conflict in emotive language: 
6 9 cited in Brie, Michael: "Das politische Projekt PDS ..." op. cit., p. 27 
7 0 " I c h finde entsetzlich, wie viele Ostdeutsche nach neuer Identitat stochern. Das haben sie nicht 
notig, denn hinter der neuen Identitat verbirgt sich Anpassung an westdeutsche SpieBigkeit." Klaus 
Lowitsch, in: 94: Thiiringen wahlt. Landeswahlkampfburo der PDS Thiiringen 1994 
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Trotz entsprechender sozialer Abforderung fur viele der Kumpel begann ... 
die Frage nach der Zukunft der Wismut (a uranium mine in Thuringia closed 
down at the beginning of January -MD) laut zu werden. Zumal es durch die 
Plattmache des DDR-Anschlufles in der gesamten Region keine nennenswerte 
Industrue mehr gibt ... der Verdacht (wird) immer offenbarer, daB die 4,500 
Wismuter ins Aus gefuhrt werden sollen, um dann einem renommierten 
Westkonzern Platz zu machen fiir das fetle Sanierungsgeschaft.lx (my italics) 
Secondly, the filtration process involves the adapting of the message conveyed to suit 
the needs of the target environment concerned, resulting in permutations ranging 
from a subtle re-working of different messages to out-and-out contradiction. 
Numerous commentators have challenged this selective filtration, offering clear 
evidence of a less-than-universal success: 
Im Westen sagen Sie (Gysi - MD), frank und frei, die DDR sei "zu Recht" 
untergegangen, im Osten erklaren Sie Ihren Wahlern, die DDR sei 
untergegangen, weil sie "nicht sozialistisch genug" war, die Bemerkung "zu 
Recht" verkneifen Sie sich. 7 2 
On the one hand we find the PDS, as above, in 'AnschluB' mode: 
Die groBen Chancen der Vereinigung der beiden deutschen Staaten wurden 
durch Beitritt und AnschluB bewuBt zerstort. ... Die bislang letzte groBe 
Stunde der Politik in der Bundesrepublik war 1989/90. Es war die blinde 
Politik des Anschlusses um jeden Preis ... Es war Nichtpolitik. Sie hat eine 
GroBteil jener Chancen zerstort, die wieder einmal durch und fur Menschen in 
Deutschland entstanden waren . . . 7 3 
Statt gleichberechtigter Einigung erfolgte der Beitritt der DDR zur 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, aus dem ein bloBer AnschluB wurde. 
Emanzipatorische Moglichkeiten der Vereinigung wurden verspielt.14 (my 
emphases) 
While the PDS-led Gerechtigkeitskomitees had told East Germans that the unification 
process was the root of all evil, we compare this message with the seemingly 
7 1 ibid., p. 5 
7 2 Broder, Hendryk: "Der begabteste Schwindler." In: Die Woche. 13 January 1995 
7 3 G y s i : Ingolstddter Manifest, op. cit., pp. 2, 7 
7 4Parteivorstand der PDS: "lOThesen ..." op. cit., p. 23 
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contradictory message conveyed by a pragmatic leadership to a fairly closed circle of 
party members and sympathisers75 in Neues Deutschland only a few months earlier: 
Mit dem Ende der DDR ist Sozialismus in Deutschland erst moglich 
geworden ... Wer sich heute gegen die Einheit stellt verhalt sich reaktionar. 
Die Linke muB endlich die deutsche Einheit als emanzipatorischen Impuls (! -
MD) aufnehmen ... Mit "Deutschland halt's Maul" aber ist kein 
demokratischer Staat zu machen ...>76 (my emphases) 
The accusation of contradictoriness might, of course, be challenged by pointing to 
the indeterminate nature of "emanzipatorische Moglichkeiten wurden verspielt", 
which will bear a reading whereby not all emancipatory possibilities were called into 
question. The PDS might argue, too, that the "emancipatory impulse" message is a 
logical extension of its consistent 'synergist' message. We observe, here however, a 
crucial transfer of emphasis: unification is now re-cast as the positive basis per se for 
developing what the PDS wishes to achieve, not as a (rather unsolid) means for 
gradually moving towards it. These tenuous counter-claims apart, it is interesting that 
the decision to re-cast unification as an emancipatory process comes within the 
context of the Einsiedel debate touched upon above; here the immediate discursive 
aim seems to have been to justify to the party faithful the incorporation into the party 
of the proudly and avowedly pro-German, West (!) German von Einsiedel at a time, 
in the crucial pre-election period, in which party pragmatists had to consider ways -
as we saw above- of potentially appealing to a pan-German audience. To many on 
the lef t 7 7 this has been viewed as an inexcusably opportunist means of pandering -
via a potent symbol of German aristocracy - to nationalist sentiment in the attempt to 
draw a vaguely defined 'protest' vote from factions further to the right of the political 
spectrum. 
1m "Stern" hat Gysi gesagt "die Klugeren unter unseren Gegnern werden 
irgendwann anerkennen, daB die PDS die bessere Art ist, den Protest 
einzufangen", weil die Leute dann nicht Republikaner wahlten.78 
The notional common category of "protest" is invoked, too, by Andre Brie: 
7 5 "Ihre (the PDS's -MD) interne Kommunikationsstuktur ist relativ gut ausgebaut. Mit der Zeitschrift 
DISPUT, dem Pressedienst und vor allem der Tageszeitung Neues Deutschland, die primar von PDS-
Mitgliedern bzw. Sympathisanten gelesen wird, ist sie in der Lage parteiweite Diskussionen zu 
fuhren." Brie M.: "Das politische Projekt PDS ..." op. cit., p. 34. (my italics) 
7 6Bisky/Brie/Gohde/Gysi/Lederer: "Borniertheit erneut als politische Kategorie?" op. cit. 
7 7 see for example, the comments of Ebermann et al. In: "Dem deutschen Volke dienen." In: Konkret. 
no. 8. July 1994 (interview with Andre Brie, Thomas Ebermann et al.) 
7 8 Hermann L . Gremliza in: Konkret. ibid. 
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Wir wollen Protestwahler, ... nicht nur diejenigen ... die bewuBt links 
wahlen, sondern auch die, die einfach die Schnauze voll haben, bei denen die 
Gefahr besteht, daB sie Republikaner wahlen. Wir wollen keine rechten 
Wahler. Aber die Protestwahler wollen wir schon. Das tun wir nicht indent 
wir uns nationalistisch anbiedern.19 (my italics) 
The furious inner-party polemic upon the Einsiedel question and the wealth of 
accusations of opportunism levelled at the leadership show many in the party to be in 
some disagreement with Brie. Challenged by Ebermann et al. upon the 'new' 
position, Brie invokes a necessary fatalism: 
Mann muBte diese Einheit annehmen und von ihr ausgehend 
emanzipatorische Politik machen.80 
in which Ebermann perceives clear evidence of a - to use his words - "taktisches 
Geschleime"81: 
Da steht "als emanzipatorischen Impuls annehmen", nicht: als ScheiBe^  die 
man nicht andern kann8 2 
The ideological centre's 'new' pragmatism over German unification makes clear two 
important dimensions which, as we have sought to highlight throughout, must be 
grafted on to any model of PDS discourse: 
1) the parteiinterner/parteiexterner context. Observe how the (tactical?) 
encouragement of a more positive pro-German stance is presented with the narrower 
ranks of the party faithful and clashes with the sentiments, widely propagated in the 
public arena (particularly in the East), as to the 'juggernaut' nature of unification. 
Likewise, as we observed above, the leadership's public display of solidarity with its 
KPF takes on a very different perspective when we read of the behind-the-scenes 
differences described by Falkner and Huber. 
2) the temporal perspective: the re-casting of unification in this crucial pre-election 
period came at a time which for many offers evidence a telling tactical motivation. 
Interestingly, we observe that the leadership's return to a view of unification as anti-
emnacipatory in the post-election 10 Thesen came at a time when electoral successes 
7 9 Andre Brie, ibid. 
8 0 Andre Brie, ibid. 
8 'Ebermann, ibid. 
8 2 Ebermann, ibid. 
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had already been secured. The latter speak insistently of an overweening 
Grojideutschland and Grofimannssucht. 
An inextricable element in the overall picture is the discursive environment in which 
utterances are made: in other words, is the environment in which a text is proffered 
one which requires the text to maintain, for example, a form preserving (at least the 
veneer of) a 'sober', rational and objective treatment of a particular issue or set of 
issues (as in the case of an article in a serious academic journal), or is it one such as, 
say, an electoral rally, whose attendant circumstances more readily allow emotive 
and/or crude oratory. (There is, of course, all manner of complex gradations in-
between.) 
The emotive Anschlufi and related concepts can be seen to be particularly in evidence 
in emotionally charged environments such as the following extract from a 
Bundestag-speech given by an embattled Gysi facing a barrage of hostile 
interjections: 
Deutschland hatte gerade im letzten Jahr groGe Chancen, die samtlich vertan 
wurden: statt Vereinigung mit der DDR ihr Anschlufi mit einer sich in alien 
Bereichen verbreitenden BesatzermentalitatP (my italics) 
The 'AnschluB' sentiments are equally in evidence in the emotive Thuringian 
electoral newspaper article cited above. On the other hand in a serious, politological 
contribution84 to the (West-Berlin) Kursbuch, requiring a 'balanced' treatment of 
thesis and antithesis a la Bortfelt, Gysi offers an unemotive picture of how "Die 
Vereinigung Deutschlands"85 (my italics) could have been achieved in away which 
was "chancenreicher" for East Germans. This article foregrounds the GDR's lack of 
social and economic achievement, offers an acknowledgement of a "diktatorisch (! -
MD) gefuhrten Gemeinwesen(s) DDR", a "Defizit an Demokratie", the fact that 
"1961 muBte dieser Staat seine Burger einmauern, weil sie ihm wegliefen", a "Manko 
an Lebensqualitat" and the observation that "Eine Gesundung der Volkswirtschaft 
der DDR ware ein auBerst langwieriger ProzeB gewesen mit gravierenden 
Einschnitten im sozialen Bereich".86 (Compare Gysi's earlier observation, cited above 
that "selbst ein so scharfer Kritiker der Verhaltnisse in der DDR wie Robert 
8 3 "Rede des PDS-Vorsitzenden im Deutschen Bundestag am 17.01.1991." In: Die Waffen nieder. 
Berlin: Parteivorstand der PDS 1991 
8 4 G y s i : "Letzte Ausfahrt Sozialismus." op. cit. 
8 5 ib id . , p. 155 
8 6 ib id . , p. 151 
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Havemann erklarte, im besseren Deutschland zu leben"87.); contrast this with, on the 
other hand, the following extract from an emotive speech given by Gysi on East 
Berlin's Alexanderplatz shortly before the elections to the Berliner 
Abgeordnetenhaus in 1995, which foregrounds the GDR's social achievements: 
Im Herbst 1989 haben viele von uns gehofft, daB wir den entsetzlichen 
Fahnenappellen in den Kinderferienlagern loswerden, aber viele von uns 
haben nicht gewuBt, daB sie das Kinderferienlager gleich mit loswerden; so 
war das auch nicht gedacht, denn das war eine vernunftige soziale 
Einrichtung und da konnen wir viele andere Beispiele nennen.88 (Note again 
the polarised picture: no attempt is made to dwell on the problematic 
interdependence of Fahnenappell and Ferienlager [with its decidedly military 
connotations!] - MD.) 
PDS discourse is a highly complex quasi-cubist model of differing perspectives, as 
the party strives to legitimise itself broadly. For many it offers evidence of a high 
degree of tactical opportunism. Given that PDS utterances offer 'something for 
everyone' it is easy for the right, with Moreau leading the vanguard, to select only 
those perspectives which can be pressed into its simplistic extremism-model. It is 
hoped that the present work has gone some way towards alerting the reader to the 
pitfalls of such an approach. 
8 7 see chapter 1, footnote 254 
8 8 Extract from speech given by Gysi on 20 October 1995 at an electoral rally preceding the elections 
to the Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus. Taped by the author. 
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